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AMONG the many lucid and valuable conceptions that have been given to the world by the French thinker Auguste Comte, whose name, we believe, is now tolerably familiar to most British readers, one of the most serviceable is his classification of the Sciences. Taking for his principle of arrangement that of proceeding from the more general and simple onward to the more special and complex, M. Comte classifies the sciences or possible departments of human knowledge in the following order :—Mathematics ; Astronomy ; General Physics ; Chemistry ; Biology, or the science of individual organized beings, (subdivided into the two branches of Vegetable and Animal Physiology, of the latter of which the whole science of the human mind constitutes, in M. Comte's scheme, only a prolongation or ap-

pendage, under the form of a special investigation into the cerebral functions of the animal Man ;) and Sociology, or the science of human society. This arrangement of the sciences according to their natural relations, coincides, M. Comte affirms, with the order of their historical discovery and development ; and it ought also, he thinks, to be adopted as the proper order of study in a course of general education. At the present day, he thinks, only the first four sciences of the series—Mathematics, Astronomy, General Physics, and Chemistry—have been overtaken by the scientific spirit, and subjected to scientific methods,—the two last, indeed, being but recent acquisitions of the human intellect ; Biology is still an unorganized medley, in which, though the scientific spirit has entered upon it, and is daily effecting the most powerful reductions amid its phenomena, all sorts of superstitious and unscientific notions still prevail : and lastly, Sociology, the mere conception of which as a possible science is but an event of yesterday, exists yet only as a hope, a prediction, a blank space chalked out by anticipation for the speculative labours of the future.

This is not the place for a thorough criticism of the foregoing classification of the sciences. Such a criticism would involve a rigorous representation of the whole battle between that system of so-called positive philosophy of which M. Comte is the advocate, and which resolves all human knowledge back into the one element of sensuous or external experience, and that other, and we believe truer system, which, assuming as its first axiom the radical distinction between man and the conditions in which he finds himself, seeks in the original and independent structure of the human mind itself the warrants of a higher certainty, and the necessary measure and predetermined form of all possible experience. Such an argument we would willingly attempt on a fitting occasion, but it is beyond our present purpose ; and we forego it the more readily, because we know that in the city where these pages shall first see the light a hundred swords will have already leapt from their scabbards at the mere prospect of a skirmish in the hereditary metaphysic cause. Accepted, however, with due limitations, the classification of the sciences proposed by M. Comte will be found of admirable use ; we perceive that it is already gaining ground in quarters where its origin is either unknown or concealed ; and without the slightest fear that good money will turn into slate-stones in our possession because it may have been obtained from a suspicious source, we feel convinced that we cannot better usher in the conception of Sociology as a possible science, than by calling attention to the place it holds relatively to other sciences in the scheme of the thinker who has announced its advent most formally, and written on it most largely.

The word *Sociology* is a convenient barbarism coined by M. Comte, and objectionable only as being a hybrid between the Latin and the Greek. Among the synonymous names are these—the Social Science, the Science of Society, Social Physics, Political Science, Historical Science, the Science of History. The general idea involved in all these phrases is essentially this:—All the phenomena of society, all the events and movements that occur in communities of human beings, take place in accordance with fixed natural laws; every community, however large it may be, however heterogeneous its composition, and however discordant the aims of its members, is yet borne along in a regular inwardly determined path or career; nay, the life of the human race as a whole, all calamities, wars, and national vicissitudes included, is but one grand and divinely pre-arranged evolution, pervaded by a huge intention, and leading to a definite result. From this description of the Social science it will be seen that it is properly placed by M. Comte as the last in the series of the sciences. Should any one, admitting the title of Mathematics, Astronomy, General Physics, and Chemistry to rank as sciences, deny the possibility of a Biological Science, at least in its higher departments, on the ground that the fact of life or free-will interposes a gulf, impassable to any scientific method, between the domain of matter and that of mind, such a person must *a fortiori* deny the possibility of a Social science; and, on the other hand, whosoever admits a psychological science, or science of the mental phenomena of individual human beings, to be possible, must see that its relation to its theoretical successor, the Social science, is that of the less to the more complex, and that as Psychology proper presupposes the conclusions of Physiology, Physiology those of Chemistry, Chemistry those of General Physics, General Physics those of Astronomy, and Astronomy those of Mathematics, so the conclusions of Psychology, together with those of the whole preceding series, must be carried forward as a contribution to the Social science, there to be combined with new elements, and treated to a higher elaboration.

The idea of the resistless progress of human affairs in a certain determined path is one which, in some form or other, has existed in every age. To the religious mind, especially, it has at all times been familiar. The ancient Pagan nations, when they fancied the interests of special communities to be under the care of special tutelary deities, entertained a notion the effect of which was in some degree scientific, inasmuch as it taught them to believe that a hidden unity and meaning underlay all the perplexing phenomena of visible history. Indeed, from the very nature of the object-matter of the Social science, the scientific aspiration must have manifested itself there long before it can

have entered on the domain of the later sciences of the inorganic series. From the beginning of the world social phenomena, such as wars, laws, and revolutions, have been among the most obvious and interesting objects of human attention ; whereas the materials of the mechanical and chemical sciences have been dug slowly into light one by one, and have never stood forth in attractive accumulation before the common gaze. Hence, curiously enough, the aspiration after a science of history is at least as old as the beginnings of astronomical science. While as yet Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology slumbered in the bosom of the earth, the heavenly luminaries wheeled their silent courses in the conspicuous vault above ; and no sooner had men ascertained something regarding their times and revolutions, than, hastening to connect these brilliant motions of the upper concave with the only others that rivalled them in extent and visibility, namely, the motions of men on the subjacent plane of earth, they sought to involve both in a single system, so that the little knowledge they had gained of the one might serve also in lieu of a science of the other. Although, therefore, in the order of strict development, Sociology may be the last of the sciences, it existed in conception, and as an attempt, almost before any of the others.

Familiar to the religious mind in all ages, the idea of a resistless and determinate progress in human affairs has, of course, been specially familiar, and in a far higher form, to the Christian intellect. Two forms, we think, may be distinguished, in which the fundamental religious doctrine of a Divine Providence as pervading history has been developed in Christian philosophy. The first is the theory of general optimism, according to which the notion that all is for the best is superadded to the radical notion that all is predetermined. But however irresistibly this theory may recommend itself to the religious mind in the sense in which it was propounded by Leibnitz, namely, as applicable to the whole finished rhythm of the Divine procedure, to the universal series of ages and worlds, to assume it as true in that more restricted sense in which alone it could furnish the organizing principle of the Social science, namely, as predicable of this world by itself, would be quite unwarrantable. The idea, indeed, of a purely terrestrial optimism—the idea that this world has been necessarily arranged so as to contain within itself all the elements of a full and pacific solution, is at present, especially in the hands of a certain school of sentimentalists, one of the most notable impediments in the way of a sound and healthy philosophy. Far more fit to perform the function of a leading conception in the Social science, and at the same time far more peculiarly Christian in its character, is that other form of the great idea of Providence which sees in all history but one con-

tinuous evolution of the Divine scheme for the redemption of a fallen race. Although this view has been necessarily present in the really Christian mind of all ages, and although so celebrated a writer as Jonathan Edwards devoted one of his treatises to a special elaboration of it, the full apprehension of it by Christian thinkers, and even by Church-historians, seems to be an event hardly yet completed. Hence the continued prevalence of the distinction between sacred and profane history—a distinction proceeding, it is true, on certain important considerations, but the inordinate recognition of which has been very injurious. Even the similar distinction between ancient and modern history, though conventionally far more necessary, carries with it a mischievous effect.

But, though religious faith in general, and the Christian theology in particular, had thus from the beginning prescribed a mode of looking at history which was tantamount, had the fact been perceived, to the instauration of history as a possible science, the effective and detailed conception of such a science as a department of real knowledge was only practicable at an advanced point in the natural career of progressive human culture.

"The condition of politics," says Mr. Mill, "was until very lately, and has scarcely even yet ceased to be, that which Bacon animadverted on, as the natural state of the sciences while their cultivation is abandoned to practitioners; not being carried on as a branch of speculative inquiry, but only with a view to the exigencies of daily practice, and the *fructifera experimenta* therefore being aimed at, almost to the exclusion of the *lucifera*. Such was medical investigation before physiology and natural history began to be cultivated as branches of general knowledge. The only questions examined were, what diet is wholesome? or what medicine will cure some given disease? without any previous systematic inquiry into the laws of nutrition, and of the healthy and morbid action of the different organs, on which laws the effect of any diet or medicine must evidently depend. And in politics the questions which engaged general attention were similar:—Is such an enactment, or such a form of government, beneficial or the reverse, either universally or to some particular community? without inquiry into the general conditions by which the operation of legislative measures, or the effects produced by forms of government, are determined. . . . No wonder that, when the phenomena of society have so rarely been contemplated in the point of view characteristic of science, the philosophy of society should have made little progress—should contain few general propositions sufficiently precise and certain for common inquirers to recognise in them a scientific character. The vulgar notion accordingly is, that all pretension to lay down general truths on politics and society is quackery; that no universality and no certainty are attainable "in

such matters. What partly excuses this common notion is, that it is really not without foundation in one particular sense. A large proportion of those who have laid claim to the character of philosophic politicians, have attempted, not to ascertain universal sequences, but to frame universal precepts. They have had some one form of government, or system of laws, to fit all cases ; a pretension well meriting the ridicule with which it is treated by practitioners, and wholly unsupported by the analogy of the art to which, from the nature of its subject, that of politics must be most nearly allied. No one now supposes it possible that one remedy can cure all diseases, or even the same disease in all constitutions and habits of body."—*Mill's Logic*, vol. ii. pp. 449-451.

It is not difficult to account for the circumstance that this practical denial in detail of the possibility of a science of history has co-existed all along with that speculative assent to the possibility of such a science which is involved in the belief in a Divine Providence. The notion that all history is regulated by, and representative of, a divine purpose, might very well exist, and yet the notion that this purpose is immanent in history in the form of general laws, indissolubly inwrought through its very matter, might very well be wanting. But precisely in this latter notion lies the essence of the conception, so far as any devout Theist can entertain it, that history may be prosecuted as one of the inductive sciences. The conception of a Social science cannot be entertained at all by any one who has a true faith in God's existence; unless the grand primary notion of "the hand of God in history" is strictly reconcilable with the notion that the historic evolution, complex as it is, is carried on through the medium of what are called laws. Instead of a reconciliation, indeed, between the two notions, M. Comte and his school contend for the absolute transmutation of the one into the other ; the idea of general laws being, according to them, only the matured expression of what was formerly conceived under the notion of supernatural activity, which notion, therefore, is already being gradually disintegrated, and is doomed, they say, to ultimate evanescence, according as the expression into which it has been translated is efficiently extended out of the simpler into the more complex departments of human experience. But no one will fear this omen whose philosophy is faithful enough and profound enough to see how the idea of Deity may be retained, and intellectually required and exulted in, even in that field from which it is declared by the thinkers in question to have been irrecoverably banished—the field of astronomical science. He in whose mind the study of the *mécanique céleste* has produced such all-sufficing comfort as to make the idea of Divine energy rationally unnecessary in the contemplation of the stars and planets, has assu-

redly very little religion left to be lost in speculations on men and peoples.

Among the conditions that were necessary to the full conception of history as a possible science, and the want of which postponed that conception till a date comparatively so recent, M. Comte specifies two—a sufficient base of social phenomena from which to generalize; and a sufficient prior cultivation of the scientific spirit, and accumulation of scientific conclusions, by research in the field of the simpler sciences. Neither of these conditions, he thinks, was adequately fulfilled prior to the commencement of the eighteenth century. Thinkers who lived before that time neither had a sufficiently large or competently recorded range of past time wherein to prosecute their explorations, nor were they sufficiently trained in the inorganic and physiological sciences to know how to conduct their explorations in a hopeful manner. Acquiescing in this characteristic and just remark, we would call attention more expressly to one particular condition virtually involved in the second of those mentioned by M. Comte, the realization of which has, in our opinion, contributed enormously to the development of the conception of a Social science. We have often fancied that a most interesting essay might be written on the effects produced on human thought, both in the general and in individual minds, by the first thorough apprehension of the notion that the earth is not a plane, but a measurable globe. The effects of the gradual growth of this notion in the mind of the race as a whole have been immense; and much of the entire intellectual difference between the ancients and the more recent moderns may be summed up as consisting in the fact that this notion, unknown or very slightly apprehended by the former, has been familiar to the latter. Moreover, we would almost assert that the degree and constancy with which this notion is present in individual minds, may be taken as a test and measure of their comparative intellectual generality. All great modern poets, such as Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, and Goethe, have had this astronomical notion present in their minds in such a degree and so continually, that it may be said to have constituted one of the habitual forms of their thought. Thus, Shakespeare—

“Strike flat the thick rotundity o’ the world.”

Nor is it difficult to see, in particular, how this notion stands related to the development of Social science. The cardinal conception of such a science is the conception of humanity as a whole; and although minds of metaphysic reach, or minds that Christian doctrine had taught to rise above the idea of nationality, might be able to compass this conception, even while con-

tinuing to imagine the human race as the dispersed tenants of an undefined earth, yet the conception could be grasped firmly and familiarly only after the imagination had learned to picture the race as the living freight of a ponderable and moving ball, eight thousand miles, or thereby, in diameter. Nay, as by the increase of our mechanical means for locomotion, and for the rapid intercommunication between different parts of the earth, mankind at large are becoming more familiar with this conception of the physical form and limitation of our planet, it may be observed that the cardinal notion of the Social science is even now continually gaining force.

Pascal seems very distinctly to have apprehended this cardinal conception, as we have called it, of the science of history. "The entire succession of men," he said, "during the long series of ages, ought to be considered as a single individual, subsisting for ever, and continually learning." It is now admitted, however, that the merit of having first expounded the possibility of a social science, and of having first attempted to lay the speculative foundations of such a science, belongs to the illustrious Italian philosopher, Giovanni Battista Vico, who was born at Naples in the year 1668, and died, after an active, though not very happy life, in the year 1744. After having distinguished himself by various ingenious writings, Vico, in the year 1725, or when he was fifty-seven years of age, published his greatest work, the *Scienza Nuova*, under the following title—"Principles of a New Science, relative to the Common Nature of Nations, whereby may be discovered New Principles of Natural Law." To this work, the confused and fragmentary form of which caused it to be neglected for many years, the attention of scholars has recently been directed with considerable interest, chiefly, we believe, from the fact that two of the most important trains of speculation that have occupied the learned world during the last century—namely, the speculation as to the origin of the Homeric poems, and the personality or non-personality of Homer; and the speculation as to the authenticity or non-authenticity of early Roman history—are to be found there distinctly propounded. In the one speculation Vico seems to have anticipated Wolf; in the other Niebuhr. These brilliant anticipations, however, constituting together, as they do, almost a complete prevision of the modern theory of the Mythos, are but episodes in the development of the main doctrine of Vico's work, which is this: That, as the idea of the material world existed in the Divine mind before the creation of that world, and is now carried out by means of material laws; so there pre-existed in the Divine mind an eternal idea of human history, which idea is similarly carried out in the actual course of events. It is to the investi-

gation of this great subject that he invites attention, with the bold but perfectly just assertion, that in doing so he is installing "a new science." The manner in which he proceeds, 'proves that he meant to place the new science strictly under the guardianship of ordinary scientific methods, as these were then understood, not excepting the recently promulgated Baconian rule. He opens the work by laying down a base of material in the form of a chronological table of the events of ancient history as far as the second Punic war, and by enumerating, in connexion with it, certain axioms or general truths, by the application of which conclusions may be arrived at; after which he launches into an exposition of his own historical generalizations. An extract or two, quoted from Michelet's French translation of the work, will give a notion of its style and tenor.

"In default of knowing the *true*, men strive to arrive at the *certain*, to the end that, if the *intelligence* may not be satisfied by *science*, the *will* may at least repose on *conscience*.

"*Philosophy* contemplates the *reason*, whence comes the *science of the true*; *philology* studies the acts of human liberty, whence follows *authority*; and it is from this that there arises the *conscience of the certain*. We comprehend, therefore, under the name of philologists, all the grammarians, the historians, and the critics, who occupy themselves with the knowledge of *languages* and of *facts*, (as much the *internal* facts of the history of peoples, such as laws and usages, as the *external* facts, such as wars, treaties of peace and alliance, commerce, and travels.) The same axiom shews us that the philosophers have stopped half-way, in neglecting to give to their *reasonings* a *certitude* drawn from the *authority* of the philologists, and that the philologists have fallen into the same fault in neglecting to give to facts the character of *truth* which they would have received from *philosophic reasonings*. Had philosophers and philologists avoided this double error, they would have been more useful to society, and they would have anticipated us in the search after this new science.

"The study of the acts of human liberty, so uncertain by nature, derives its certitude and determination from the *common sense* applied by men to human *needs* or *uses*—a double source of the natural law of nations.

"The *common sense* is a judgment without reflection, participated by a whole order, a whole people, a whole nation, or the whole human race. This axiom will open up to us a new critic relative to the *authors of peoples*, who must have preceded by more than a thousand years the *authors of books*, with whom criticism hitherto has exclusively occupied itself.

"Uniform ideas born among peoples unknown to each other, must have a common ground of truth. A great principle this, according to which the common understanding of the human race is the criterium indicated by Providence for determining what is certain in the natural law of nations! This *certitude* is arrived at by knowing

the unity, the essence of this law, to which all nations conform with diverse modifications. The same axiom forecloses all the ideas that have been formed hitherto regarding the natural law of nations; a law which, according to the common opinion, must have come forth out of some one nation in order to be transmitted to all others. This error has been made predominant by the vanity of the Egyptians and the Greeks, who, if we are to believe themselves, have diffused civilisation over the world. It was a natural consequence of this opinion, that the law of the Twelve Tables was represented as having come to Rome from Greece. Thus civil law must have been communicated to other peoples by a purely human arrangement; and there would have been no law planted by Divine Providence in the nature, in the manners, of humanity at large, and ordained by it as binding among all nations! We shall not cease in this work to strive to demonstrate that the natural law of nations has its birth in each people in particular, without any one of them having any knowledge of the others; and that, consequently, on the occasion of wars, embassies, alliances, treaties of commerce, this law has been recognised as common to the whole human race.

"The nature of things consists in this, that the things happen in certain circumstances, and in certain manners. Let circumstances present themselves the same, things will happen the same and not different."—*Scienza Nuova*, Book i. ch. 2, secs. 9-14.

"The human mind naturally loves uniformity. This axiom applied to legends depends on an observation. Let a man be famous for good or evil, the popular mind will not fail to place him in such or such a circumstance, and to invent in his behalf fables in harmony with his character—*lies in fact*, doubtless, but *truths in idea*, since the public only imagines what is analogous to reality. Let one reflect, and one will find that the *poetically true* is the *metaphysically true*, and that whatever of the *physically true* is not conformable thereto ought to pass for false. The true captain, for example, is the Godfrey of Tasso; all those who do not wholly conform to this model merit not the name of captain. A consideration important in the science of poetry!"—*Ibid.*, sec. 47.

"The vanity of nations, each of which wishes to be considered the most ancient of all, deprives us of the hope of finding the principles of the new science in the writings of philologists; and the vanity of savans, who will have it that their favourite sciences had reached perfection from the commencement of the world, prevents us from seeking them in the works of philosophers; we will follow our researches, therefore, as if books did not exist. But in this dark night, in which the most remote antiquity is shrouded from our eyes, there appears a light which cannot lead us wrong. I speak of this incontestable truth: *The social world is certainly the work of men*, whence it results that its principles can and ought to be found in the modifications of human intelligence themselves. This admitted, will not every reflecting man be astonished that philosophers have seriously attempted to understand the *world of nature*, which God has made, and whereof

He has reserved the science to Himself, and have neglected to meditate on that *social world* which men can understand, inasmuch as it is their own work? . . . Since *the social world is the work of men*, let us examine in what they are agreed, and will always agree. It is thence that we shall derive *the principles which explain how all societies form, and how they maintain themselves*—principles universal and eternal, as those of every science ought to be.”—*Scienza Nuova*, Book i. ch. 3.

“The new science will, in one of its principal aspects, be a *civil theology of the Divine Providence*, a thing which seems till now to have been wanting. Philosophers have either entirely misconceived Providence, as the Stoics and the Epicureans did, or have considered it solely in the physical order of things. They bestow the name of *natural theology* on the metaphysic in which they study this attribute of God, and they rest their reasonings on observations drawn from the *material world*; but it was, above all, in *the economy of the civil world* that they ought to have sought their proofs of Providence. The new science will be, so to speak, a *demonstration in fact, a historical demonstration, of Providence*; inasmuch as it ought to be a history of the decrees by which this Providence has governed, without the knowledge of men, and often in spite of them, the grand corporation of the human race. Although this world has been created *particularly*, and *in time*, the laws that have been given to it are not the less *universal and eternal*. . . . In the whole series of possible things, can our spirit imagine causes more numerous, less numerous, or other than those of which the social world is the product? . . . In order to find the so-called nature of things as regards human affairs, the new science proceeds by a *severe analysis of the thoughts of men relative to the needs or uses of the social life, which are the two sources of the natural law of nations*. Thus considered under the second of its principal aspects, the new science is a *history of human ideas*, in accordance with which it appears that *the metaphysic of the human mind* should proceed. If it is true that *the sciences ought to commence at the same point where their subject (object-matter) has commenced*, metaphysics, this queen of the sciences, commences at the epoch when men set themselves to think *humanly*, and not at that when philosophers set themselves to reflect on human ideas. In order to determine the epoch and the place in which these ideas had their birth, in order to give to their history the certitude which it ought to derive from the *metaphysical chronology and geography* proper to them, the new science applies a similarly *metaphysical criticism* to the founders, the *authors of nations*; who preceded, by more than a thousand years, the *authors of books*, with whom philological criticism has hitherto occupied itself. The criterium of which it makes use, is that which the Divine Providence has taught equally to all nations, namely, *the common understanding of the human race*, determined by the necessary convenience of human affairs themselves. It is for this reason that the sort of proof on which we principally lean is, that, such laws having been established by Providence, the destiny of nations *must have followed, still does, and always will*, follow the course indicated by the new science, even

were an infinite number of worlds to arise during eternity—a hypothesis indubitably false. In this manner the new science traces the eternal circle of an *ideal history*, in which *the histories of all nations in time* revolve, with their birth, their progress, their decline, and their termination. . . . What history more certain than that in which the same person is at once the actor and the historian? Thus the new science proceeds precisely after the manner of geometry, which at once creates and contemplates the ideal world of magnitudes; but the new science has as much more of reality, as the laws which regulate human affairs have, than mere points, lines, surfaces, and figures. This shews that the proofs, whereof we have spoken, are of a *divine* species, and that they ought, O reader, to give thee a *divine* pleasure, for with God to know and to do are the same thing.”—*Scienza Nuova*, Book i. ch. 4.

From these extracts, in which we have purposely preserved the original italics, it will be seen how powerfully Vico had grasped the conception of the new science. The expressions he uses are, it will be observed, somewhat hazy and obsolete, and his book is, on the whole, rather a medley of thoughts and fancies, pervaded by a central idea, than a coherent treatise; but we doubt if there are not things in Vico with which the intellect, even of our own time, has not yet fully come up. We doubt, for example, if even yet our thinkers could furnish a deeper summary of the truths on which the Social science proceeds, than that which may be condensed from the foregoing passages of the *Scienza Nuova*; to wit, that human nature is a substance, so to speak, possessing certain essential properties and attributes, like any other substance to which men give a name; that wherever it is, therefore, human nature will, if the conditions are similar, yield similar manifestations; that, consequently, separate nations commencing the career of civilisation at the same time, or from the same point, would necessarily, and without any communication with each other, go through stages similar in the main; that the true power whereby this social life, this development of human nature in the mass, is advanced, is to be sought for primarily, not in the books of writers, but in the popular and universal sense of mankind, the *sapienza volgare*, the general social heart; that what the generality of the human race feels to be just is *de facto* the rule of the social life; that the manner in which this rule acts for the evolution of history, is by the concentration, conscious or unconscious, of the common understanding or sense of mankind on general human needs and uses as they arise; and that the career which humanity thus actually works out for itself, is the fulfilment of the ideal scheme of history which pre-existed in the Divine mind.

It is only necessary to describe farther what was Vico's own conclusion as to the nature of the path in which humanity ad-

vances; in other words, what was his theory of history. Confining himself at first to the ancient world, the scheme of which he had laid down at the outset in his chronological table as a base of speculation, he defines the course of ancient history among all the nations usually considered under that head, as having consisted of three ages or states of being—first, a divine or theocratic age; next, a heroic or poetical age; and lastly, a human or consciously rational age. In the first age, all the manifestations of human activity were characterized by the prevalence of the religious mode of thought alone and by itself—laws and governments were theocratic, manners and customs were acts of worship, judicial trials were appeals to the divinity, even language was hieroglyphic; in the second age, the heroic mode of thought dominated—hence aristocratic governments, feudal customs, metaphorical or poetical language, &c.; and lastly, in the human age, the procedure of which is consciously rational, come monarchical or democratic governments, civilized social usages, and language either scientific or scientifically directed. Such, Vico says, is the true generalization of the course of history, as exhibited in the ancient nations. Now, his theory is, that modern history is essentially a repetition of this process; that is to say, that the destruction of the Roman civilisation by the northern races was, as it were, a reduction of human society back to its beginnings in primary chaos, and that the progress of the modern nations since, has been essentially an advance in the career of the three stages—the divine, the heroic, and the human. In other words, Vico's theory or representation of history is that of a recurring cycle or curve, repeating itself indefinitely, in each case presenting distinctly the same succession of stages. Society, according to him, is a phoenix, periodically destroyed, and periodically arising out of its own ashes.

Though not deficient in a certain superficial plausibility, and though possibly containing a fund of real truth, which may be effectively absorbed into a higher view, this conclusion of Vico as to the nature of the path in which the human race necessarily advances, is certainly a failure in the supreme sense in which it is promulgated, and far less worthy of commemoration than the fine prior speculations on which it is founded. Accordingly, in the progress of the conception of a Social science since Vico's time, his special theory of the law of the historic movement has almost disappeared, perhaps without having received a sufficient appreciation of what is really substantial in it. His general views, however, have gradually gained ground in the speculative world, though at a rate so slow as to prove his wonderful forwardness as a thinker. To trace the development of his main conception systematically, from the publication of the *Scienza Nuova* to the

present time, is impossible here; we can but indicate the points that seem most worthy of notice.

Vico's own principle of the necessary appearance of similar social manifestations in similar circumstances would be a sufficient answer to those who should insist on tracing the growth of historical science in France during the last and the present century directly to his influence. Were there evidence that those of his French contemporaries, whose influence on historical literature was most marked, had studied or borrowed from his work, the case would, of course, be altered; but this is a question on which we cannot enter. Suffice it to say, that about the middle of last century, there did arise in France a new mode of regarding history, and of writing it, which proved that the notion of a possible Social science had obtained a place in the French mind. This change consisted not so much in an express and conscious effort to realize a result previously conceived under the name of Social science, as in a kind of instinct which led writers to treat the facts of history in a spirit of scientific generality, and to philosophize on social details. Among the names most worthy of notice in connexion with this determination of French thought, is that of Montesquieu. In his *Essay on the Greatness of the Romans*, (1734,) and more conspicuously, in his *Spirit of Laws*, (1748,) Montesquieu, without having a conception of the Social science as a whole by any means comparable to that of Vico, gave his countrymen a very instructive example of the manner in which the inductive method might be applied in the work of political generalization. His chief use of this method may be said to have consisted in the perception that, by observing the circumstances in which particular human customs and particular modes of government are uniformly found, conclusions may be arrived at as regards the causes of which such social manifestations are the product. Probably the value of this lesson was not diminished by the fact that the value of certain kinds of causes—those of climate, for example—in modifying human institutions, was greatly exaggerated by Montesquieu.

The tendency to generality, to the observation of social coincidences and sequences, thus introduced into French historical literature, and so consistent with the habits of the French mind, received an immense increase about the epoch of the French Revolution. Considered, indeed, with reference to its intellectual consequences, that event may be described as a prodigious experiment worked by Nature for the behoof of the Social science, at a time when nothing more could be made of a mere survey of the quiet past. Among the new conceptions with which it flooded the speculative world, one of the most important was that involved in the now time-honoured phrase, *Progress of the*

Species. The authorship of this conception in the sense in which it has since been current, is ascribed more particularly to the unfortunate Condorcet, whose "Sketch of a Historic View of the Progress of the Human Mind" was written in 1793; the germ of the conception, however, may be traced to Turgot. Since it was promulgated it is certain that the theory of progress, of continued motion in one direction, as the law of history, has completely displaced the cyclical theory of Vico.

As promulgated at the time of the French Revolution, however, the theory of progress, as the law of the historic movement, was clogged with certain serious misapprehensions which robbed it of its genuine scientific value, and which have vitiated the whole course of subsequent social speculation. As the word Progress, etymologically, implies nothing more than continuous advancement in a straight line, so, when applied as a description of the character of the historic movement, it ought properly to imply nothing more than this—that the evolution of the human destinies proceeds regularly through a series of continuous stages; that in the succession of human generations each is to be regarded as the necessary result of that which preceded it, and as the necessary parent of that which follows it. The thinkers of the French Revolution, however, did not master this purely scientific view of the social progress. Exulting in the vast emancipation which had just been wrought out, drunk with their new liberties, they represented themselves as cut off from the whole preceding past by a great gulf which humanity had miraculously overleaped; on all the many centuries that lay on the other side of that gulf they looked back with an eye of scorn, as if nothing had ever been rightly done in them, except perhaps by a Brutus here and there in an anti-despotic fit; while to the centuries that were to come they looked forward with a sanguine enthusiasm, as along a bright vista, wherein, with the aid of reason and representative institutions, mankind were to attain happiness and perfection. Though natural and even necessary as a protest against the opposite mode of thinking which had till then prevailed, and which represented all history as a degeneracy from a golden past, it is obvious that this view of the revolutionary thinkers was deplorably unscientific. In the first place, as regards its general vituperation of the past, it proceeded on a total oblivion of the law of historic continuity, which teaches us to regard the entire succession of generations as connected together in such a manner that not one generation could possibly have been omitted, or have been, in the slightest particular, different from what it was, without a complete change in the final result. And, in the second place, in holding forth the prospect of infinite perfectibility, it was false to the scientific law that the

length to which any process^o can go is limited by the nature of the elements concerned in the process. Yet, both these errors have been perpetuated in association with the word *Progress*. The perpetuation of the one we see in the daily speech and conduct of that ungenial class of sciolists who are ever regaling us with the song, "Our enlightened age—our enlightened age;" the perpetuation of the other in the daily speech and conduct of those more amiable sciolists who spend their time in foretelling the final perfection of the species. Of the two errors, though they are sometimes found in combination, the former is the more noxious and the more ungraceful. That mode of thinking which, boasting of the enlightenment of the present, looks back to the past with scorn and intolerance, denouncing all that was there transacted as wrong and irrational, representing all its great men as brutes or barbarians, all its institutions as blunders, and all its movements as mere waste of energy, is a mode of thinking to which no mercy should be shewn, but which should be mauled on the head wherever it appears. What! shall men malign the dead over whom they walk, and the fruit of whose labours they thanklessly inherit? Shall we, so proud of what we are, find nothing right, nothing admirable, in that series of past efforts by which Nature has at least arrived at the pitch of producing *us*? Let us take care! If we of generation M think so scornfully of generations A, B, C, &c., what will generation Q, not to speak of generation Z, have a right to think of us? That view of history, in short, is alone just, which regards each generation as a necessary part of the whole historic evolution, and as deriving its title and its meaning from the relation which it bears to that whole. How this view is to be reconciled with the right of passing moral judgments on the past, and how it is also to be incorporated with a true theory of progressive human improvement, are questions of a higher nature.

The position to which historical philosophy had been brought in France and in other countries, by the dissemination of the progress-notion in the sense which we have described, is represented by the condition of politics both in France and in other countries since that time. On the one hand arose *Toryism* in its various forms, defending the cause of order and clinging to the traditions of the past; on the other hand arose *Radicalism*, or the revolutionary doctrine, to press the cause of progress, and apply a critical analysis to the past; and the business of reconciling between the two was undertaken by *Whiggism*, or the doctrine of the finality of parliamentary institutions on the English plan. Into this medley of opinions, the direct consequence of the French Revolution, two distinct streams of speculation have since discharged themselves, the effect of which, conjoined

with that produced by the continued and zealous prosecution of all kinds of historical studies in France, has been to bring the political philosophy of that country exactly to its present state. These two streams of speculation are—*first*, that contributed by the school of *Political Economy*; and, *secondly*, that contributed by the school of *Socialism*. Political economy, as is well explained by its most distinguished living English teacher, is a departmental science, cut out from the general body of the Social science, because the class of social phenomena of which it treats are easily capable of being viewed apart. These phenomena are “those,” says Mr. Mill, “in which the immediately determining causes are principally those which act through the desire of wealth; and in which the psychological law mainly concerned is the familiar one, that a greater gain is preferred to a smaller. By reasoning from that one law of human nature, and from the principal outward circumstances which operate upon the human mind through that law, we may be enabled to explain and predict this portion of the phenomena of society, so far as they depend on that class of circumstances only; overlooking the influence of any other of the circumstances of society; and therefore neither tracing back the circumstances which we do take into account, to their possible origin in some other facts in the social state, nor making allowance for the manner in which any of those other circumstances may interfere with and counteract or modify the effect of the former.” Although, however, by thus isolating the economic portion of the social phenomena, it is possible to construct a special science, the prosecution of which shall be far more easy than that of the general Social science to which it belongs, it is clear that the ultimate destination of all those truths which may be arrived at in the special or economic science, is to be returned into the body of the general or Social science, there to act, so to speak, only as a thickening ingredient, to facilitate, by its interpenetrating power, the reduction of the remaining phenomena. Such a thickening ingredient, such a body of partial doctrine, has actually been contributed to Social science by the labours of political economists; indeed, among the surtest generalizations that social or political science can exhibit are those which have been contributed by the economists; and that these generalizations are insufficient to yield a complete rule of social procedure—a fact involved in the departmental nature of the science to which they belong—does not detract from their real value. But besides contributing a body of actual doctrines towards the formation of a Social science, political economy has, by the general spirit and tenor of its teachings, had a reflex effect on the very conception of such a science. The primary notion of political economy, it is well known, is that of

freedom, of non-intervention^{*} of the correlation of supply and demand. Now, extend this notion, and it will be seen that the studies of the political economists have been peculiarly fitted to educate men in the conception, so important to a right view of the Social science, of the spontaneous tendency of phenomena towards a natural order, and of the necessary inter-relation of all classes of social phenomena and of all portions of society. Followed out to the utmost, indeed, the spirit of political economy leads to the fatal conclusion—that the conduct of the social life should be left entirely to the spontaneous operation of those laws which have their seat of action in the minds of individuals, without any attempt on the part of society, as such, to exert a controlling influence; in other words, without allowing to the State or to institutions for general government any higher function than that of protecting the individual freedom. And it is in this respect that political economy has called forth the antagonistic doctrine of Socialism. Viewed historically, Socialism has certainly some of the marks of a genuine step in the progressive development of the human mind; hardly any movement, indeed, could be named, answering more exactly, in some of its characters, at least, to Vico's beautiful criterium of what constitutes a real and authoritative intention of Nature in history—namely, a clear origin in the common understanding and sense of mankind as applied to the consideration of a newly-felt want. The influence of Socialism, however, on Social science, properly so called, has consisted less in the addition of positive doctrines of any substantial value, than in the general impulse it has given to social speculation, and the effect it has had in familiarizing the mind to the contemplation of large social combinations. As opposed to political economy its effect has been to vindicate the right of other laws than those concerned in the acquisition of wealth to a recognition in the social constitution; and also to reassert, in a new and higher form, the necessity of general government, that is, the scientific superiority of the will of society, as such, to that of all its members individually. On this last point we shall have yet to enlarge.*

Out of this unorganized mixture of so many elements—Toryism, Radicalism, Whiggism, economic dogma, and Socialist aspi-

* In Mr. Newman's recently published *Lectures on Political Economy* the reader will find a very clear recognition of the fact that Political Economy is but a subordinate or departmental science, accompanied at the same time with a very emphatic assertion of the real claims of this science, departmental as it is. Among the many merits of Mr. Newman's volume, however, we cannot rank his unexcepting depreciation of the political force of the Socialist movement. No movement occupying so large a space in history could possibly be so devoid of positive worth of any kind as he represents Socialism to be. In this respect, Mr. Mill, who anticipates much from Socialism, seems to entertain the more just and philosophic view.

ration—has resulted that state of anarchy in political matters, in which France, and with it almost all the rest of Europe, now find themselves. Names might be mentioned, such as those of Saint-Simon, Michel Chevalier, Guizot, and Proudhon, illustrating, each in a special manner, the various leading directions of French thought that meet and cross each other in this anarchy. It is time, however, to allude more particularly to the views of M. Comte, who, notwithstanding the small acceptance which his speculations at present find in his own country, really is, what he asserts himself to be, the man who has most distinctly perceived the fact of this anarchy, and has made the most systematic attempt to bring it to an end, by introducing into politics the methods of general science. M. Comte's views of the Social science, and of its application to the present state of Europe, are to be gathered from various writings published since 1822, but chiefly from the last three volumes of his principal work, the *Système de Philosophie Positive*. These volumes, published between 1839 and 1842, are entirely devoted to Sociology, viewed as the last member of the whole series of positive sciences. We understand, indeed, that M. Comte has an express and separate work on Sociology now ready, containing a more detailed exposition of his views; but the work cannot find a publisher.

M. Comte's services to Social science may be classed under three heads:—*First*, His distinct exposition of the possibility of such a science, of its nature and methods, and of the benefits that will arise from its cultivation; *second*, His attempt to initiate such a science by supplying what he conceives to be a correct formula of the cardinal law of all social development; and *third*, His contribution, while illustrating this law, of a mass of independent propositions or generalizations, applicable either to the interpretation of history or to the conduct of politics, and intended to form the nucleus of a body of positive social doctrine. Our admiration of his remarkable merits under the first of these heads is qualified by that fundamental and profound objection which we have to his whole philosophy. According to M. Comte's definition of science, phenomena are then only viewed scientifically when they are contemplated as arising from the operation of natural laws, and when the notion of divine or supernatural activity, in connexion with them, is entirely got rid of as irrational and absurd. Hence, when he proposes to invest history with the dignity and name of a science, what he really means, is to perform for social what he thinks has been already performed for astronomical and physical phenomena, namely, chase the idea of deity or providence from the midst of them, so as thus finally to extinguish that idea from the human mind altogether, and complete the triumph of atheism. Now

this, as we have already hinted, is quite consistent with that principle of universal empiricism on which the philosophy of Comte and his school is irrevocably founded. If the conception of deity is empiric, a mere generalization from European, Asiatic, African, and American experience, then the idea which generalization has created, generalization may dissipate. But if, as a nobler philosophy tells us, our faith in God rests on another, even an eternal foundation, then all this is false; and, as the religious sentiment which teaches the presence and power of deity may coexist in astronomical science with a conception of invariable astronomical laws, as strong and accurate as that which Comte himself holds, so, also, in Social science the religious sentiment may and will survive all the inroads of the most remorseless *positivité*. In this respect, even Vico's old conception of the Social science was nobler and profounder than that of Comte; and we shall soon see, in other instances, that, whatever Comte may think, the conception of history as a thing of laws and sequences, by no means belongs to the avatar of atheism.

The formula laid down by Comte, as expressive of the main law of all social development, is this—that the human mind, both in the general career of history, and in the process of elaborating the special sciences, has passed through three successive stages, which he calls respectively, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. In the first stage, man explains phenomena by the hypothesis of supernatural activity; in the second he substitutes abstract or metaphysical notions, such as those implied in the words nature, power, goodness, for real divine entities; and in the third he arrives at accurate science, in the absolute resolution of all that he sees into natural laws. Corresponding, in the material, with the first or theological stage in the spiritual order, is, according to Comte, the age of military activity, through which humanity has already almost passed; corresponding to the third or positive stage, is the age of industrial activity, already begun; and that we are still in a state of transition between the two, arises from our being still, in a great measure, in the second or metaphysical stage. Of this alleged law of history, which M. Comte claims as his greatest discovery, we have only to say that, though liable in the sense in which it is advanced, to the fundamental objection already specified, and though by no means so enormous an intellectual feat in our eyes as it seems in those of M. Comte himself, it will yet be found a very serviceable expression in representing certain aspects of the social progress. Indeed, it does not greatly differ, even verbally, from the law of the historic movement already mentioned as having been long ago propounded by Vico. This is not the only instance, however, in which M. Comte's exclusive acquaint-

ance with the writers of his own country, or at least scanty acquaintance with foreign thought, has led him to exaggerate the novelty of his views.

To our mind, the most valuable of the services rendered by M. Comte to the science of society, next to his advocacy of the claims of the science itself, consists in the number of miscellaneous generalities which he has contributed towards the formation of the science. We hardly know a book so rich in luminous propositions, applicable to politics, as the last three volumes of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. Notwithstanding the inherent defects of the author's philosophy, which frequently vitiate his speculations, these three volumes may be recommended as a magazine of truths, which it would be for the advantage of every speculative or practical politician to have thoroughly mastered. M. Comte's criticisms of the existing state of politics deserve special attention. Without entering, however, into a detailed consideration of any of the multitudinous propositions offered in the treatise as a nucleus of future political doctrine, let us mention one admirable distinction transplanted by M. Comte with the happiest effects from the anterior sciences of his series into the science of social physics. In material physics, it is well known, a distinction is made between what are called *statical laws*, that is the laws or conditions of equilibrium, and what are called *dynamical laws*, that is the laws or conditions of movement. A similar distinction is made in biological studies, where the phenomena of *organization*, properly so called, are distinguished from those of *life*, properly so called; the one being made the subject of a statical science, under the name of anatomy, and the other the subject of a dynamical science, under the name of physiology. Extending this distinction to Sociology, M. Comte divides that science ideally into two branches of inquiry, the one of which he calls *social statics*, the other *social dynamics*. Under the title of social statics he includes all investigations into the laws of social equilibrium or organization, all the anatomy of society; under the title of social dynamics, he includes all investigations into the laws of social movement or life, all the physiology of society. In other words, social statics aims at a *theory of possible social simultaneities*,—that is, at the knowledge of what social fact or phenomenon can spontaneously co-exist with what other social fact or phenomenon; social dynamics aims at a *theory of possible social successions*,—that is, at the knowledge of what social phenomenon or arrangement of phenomena will result from, or will produce, what other social phenomenon or arrangement of phenomena. Now, inasmuch as disorder consists in an attempt to force impossible social simultaneities, and as the failure of progress arises from ignorance of possible social successions, it follows that it belongs

to social statics to furnish politicians with the true theory of *order*, and to social dynamics to furnish them with the true theory of *progress*; and that only by the conjoint study of both, as branches of one science, can the great problem of politics, the reconciliation of the interests of order with those of progress, be adequately solved.

Having thus traced, in a cursory manner, the progress of the conception of a Social science, as that has been developed more especially in the French mind during the last century, let us turn our attention to the fate of the same conception in Germany. As, in many respects, however, our sketch of the progress of historical philosophy in France may be accepted as a sketch of its progress over all Europe, we have only to note in particular, as regards Germany, those points wherein the special peculiarities of German thought have modified the general conception of a Social science in that country, and in all, wherever situated, whom its thinkers have affected.

One of the first Germans that caught or reproduced the idea of Vico, was the celebrated Herder, whose well-known work, entitled, "*Ideas towards a Philosophy of History*," was published in 1774. In the preface to the second edition of that work, there occurs the following sentence, explanatory of its title and its general tenor:—"At an early age, when the dawn of science appeared to my sight in all its beauty, the thought frequently occurred to me, whether, as everything in the world has its philosophy and science, there must not also be a philosophy or science of what concerns us most nearly, of the history of mankind at large." In accordance with the view thus briefly propounded, there is found throughout Herder's work, both in its dissertations on the physical relation of man to the rest of the universe, and in its general survey of human history, a constant recognition of the idea of scientific connexion, and of the presence of a meaning, determining each part and characterizing the whole. Nor is this rendered less appreciable by the glowing tone of religious eloquence which pervades the work, and the natural manner in which, in his language, the cold algebraic things, called general laws, are always represented as the external symptoms of a divine and ever-working purpose.

Herder's idea of a science of history, however, hardly equalled in precision that of Vico, and certainly fell short of the idea of such a science, which lay, clear and definite, amid such a mass of other mighty things, in the mind of the great Kant. That we were not wrong in saying that M. Comte's exclusive acquaintance with French thought, leads him to exaggerate the novelty of many of the views which he expounds, and the claims of the French intellect to original property in them, will appear, we believe, from the following most notable extract from a short

essay of Kant's published in 1784, and entitled, "An Idea of a Universal History, in a Cosmopolitical Point of View."— (*Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht.*)

"Whatever be the conception of the liberty of the will which one may form in a metaphysical point of view, its phenomena, human actions, are determined, just as well as every other kind of natural events, according to universal laws of nature. It is to be hoped that the history which is occupied about the narrative of these phenomena, however deeply concealed their causes may be, will, when it contemplates the play of the liberty of the human will in the main, discover a regular course of it, and in such a manner that that which is obviously implicated and irregular in single subjects, will be cognised in the whole species as a continually progressive, though slow, unfolding of its original predispositions. Thus, marriages, and the births and deaths arising from them, seem, as the free-will of men has so great an influence on them, to be subjected to no rule according to which their number can be previously determined by reckoning; and yet the yearly tables of them in great nations, evince that they happen just as much according to constant laws of nature as the so inconstant rains, whose happening cannot be previously determined singly, but which, on the whole, do not fail to maintain the growth of plants, the flow of rivers, and other dispositions of nature, in a uniform uninterrupted course. Individuals, and even whole nations, little think that, while they, every one according to his own mind, and the one often contrary to the other, pursue their own individual purposes, they go on unobserved, as if guided by a clue, in a design of nature which is unknown to them, and labour at the furtherance of that design; which design, were it known, would signify very little to them. As men, on the whole, do not proceed in their pursuits conformably to an instinct merely, like brutes, and yet not according to a concerted plan, as rational citizens of the world, it seems that no history of them, agreeable to a plan, (as of the bees and the beavers,) is possible. One cannot forbear a certain indignation at seeing their actions represented on the great theatre of the world, and, notwithstanding the wisdom of individuals appearing here and there, at finding, at last, everything in the gross composed of madness, of childish vanity, and frequently of childish wickedness and the rage of destruction; so that one is finally at a loss what sort of conception one ought to form of our species, so conceited of its superiority. There is here no expedient for the philosopher, but (as he cannot at all presuppose, in men and in their actions in gross, any rational proper design) that of endeavouring to discover a *design of nature* in this nonsensical course of human affairs, so that a history of creatures who proceed without a plan, may nevertheless be possible, according to such a determinate plan of nature. Let us see whether we can succeed in finding a clue to such a history, and we shall then leave it to nature to produce the man who is to compose the history itself afterwards. She thus produced a Kepler, who subjected, in an unexpected manner, to precise laws the eccentric orbits of the planets, and a Newton, who explained these laws from a universal natural cause."

The special "clue" to the course of history, which Kant thus announces it to be the purpose of his essay to furnish, in other words, the special philosophic conception in the light of which he proposes that history, as a whole, should be regarded, is that indicated by the phrase of the title, *In weltbürgerlicher Absicht*, "In a cosmopolitical point of view." The manner in which he evolves this conception is as follows:—All the natural predispositions of a creature are destined, one time or another, to be developed completely and conformably to an end; in man, however, as a rational being, and capable of advancing, therefore, only by slow and continued effort, those natural predispositions, which lead to the use of reason, can be completely developed only in the species, not in the individual; it is the will of nature that man shall unfold entirely out of himself everything that surpasses the order of his mere animal existence; the means which nature uses to bring about the development of all her predispositions, is their antagonism in society; the greatest problem for the human species, to the solution of which all nature compels it, is the establishment of a universal civil society administering law to itself; this problem is at once the most difficult, and that which will be solved the latest by the human species; it is dependent on the other problem, of the establishment of a legal external inter-relation of states, and cannot be solved except through that problem; therefore, "*The history of the human species in the gross may be considered as the execution of a hidden plan of nature, in order to bring about an internal perfect constitution of state, and, to this end, an external one too, as the only condition of things in which she can fully unfold all the predispositions in humanity.*" This clue Kant does not offer as the only one that could be given, but simply as one which appears to him to have peculiar advantages. By viewing all history as a secret striving forward of nature towards the goal of cosmopolitanism, *i.e.*, towards the establishment of a universal civil constitution of human society through the medium of a prior legal union of states, we shall be able, Kant believes, not only to diffuse explanatory light through the distracted play of human affairs, not only to arrive at a kind of art of political prediction, but also to open up to the human race a consolatory prospect of its future on the earth, and so to offer to reason "a justification (*Rechtfertigung*) of Nature, or rather of Providence." Moreover, as he sagaciously remarks, such a view will correspond with that which people will be soon obliged to take at any rate; for, considering what a load of history will be transmitted to posterity, a load which will be all the larger for the laudable circumstantiality with which history is now written, it is clear that posterity will take account of the earlier portions of the past only from the point of view of what interests themselves, in other words, in the light

of the question, What have nations and governments perfected, what spoiled, in a cosmopolitical point of view?

Kant protests that, though the clue proposed in his essay is in some degree derived *a priori*, it is not his intention to supplant the merely empiric generalization of history; he has but given "a notion," he says, "of what a philosophic head (who must have a great knowledge of history) might try from another point of view." Still, as the philosophic heads of Germany, subsequent to Kant, have generally shunned that "elaboration of history empirically compiled merely," which he left open to them, it may be said that in the tinge of *a priori* thought which pervades the foregoing extract, we have the characteristic difference between the philosophy of history as it has been prosecuted in Germany, and the philosophy of history as it has been generally understood in France. Comte's notion of the way to proceed in theorizing upon history corresponds with the nature of his system. Acquiring as large a knowledge as possible of the empiric facts of history, he would construct, with no other aid than that of his previous empiric conclusions in other sciences, the most general possible expression that would accurately describe these facts; and then, avoiding, as metaphysical or theological, all talk of what nature or any other entity *must have* designed, or not designed, with regard to the human race, he would come forth with this general expression, and affirm it to *be* the law of history. Kant, on the other hand, coming, like a strong man in the morning, from a prior field of teleology and metaphysic, wherein he has been expatiating, brings with him into history a clue derived from his more abstract speculations, and eking this out by sagacious empiric observation, (the perception of the tendency of mankind towards an external cosmopolitical organization was less easy in Kant's time than it is in ours,) he announces his law in terms which correspond with the mode in which it was conceived, and religiously links, as it were, this ephemeral world with the realms of the everlasting and invisible. And thus, even in history, there enacts itself a portion of the eternal antagonism between the two polar philosophies.

A far less mitigated attempt than that of Kant to introduce *a priori* reasonings into history, was made by his successor Fichte, whose convictions on this point were so strong that he would not acknowledge any history to be philosophical unless the author were prepared to exhibit the actual phenomena with which he had to deal, under the form of necessary deductions from some *a priori* principle. His views on this matter are thus expressed in the first of his lectures on "the Characteristics of the Present Age."

"The mere empiricist, who should undertake a description of the age, would seize upon some of its most striking phenomena, just as they

presented themselves to casual observation, and recount these, without having any assured conviction that he had understood them all, and without being able to point out any other connexion between them than their co-existence in one and the same time. The philosopher who should propose to himself the task of such a description, would, independently of all experience, seek out an idea of the age, (which, indeed, in its own form, *as idea*, cannot be apparent in experience,) and exhibit the mode in which this idea would reveal itself under the forms of the necessary phenomena of the age; and in so doing, he would distinctly exhaust the circle of these phenomena, and bring them forth in necessary connexion with each other, through the common idea which lies at the bottom of them all. The first would be the *chronicler* of the age; the second would have made a *history* of it a possible thing. . . . Thus, then, every particular epoch of time is the fundamental idea of a particular age. These epochs and fundamental ideas of particular ages, however, can only be thoroughly understood by and through each other, and by means of their relation to universal time. Hence it is clear that the philosopher, in order to be able rightly to characterize any individual age, and, if he will, his own, must first have understood *a priori*, and thoroughly penetrated into the signification of universal time, and all its possible epochs. The comprehension of universal time, like all philosophical comprehension, again presupposes a fundamental idea of time, an idea of a fore-ordered, although only gradually unfolding, accomplishment of time, in which each successive period is determined by the preceding; or to express this more shortly, and in more common phraseology, it presupposes a *world-plan*, which, in its primitive unity, may be clearly comprehended, and from which may be correctly deduced all the great epochs of human life on earth, so that they may be distinctly understood both in their origin and in their connexion with each other."—*Fichte's Characteristics of the present Age; Smith's Translation*, pp. 2-4.

This "world-plan" of Fichte, which, according to him, is to be excogitated *a priori*, and from which all the actual facts of history are to be deducible, corresponds, it will be seen, to the "clue" of Kant. Referring the proof of the proposition to the higher metaphysics, Fichte affirms his own idea of this world-plan in the following terms:—"The end of the life of mankind on earth is this, that in this life they may order all their relations with freedom according to reason." This being the end of the life of mankind, it follows, he says, that that life divides itself into two parts—the one in which the end has not been yet attained, the other in which it approaches its attainment; and, proceeding farther, he divides the whole process of its gradual achievement, in other words, the whole life of the human species into five demonstrably necessary epochs, to wit:—1. "The epoch of the unlimited dominion of reason as mere unconscious instinct,"—i.e., the age when the species, organized according to reason, and carrying reason, as it were, physically inherent in its very blood and veins, shall

yet act blindly, and not by a free-will choosing the reasonable ; 2. "The epoch in which reason, as instinct, is changed into an external ruling authority,"—*i.e.*, the age in which positive systems of life and doctrine, which cannot prove themselves, shall usurp and compel the blind obedience of mankind ; 3. "The epoch of liberation, *directly* from the external ruling authority, *indirectly* from reason as instinct, and *generally* from reason in any form,"—*i.e.*, the age of absolute lawlessness and indifference to truth ; 4. "The epoch of reason as science,"—*i.e.*, the age when mankind shall make the rules of reason their study ; and, 5. "The epoch of reason as art,"—*i.e.*, the age in which humanity shall completely and freely shape itself into a type of reason. According to this scheme of history, as necessitated *a priori*, it will be observed that reason is the eternal or stationary element, and freedom the element to be evolved in time. In other words, history is, according to Fichte, the problem of the identification of reason with freedom, or rather of the gradual transmutation of reason as a mere physical property, inherent in the human race, into reason as a conscious virtue. It may be added, that Fichte, calling to his aid an empiric verification, declares the present time to belong to the third of the foregoing ages, that is, to the middle and worst stage of the historic evolution.

What our Baconian readers will say to this bold attempt to prescribe on absolute or metaphysic grounds the course along which history must necessarily march, we can very well surmise ; nor are we disposed to withhold our sympathy when they protest against the incurable character of arbitrariness which must always attend such reasonings. Of the treatise, however, of which the foregoing scheme of history forms, as it were, the vertebral theory, we have to say, that it is worthy of any reader's best attention, not less from the really just and solid thoughts which it contains, and which, though made dependent by their author on the theory they illustrate, are yet independently impressive, than from the exemplary moral earnestness with which it is written, and which cannot fail to communicate itself to the reader. Besides, our impression is, that the main theory itself contains much that may very well stand good even when translated into the form of an induction from actual history ; if, indeed, there was not a larger exercise of empiric reference in the act of constructing the theory than the author was himself aware of. And, after all, at a time when there is such a disposition to allow man only such thoughts as accompany the process of generalizing empirically outwards from the human centre, there is health in every attempt, though it be but of the arbitrary philosophic imagination, to reverse this mental process, and to bring down out of the region of infinite contemplations, if not a

spark of transcendental light, at least new store of that primal sense of mystery wherein it is, as we believe, a condition even of scientific truth that the sciences themselves shall be shrouded.

Without tracing the farther development which the philosophy of history has received in Germany at the hands of Schlegel and Hegel, let us attend to one remarkable interposition in the course of that development made by the greatest of the German church-historians. The question must have already occurred to many of our readers, how this conception of history as a scientific evolution according to regular laws inherent in the very constitution of the species as such—a conception which, as we have seen, seems now to be an accepted fact among all general thinkers—is reconcilable with the belief in the altogether superhuman origin of Christianity. The transcendentalists, Kant and Fichte, of course, as well as the empiricist Comte, get quit of this difficulty by denying this superhuman origin, and including Christianity itself as a necessary portion of the general mundane evolution, divine only in the sense in which all is divine. The orthodox Christian, however, whose faith revolts from such a view, must seek another solution. To him also, if a man of philosophic culture, the fact that there *is* a science of history, that society *has* advanced and *does* advance according to regular laws inherent in its original constitution, is undeniable; he no more denies it than he denies that there is a science of the individual human mind, on account of the difficulty of reconciling this fact with the belief, which he independently holds, that the communication of grace to the heart of man is altogether a supernatural act. The difficulty, it will be observed, is precisely the same in both cases; and, as in the one case, it has not prevented Christians from accepting as possible a science of the human mind, and even being distinguished labourers in that science, so, in the other, it does not prevent them from accepting as possible and from cultivating a science of history. The solution they confide in is the same in both cases. As they believe the power of grace to be supernaturally communicated, and yet its essence to be in profound adaptation to the human constitution, and its operation in the heart to be in accordance with the ordinary mental laws; so, believing the origin of Christianity in the world to be altogether divine, they yet believe its adaptation to the needs of humanity to have been pre-established, and its incorporation with history to have proceeded according to the ordinary social laws. Such, at least, is the view promulgated, in opposition to the rationalism of his country, by the noble Neander. The following are almost the opening words in his *General History of the Church*:—

“The history (of the Church) will shew how a little leaven, cast

into the mass of humanity, has been gradually penetrating it. Looking back on the period of eighteen centuries, we would survey a process of development in which we ourselves are included—a process moving steadily onward, though not in a direct line, but through various windings, yet in the end furthered by whatever has attempted to arrest its course; a process having its issue in eternity, but constantly following the same laws, so that, in the past, as it unfolds itself to our view, we may see the germ of the future which is coming to meet us. But, although the contemplation of history enables us to perceive the powers as they are prepared in their secret laboratories, and as they are exhibited in actual operation, yet, in order to a right understanding of all this, it is presupposed that we have formed some just conception of that, in its inward essence, which we would study in its manifestation and process of development. . . . Now, Christianity we regard not as a power that has sprung up out of the hidden depths of man's nature, but as one which descended from above, because heaven opened itself for the rescue of revolted humanity; a power which, as it is exalted above all that human nature can create out of its own resources, must impart to that nature a new life, and change it from its inmost centre. . . . But, although Christianity can be understood only as something which is above nature and reason, something communicated to them from a higher source, yet it stands in necessary connexion with the essence of these powers and with their mode of development—otherwise, indeed, it could not be fitted to elevate them to any higher stage; otherwise, it could not operate on them at all. And such a connexion, considered by itself, we must presume to exist in the works of God, in the mutual and harmonious agreement of which is manifested the divine order of the universe. The connexion of which we now speak consists in this,—that what has by their Creator been implanted in the essence of human nature and reason, what has its ground in their idea and their destination, can attain its full realization only by means of that higher principle, as we see it actually realized in Him who is its source, and in whom is expressed the original type and model after which humanity has to strive. And, accordingly, we see the evidence of this connexion whenever we observe how human nature and reason do, by virtue of this their original capacity, actually strive, in their historical development, towards this higher principle, which needs to be communicated to them in order to their own completion, and how, by the same capacity, they are made receptive of this principle, and conducted onward till they yield to it, and become moulded by its influence.”—*Neander's General Church History, Translated in Clarke's Foreign Theological Library*, pp. 1-3.

According to this view, the relationship of Christianity to the world is to be regarded as consisting in what Dr. Chalmers would have called a special *collocation* of the superhuman and the human—a pre-arranged contact, so to speak, between two

systems, the law of whose higher unity lies in the infinite purpose of the Divine Mind. And here, if anywhere, one must be aware of the miserable leanness and pedantry of all our conceptions of things got out of this vain analytic by which science necessarily proceeds, as compared with the awful sense of mystery that oppresses us when we give ourselves naturally up to the contemplation of the whole. If, considering the complexity of human nature, its wonderful and inexplicable activity in the living and glowing man, we are sometimes tempted to proscribe as useless all talk about laws, sequences, and the like, and are ever constrained at the last to take refuge in the fact, that all emanates immediately from vital energy and volition; how much more, in regarding the wonders of history, shall we find it necessary either to dismiss our petty Social science, with its mechanical jargon about natural laws, as a pretence and impertinence, or to take it strictly to heart that this science, with its jargon, is but a way of viewing the matter for occasional convenience, and that after all the old faith is still also the true one, that there is an indwelling Spirit of the ages and the worlds, whose will governs all things!

In England the notion of a Social science in any very determinate sense of the phrase, is extremely recent. Among our political writers, indeed, there have been men of real scientific generality, among whom no one deserves more particular mention than Edmund Burke. England, also, has partaken in the main in the development of political doctrine, which has gone on in France since the epoch of the French Revolution, and her contributions to the departmental science of political economy have been larger than those of any other nation. Nor ought it to be forgotten that the mere poetic instinct of many of our historical writers—the essence of the narrative art consisting in a perception of the fact of plot or evolution—has enabled them to produce works such as even the scientific critic must pronounce admirable. But in the appreciation of the fact that there is, and must be, a science of social as well as of any other kind of phenomena, England has certainly been later than either France or Germany. Dr. Arnold, for example, seems to have caught a glimmer of such a conception only towards the close of his life, when he was composing his course of General Lectures on *Modern History*. So far as we are aware, the first promulgation of the conception in England, in all its length and breadth, was made by Mr. John Stuart Mill, some years ago, in that part of his general work on *Logic* which is devoted to a disquisition on what the author calls the *Logic of the Moral Sciences*. Chapters VI.—X. of that disquisition may be still referred to as a repertory of thoughts on the subject.

Among the English works of more recent date in which the idea of a Social science is assumed and argued on, one of the most noteworthy is the "Social Statics" of Mr. Herbert Spencer. The title of this work, however, is a complete misnomer. According to all analogy, the phrase "Social Statics" should be used only in some such sense as that in which, as we have already explained, it is used by Comte, namely, as designating a branch of inquiry whose end it is to ascertain the laws of social equilibrium or order, as distinct ideally from those of social movement or progress. Of this Mr. Spencer does not seem to have had the slightest notion, but to have chosen the name of his work only as a means of indicating vaguely that it proposed to treat of social concerns in a scientific manner. This is to be regretted the more, because it would have been easy to convey the same intimation in a more appropriate title; as, for example, that of "Social Ethics." For, in reality, the work is a contribution to the philosophy of political right, an investigation into the nature and limits of the notion of duty, as it applies to the conduct of men in their purely social relations. So viewed, it deserves very high praise for the ability, clearness, and force with which it is written, and which entitle it to the character, now so rare, of a really substantial book. Were we here treating of the work as a whole we should have some exceptions to take to its doctrine as a work on social ethics; our criticisms, however, must be confined to a notice of what the work implies with respect to the author's views in social physics, that is, with respect to the theory he holds of the nature of the social development.

In this aspect, the point of view of the author may be summarily described as being that natural to a person whose intellectual habits have been formed chiefly by prior studies in the department of the more common English metaphysics, and in the department of political economy. It is in accordance with this, we think, that the work bears a certain perceptible resemblance to some of the writings of Proudhon; though Proudhon, whose metaphysical notions have been derived from the more profound school of Germany, and whose moral vehemence leads him far beyond the economists, writes in a style compared with which Mr. Spencer's is mild, and propounds conclusions compared with which Mr. Spencer's are timid and conservative. Mr. Spencer begins his work by an acute and satisfactory refutation of the doctrine of expediency as the ground of moral obligation. Adopting, as the only possible foundation of morals, the doctrine of a special moral sense, he proceeds, in a very ingenious manner, to inquire whether there is any one maxim or principle which may be regarded as the primary or fundamental revelation of this moral sense, and from which, as the specific propositions of

geometry from the geometric axioms, all the various forms of social duty may be evolved. Such a first principle he finds in the following definition of justice:—"Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man." This, he says, is the sole law of the social relationship: whatever action or institution respects it, is socially right; and whatever action or institution infringes it, is socially wrong. There may, he admits, be other maxims of morality imposing limitations on the right of individuals to use the full personal liberty which the foregoing maxim would allow them—as, for example, it may be wrong for a man to get drunk, notwithstanding that he has, according to the foregoing maxim, full liberty to do so, if he pleases; these laws, however, if they exist, are only supplementary to the main one; they hold only as between individuals and the Supreme Being, and have no claim whatever to social recognition. The great primary principle, as it were, first chalks out a certain circle of liberties for each man, the measure of this circle being the demands of the personality of each as conditioned by the equal liberty of all others; whether the individual shall occupy the whole of this circle, or whether he shall restrain himself by certain additional rules of action, is a matter for his own consideration, with which society, as such, has nothing whatever to do.

This principle of Social Ethics, which is identical with one of the pervading doctrines of Proudhon, Mr. Spencer applies, at least by inference, to the criticism of history. So far as we can gather his views of history from the course of his remarks, it seems to be this—that the whole life of the species has been a gradual development, having for its end the final and triumphant recognition of the principle of equal rights. Hitherto, the principle has not been recognised; in the early portion of the history of our species, it was unknown or trampled on; physical force, tyranny, the sword ruled; individuals accumulated in their own hands the liberties of millions, and perpetuated the same abuse by unjust laws and institutions; and thus society has reached our time bearing in its bosom a mass of indurate wrong, legalized injustice, and organized oppression. This, like other forms of evil, has arisen from the fact, that the human race was not originally adapted to the *ensemble* of the conditions in which it was placed, but was left to work out such an adaptation in time. The process of adaptation, however, is going on; already for several generations there have been loud though vague assertions of the grand social principle of equal liberty; and the whole tendency of events is towards the rational promulgation and social victory of this principle. One form of this victory will be the ultimate abrogation of government both as a fact and as a

notion. For, as all civil government, all institutions for repressing crime, have originated in the disposition of men to infringe each other's liberties, when this disposition disappears, government will be unnecessary, and each individual will move as a self-regulated unit. In all this, Mr. Spencer but repeats the well-known cardinal speculation of Proudhon, whose notion also it is that history is an evolution of the doctrine of equal rights, and that the goal to which the human race tends is that of *anarchy*, or the absence of all forms of government. In the application of his principle, however, to the special institution or law of property, Proudhon goes a thousand miles beyond Mr. Spencer—denying the right of property altogether, while Mr. Spencer only denies the right of property in land.

Among the objections we have to the argument of Mr. Spencer's book, one of the strongest is this, that, at least in the special manner in which it is put forth, it seems to cast a cold and irreverent look over the whole past. Oppression, tyranny, extortion, wrong, the wholesale butcheries of ancient conquerors, the despotic exactions of feudal lords—such are the phrases in which Mr. Spencer's impressions regarding the past seem most naturally to take shape in his mind. Now, our convictions on this point have been already stated, and it only remains for us to say that these are so strong that, if any doctrine could be shewn necessarily to involve such a systematic depreciation of the past, we should instantly, and without farther inquiry, reject that doctrine as false and unscientific. We hate your men who are for ever telling you that Alexander the Great was a monster, and Cæsar a tyrant, and everybody else that used a baton or a battle-axe, a villain and a ruffian. We dislike even that milder degree of the same sentiment which Mr. Spencer shews when he repeats the commonplace complaint, that people erect monuments to the Napoleons and Wellingtons rather than to the Watts and Arkwrights of the human species. This is but trumpery talk, unworthy of a man of profound science. But we do not see, after all, that it is necessary to Mr. Spencer's theory of the human progress, according to every mode in which that theory could be understood. Although the law of equal social liberty may be the rule of the human species in the sense that it is the end towards which the human species tends and has been tending from the beginning, we do not see that our criticisms of special portions of the past should be soured by the sense that then the rule was neither attained nor hinted at. In any process having for its end a definite result, our rule of criticism, as the process goes on, should certainly consist at most in this question, How far is this or that part of the process a step towards the intended result? We do not despise a machine while it is being made, nor object

to a child because he is not yet a man. Even according to Mr. Spencer's own view, therefore, of the nature of the social development, we think his manner of speaking of the past needlessly irreverent. If an end is glorious, the evolution of that end, even had it no other merit than that of *being* the evolution of the end, is surely respectable. But Mr. Spencer's error is, that, attending exclusively to that element in the social progress the existence of which is a thing of evolution, namely, the element of freedom, he takes no account of the other element, the eternal reason, to use Fichte's phrase, which must be assumed as having been primarily inherent even in the unconscious and instinctive being, so to speak, of the human race. Fichte, in whose theory of history the development of conscious freedom figures as largely as in that of Mr. Spencer, is enabled, by this accompanying idea, to maintain and recognise for the past a higher title to reverence than that of having been a mere struggle towards the present and the future; and hence his allusions to the actual course of the world in bygone times are warm with all a poet's feeling for the ancestral and the heroic. Comte, also, though occupying so different a point of view, has this singular merit of a large and unreserved appreciation of the dignity of the whole past.

There is another respect in which we think Mr. Spencer's views err against the most advanced conception of a Social science. His main principle, as we have already stated, is that society, as such, has nothing to do with the actions of individuals so long as these actions lie strictly within the circle marked out for each man by the requirement of non-interference with the freedom of his neighbours. Every man, so far as society is concerned, may do as he pleases, so long as he keeps within that circle; and the only proper function of government, therefore, so long as the imperfection of men shall render government necessary, is to prevent men from selfishly going beyond their legitimate circles, and extending their own liberties at the expense of the liberties of others. That this principle, so peremptorily expressed, leaves a considerable difficulty behind it, Mr. Spencer seems to be himself aware—acknowledging, for example, that it is not easy to assent to the notion that society ought to let a man be a drunkard or any other kind of sinner he pleases, provided he maintains that character peaceably, and does harm, as the phrase is, to nobody but himself. But Mr. Spencer's hesitation in such cases does not arise from any doubt of the universality of his principle, but from the practical consideration that it is difficult to say in such cases that it does *not* apply; difficult, for example, to be sure that the drunkard or other private sinner is doing harm to nobody but himself. Let the principle be clearly applicable, and he will carry it out to the

utmost. Thus, in discussing the rights of children, he pushes his idea of the equal freedom of all not only to the length of abolishing the supposed right of parental compulsion, but even, as the impression of most of his readers must be, to a length that would abolish all parental authority whatever, and entirely revolutionize the filial relationship. We suppose, too, that he would think it a legitimate consequence of his principle that suicide, and a number of other acts now punishable by law, should be removed altogether from the list of civil offences, and treated only as sins of the private conscience. Indeed, we do not see how he can stop short of authorizing the exposure of infants; for, unless there be a special enactment exempting children under a certain age from the operation of the principle of equal rights and entitling them to be treated under another principle, (a thing which Mr. Spencer himself ridicules,) we do not see what right a baby has to sustenance provided its mother wishes to break the mammary relation. The exposure of infants, therefore, though not their violent murder, would be socially legitimate. And lastly, Mr. Spencer distinctly asserts and contends for the right of every individual to ignore the State when he chooses—that is, to refuse obedience to the laws of the community in which he is enrolled, on condition, of course, of renouncing its privileges. There are, doubtless, many other curious consequences to which Mr. Spencer's principle would lead, for he intimates his knowledge that it involves very startling results; and though the mere contemplation of these results is, of itself, no refutation of the principle, it is right that in playing with such a dagger we should know the sharpness of its edges.

It is not in its aspect as an ethical proposition that we are to consider Mr. Spencer's principle. We will admit even that we see various directions in which a certain modified version of the principle might be advantageously put in practice. Possibly enough the doctrine of non-interference with individual action, except on definite grounds of social necessity or protection, has not yet been exhausted of all its useful applications even in free countries. But when we translate Mr. Spencer's principle into its necessary correlative form as a proposition in social physics, then, we believe, the inevitable dislike, if not horror, which the principle must produce in the quick common mind, when given as an ethical prescription, will be amply justified by its demonstrably unscientific character when stated indicatively. For what is the principle when so translated? Nothing less, so far as we can see, than a definition of society in the following terms:—Society is simply an aggregation of individuals, moving and acting each within a special circle, the circumference of

which is determined positively by the strength of the included personality, that is, by the absolute capacity of the faculties to exercise themselves, and negatively by the pressure of all the competing circles; the sole problem of the social state is, therefore, the establishment of equal freedom by the rule of *Laissez-faire* for all the aggregated individuals; and the laws of the social life are simply those of the mechanical co-existence of a certain number of human units. "The characteristics exhibited by beings in an associated state," says Mr. Spencer, "cannot arise from the accident of their combination, but must be the consequences of certain inherent properties of the beings themselves. True, the gathering together may call out these characteristics; it may make manifest what was before dormant; it may afford the opportunity for undeveloped peculiarities to appear; but it evidently does not create them. No phenomenon can be presented by a corporate body but what there is a pre-existing capacity in its individual members for producing." Again he says, "Every social phenomenon must have its origin in some property of the individual." And again in combating Socialism, he observes that it could only be true if we existed in society "after the same fashion as those compound polyps, in which a number of individuals are based upon a living trunk common to them all;" a theory which he believes no one would be absurd enough to hold. In this resolute representation of all social phenomena as taking their rise in the constitution of the individual man, Mr. Spencer is supported by Mr. Mill. "The laws of the phenomena of society," says Mr. Mill, "are and can be nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of human beings united together in the social state. . . . Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance, with different properties, as hydrogen and oxygen are different from water, or as hydrogen, carbon, and azote, are different from nerves, muscles, and tendons. Human beings in society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual man." It may be added that this view is natural to students of political economy,—the contests of this science for absolute commercial freedom having bestowed on its students a special clearness of vision with respect to the motions of the human unit or molecule, often, though not in Mr. Mill's case, prejudicial to their conceptions of society in the aggregate.

Now there is a great deal in this with which we cannot agree, though it is not perhaps easy to find language in which to express our difference. There is, it appears to us, something confusing in the terms in which Mr. Spencer and Mr. Mill state their belief that the phenomena of society are only the manifes-

tations of the human nature of individuals in a state of union. For, though the individual human being, as such, is conceivable to us, and though there are certain sciences which are concerned with the laws of purely individual human nature, yet, in point of fact, the individual human being is always thought of by us as a member of society. The individual man who is the object of our studies is always imagined as already existing in social relationship with other men; so that many of the phenomena which we set down as those of individual human nature, are in reality dependent for their existence on what Mr. Spencer calls the accident of social combination. In short, instead of representing society as built up of individuals, we may reverse the mode of thought, and represent individuals as the decomposed particles of society. In this sense, of course, it is true that the properties of the mass are the combined result of the properties of the particles, seeing that we have already implied in the particles the properties which they derive from belonging to the mass. But if we conceive the particles *per se*, if we first take for granted about human beings only as much as it is possible for us to conceive known about them as individual objects, then it is not true that the farther knowledge of what would result from the accident of their combination would be a mere work of logical inference. Were our knowledge of individual human nature in this sense as profound and accurate as it could possibly be, we could no more deduce thence the phenomena of associated human nature without the help of empiric observation of society than we could tell beforehand, from our knowledge of oxygen and hydrogen separately, that, when combined, they would form water. Instead of saying, therefore, with Mr. Spencer, that "the characteristics of beings in an associated state cannot *arise* from the accident of combination," and then patching up this proposition by admitting that "the gathering together may *call out* these characteristics," thus landing ourselves in a metaphysical controversy between *arising* and *calling out*, between the *cause* of a phenomenon which inductive science has nothing to do with, and the *conditions of the appearance* of a phenomenon which is what inductive science professes to ascertain; the true scientific mode of expression certainly would be, to say that the accident of combination generates new phenomena, and that therefore our knowledge of society as such has to be attained by distinct induction with respect to the social state, and not merely from our knowledge of human beings individually. In other words, the laws of the action of human beings in the mass are *not* logically resolvable into the laws of the action of human beings as individuals; and nothing can be possibly affirmed as completely true in the Social science from any theory, however correct, of individual

human nature. A committee, or a public meeting even, is something more than merely the sum total of the individuals that compose it. Wherever a few persons are gathered together for a common purpose, much more in political communities and nations, there is, we believe, the virtual creation of a new organization subject to new laws of life. The researches of Reichenbach and the animal magnetists, may yet throw some light on this subject, by investigating the phenomena of sociability; meanwhile, let the fact as we have stated it be distinctly comprehended. As far as the application of Mr. Mill's simile is fair, men when brought together *are* converted into another kind of substance with different properties, as water is different from hydrogen and oxygen, or as nerves, muscles, and tendons are different from hydrogen, carbon, and azote. The contrary can be maintained only by a confusion of conception equivalent to that which, first implying in hydrogen and oxygen all that we know of them in their combined form as water, should then assert that water is the same as hydrogen and oxygen, taking no account of the cardinal fact of the case, that of the chemical union; or which, first implying in hydrogen, carbon, and azote, all that is known of them in their organized form as nerves, muscles, and tendons, should then assert these nerves, muscles, and tendons to be merely the chemical substances aforesaid, omitting all consideration of the accident of organization. Or, not to avoid Mr. Spencer's challenge, we *do* believe that we "exist in society after the same fashion, to some extent, as those compound polyps in which a number of individuals are based upon a living trunk common to them all." Not only do men in society perform functions peculiar to them in that state, as for example, that of passing laws, condemning criminals and the like, but some of the phenomena presented by human beings in the mass are almost contradictory in appearance to those exhibited by human beings individually. We believe that there are cases in which communities and nations spontaneously do what is repugnant to the wishes of all their members, taken one by one—cases in which men maintain sternly in the gross, as by the compulsion of a social reason or conscience, principles of action which individually they deny or abandon. Vico seems to have had some such notion very clearly in his mind; and we believe it is absolutely essential to a correct conception of the Social science. Thus only, indeed, does Sociology take its place as the last independent member of the series of the inductive sciences, distant from pure biology by an equal scientific remove, as that by which biology is distant from chemistry, chemistry from physics, physics from astronomy, and astronomy from mathematics.

Fully to develop the importance of the notion we have thus

attempted to expound, would require more space than we have left. Among its consequences, as appears to us, would be a considerable diminution of value in that method of prosecuting the Social science, which Mr. Mill describes by the name of the Direct Deductive Method, that is, the method of directly inferring *probable* laws of society from the previously ascertained laws of individual human nature; and an enhanced regard for that other method, chiefly favoured by Comte, which Mr. Mill describes as the Historical or Inverse Deductive Method, that is, the method of first generalizing from actual observation of social phenomena, and then *verifying* the generalizations backward, as it were, by shewing their harmony with the known laws of the human mind. But our concern is chiefly with the effects of the notion on Mr. Spencer's speculations. The radical fallacy of these, it appears to us, consists in this, that they proceed on the supposition that society has no life, no purpose, no destiny as such, but is a mere numerical succession of individual existences. Hence, fixing his regard on the increase of the happiness of individuals, as the highest conceivable object for which the world can have been created, and having formulized the conditions of this happiness in the principle of equal rights for all, he constructs an ideal of society, whose highest principle is the rule of universal *Laissez-faire*. The whole problem of the Social state is, according to his view, to secure liberty to every individual to do as he pleases, so long as he does not infringe on the liberty of others to do as they please; and the sole purpose of government is therefore the negative one of repressing crime. Now our view is, in a great degree, the reverse of this. Society, as we believe, is not merely a device for the wellbeing of individuals; it has, we believe, an organic life, an ulterior destination, of its own; and it may sometimes even happen, we think, as in the case of a general war, that what is good and splendid in the social development, may not coincide with what is immediately beneficial for the individuals concerned in effecting it. Instead, therefore, of subordinating the laws of society to the ascertained personal interests of the individual, we would subordinate the laws of individual action to the ascertained conditions of noble social existence. Instead of regarding the polypidom as a mere invention to secure the rights of the polyps, we would regard the polyps as indentured servants to the higher being of the polypidom. How far Mr. Spencer's theory of equal rights for all, might even then hold good, and whether a theory of inequality of rights, of proportionality of rights to faculties, of a hierarchy of parts, might not be more tenable, we shall not now attempt to decide. Regarding his doctrine, however, of the right of the individual to ignore the State, we will say that we cannot assent to it; and that we hold that,

in case of an attempted secession of the kind, the State has a right, capable of a just definition, to pursue the discontented individual, to clutch him back to his place, and to make him, if not hold his tongue, (for toleration of speech may be an ascertained condition of advanced sociability,) at least pay his taxes. Again, with regard to the doctrine of the purely negative function of government, and its consequent evanescence in time, here also we take the other side. As society has a general will, reason, and purpose of its own, so, we believe, has it positive* duties, and so ought it to have special organs of thought, expression, and activity. Institutions for social government are therefore, we believe, necessary facts in the being of the species; and the cosmopolitanism of Kant, rather than the anarchy of Proudhon, (perhaps, in part, *through it*,) is the historic goal.

It is a consequence of the high degree of complexity which we thus attribute to the Social science, that we are not so sanguine as some in our expectations of the speedy perfection of a corresponding art of politics. But, as Mr. Mill remarks, a degree of knowledge which is very inadequate to the purposes of historic prediction, may be very useful for the purposes of political guidance. Already, we believe, Social science is in possession of a body of doctrines capable of beneficially directing the conduct of politicians. Nay, if it were but generally understood what the political art is; if it were but generally understood that politics is not a hap-hazard wrestling with a heap of loose matter, but an art, the essence of which consists in so modifying existing social phenomena by the social free-will, that desired social ends may be accomplished through the spontaneous operation of the invariable social laws already established, we believe that the benefit would be immense. Were this understood now, many of our most admired political watch-words would cease to be pronounced, and many of our most conspicuous statesmen would have a place on the shelf among other lumber.

ART. II.—DÉMONSTRATIONS ÉVANGÉLIQUES ;—*de Tertullien, Origène, Eusèbe, S. Augustin, Montaigne, Bacon, Grotius, Descartes, Richelieu, Arnaud, De Choiseul-du-Plessis-Praslin, Pascal, Pelisson, Nicole, Boyle, Bossuet, Bourdaloue, Locke, Lami, Burnet, Malebranche, Lesley, Leibnitz, La Bruyère, Fénelon, Huet, Clarke, Duguet, Stanhope, Bayle, Le-Clerc, Du-Pin, Jacquelot, Tillotson, De Haller, Sherlock, Le Moine, Pope, Leland, Raciné, Massillon, Ditton, Derham, D'Aguessseau, De Polignac, Saurin, Buffier, Warburton, Tournemine, Bentley, Littleton, Fabricius, Addison, De Bernis, J. J. Rousseau, Para du Phanjhas, Stanislas I., Turgot, Statler, West, Beauzée, Bergier, Carraccioli, Jennings, Duhamel, Liguori, Butler, Bullet, Vauvenargues, Guénard, Blair, De Pompignan, Deluc, Porteous, Gerard, Diessbach, Jacques, Lamourette, La Harpe, Le Coz, Duvoisin, De la Luzerne, Schmitt, Poynter, Moore, Silvio Pellico, Lingard, Brunati, Manzoni, Paley, Perrone, D'Orleans, Campien, Perennes, Wiseman, Buckland, Marcel-de-Serres, Keith, Chalmers, Dupin Aîné, S.S. Gregoire XVI.* Traduites, pour la plupart, des diverses langues dans lesquelles elles avaient été écrites ; reproduites INTÉGRALEMENT, non par extraits ; annotées et publiées par M. L'ABBÉ MIGNÉ, éditeur des Cours Complètes. Petit Montrouge. Paris, 1843.

SUCH is the title-page of this elaborate work, and we give it in full as a brief but comprehensive table of its contents. It is recommended in the "advertisement" as the best work on the truth of Christianity in general, and of Catholicism in particular, in the whole world ; and it is said to be specially distinguished by this, that the authors of the treatises included in it are not mere commentators or theologians, but writers of European reputation, (*des célébrités Européennes*), who are esteemed alike by the men of the world and of the cloister, by the Protestant and the Catholic, by the Infidel and the Believer, as those who have been foremost in point of intelligence in their several ages and countries. But while it is designed for the general defence of Christianity, it is designed also for the special vindication of Catholicism ; and is directed not only against Infidels, who deny or doubt the truth of the one, but also against Heretics and Schismatics, who question the authority of the other. Every objection which has been urged against Christianity, as it is professed in the Church of Rome, is here refuted ; the objections of Pagan philosophy, by Origen, Eusebius, and Augustine ; those of the middle age and of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, by Bacon, Montaigne, and Descartes ; those

of the seventeenth century, by Bossuet, Pascal, and Nicole; those of the eighteenth, by Gerdil, La Harpe, and Milner; and those of the nineteenth, by Poynter, Keith, and Chalmers. And the value of the whole collection is said to consist in this, that each work is given ENTIRE, and that the series contains more than 150 volumes, translated from various languages into French, and constituting a complete body of Apologetic Theology. Its value is supposed to be greatly enhanced by the fact that the whole works of CARDINAL WISEMAN are incorporated in it, who is characterized as one of the most illustrious members of the Episcopate, and who is said to have furnished to the editor a copy of *all* his productions, revised and annotated by his own hand. The work is arranged in *chronological order*, and exhibits the various defences which have appeared from age to age in reply to the successive phases of unbelief, as the best method of exhibiting the progress of human thought, and the filiation and revolution of the various systems of opinion. The title-page of the first volume, however, was adopted provisionally, and every competent reader of the original *Avis* was invited to send in such suggestions as might occur to him, with the view of completing, by means of additional treatises, the outline of the plan which the editor had sketched. Accordingly, in the course of publication, a considerable change was made in the contents, as originally announced; *five* names which appeared in the title-page have been entirely omitted,—viz., Newton, Necker, Milner, Moehler, and Riambourg; partly because the translations of Milner and Moehler had not been completed in time, partly, also, because Riambourg's writings had not yet become public property, and those of Newton and Necker were found to contain, the one too much of the fanaticism of the Protestant, the other of the spirit of philosophy. But for these several other treatises have been substituted; and we are led to expect that in another work, of an analogous character, under the title of "*Nouvelles Démonstrations*," we shall be presented with a *hundred* additional apologists, both ancient and modern, Frenchmen and foreigners. From Italy we are to have Rosmini, Peraltì, Tassoni, Trombelli, and Valsecchi; from England—Lardner, Milman, Anderson, Beattie, Erskine, and Sumner; from Germany—Kühn, Goerres, Doellinger, Tholuck, Müller, Hengstenberg, Klee, Günther, Schlegel, and Drey; from France—Gauchat, Houteville, Lefebvre, François, Papin, Barruel, Regnier, Pontbriant, Beurrier, and Bonhours. From the earlier ages of the Church we are to have Minucius Felix, Arnobius, Lactantius, and Theodoret; from the middle age—Anselm, Thomas, and Raymond Lulle; from the more modern era, Marsilius Ficinus, Savonarola, Du Perron, Vives, De Mornay, Eckius, Cotton, and Morus.

We know few studies more interesting or more instructive than that of the History of Apologetics. As Christianity has come into collision with every successive system of error through the long tract of eighteen hundred years ; with the Pharisaism and Sadducism of the Jews ; with the popular paganism of Greece and Rome ; with the philosophical systems of Epicurus, Plato, and Zeno ; with the mythical theories of Porphyry, Jamblichus, and Julian ; with Mahommedanism in the East, and Infidelity and Rationalism in the West, it is impossible to conceive a more extensive or more inviting field of inquiry than that in which we trace the progress of its trials and triumphs when brought into conflict, at successive epochs, with so many and such formidable antagonists. But in this, as in every other department of theological science, the subject admits of being viewed from different stand-points, and of being treated in different ways. The method that has been most generally followed in this country, is that which is naturally suggested by the *different kinds of evidence* to which an appeal is made in defence or confirmation of our faith ; such as—the *presumptive* evidence, including the argument from Analogy, which is directed to the object partly of neutralizing preliminary objections, so as to relieve the subject of the weight of any adverse prejudice, and partly, also, of imparting to it such a character of verisimilitude, as may serve to awaken a sense of obligation to further inquiry ;—the *direct* evidence, including the *external*, the *internal* and the *experimental* evidence, and exhibiting the argument from the miracles, prophecies, and types of Scripture, with their historical verifications ; the argument from the characters of divinity, which are stamped on its whole contents, and from the confirmatory attestations of Christian experience ;—and finally, the *collateral* or subsidiary evidence, arising from tradition, monumental remains, and other similar sources, which shew that profane history itself is in accordance with the supposition that the Christian religion is true. Another method might be adopted in the treatment of the evidences of revealed religion ;—a method less scientific, indeed, in point of arrangement, but not, perhaps, less interesting or less impressive than the former—the method of exhibiting, in their proper historical order, a continuous series, or at least, a sufficient specimen, of the various defences and apologies which have appeared since the Apostolic age down to the present time. This is the method which has been preferred and adopted by the Abbé Migne and his associates. But even when the historical plan is pursued, there is still room, we think, for a *classification of the topics*, and there might be great advantage in availing ourselves of the aid of system which, in every other branch of inquiry, is found to be so useful and indispensable.

Were the subject treated, not chronologically, as in the present work, but in the order of *its relation to the various parties* with whom Christianity has had to contend, it might be conveniently divided into *four parts*: the *first* exhibiting an historical view of the JEWISH controversy, or of the arguments for and against Christianity, as stated by the advocates of Judaism on the one hand, and the apologists for Christianity on the other; the *second* exhibiting an historical view of the PAGAN controversy, or of the argument maintained by the primitive Christians against ancient heathenism, both in its popular and philosophical form; the *third* exhibiting an outline of the MAHOMMEDAN controversy, or of the argument maintained by the Church against the adherents of the false prophet; and the *fourth* exhibiting a view of the MODERN INFIDEL controversy, including both the argument against the DEISTS of the former, and the RATIONALISTS of the present age. In reviewing the history of these several branches of the great controversy, we shall find that, while there are both arguments and objections which belong peculiarly to each of them, and which impart to them their distinctive character, or constitute their more prominent features, there is also in all of them an evidence of a general kind, applicable at all times and in all circumstances, and available for the benefit of the Universal Church. The Christian apologists reasoned differently, in some respects, with Jews and with Pagans, with Mahommedans, with Deists, and with Neologians; for the principles assumed, or the facts admitted by these several parties, were not the same, and it was necessary to adapt their mode of argument, whether in the way of attack or of defence, to the peculiar opinions of those with whom they were immediately engaged; but notwithstanding this specific diversity, there is a body of positive evidence which is common to them all, and which constitutes the solid substratum of the Christian faith,—even that evidence which arises from the miracles and prophecies of Scripture, from its internal character and experimental verifications, and which is still available for the benefit of modern times, and will continue to be valid till the end of the world.

Christianity was *first* addressed to the Jews, and it offered itself to them as a completion of the scheme which had been revealed in their own Scriptures. Some of them believed the Gospel; others rejected it, and were peculiarly zealous and active in opposing the progress of what they conceived to be an unwarranted and impious innovation on the religion of their fathers. Their opposition began during our Lord's ministry, and was continued under that of his apostles; so that we have in the New Testament itself the earliest authentic account of the

grounds of their unbelief, which are the same in substance, with some modifications, that are insisted on by their descendants at the present day. It would appear from the sacred narrative that, even during the short period of our Lord's public ministry, the question had assumed two successive shapes: at first it was merely, whether Jesus was a prophet sent from God? and for a time many seem to have been willing, like Nicodemus, to acknowledge him in this character on the strength of his impressive teaching and his amazing miracles; but afterwards, when he proclaimed himself as the Messiah that had been promised to their fathers, they were shut up to the alternative of either admitting this high claim, or of denying that he was a prophet at all; and hence those who expected and wished a temporal deliverer rather than a spiritual Saviour, treated him as an impostor, and ascribed his very miracles to Satanic agency. This seems to have been the mental process by which many who were willing at first to acknowledge his prophetic character were ultimately led to reject his claims. Had the question been, whether he was a prophet sent from God? they might have regarded his teaching and his miracles as a sufficient evidence in his favour; but when the question came to be, whether he was the Messiah of whom Moses and the prophets did write? another element must be taken into account, viz., the conformity between his character and work, and the descriptions of both which were contained in the Old Testament. And hence all the objections which are mentioned in the New Testament as having been raised against him during the course of his personal ministry are directed to this point, and designed to shew that he wanted some mark or other which was to be characteristic of the Messiah, and by which he should be identified when he came. In like manner, the great object of the Apostles in arguing with the Jews, was just to prove that "Jesus is the Christ" by appealing to their own Scriptures, and shewing that all the predictions and types of the Old Testament had their true and complete accomplishment in him.

These remarks may serve to explain the *state of the question* as it existed in the Apostolic age. The unbelieving Jews did not deny the miracles of Christ, but conceived that if they could convict him by their own Scriptures of pretending falsely to the character of the promised Messiah, they might account for his miracles by ascribing them, as they did successively, to the power of Beelzebub, or the influence of magic, or to the mystic virtue of the Shem-hamphorash, the ineffable name. It is very remarkable that in their own account of the life of Christ—the *Toldoth Jeschu*—they never once deny his miraculous powers, but attempt merely to account for them by one or other of the

causes to which we have just referred. Their infidelity, then, rested on an intelligible ground: it may be traced to certain peculiarities in their hereditary opinions and expectations, which originated in an erroneous interpretation of the Old Testament, and it may thus be accounted for in perfect consistency with the admitted reality of those miracles which the Christians ascribed to God, the God of Truth, and the Jews to Beelzebub, the Father of Lies. It is not difficult to discover the original grounds of their objections to Christianity. The grand parent cause of their unbelief was undoubtedly that aversion to spiritual religion, and especially that repugnance to the essential doctrines of the Gospel which is natural to the human mind; but next to this, the cause which operated with the greatest efficacy was a prejudice induced by their education in the schools of the Scribes and Pharisees, who had put their own interpretation on some important parts of the Old Testament Scriptures, and who taught them to expect a very different Messiah from what they found in Jesus of Nazareth. There were several distinct topics on which the Christian scheme differed widely from their traditional opinions, and against these their objections were mainly directed. They had been taught to expect a temporal deliverer in the person of Messiah, a powerful prince, who should emancipate their nation from the thralldom of Rome, and re-establish the dominion of the house of David; whereas Jesus appeared as "a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," in a state of poverty and humiliation, attended only by a band of humble fishermen. He proclaimed himself, indeed, as a prince, but only as "the Prince of Peace;" as a king, but as one whose "kingdom was not of this world;" as a Saviour, but as one who came "to save his people from their sins." They had been taught that the law and the institutions of Moses, established as they had been by Divine authority, were immutable and perpetual; and, looking rather to the letter than to the spirit of that economy, they regarded every alteration in its form as an iniquitous attempt to supersede or to innovate on a constitution which had received the seal of God's miraculous attestation: whereas Jesus appeared, declaring, indeed, that "he came not to destroy the law but to fulfil," yet proclaiming also, that "the kingdom of God," a new and better dispensation, was at hand, and that "the hour cometh when neither in the mountain of Samaria, nor yet at Jerusalem, should men worship the Father, but all should worship him everywhere in spirit and in truth." They had been taught to regard themselves as standing in a peculiar relation to God, from which the Gentiles had been expressly excluded, and to believe that none could share in the blessings which belonged to the faithful, otherwise than by becoming proselytes to the

Jewish faith and worship ; but Jesus appeared, proclaiming his reverence for their religious services, yet predicting the abolition of their distinctive privileges, and the destruction of the Temple itself : and he was followed by his apostles, who announced the calling in of the Gentiles, without any of the forms of Jewish proselytism, and without even the preliminary of circumcision. They had been taught that their acceptance with God stood connected with the observance of their sacred rites, and might be secured by the works of their law : hence they gloried in their being the children of Abraham, and heirs according to the promise ; but Jesus appeared, declaring that the righteousness even of the Scribes and Pharisees could not entitle them to admission into the kingdom of God : and that another method of salvation, not by works but by grace, was announced in the gospel of his spiritual kingdom.

There were many other points of inferior moment, which gave rise to occasional controversy between the first Christians and the Jews, in those colloquial discussions which preceded the literary warfare on the subject ; but the topics which have been briefly indicated were the cardinal hinges on which the whole question turned in primitive times. At a later period, the Jews, while they retained and transmitted the old objections of their fathers, along with their comments on the life and miracles of the Saviour, were driven by the progress of events, and especially by the destruction of Jerusalem, the dispersion of their nation, and the continued disappointment of their fondly cherished hopes, to have recourse to other expedients, both for vindicating their own cause and assailing the credit of the Christian Church ; and their more recent grounds of objection may be described as consisting chiefly in the following particulars :—The prophecies which their earlier writers had usually described as Messianic, were otherwise applied, some to Hezekiah, others to the Jewish nation at large, so as to evade or invalidate the proof which Christians had derived from them in favour of the Lord Jesus Christ. The predictions, again, which were still acknowledged to be Messianic, were said to be suspended, or their fulfilment delayed, on account of their sins, and to wait for their accomplishment until the dispersed of Israel should return to God with their whole heart. Some of their writers, too, broached the idea of *two* Messiahs, the one a suffering, the other a conquering and victorious Saviour, endeavouring thereby to evade the argument from the fulfilment of ancient prophecy, both in the humiliation and exaltation of Jesus of Nazareth. They further endeavoured to invalidate the authority of the New Testament in a great variety of instances, and by most minute and captious criticism, by shewing that it is self-contradictory, as well as utterly at variance with the true

meaning of the Old Testament, on which it was professedly founded. And finally, after the corruption of Christianity, both in the Eastern and Western Churches, the Jews found a fertile, and, it must be owned, a well-founded ground of objection against Christianity as it was then exhibited, in the superstitions which had become incorporated with it, and especially in the idolatrous worship of saints and images, which they justly conceived to be at direct variance with the whole design and scope of the Old Testament, and with the express law of the Decalogue; and thus these flagrant corruptions served not only to weaken the Christian Church, but also to confirm the unbelief of God's ancient people, who did not discriminate aright between the system of Christianity as it is revealed in the New Testament, and the corrupt form of it which was embodied in the visible Church. These are the principal heads of the controversy between the Jews and Christians, first in primitive, and then in more recent times. On both sides, it has been partly *defensive*, and partly *aggressive*: the Jews having defended their own position, and assailed that of the Christians; while the Christians have vindicated the Gospel from Jewish objections, and assailed the Jews in their turn, by shewing the inconsistency of their tenets with the true meaning of their own Scriptures. In reviewing the whole course of this most interesting discussion, between the representatives of God's ancient people and the followers of Christ, we can hardly fail to be impressed with the feeling that the continued unbelief of the Jews, notwithstanding the disappointment of their long-cherished hopes, and the signal accomplishment of the Scriptures in their mournful experience, is a very awful phenomenon in the moral world; but it is one which should in nowise shake or stagger our faith: on the contrary, it is a signal proof of the Divine prescience by which it was predicted; and it should lead us to remove every stumbling-block out of their way, by reforming the abuses of the Church, while we wait in faith and prayer for the time when Israel shall be grafted in again, and when their conversion will add fresh evidence and impart new life to the Christianity of the whole world.

The literature of this *first* branch of the great controversy is peculiarly rich. It commences with the earliest Apologists; it is continued onwards from age to age, long after Paganism had been overthrown; it employed many pens amidst the darkness of mediæval times; and even at the present day, amidst the light and civilisation of the nineteenth century, it is neither obsolete nor unimportant. Any one who is disposed to study it as a distinct branch of the general subject, may consult with advantage a few standard works, produced at each of the

successive eras of its history : in primitive times, we have the dialogue of Justin Martyr with Trypho a Jew, and Origen's reply to Celsus, who personated a Jewish objector to Christianity : in the middle age, we have the "*Pugio Fidei adversus Mauros et Judæos*," written in the thirteenth century, and afterwards published at Leipsic with valuable prefaces by De Voisin and Carpzovius : at a later period, we have the "*Tela Ignea Satanae*," by Wagenseil, including amongst other curious pieces, the *Toldoth Jeshu*, or the Jewish account of the life and miracles of Christ ; we have also the valuable work of Limborch, "*Amica collatio cum erudito Judæo*," (Dr. Orobius,) with the treatises of Kidder and Stanhope in the Boyle Lectureship : and in our own age, and for popular use, we have Charles Leslie's "*Short Method with the Jews*;" Dr. Greville Ewing's "*Essays addressed to the Jews, on the authority, the scope, and the consummation of the Law and the Prophets*;" and "*The Old Paths, or a Comparison of the Principles and Doctrines of Modern Judaism, with the Religion of Moses and the Prophets*," by Dr. Alexander M'Aul of Trinity College, Dublin. These works, read in connexion with Allen's "*Modern Judaism*," which gives an interesting account of their present opinions and observances, and with Dr. Owen's "*Preliminary Exercitations*," which contain a vast amount of information on the methods and artifices of Rabbinical exegesis, will be sufficient for the illustration of the *first* branch of Christian Apologetics.

The controversy with Judaism began during the personal ministry of our Lord ; it was speedily followed by the *Pagan* controversy, when, under the ministry of his Apostles, Christianity was openly proclaimed to the Gentiles as well as to the Jews. The history of this *second* branch of the subject is deeply interesting ; it leads us to contemplate the progress and triumph of Divine truth, proclaimed by a few fishermen and tentmakers, in opposition to the learning, and policy, and power, of the greatest empire that ever existed in the world. We must endeavour to conceive of the grandeur and gorgeousness of that system of superstitious worship which then prevailed, if we would estimate either the difficulty or the value of the triumph which Christianity achieved. It was a system of Polytheism, universally diffused and firmly established : tolerant of all forms of religious observance, and of every variety of religious creed, one only excepted,—a system which had been the gradual growth of centuries,—which priests had hallowed, and poets celebrated, and princes patronized : a system defended by the policy and power of the Roman Empire, and associated with the prejudices and habits, the affections and interests, the very pastimes and passions of the people : a system

which statesmen upheld as a convenient engine of government; which philosophers might inwardly despise, but would not openly assail; and to which the veriest sceptics offered the homage of outward respect and observance. In the words of Gibbon,—“The policy of the emperors and the Senate, as far as it concerned religion, was happily seconded by the reflections of the enlightened, and by the habits of the superstitious part of their subjects. The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true, by the philosopher, as equally false, and by the magistrate, as equally useful: and thus toleration produced not only mutual indulgence, but even religious concord. The superstition of the people was not embittered by any mixture of theological rancour; nor was it confined by the chains of any speculative system. ‘The devout Polytheist, though fondly attached to his national rites, admitted with implicit faith the different religions of the earth.’ ‘Such was the mild spirit of antiquity, that the nations were less attentive to the difference than to the resemblance of their religious worship.’ Notwithstanding the fashionable irreligion which prevailed in the age of the Antonines, both the interests of the priests and the credulity of the people were sufficiently respected. In their writings and conversation, the philosophers of antiquity asserted the independent dignity of reason, but they resigned their actions to the commands of law and of custom. Viewing with a smile of pity and indulgence, the various errors of the vulgar, they diligently practised the ceremonies of their fathers, devoutly frequented the temples of the gods: and sometimes condescending to act a part on the theatre of superstition, they concealed the sentiments of an Atheist under the sacerdotal robes.”* Such is the modern sceptic’s glowing picture of ancient Paganism: yet, suddenly a few fishermen appeared in an obscure corner of the Roman Empire—they preached, and with no power, excepting that which accompanied their word, their doctrine spread, and spread the wider and faster by reason of persecution and martyrdom, until that old, established, and gorgeous superstition fell, like Dagon before the ark of the living God.

The Pagan controversy was in some respects widely different from the Jewish. With a few inconsiderable exceptions, the Gentiles had no previous knowledge of the character and will of the true God as these had been revealed to the Jews in the Old Testament Scriptures: they held principles, or rather were preoccupied with prejudices, of a directly opposite kind. It was necessary, therefore, to reason differently with them, and

* *Gibbon’s Decline and Fall*, vol. i. p. 41.

to direct their thoughts in the first instance to the fundamental truths of a pure Theism, and the flagrant errors of their favourite superstitions. Accordingly, we find in the New Testament, which contains the earliest information on the subject, that the Apostles reasoned with the Gentiles in this way; as when Paul stood on Mars' Hill, and addressing the cultivated inhabitants of Athens, exclaimed, "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are exceedingly given to the worship of the Gods, (*ὡς δεισιδαιμονεστέρους ὑμᾶς θεωρῶ*, Acts xvii. 22;) for as I passed by and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription, *TO THE UNKNOWN GOD*. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, HIM declare I unto you. God that made the world, and all things therein." "In Him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring. Forasmuch, then, as *we* are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art or man's device." This is a beautiful specimen of the primitive argument against Paganism. The question, however, assumed several distinct shapes in the subsequent history of the Church. In its earliest stage it was simply a question as to the claims of Christ as the founder of a new religion, or as the object of religious worship; and had the Apostles contented themselves with merely urging these claims, without denouncing the creeds and customs of Polytheism, there seems to be no reason to doubt that multitudes who were ready to welcome any new system which commended itself to their taste, might have consented to give Christ a place in the Pantheon, and Christianity full and ample toleration in the empire. But the very genius of Christianity forbade such an alliance: it was essentially and directly opposed to Paganism in all its forms—it admitted of no compromise, and could not speak to error in the language of conciliation; and as soon as its true character was discerned, the controversy assumed a new and more formidable aspect. At this second stage, the prejudices and passions of the people combined with the policy and power of government to put down Christianity by persecuting its disciples, not because Christianity professed to be a true and good religion, for this many might have been willing to concede, but because it professed to be *the only* religion that was pleasing to the one living and true God. Hence "the mild and tolerant spirit of Paganism," which could endure and even protect and establish every form of superstitious worship, was converted at once into a spirit of persecution. This was the age of martyrdom, and the arguments of the first Christians were sealed with their blood. As persecution waxed hotter, the controversy became, on the side of the Christians, rather an assault on

Paganism than a defence of Christianity ; the courage of the martyrs rose as their danger increased, and they boldly attacked both the superstitions of the common people and the philosophical systems of the more refined advocates of the established worship. A *third* stage arrived, when the opposition which had hitherto been made to Christianity by the brute power of the mob or the magistrate, was embodied in writings designed partly for the vindication of the ancient system, and partly for the conviction and exposure of the Christians. Various charges of a most heinous and offensive nature were preferred against them, charges which, if they had been true, might have justified the interference of the Government in crushing an immoral and unsocial abomination ; and the Christians replied in self-defence, renewing, at the same time, their solemn protest against Paganism as a false and debasing superstition. This was the era of the Apologists, whose writings, often addressed to the Roman magistrates and emperors, were mainly directed to disprove the accusations which had been brought against them. The *last* stage of the controversy arrived, when the defenders of Paganism, driven from many of their ancient strongholds, and no longer able to defend the old superstitions in their naked grossness, had recourse to an allegorical explanation of them, contending that they were designed to represent the principles and processes of physical nature, and that, when thus interpreted, they contained the maxims of a hidden wisdom. They had recourse, too, to another expedient—that of writing the lives of their great men, such as Apollonius of Tyana, and setting them up as rivals to Jesus Christ. The extant remains or reputed opinions of Porphyry, Jamblichus, and Julian, throw an interesting light on this phase of the great argument.

But Paganism was doomed ; the breath of the Lord had smitten it, and neither the power of the empire, nor the prejudices of the people, nor the artifices of the priests, nor the plausible sophistries of a pliant philosophy, could save it ; it fell before an humble band of Galilean preachers, and now, throughout the whole extent of Europe, it lives only in the classic page.—*“Stat nominis umbra.”*

For a full view of the controversy, which issued in the downfall of ancient Paganism and the public establishment of Christianity, recourse must be had to the early Apologists—to Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Minucius Felix, Arnobius, Eusebius, and Augustine. In the *“Démonstrations Évangéliques,”* several treatises belonging to this era are given entire in a French version, viz., TERTULLIAN’S *“Apologeticus adversus Gentes pro Christianis,”* and also (for a special reason which will be noticed afterwards) his *“Liber de Pre-*

scriptionibus Hæreticorum;" ORIGEN's treatise against Celsus; the Evangelical Preparation and Evangelical Demonstration of EUSEBIUS; and AUGUSTINE's treatise on the true Religion. These are the only treatises given in this work that bear on the early history of Christian Apologetics; and from the age of Augustine there is a sudden leap to that of Montaigne and Bacon. The bill of fare is somewhat meagre in this department. We have nothing of Justin Martyr, nothing of Clement, and nothing of "the City of God." We thankfully accept the valuable treatises of the Bishop of Cæsarea, and have long wished to see them translated, so as to be made accessible to the unlearned reader. In our own language we have a good specimen of the earlier Apologies in Mr. REEVES' translation of Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Minucius Felix, and Vincentius Lirinensis, which may be read with the greater advantage after a careful perusal of Archbishop Wake's "Genuine Epistles of the Apostolic Fathers." The Abbé Houteville, in a discourse prefixed to "The Christian Religion proved by Facts," gives an interesting "review of the method of the principal authors who have written for and against Christianity since the Apostolic age." This discourse was translated into English, and published separately. SEMISCH in his "Life and Times of Justin Martyr," has collected a large variety of information illustrative of the same subject. But by far the best source of information, next to the study of the original writers, is the immortal work of LARDNER, a work that can never be superseded nor surpassed, and which will only acquire a higher value in proportion as the principles of historical evidence are more thoroughly understood, and the application of them more carefully studied.

The conflict with ancient Polytheism had scarcely terminated, when there arose in the East a new and formidable antagonist to Christianity, which, unlike Paganism, loudly proclaimed the unity of God, and admitted generally the truth both of the Old and the New Testaments, while it proposed a new and authoritative revelation from Heaven. Christianity had already become corrupt or lethargic, and MAHOMET was sent as a scourge to the Eastern churches. "With the sword in one hand, and the Koran in the other,"* he speedily obtained a complete mastery over extensive and populous regions, and established an almost insurmountable barrier against the progress of gospel truth. Yet Mahomet and his followers were not unbelievers, in the ordinary sense of the term; they recognised both Moses and Christ as true prophets; and the Koran itself contains innumerable refer-

* Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, vol. ix. pp. 192, 224. (12mo.)

ences to the facts and doctrines both of the Old and the New Testaments. It is, in fact, founded on these earlier revelations, and professes to be supplementary to them; but it speaks not only of the corruption of the Christian churches, it speaks also of the corruption of the sacred writings; and Mahomet is described as the Paraclete or comforter whom Christ promised to send, after his ascension, to guide his disciples into *all truth*. It contradicts the received Scriptures, both in regard to some matters of fact, and to several important points of faith and practice; but, speaking generally, it does homage to the great facts on which the Jewish and Christian religion are based. Its brief but comprehensive confession of faith may be summed up in two articles, which are described by Gibbon as "an eternal truth and a necessary fiction;" that THERE IS ONLY ONE GOD, AND THAT MAHOMET IS THE APOSTLE OF GOD.

Propounded as it was to rude and ignorant tribes, many of them still practising the rites of Sabeian worship, and offering their homage to the sun, moon, and stars, as well as to departed but deified heroes, and published at a time when the Christian Churches in the East had fallen into corruption and decay, it excited opposition, as every innovation in religion must,—but this was speedily quelled, not by spiritual but by carnal weapons. We have fragments of colloquial debate and discussion, during the life of Mahomet, which are incorporated in all the authentic histories of his singular career, and which are sufficient to shew that his revelations were not at first received with implicit credence: but we have no record of any literary controversy on the subject until a much later period, when the claims of a system, already firmly established by force, began to be canvassed at the bar of reason. The translation of the Koran by Sale, with his introductory dissertations; and the writings of Pococke, Reland, Prideaux, and Boulainvilliers, may be consulted with advantage on its earlier history: but more recent works must be referred to if we would understand fully the precise state of the question as between the Christian and Mahomedan faith. This branch of the general controversy is often regarded as one of very subordinate interest, and as having little claim on the attention of students: and it is true, so far, that we are less in danger from the claims of the false prophet, than from the cavils and objections of infidels within our own borders. But there are at least *two* considerations,—the one of a general, the other of a more special kind,—which may serve to vindicate the claims of the Mahomedan controversy to the careful study of the more inquiring members of the Christian ministry:—the *first* is, that it serves, in the way of contrast, to enhance the strength and value of the Christian evidence, by shewing how difficult, or

rather how impossible it is for any scheme of imposture to *simulate* an evidence of the same or of a similar kind; and by exposing the shifts and expedients to which, in the absence of that evidence, every impostor, however fanatical, must necessarily be reduced. The *second* is, that if it be not necessary for all, it is indispensable at least for our missionaries in the East, to acquire a thorough knowledge of the arguments *pro* and *con* as between the advocates of the Christian and Mahommedan faith; since they must necessarily come into frequent intercourse with the followers of the false prophet, and they will find, that of all the opponents of Christianity, they are the least ready to be convinced or impressed by the preaching of the Gospel. On this subject, we refer to a very curious collection of papers recently published by Dr. Lee, Professor of Arabic at Cambridge, entitled, "Controversial Tracts on Christianity and Mahommedanism, by the late Rev. HENRY MARTYN, and some of the most eminent writers of Persia." In a very long and learned Preface, Professor Lee gives "some notices and extracts from the controversy, as it existed prior to the times of Mr. Martyn,"—especially from three books, "one composed in the Persian language by Hieronymo Xavier, a Catholic missionary: another, containing a reply to Xavier's work, by a Persian nobleman named Ahmed Ibn Zain Elébidin, written also in the Persian; and the third a rejoinder in Latin, by Philip Guadagnoli, one of the Professors attached to the College *de propaganda fide*, in defence of Xavier's work." In the first of these treatises the elementary principles of Theism are inculcated at the outset, in opposition to the Eastern doctrines of Pantheism and Absorption: then the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, and original sin, are expounded; and, finally, the contrast between the Christian and Mahommedan faith is illustrated in a variety of distinct particulars. All this, however, is intermingled, as might have been expected, with doctrines peculiarly Popish; such as the worship of images, and the virtue of sacred relics, the religious observance of saints' days, and the temporal and spiritual power of the Popes. In the reply of the Persian nobleman there is not a little of acute ingenious pleading, founded on the contents of the New Testament itself. He attempts to shew that our Lord's warning against false prophets does not apply to Mahomet, whose advent had been predicted, as well as that of Christ, in the earliest Scriptures—the Pentateuch; for the words, "a light came from Mount Sinai," apply to Moses; and the words, "it shone upon us from Mount Seir," apply to Christ, who spoke from Seir in Galilee: and the words, "it was revealed to us from Mount Paran," apply to Mahomet, who spake from Mount Paran, in the neighbourhood of Mecca. He farther attempts to shew, that

Christ's teaching was as much opposed to that of Moses as Mahomet's was to that of Christ, and that we are shut up, either to the impartial rejection of both, or the admission of their respective claims. He argues, too, with all the subtlety of a European critic, quite, indeed, in the vein of Strauss and his compatriots, on the discrepancies of the sacred narrative, and is quite as decided, and as *rational* too, as any Socinian in denying the divinity of Christ, and denouncing the doctrine of the Trinity. The defence of Xavier by Guadagnoli, which is dedicated to Pope Urban VIII., and which bears upon it the approbation and *imprimatur* of the sacred college, is divided into *four parts*, corresponding to the four principal heads of objections by the Mahomedans; the first relating to the sacred mystery of the Trinity; the second, to the ineffable sacrament of the Incarnation; the third, to the authority of the sacred writings; and the fourth, to the Koran, and the claims of Mahomet as a legislator. The controversy between the saintly *Henry Martyn* and the Mahomedans commenced in 1811. Mirza Ibrahim, the preceptor of all the Moolas, was the writer of a book in defence of Mahomedanism, which appeared on the 26th of July. "A considerable time," it is said, "had been spent in its preparation, and on its seeing the light it obtained the credit of surpassing all former treatises upon Islam." Henry Martyn's biographer says that his reply to it was divided into two parts—the first devoted principally to an attack upon Mahomedanism; the second intended to display the evidences and establish the authority of the Christian faith. Professor Lee, however, divides it into three parts, and offers first a translation of the Arabic tract of Mirza Ibrahim, in defence of Islamism, with an appendix, containing an extract from the tract of Aga Acber, on the miracles of Mahomet; and then the translation of the first, second, and third tract of Mirza Ibrahim, by Martyn, with the rejoinder of Mohammed Ruza in reply, and a copious criticism by the editor and translator. We have referred to this work as affording the best exemplification, accessible to us, of the state of the Mahometan controversy in the present age; and we cordially agree with Professor Lee in thinking, "that the general attention that has of late been paid to missionary exertion, both within and without the pale of the Church of England, constitutes a farther motive to the prosecution of these studies; and that without an extensive cultivation of them, there is not much reason to anticipate the success to which it is their object to attain."

The more modern controversy between Christianity and unbelief falls to be divided into two parts—the Deistical and the Neologian.

The revival of letters, and the reformation of the Church, aided by the invention of printing, and the general progress of civilisation, produced an active and restless spirit of inquiry in Europe, while the offensive and intolerable corruptions which had infected the visible Church gave rise in many minds to a deep-seated, heartfelt prejudice against Christianity itself. The right of private judgment, which had been violently wrested from men, and as violently redeemed, was no sooner restored than, by a natural reaction, it sought to revenge itself on those by whom it had been forcibly enchained. And the *fourth* great controversy between Christianity and the spirit of unbelief, was *occasioned*, more or less directly, although it cannot be said to have been *caused*, by that great revolution in the public mind of Europe.

There is a striking difference between the ancient Pagan and the modern Deistical controversy. In the former, the advocates of Christianity were called to expose the absurdities and immoralities of Polytheism, which had become, under the unaided light of nature, the universal religion of mankind: in the latter, they were met with the plea that Revelation was unnecessary, and therefore incredible, by reason of the *perfect sufficiency of the light of nature*, and the purity and perfection of the religious system which it was able of itself to establish in the world. What had occurred, it might be asked, in the ages which intervened between the two to account for, or to justify so great a change in the state of the question? Had human reason excogitated for itself a system of pure and perfect Theism? or had she derived from Christianity a new view of nature, and decked herself out in borrowed plumes! The Bible, as God's own commentary on his works, throws a flood of light on the constitution of Nature, and on the course of Providence: it appeals above all to the conscience, and rouses it into vigorous action; and thus, even where its heavenly origin is doubted, or its peculiar doctrines despised, it may operate powerfully in producing both a purer Ethics and a more perfect Theism, than had ever been attained to through the unaided light of nature; and on the ground of this very benefit,—a secondary and derivative result of revelation, the pride of man's reason may found an argument to shew that Natural Religion is all-sufficient, and supernatural teaching superfluous. Now that reason was recognised as a rightful inquirer, she must forthwith arrogate the functions of an arbiter, and the authority of a judge: she must deliberate on the *reasonableness* of every article of faith, and receive or reject it without reference to *authority*, whether human or Divine; and thus, instead of sitting down meekly as a scholar, she must exalt herself as a superior, and man's folly must give or deny its sanction to

the wisdom of God. This fatal principle,—so different from that of the mere right, or rather the moral duty of private judgment,—led as a necessary consequence to the rejection of the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel ; for these doctrines which constitute the characteristic features and the very essence of real Christianity, are alike offensive to carnal reason, and opposed to the corrupt passions of men ; they must, therefore, be discarded as “foolishness,” and those lessons of Scripture must only be retained which commend themselves to the unrenewed mind. Hence the Deism of Lord Herbert ; hence the meagre heresy of Socinus ; and hence also the monstrous Neology of Germany.

But this controversy also has assumed various shapes, and passed through several successive stages. Sometimes it has deified Nature and denied God—not only as the revealer of supernatural truth, but also as the creator and governor of the world ; and in this form the system of Pantheism, idealistic or material, is substituted for the religion of the Bible, as in the writings of Spinoza and Comte. Sometimes it has decried reason and undermined all the principles of human belief ; and in this form a withering and dreary scepticism takes the place of a simple and confiding faith, as in the writings of Montaigne and Hume. Sometimes it has attempted to establish a system of pure Theism, on the ground of natural evidence and without the aid of revelation ; and in this case, a cold and lifeless form is substituted for the vital spirit of Christianity, as in the writings of Herbert of Cherbury. On this important branch of the great controversy, we possess an invaluable treatise in Dr. JOHN LELAND’S “VIEW of the principal Deistical Writers that have appeared in England in the last and present Century ;” a work which states the views, and answers the objections of Herbert, Hobbes, Blount, Toland, Shaftesbury, Collins, Woolston, Tindal, Morgan, Chubb, Hume, Bolingbroke, and some other anonymous writers, and gives an account of the various answers which were published against them at the time when their writings appeared. The “*Démonstrations Évangéliques*” furnish a useful supplement to this important work, by making us acquainted with a considerable number of Continental writers, whose works are not so generally known in this country, and whose views, although somewhat different from those of the Protestant defenders of Christianity, are often such as to contribute both strength and ornament to the same august and noble cause.

The Deistical controversy in England had a closer connexion than may at first sight appear, with the rise and progress of Rationalism in Germany. For, whether we accept the testimony of the “*Tracts for the Times*,” “that the Rationalism of Germany was occasioned in good measure by the importation of

deistical books and opinions from England—books and opinions which England herself had rejected;”* or the somewhat contradictory testimony of Dr. Pusey, “that the constant appeal to the *rationality* of Christianity, which led Tindal to conceive of it as a mere republication of the religion of nature, was extremely encouraged in Germany by the translation of the works of the *earlier English apologists* ;”†—in either case a connexion is established between the two great phases of English and German infidelity; and such a connexion as proves the filiation of the one from the other. The supposed “reasonableness of Christianity” led some, in the first instance, to explain away all that was peculiar to the Gospel, or offensive to the natural mind; and when this attempt was found to be too arduous, it was succeeded by the theory of myths, which essayed to account for every fact or doctrine of Scripture on purely natural principles. The history of this portentous aberration of reason is sketched by Amand Saintes, in his “*Histoire Critique de Rationalisme en Allemagne* ;”‡ and its leading principles are well discussed in the “*Études Critiques sur le Rationalisme Contemporain*,” par L’ABBÉ H. DE VALROGER.§ In its earlier development it is illustrated by Mr. Rose and Dr. Pusey; in its latest it is embodied in Strauss’s *Leben Jesu*, which has been answered by Neander, Tholuck, and others, a specimen of whose arguments is given in Dr. Beard’s “*Voice of the Church*.”

We have thus briefly sketched the outline of a comprehensive course of study in the department of Christian apologetics; and we think that some such arrangement of the various topics of that complex theme as we have ventured to indicate might be adopted with great practical advantage. Before leaving the subject we may add, that besides the “*Discours Historique et Critique*,” by the Abbé Houteville, to which we have already referred, the history of apologetic literature has been written in German by *Tschirner*, (*Geschichte der Apologetik*;) that Dr. Gerard of Aberdeen has exhibited a succinct but comprehensive “*View of the Controversy concerning the Truth of Christianity*,” in his *Compend of the Evidences*; and that the student will find an excellent guide in the “*Delectus Argumentorum et Syllabus Scriptorum qui Veritatem Religionis Christianæ adversus Atheos, Epicureos, Deistos, seu Naturalistos, Idololatrios, Judæos, et Muhammedanos lucubrationibus suis asseruerunt*,” by J. A. Fabricius.

The voluminous, and in some respects valuable work, whose title stands at the head of our Article, has not been framed according to the method which we have described. The editor,

* Tracts for the Times, No. 57, p. 8.

‡ Paris, 1841.

† Dr. Pusey on the Theology of Germany.

§ Paris, 1846, pp. 912. 8vo.

following no other order of arrangement than that of mere chronological succession, and guided in his selection of the treatises which should be inserted simply by his own views, or by the advice which he received from others, in regard to what might be best suited to the wants or tastes of the present age, has presented to the public a translation of a large number of volumes and tracts, generally well executed, and often accompanied with valuable literary notices, both of the authors by whom they were severally written, and of the various discussions to which they gave rise. The work, however, can only be regarded as a store-house of materials for the construction of a system of apologetics—a store-house which is peculiarly rich and full in the department of the more modern Continental treatises, but comparatively meagre in that of the earlier apologists. The plan of publishing the entire treatise, in every instance, which is generally followed, cannot be too highly commended; and we are only the more confirmed in this opinion by several instances in which the editor has departed from it, as in the case of Montaigne, Boyle, and Nicole. The editor and his accomplished associates deserve our thanks for the intellectual banquet which they have prepared for us; the viands are so good, and at the same time, as we are assured, *so very cheap*, that they might have been safely left to commend themselves; and surely it could scarcely be necessary to introduce such a work to the only class of readers who are at all likely to relish it, by the following astounding *gascognade*—“*Nous ne craignons pas de dire de cette publication qu'elle est, sans contredit, sur la vérité du Christianisme en général, et du Catholicisme en particulier, l'ouvrage le plus fort qui existe dans le monde entier.*” “*Nous ne craignons pas d'avancer que celui qui posséderait bien nos Démonstrations, pourrait à bon droit faire dire de lui à tout adversaire, Timeo unius libri virum; et si, dans nos temps de scepticisme, de doute et d'indifférence, quelqu'un, laïque ou prêtre, se trouvoit condamné à n'avoir qu'un seul ouvrage en sa possession, nous lui conseillerions volontiers de donner, après les saints livres, la préférence à nos Démonstrations!*”

The work thus highly extolled is liable, in our opinion, to at least one very grave and serious objection. It is avowedly a defence of Christianity in general, and of Catholicism in particular; and hence, while the writings of Bacon, Grotius, Boyle, Locke, Burnet, Leslie, Clarke, Tillotson, Sherlock, Leland, Chalmers, Keith, and many other Protestants, are laid under contribution for the general defence of Christianity, those of Bossuet, Bourdaloue, Fénelon, Bergier, Gerdil, and above all, of Wiseman, are added not only in defence of the same cause, but also in support of the peculiar doctrines and claims of the Church

of Rome, which the former class of writers would have indignantly denounced as flagrant corruptions of "the faith once delivered to the saints." We do not accuse the editor or his associates of *mala fides* in this, for the plan of the work is boldly announced at the outset, and we are frankly told that the writers have been purposely selected, on the principle of providing for two distinct objects:—That "the one half of them might demonstrate Christianity, in opposition to doubters and infidels of all sorts, and the other half might compel all heretics to rush into the arms of Catholicism as their only safe resting-place. Nor are we prepared to say that every allusion to the distinctive principles of the Church to which the writer belongs is forbidden by the laws of legitimate controversy. But we do most seriously protest against any attempt to make Christianity responsible for the errors and corruptions of the Church of Rome, or to throw the *onus* of defending the spiritual and temporal supremacy of the Pope, the doctrine of Transubstantiation, and the worship of saints and images, on her apologists. We hold that these doctrines and rites constitute no part of genuine Christianity; and we know of nothing more fraught with danger to the sacred cause, than any attempt to mix them up with the faith which we are concerned to defend. What can be more revolting to reason, or more inconsistent with the testimony of our very senses, than the figment of Transubstantiation? or what better fitted to strengthen the prejudices of worldly men against religion, as if it were the product of mere priestcraft, than the arrogant pretensions of the Pope and his hierarchy? And what more grievous stumbling-block to the surviving representatives of God's ancient people than the apparent idolatry of the Church of Rome? Yet all these obnoxious tenets and observances are blended in this work with the great truths of natural and revealed religion, and placed, in point of evidence and authority, precisely on the same level; as if Christianity could not exist or could not at least be proved without the recognition of what every Protestant abhors and abjures: and this, too, while the Christianity of Bacon, and Locke, and other Protestants, is largely insisted on, and their writings are laid under contribution in aid of the sacred cause. There is in our mind a manifest and glaring inconsistency in the procedure of the learned Abbé and his assistants in this matter. We have, on the one hand, a formal recognition of the personal Christianity of such Protestant writers as Bacon, Boyle, Grotius, Newton, and Clarke; and yet we have, on the other, an equally explicit denial of their claim to be regarded as members of the one true Catholic Church. They were Christians, and sincere Christians too; nay, they were able and valiant defenders of the common faith of Christendom, insomuch that even the Papacy

itself has not scorned their aid in constructing a body of apologetic theology : but they were Protestants, and as such separated from the pale of that Church which claims a monopoly of salvation. They “were aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenant of promise.” Surely the learned Abbé must see that, if real personal Christianity may exist in a state of separation from the Church of Rome, the exclusive claims and arrogant pretensions of that Church are not a little preposterous. And yet, while it is admitted that Bacon was profoundly versed in the knowledge of Scripture, and that it was a delightful task to collect the fragments which serve to shew the profound religion of that great man, (*la religion profonde de ce grand homme,*) while the personal piety of Boyle, Newton, Stanhope, and many more, is explicitly declared, we are nevertheless assured that they had no part nor lot in the Church on earth, and could have no hope of being admitted into the Church in heaven ! GROTIUS had said towards the close of his great work—that he would now shew in a few words to Christians, of whatever nation or sect, what use they should make of the truths which had been established : and this truly liberal and catholic recognition of true Christianity wherever it exists is immediately followed up by a note breathing the unchangeable spirit of Popery. “C’est une erreur de croire qu’il y ait d’autres vrais Chrétiens ni d’autres domestiques de la foi, que les fidèles qui sont dans le sein de l’Eglise Catholique ; ceux qui s’en sont séparés, ceux qui forment ces sectes, qui toutes divisées entre elles, ne s’accordent que pour s’élever contre l’Eglise Romaine, la seule véritable,—tous ceux-là ne sont point enfants de l’Eglise : comme ils ne reconnaissent point celle-ci pour leur Mère sur la terre, ils ne doivent point espérer d’avoir Dieu pour Père dans le ciel. L’Eglise est l’Arche hors laquelle il n’y a point de salut !” We had thought that all true Christians belong to the true Church here, and might hope for admission into the Church above ; but no ; the Christianity of Bacon and Boyle is admitted, nevertheless they were Protestants, and as Protestants they must be excluded. And yet occasionally we discover some traces of a natural relenting—some indications of a certain degree of indecision. They are once called “*nos frères séparés* ;” and the definition of the Church is sometimes made wide enough to embrace all in every place who profess to believe in Jesus Christ, and who observe the ordinances of his house.

We cannot of course attempt, within our assigned limits, to offer a detailed criticism on the various treatises, extending, as we are told, to somewhere about 150 octavo volumes, which are comprised in sixteen folios, closely printed in double columns ; but, on a general survey of their contents, we have collected a

few *notabilia* which may serve to illustrate at once the general plan of the work, and the method in which it is executed.

The selections from the writings of TERTULLIAN, which form the first article in the series, are sufficient to indicate the two-fold object which the editor has kept steadily in view throughout—his one object being the defence of Christianity in general, he has given Tertullian’s APOLOGY against the Gentiles, and his other object being the defence of Catholicism in particular, he has added Tertullian’s Treatise “*De Præscriptionibus Hæreticorum.*” This “unique argument des Præscriptions,” is said to be vastly effectual, and it certainly is *very convenient*: it is described as “a peremptory exception which the defendant is entitled to take against the assailant, and by which the latter is non-suited, owing to the absence of a title to plead, without entering at all into the consideration of his reasons or his method.” And with this formidable weapon Tertullian is said to have vanquished all the sects that were hostile to the Church, “*without refuting any of their arguments—without even examining any of their doctrines.*” Why then did Tertullian publish his Apology? why did he enter on a formal refutation of the errors of Marcion? why did he argue and redargue as if everything depended on the strength of his proofs? and why do his Popish Translators reproduce his arguments in defence of Christianity at the present day? Surely if *Præscription* had already taken place while he lived, and were sufficient of itself to bar all pleas whether of infidels or of heretics, it must have been confirmed by the lapse of 1600 years; and yet even the Church of Rome will not leave the cause to rest upon it; she eagerly lays hold of every subsidiary prop which reason may furnish, and does not disdain even to accept the aid of Leland, and Chalmers, and Keith.

We gladly accept the version of Origen’s reply to Celsus, and the two great works of Eusebius—the latter being still a desideratum in our own language. The treatise selected from the writings of Augustine is too brief to afford an adequate representation of the apologetics of the author of “*The City of God.*” In these cases the rule of translating the entire treatise has been adhered to, but we are now introduced to a class of writings which are presented only in fragments, and these fragments are selected and arranged without any intelligible principle other than the mere taste of the translator. Thus, after a long disquisition, entitled, “*The Christianity of Montaigne,*” in which the philosophical sceptic is declared to have been a sound believer and a true Catholic, nay, all but inspired, if we can believe his enthusiastic panegyrist, who does not scruple to say, “*L’Esprit de Dieu semblerait dicter, et Montaigne tenir la plume,*” we are presented with a long series of extracts from the Natural Theo-

logy of Raymond de Sebonde, accompanied with a corresponding series of extracts from Montaigne's *Essays*, and these are strung together without any discernible principle of connexion.

Next in order comes the immortal BACON; and we are gratified to find that, although not a Catholic, he is recognised as a Christian, while his great merits as the Father of Inductive Science are frankly acknowledged. In a preliminary discourse, containing some interesting literary notices illustrative of the opinions which have been entertained of the Baconian philosophy on the Continent, and especially in France, the translator confesses, that, in common with many writers of the Romish Church, he entertained a very natural prejudice against Bacon on account of the encomiums which had been pronounced upon him by the Encyclopædists and other enemies of Christianity; but adds, that this prejudice was entirely dissipated by a careful study of his writings, and gave place to a sentiment of profound admiration, not only of his genius, but of his piety. It is not a little strange that, when Romish writers abroad are beginning to appreciate the religious spirit of Bacon, some liberals in our own country have not scrupled to hint at the Atheistic tendency of his system, and have even had the effrontery to affirm, that his professed belief in God was a necessary expedient for retaining his Chancellorship!* The revolting imputations of Atkinson and Martineau are similar to those which were long since broached by the author of the *Analysis of Bacon's Philosophy*, published in 1755, by which he was for the most part known in France: and they are answered by anticipation in this preliminary discourse.

Thus far we are indebted to our French neighbours for the vindication of our illustrious countryman: but we cannot approve of the manner in which they have exhibited his views by means of *garbled extracts*, nor of the use which they have sometimes made of his remarks on disputed points of doctrine. Thus, we are told that Bacon was a Protestant, but that in his confession of faith there is nothing that might not be asserted to by a member of the Romish Church. This *might* have been perfectly true; for the Romish Church having added the creed of Pope Pius to the articles of the earlier creeds, a Protestant who *ex animo* believes in the latter, might possibly construct a confession from which a Roman Catholic need not dissent: but we greatly doubt whether a staunch Romanist could, consistently with his belief in the decisions of the Council of Trent, subscribe the noble testimony of Bacon, when he says, "that the Church hath no power over the Scriptures, to teach or command any

* "Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development," by H. G. Atkinson, Esq., and Harriet Martineau. London, 1861. Pp. 174, 182, 220, 265.

thing contrary to the written Word, but is as the ark wherein the tables of the first testament were kept and preserved; that is to say, the Church hath only the custody and delivery over of the Scriptures committed unto the same; together with the interpretation of them, but *such only as is conceived from themselves.*" We are told again, that Bacon always speaks respectfully of the Pope: that if he opposed the temporal power of the Romish See, he did so only as the defenders of the Gallican liberties have done; and that he often praised the writings of the scholastic divines. Let Bacon speak for himself.* "It was great blasphemy, when the devil said, '*I will ascend and be like the Highest;*' but it is greater blasphemy to personate God, and bring him in saying, '*I will descend and be like the prince of darkness.*'† And what is it better to make the cause of religion descend to the cruel and miserable actions of murdering princes, butchery of people, and subversion of states and governments. Surely this is to bring down the Holy Ghost, instead of the likeness of a dove, in the shape of a vulture or raven; and to set, out of the bark of a Christian Church, a flag of a bark of pirates and assassins. Therefore it is most necessary that the Church by doctrine and decree, princes by their sword, and all learnings, both christian and moral, as by their mercury rod, do damn and send to hell for ever those facts and opinions tending to the support of the same, as hath been already in good part done." In another place,‡ he speaks of the Reformation in these terms: "The purity of Religion, which is a benefit inestimable, and was in the time of all former princes, until the days of her Majesty's father of famous memory, unheard of. Out of which purity of religion have since ensued, beside the principal effect of the true knowledge and worship of God, three points of great consequence to the civil state. One, the stay of a mighty treasure within the realm, which in foretimes was drawn forth to Rome. Another, the dispersion and distribution of those revenues, amounting to a third part of the land of the realm, and that of the goodliest and the richest sort, which heretofore was unprofitably spent in monasteries, into such hands as by whom the realm receiveth, at this day, service and strength, and many great houses have been set up and augmented. The third, the managing and enfranchising of the regal dignity from the recognition of a *foreign superior!*" And in answer to the favourite argument of Papists founded on the existence of sects and divisions in the Protestant Church, he says, "that the Church of God hath been in all ages subject to contentions and schisms: the tares were not sown but where the wheat was sown

* Bacon's Works, II. 487.
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† Ibid. II. 260.

‡ Ibid. III. 54, 59.
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before. Our Saviour Christ delivered it for an ill note to have outward peace." "And reason teacheth us, that *in ignorance and implied belief it is easy to agree, as colours agree in the dark*; or if any country decline into Atheism, the controversies wax dainty, because men do think religion scarce worth the falling out for; so as it is *weak divinity to account controversies an ill sign in the Church*." Bacon's Protestantism can scarcely be questioned after reading these explicit testimonies: but by a peculiar sort of management, which has often been resorted to by Popish controversialists, his writings may be garbled, and the reader may be misled by partial quotations. We have some amusing instances of this in the compilation of M. Emery. He translates a large portion of "The Characters of a believing Christian, in paradoxes and seeming contradictions:"* but on comparing the translation with the original, we find that the first *four* paragraphs are entirely omitted; that the fifth is in one important respect mistranslated; for Bacon's words, "He believes God accepts him in these services wherein he is able to find many faults," are rendered thus—"il croit que des actions où Dieu peut lui reprocher bien des fautes, *servent à sa justification*;"†—that the *sixth* is added with some alterations to the fifth; that the *seventh* is abbreviated; that the *eleventh* and *thirteenth* are omitted—the latter for this good reason apparently, that it condemns the worship of angels; and this is only a specimen of the mode in which several works are given which are described on the general title-page as "reproduites INTEGRALEMENT, non par extraits." Bacon's "Advertisement touching the Controversies of the Church of England," is given only in part, and that too in detached fragments: and his noble introduction, in which he expressly contrasts the controversies which Protestants have waged among themselves, with the more vital questions between them and the Church of Rome, is entirely suppressed.

In connexion with the illustrious BACON, we cannot refrain from referring to the treatment which another of our most distinguished countrymen has received at the hand of the editor and his associates—we mean the truly excellent and amiable ROBERT BOYLE. Of all his admirable treatises one only is given in this voluminous collection, viz., his "Dissertation on the profound reverence which is due to God;" and while his enlightened zeal for the cause of revealed religion is explicitly acknowledged, the truly Catholic spirit which prompted him to found the noble Lectureship which bears his name, and which dictated the terms of his bequest, is so ill appreciated by his Romish commentators, that they affect to find in it a proof of

* Bacon, II. 494. *Démonstrations Evangél.*, II. 712, 789.

† *Ibid.*, II. 500. *Démonstrations Evangél.*, II. 713, 902.

the inherent weakness of Protestantism, or at least of his want of confidence in its stability. For *several times*, in different parts of the work, we have the same miserably low-minded estimate of the motives which induced that truly noble man to found a lectureship on "the truths of the *Christian religion in general*, which should *not* enter on the discussion of those controversies by which Christians were divided among themselves." Thus in the *fourth* volume of the "*Démonstrations Evangeliques*," after quoting the terms of the bequest, as providing "pour un certain nombre de sermons qu'on doit prêcher toutes les années sur les vérités de la Religion Chrétienne en général, sans entrer dans les disputes particulières qui divisent les Chrétiens," the writer adds, "*il sentait que la secte qu'il professait ne gagnerait rien à cette discussion.*" And again in the *sixth* volume, "on aperçoit facilement, d'après la disposition qu'on vient de lire, que le testateur, *intimement convaincu de la foiblesse des sectes Protestantes*, craignit de les détruire toutes, et la sienne en particulier, on les mettait aux prises, et jugea à propos, pour éviter ce danger, de s'attacher à la défense du Christianisme en général." (!) Surely it might have occurred to the mind of any candid Catholic that the defence of Christianity is one thing, and the defence of any particular denomination of Christians another: and that to such a lofty and comprehensive mind as that of Robert Boyle it might seem to be expedient to unite all the churches of Christendom in defence of their common cause, by excluding from his lectureship everything that might tend to revive unnecessarily the points of comparatively minor moment on which they differed among themselves. And, strange to say, this more liberal view of the matter is given by the French translator of Samuel Clarke's *Demonstration*, which is inserted in the *fifth* volume of the "*Démonstrations*;" for, notwithstanding their common connexion with the Romish Church, and the vigilant editorial supervision of Abbé Migne, the translators are not always found to be of the same mind. After narrating the terms of the bequest, it is added, "*il fit plus, car il prit soin de marquer en général le sujet sur lequel il entendait que cette lecture roulât. Il interdit à ceux qui entreraient dans la carrière qu'il ouvrait la controverse contre les sectes particulières qui partagent le Christianisme. Il y a tout lieu de croire que les sages réflexions que cet habile homme avait faites sur la manie de prédicateurs qui, dans presque tous les pays, s'acharnent sur des disputes de néant, pendant qu'ils négligent les matières les plus importantes; il y a, dis-je, tout lieu de croire que ces réflexions ont produit la cause de son codicille qui restreint la lecture en question aux vérités générales et aux principes de la foi.*" . . . "Il ordonna en un mot que cette

lecture fût toute employée à mettre en évidence les preuves de la vérité de la Religion Chrétienne, et à les défendre contre les attaques des infidèles, notoirement tels, comme sont les Athées, les Déistes, les Païens, les Juifs, et les Mahométans, *sans toucher aux controverses* que les diverses Sociétés de Chrétiens ont les unes avec les autres." The plan of the "Démonstrations Evangéliques" proceeds on a different principle; it attempts to combine the defence of Christianity with the vindication of Popery, and is as much directed against the Protestant as against the infidel cause. We think that M. Abbé Migne had done well to imitate the example of Robert Boyle, and that, in doing so, he would have shewn more of a truly Catholic spirit, and less of a narrow sectarian bigotry.

On the whole, this collection of "Démonstrations Evangéliques," although far from being either complete or in all respects unexceptionable, is a valuable contribution to sacred literature. It offers, at a cheap rate, and in a commodious form, a French version of some standard works; and did it contain nothing else than the massive treatises of Origen, Eusebius, and Huet, it might be accepted with gratitude by every student of Apologetics. But it contains much more. It places before the English reader many treatises well known on the Continent, but hitherto almost inaccessible to ourselves, which possess a high value, both in a literary and theological point of view: such as, the comprehensive work of Statler on the "Certainty of the Christian Religion;" the "Historical Proof," by Beauzée; the "Philosophy of Religion," by the Abbé Para du Phanjhas; and the Poems of Cardinal de Bernis and of Cardinal Polignac, ("La Religion Vengée" and "Anti-Lucretius,") and some others, which have hitherto been comparatively little known to the English reader. And we cannot help thinking that it may be salutary to our Continental neighbours themselves to be made acquainted with some of the standard works of our great English apologists: and that the translations of such treatises as those of Clarke, Lesley, Stanhope, West, Bentley, Littleton, Warburton, Chalmers, and Keith, may lead some at least of the more candid Churchmen of Rome to concur with the distinguished Abbé Guenée in saying, "Rendons justice à la nation Anglaise, quoique maintenant notre ennemie. Il est glorieux pour elle que la religion Chrétienne y trouve des défenseurs si zélés parmi ceux qui y occupent les premiers rangs dans la littérature, et les plus hautes places dans l'Etat. Nous accusons souvent l'Angleterre comme la source de l'incrédulité parmi nous: et de son côté, elle nous rend bien ce reproche; mais, *il faut l'avouer*, si l'on ne saurait nier que la religion n'ait été souvent et vivement attaquée par quelques écrivains de cette nation, elle n'a guère été nulle part plus sagement défendue."

- ART. III.—1. *Royalty and Republicanism in Italy.* By JOSEPH MAZZINI. London, 1850.
 2 *Italy in 1848.* By MARIOTTI. London, 1851.
 3. *Taschenbuch der Neuesten Geschichte.* Von ROBT. PRUTZ. Dessau, 1851.
 4. *Germany in 1850; its Courts, Camps, and People.* By the Baroness BLAZE DE BURY. London, 1850.

PROBABLY since the fall of the Roman Empire the world has never seen a year so eventful and distracting as 1848. It seemed like a century compressed into a lustrum. Never was there a year so distinguished beyond all previous example by the magnitude and the multiplicity of its political changes—by the violence of the shock which it gave to the framework of European society—by the oscillations of opinion and success between the two great parties in the Continental struggle. Never was there a year so pregnant with instruction and with warning—so rich in all the materials of wisdom both for sovereign and for people—so crowded with wrecks and ruins, with the ruins of ancient grandeur, and the wrecks of glorious anticipations—so filled with splendid promises and paltry realizations, with hopes brilliant and fantastic as fairy-land, with disappointments dismal and bitter as the grave. Thrones, which but yesterday had seemed based upon the everlasting hills, shattered in a day; sovereigns, whose wisdom had become a proverb, and sovereigns whose imbecility had been notorious, alike flying from their capitals, and abdicating without a natural murmur or a gallant struggle; rulers, who had long been the embodiment of obstinate resistance to all popular demands, vying with each other in the promptitude and the extent of their concessions; statesmen of the longest experience, the deepest insight, the acutest talent—statesmen like Metternich and Guizot—baffled, beaten, and chased away, and reaching their foreign banishment only to turn and gaze with a melancholy and bewildered air on the *écroulement* of schemes and systems of policy, the construction of which had been the labour of a lifetime; eminent men sinking into obscurity, and going out like snuff; obscure men rising at one bound into eminence and power; ambitious men finding the objects of their wildest hopes suddenly placed within their grasp; Utopian dreamers staggered and intoxicated by seeing their most gorgeous visions on the point of realization; patriots beholding the sudden and miraculous advent of that liberty which they had prayed for, fought for, suffered for, through years of imprisonment, poverty, and exile; nations, which had

long pined in darkness, dazzled and bewildered by the blaze of instantaneous light; the powerful smitten with impotence; the peasant and the bondsman endowed with freedom and unresisted might; the first last and the last first;—such were the strange phenomena of that marvellous era, which took away the breath of the beholder, which the journalist was unable to keep pace with, and “which panting Time toiled after in vain.”

The year opened with apparent tranquillity. In two quarters only of Europe had there been any indications of the coming earthquake; and to both of these the eyes of all friends of freedom were turned with hopeful interest and earnest sympathy. The first dawn of a new day had arisen in a country where least of all it could have been looked for—in Rome. There, in a state long renowned for the most corrupt, imbecile, mischievous administration of the western world, a new Pope, in the prime of life, full of respect for his sacred office, and deeply impressed with the solemn responsibilities of his high position, set himself with serious purpose and a single mind, though with limited views and inadequate capacities, to the task of cleansing those Augean stables from the accumulated filth of centuries. He commenced reform—where reform, though most rare, is always the most safe—from above; he purified the grosser parts of the old administrative system; he shewed an active determination to put down all abuse, and to give his people the benefit of a really honest government; he ventured on the bold innovation, in itself a mighty boon and a strange progress, of appointing laymen to offices of state; and, finally, he convoked a representative assembly, and gave the Romans a constitution—the first they had seen since the days of Rienzi. His people were, as might have been anticipated, warmly grateful for the gifts, and enthusiastically attached to the person, of their excellent Pontiff; all Europe looked on with delight; Pio Nono was the hero of the day; and everything seemed so safe, so wise, so happy, that we felt justified in hoping that a new day had really dawned upon the ancient capital of the world.

Sicily, too, had about the same time entered upon a struggle to recover some portion of her promised freedom and her stolen rights. Her wrongs had been so flagrant, so manifold, so monstrous; the despotism under which she groaned was at once so incapable, so mean, so low, so brutal; her condition was so wretched, and her capabilities so vast, that the sympathies of the world went with her in her struggle with her false and bad oppressor. All ranks of her citizens were unanimous in their resolution of resistance; even the priests, elsewhere the ready tools of tyranny, here fought on the side of the people, and blessed the arms and banners of the reformers; and what was still more

remarkable, and of more hopeful augury, all classes seemed to put mutual jealousies aside, and to be actuated by the same spirit of sincere, self-denying, self-sacrificing patriotism. Their demands were moderate but firm, and so reasonable, that the mere fact of such demands having to be made, was an indelible disgrace to Naples. So far, too, their course had been singularly cautious; they had committed no blunder, they had displayed no sanguinary passion, and no violent excitement, and it was impossible not to hope everything from a contest so wisely conducted, and so unimpeachably just. At length, on the 8th of February, the Sicilians having been everywhere victorious, the preliminaries of an arrangement with the king of Naples were agreed to, on the basis of the constitution of 1812. So far all went well.

In the meantime, excited or warned by the example of the Pope, and the enthusiasm of the Romans, other Italian princes began to move in the path of improvement. The King of Sardinia, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the King of Naples, promised a constitution to their subjects, and actually took measures for carrying these promises into effect. The excitement soon reached Lombardy; popular movements took place at Milan, but were repressed by the Austrian Government with even more than wonted promptitude and severity. Hungary had for some years been making great efforts towards national improvement, and some relaxation of the old feudal privileges, as well as towards a recovery of their old constitutional liberties; but Austria had steadily repressed all such exertions; and a long course of perfidy and oppression had at length so exasperated the Hungarians, and united all parties among them against the common enemy, that it became evident that the contest was approaching to an open rupture.

Such was the position of affairs when the French Revolution of February came like an earthquake, astounding nations, "and, with fear of change, perplexing monarchs." The events which ensued are still fresh in the memory of all men. The democratic party throughout the whole of central Europe burned to follow the example of a movement the success of which had been so signal and so prompt." The effect was electric; but not everywhere, nor altogether, wholesome. The friends of freedom felt that the time was come to assert their cause, and to claim, without fear of a refusal, the rights so long withheld; while those nations which had already taken some steps towards the attainment of free institutions, and had hitherto deemed their progress rapid and brilliant beyond their most sanguine anticipations, now began to regard it as tardy, *jog-trot*, and inadequate. They looked askance on constitutional monarchy, and began to sigh

*for a republic. The arrangement between the Sicilians and their sovereign, which had been all but concluded, was broken off, in consequence of an augmentation of the popular demands; while Tuscany, Sardinia, and Rome began to think their liberal rulers scarce liberal enough. At Berlin, where some tardy steps had at length been taken towards the advent of a constitutional government, the people were anxious to get on faster than the fears or the opinions of the monarch could go with them; an insurrection broke out, and a sanguinary contest of two days' duration desolated the city, and terminated in the scarcely veiled defeat of the crown. This was on the 18th of March. On the 6th, an insurrection took place at Munich, which resulted in the exaction of extensive reforms, and was shortly afterwards followed by the abdication of the king. On the 14th, a revolution broke out at Vienna, which ended in the flight of Prince Metternich, and the proclamation of a representative government. On the 19th the Austrians were driven out of Milan, and a provisional government was established in Lombardy. Thus, in a month from the outbreak of the French Revolution, the whole of central Europe was revolutionized.

Such is a summary of these astounding events, the like of which were assuredly never crowded into so brief a portion of time. The popular party—the friends of free institutions and constitutional rule—everywhere aroused and everywhere triumphant, achieving, with an ease and rapidity which partook of the miraculous, the most decisive victories over the oldest, sternest, rustiest administrative systems of Europe,—were everywhere followed by the sympathy, the admiration, and the prayers of all lovers of humanity, and everywhere strong with the strength which such sympathy must always give.

Where now are all those bright prospects vanished?—which of all those mighty changes have become permanent?—what has been the enduring fruit of all these brilliant victories?—where now are to be found all those fresh, young, sanguine constitutions? With scarcely an exception, everything has fallen back into its old condition. In nearly every state the old demon of despotism has returned, bringing with it worse devils than itself. Hungary and Hesse are crushed; Bavaria has been degraded into the brutal tool of a more brutal tyrant; the Prussian people are sullen, desponding, and disarmed, and the Prussian Government sunk into a terrible abyss of degradation; Austria has a new emperor, more insolently despotic than any of his predecessors for many a long year; and throughout Germany constitutional liberty has been effectually trampled out. In Italy, Venice and Lombardy have been reconquered, and are now experiencing the *œ victis*; Tuscany is worse, because more Aus-

trian than before, and alarmed at the peril she has incurred ; the small duchies are as bad as ever—they could not be worse ; the Pope, terrified out of his benevolence and his patriotism, has been restored by foreign arms, and the old ecclesiastical abominations are reinstated in their old supremacy ; while Naples and Sicily are again prostrate at the feet of the most imbecile and brutal of the incurable race of Bourbons. Two short years have passed away since Europe presented to the lover of liberty and human progress the most smiling aspect she had ever worn ;—and in this brief space of time, an inexorable destiny has gathered together all the far reaching anticipations, all the noble prospects, all the rapid conquests, all the rich achievements of that memorable era, and covered them over with these two narrow words—*Hic jacet.*

Even patriots like ourselves, who stood aloof from actual participation in the strife, viewing its vicissitudes with the simple interest of spectators, and who had no personal concern in the issue, might well be disheartened at such tremendous reverses and such extreme reaction. The cup of hope was probably never filled so full, or approached so near to the lips that were *not* to drink it. A victory so nearly gained, and so entirely lost—success so brilliant and complete, followed by failure so disastrous and so crushing—has scarcely ever been recorded in history. But we are too firm believers in human progress to imagine that even in this case the defeat has been as total and thorough as it appears ; nay, we are convinced that in the midst of apparent retrogression there has been actual advance ; that in spite of all appearances to the contrary, the years 1848, 1849, 1850, have not been lost to the onward march of humanity ; that the cause of freedom—though often fought so ill, though stained with some excesses, though tarnished by so many follies, though overshadowed for the moment by so dark and thick a cloud—has yet on the whole gained by the struggle, and grown stronger notwithstanding its manifest defeat ; and instead, therefore, of lamenting an irrevocable past, or endeavouring to allot to the various parties in the *mêlée* their respective shares in the production of the common failure, we shall do better service by attempting to extract from the confusion of events the *net results*, the residual gain, of these unexampled years.

The progress of humanity is never regular. Freedom and civilisation advance, externally at least, by fitful and spasmodic springs. Their march has been compared to that of the flood-tide, where every wave retires, yet the whole mass of waters moves incessantly and irresistibly onwards. But the similitude is inaccurate, inasmuch as in human progress there is no constant and steady movement, and no inevitable ebb. A more

correct likeness may be found in the wave which is slowly but perpetually undermining a vast cliff, covered with buildings and crowded with men, containing monuments which have endured for ages, and results of energetic industry which look forward to ages more. Everything bears the impress of stability, every individual has the conviction of immutable security, save the few who have descended to the base of the cliff and perceived the fearful havoc wrought by the ceaseless and silent toil of their unseen destroyer. No warning sound, no partial sinking of the earth gives timely intimation of the catastrophe which is preparing;—till at length, when the work is complete, and the foundations wholly washed away, an accident, a nothing, a trivial shake, a rolling of distant thunder, gives the needed jar, and the whole structure, with its mighty edifices, its ancient bulwarks, its modern creations, its vivid, teeming, multitudinous life, is engulfed in the destroying sea.

A more exact one still is to be found in the old arithmetical puzzle of our childhood—the snail which climbed up three feet every day, and slipped down two feet every night. The year 1848 was the climbing day: 1849 and 1850 were the backsliding night. Now, in 1851, we can estimate the two together, and calculate roughly how much has on the whole been gained, how much further forward we are than we were in 1847. In our last Number we spoke of France: her drama is not yet played out, and its issue and residual phenomenon no man can foresee. At present we shall confine our attention to Germany and Italy—a sad spectacle, but, closely and rightly viewed, by no means a despairing one.

The condition of these two countries when the Revolution broke out, presented some interesting points of similarity with each other, and of contrast with France and England, which it is important to notice. In all four countries there was much suffering and much discontent; but the malcontents and the sufferers belonged to different classes in society. In England and in France the lower orders were the chief malcontents; and unquestionably, especially in the latter country, they had much to complain of, and much to endure. Difficulty of obtaining subsistence, actual and severe privation in the present, and no more hopeful prospects for the future, darkened the lot and soured the temper of hundreds of thousands of the people. The more fortunate saw little before them beyond strenuous and ceaseless toil, from early morning till late evening, from precocious childhood to premature decrepitude. The less fortunate often sought toil in vain, dug for it as for hidden treasure, and found it when obtained, uncertain and unremunerative. A class—often a very numerous class—had grown up among them, whom de-

fective social arrangements had left without any means of subsistence, beyond habitual crime and the God-send of occasional insurrections.

Nearly all these were more or less uneducated, with passions unsoftened by culture, and appetites sharpened by privation—excitable, undisciplined, and brutal. Such were always ready for any social or political convulsion—prompt to aid and aggravate it, certain to complicate and disgrace it. It is a fearful addition to the perplexities and horrors of a revolution when the mass of the nation are destitute and wretched. Germany and Italy were in a singular measure free from this element of confusion; and in so far their path was wonderfully clear and easy. In Germany the orderly, industrious, and simple habits of the peasantry; the general possession of land by the rural portion of them, especially in the Prussian provinces; the relics of the old distribution of artisans into guilds; the watchful care of the numberless bureaucratic governments to prevent the too rapid increase of this, or indeed of any class; the systematic care of Austria, especially, to keep the lower classes in a state of material comfort; the habit in some states, as Bavaria, of requiring a certificate of property as a preliminary to marriage,—had combined to prevent poverty, except in rare cases, from degenerating into destitution, so that there was, generally speaking, little physical distress or suffering among the mass. The diffusion of elementary education too, (such as it was, for we are no amateurs of the Continental system in such matters,) prevented the existence of such utterly savage and ignorant masses as were to be met with in France, and unhappily in England also. The same exemption from squalid misery which in Germany was due to care, system, and culture, was bestowed upon the Italians by their genial climate, their fertile soil, and their temperate and frugal habits, so that though there was often poverty—though poverty, and, as we in England should regard it, poverty of the extremest kind was frequent, and in Rome and Naples almost universal—still, that actual want of the bread of to-day, and that anxiety for the bread of to-morrow, which make men ready for any violence or commotion, were in the greater part of Italy comparatively rare. In Tuscany and Lombardy, more especially, the utterly destitute and starving were a class quite unknown.

In both countries, therefore, the discontented and aspiring class—the makers of Revolutions—were the educated and the well-to-do; men whose moral, not whose material, wants were starved and denied by the existing system; men of the middle ranks, who found their free action impeded at every step, whose noblest instincts were relentlessly crushed, whose intellectual

cravings were famished by the censorship, and whose hungry and avid minds were compelled daily to sit down to a meal of miserable and unrelished pottage; men of the upper classes, whose ambition was cramped into the pettiest sphere, and forced into the narrowest channels, to whom every career worthy of their energies and their patriotism was despotically closed, who were compelled to waste their life and fritter away their powers in the insipid pleasures of a spiritless society, in metaphysical speculation, or antiquarian research. Hence, with all its faults, the revolution in Germany and in Italy had a far nobler origin, and a loftier character than that of France; it was the revolt not of starved stomachs, but of famished souls; it was the protest of human beings against a tyranny by which the noblest attributes of humanity were affronted and suppressed; it was the recoil from a listless and unsatisfying life by men who felt that they were made for, and competent to, a worthier existence; it was a rebellion of hearts who loved their country, against a system by which that country was dishonoured, and its development impeded; it was not the work of passionate, personal, and party aims, but of men who, however wild their enthusiasm, however deplorable their blunders, still set before them a lofty purpose, and worshipped a high ideal.

The *mouvement* party (to borrow an expressive phrase from the French) is composed in different countries of characteristically different materials. The busy ex-parliamentary reformers; the radicals, who take one grievance or anomaly after another, and agitate and grumble till they have procured its abolition; who have either originated or been the means of carrying each successive measure of reform, are with us almost exclusively composed of the active and practical men of the middle classes—merchants and manufacturers, educated enough to be able to comprehend the whole bearings of the case, but distrusting theory, eschewing abstractions, and too well trained in the actual business of life to be in much danger from disproportionate enthusiasm; shopkeepers and tradesmen, not perhaps masters of the political importance or full scope of the question at issue, but quick to detect its bearing on their personal interests, bringing to its examination a strong, if a somewhat narrow, common sense, observing a due proportion between their means and their ends, and never, in the heat of contest, losing sight of the main chance;—these constitute the centre and the leaders of the movement party in England, and have imparted to all our innovations that character for distinctness of purpose, sobriety of aim, and practicality of result, which has always marked them.—In France the *mouvement* party has been composed of the politicians by profession or by taste; of the amateurs and adventurers of

public life; of journalists, who had each their pet crotchet and their special watchword, and who attained in that country a degree of personal influence which is without a parallel elsewhere; of men to whom the Republic was a passion; of men to whom it was a dream; of men to whom it opened a vista rich in visions of pillage and of pleasure. It was a vast heterogeneous congeries of all the impatient suffering, of all the fermenting discontent, of all the unchained and disreputable passions, of all the low and of all the lofty ambition of the community.—In Germany, again, the *mouvement* party was composed, in overwhelming proportion, of the *Burschenschaft*—of students and professors, of young dreamers and their dreaming guides—men qualified beyond all others to conceive and describe a glorious Utopia, but disqualified beyond all others to embody it in actual life. It is curious to observe how everywhere throughout the German revolutions, the collegians were prominent. The students led the struggle at Berlin; the Academic Legion was for some time the ruling body at Vienna; the Frankfort Assembly was, as *The Times* truly characterized it, “an anarchy of professors.” We do not mean to say, that the revolutionary movement was not joined and sympathized with by numbers in all ranks and classes—though it is important to observe, that from the peculiar system of educational training in Germany, all these had gone through the same discipline, and been subject to the same influences; but the tone of the movement was given, its course directed, and its limit decided, by learned men, whom a life of university seclusion and theoretic studies had precluded from the possession of all practical experience, and by young men fresh from the scenes and the heroes of classic times, and glowing with that wild enthusiasm, that passionate but unchastened patriotism, those visions of an earthly Eden and a golden age, and that unreasoning devotion to everything that bears the name or usurps the semblance of liberty, which at their age it would be grievous *not* to find. Finally, in Italy, the leaders of the new Reformation were men of as pure and lofty an enthusiasm, but of far finer capacities, and of a sterner and firmer make of mind, but equally untrained in political administration, and with a task beyond their means;—men, not indeed finished statesmen or accurate philosophers, because debarred from that *education of action* which alone can complete the training of the statesman and test the principles of the thinker,—but of the materials out of which the noblest statesmen and the profoundest philosophers are made;—many of them

“Of the canvass which men use
To make storm stay-sails;”

many of them exhibiting powers for government and war which need only a fairer field to obtain their full appreciation.

It is natural that political changes emanating from bodies so variously constituted as these should be widely different in their nature and objects, and be crowned with very various degrees of success. In Italy and Germany the patriots had one almost insuperable difficulty to contend with. In both countries the fatal system of bureaucracy had paralyzed the energies and dwarfed the political capacities of the people. In Germany they had been ruled like children—in Italy like victims or like vanquished slaves. But in both countries the whole province of administration, even in its lowest branches, had been confided to a separate class, set apart and trained to that profession, and directed and controlled from head-quarters. The people could do nothing except by official permission and under official supervision; long disuse produced inevitable disqualification; long inaction inevitable incapacity;—till when the crisis arrived, it appeared that the old established functionaries were the only men capable of practical action. When the power was suddenly thrown into the hands of the inexperienced classes, none could be found among them—in Germany at least—competent to use it. In the south of Italy the old functionaries had always been so abominably bad, that even the most incompetent and fresh of the new aspirants could not possibly make worse administrators. But in Germany the fact was as unquestionable as humiliating; and one of the most important lessons inculcated by the time was the utter inadequacy of the best contrived system of national or college education for supplying political training. The lower portion of the middle classes in Germany receive a far more complete and careful education in literary and scientific matters than the same portion with us; and in the instruction of the working-classes there is (or was lately) no comparison; yet our municipal councils, our vestry meetings, our boards of guardians, our numberless voluntary associations, form normal schools for statesmen and administrators to which the Continent presents no analogies, and for which unhappily it can furnish no substitutes, and the want of which was most deeply felt in 1848. It may be safely conceded to the advocates of bureaucracy and centralization in this country, that we pay dearly for our love of self-government in daily extravagance and incessant blunders; but it must also be allowed, after recent events, that the costly experience and capacity thus acquired is cheap at any price.

In speaking, however, thus severely of the incapacity displayed by the Germans for the construction and management of constitutional forms of government, we are bound to particular-

ize one remarkable exception—an exception so signal and instructive as to inspire the most sanguine hopes for the success of the Germans in this new career, when the next opportunity shall be afforded them of shewing how far they have profited by the experience of the past. We allude to the small state of Hesse-Cassel, whose admirable struggle and sad catastrophe well deserve a brief digression. In general, we are too well aware, our countrymen take little interest in the internal concerns of foreign states; but the case of Hesse is so peculiar, so scandalous, and presents so many analogies with the most important and glorious struggles in our own history, that it will need only a short statement of what her constitution was, how it has been crushed, and how it has been defended, to excite in English bosoms the warmest admiration for the unfortunate vanquished, and the sincerest admiration for their firmness, forbearance, noble disinterestedness, and unswerving reverence for law.

The Constitution of Hesse-Cassel was granted on the 5th of January 1831, by the father of the present Elector. Its date shews its origin. The French Revolution of 1830 had awakened in the mind of Frederick-William some fears for the stability of his own throne, and he proffered his subjects a free constitution. The terms were soon agreed upon; and considering the period of excitement in which they originated, they are strangely moderate and fair, and shew, on the part of the Hessians, a far more real conception of the essence and the guarantees of freedom than is common among Continental nations. The following are a few of the most important provisions:

“The representatives are not bound by instructions from their electors, but give their vote in accordance with their duties towards their Sovereign and their fellow-citizens, according to their own judgment, as they hope to answer it before God and their conscience.

“Each representative must take the following oath:—‘I swear to hold sacred the Constitution, and always to have at heart, in my votes and motions in this Assembly, both the welfare of my Sovereign and that of my fatherland, according to my own conviction, and without allowing myself to be influenced by any other consideration. So help me God.’

“The representatives are elected to act as such for three years. After three years, new elections take place, without any decree to that effect requiring to be issued on the part of the Government. The same persons may be re-elected.

“The Elector calls the representatives together as often as he may think it necessary for the settlement of any important or pressing matters referring to the affairs of the State. They must, however, be called together at least every three years.

“The Elector has the right to adjourn or dissolve the Assembly,

but the adjournment is not to last above three months, and in case of a dissolution, the order for new elections has to be issued at the same time.

"All orders and regulations referring to the maintenance or carrying out of any of the existing laws shall emanate from the Government alone. The Government can also, during the time the Assembly is not sitting, on the request of the respective heads of the ministerial departments, and with the co-operation of the permanent committee, pass such exceptional measures as the already existing laws may not provide for, but which they may consider necessary for the security of the State, or for the maintenance of the public peace. After such measures have been passed, the representatives shall, on the requisition of their committee, be called together without delay, in order that their sanction to such measures may be obtained.

"Previous to a dissolution or adjournment of the Assembly taking place, the members have to elect a committee of three or five of their own number, not only to watch the carrying out of the measures or laws passed by the Assembly, and take care of its interest, but also to act in accordance with the instructions they may have received from the Assembly, and the provisions of the Constitution. The majority of this committee shall neither consist of officers of Government nor of those holding appointments at Court.

"The head of each ministerial department has to countersign any decree or regulation referring to his department issued by the Elector, and is held personally responsible for the contents being strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the country. As regards any decrees or regulations which have reference to more than one or the whole of the Government departments, they have to be countersigned, jointly, by the respective heads of each department, each being held personally responsible for his own department.

"All Government officers shall be held responsible for their acts, and any one guilty of a violation of the Constitution, *particularly by carrying out any decree not issued in a strictly constitutional form*, shall be proceeded against before the competent legal authorities. The representatives have the right, and are bound to proceed before the High Court of Appeal, against any of the heads of the Government departments who may be guilty of a violation of the Constitution. Should the accused be found guilty he is dismissed, and can no longer hold office.

"Beginning with the year 1831, *no direct or indirect taxes can be levied, either in war or peace, without the sanction of the Assembly*. For this purpose an estimate, stating the probable income and cost of the Government, with the greatest possible accuracy and completeness, must be laid before the Assembly. The necessity or desirableness of the different estimates must be shewn; *the different departments of the Government are bound to furnish the Assembly with any information in their possession which may be required*.

"All Government decrees relating to the collection of taxes shall

state particularly that such taxes are levied with the consent of the Assembly, without which it shall not be lawful for any collector to collect such taxes, nor are the people bound to pay them."

To this Constitution the Hessian representatives, the civil and military functionaries, and the Elector himself, solemnly swore allegiance. So sensible, so moderate, so little democratic was it, though framed at a time when most extravagant ideas of freedom were fermenting throughout Europe—so scrupulously did it confine itself to those two essential provisions, without which all political freedom is a mockery, (viz., establishing the supremacy of law, and securing to the representatives of the people the sole power of taxation,) that it caused considerable disappointment to the extreme party. Moderate as it was, however, the ink was scarcely dry with which the Elector had signed his name to it, before he began a series of covert stratagems to undermine the liberties which he had sworn to maintain inviolate; and, with the help of the same Hasenflug, who has since earned such an unenviable notoriety as prime minister in one country, and as prisoner, on a charge of forgery, in another—he had nearly succeeded in reducing the constitution to a mere name, when the Revolution of February broke out in Paris, and frightened him back into decency and law. As cowardly as he was false, he immediately issued a proclamation announcing his intention to govern in future in a really legal and popular spirit, and gave a ready sanction to a number of salutary reforms. The result was that Hesse-Cassel remained perfectly tranquil during the revolutionary furor which deluged and desolated the rest of Germany in 1848 and 1849; and with a forbearance and magnanimity which has met with a black requital, the people refrained from availing themselves of the power which that season of excitement put into their hands, to extort from their perfidious prince any additional securities, or more extended rights.

But the Elector was not a man to whom forbearance could be safely shewn. He belonged to that class of sovereigns who have been described as "the opprobria of the southern thrones of Europe—men false alike to the accomplices who have served them, and the opponents who have spared them—men who, in the hour of danger, concede everything, promise everything, turn their cheek to every smiter, give up to vengeance every minister of their iniquities, and await, with meek and smiling implacability, the blessed day of perjury and proscription." As soon as the prevalence of the reactionary spirit of 1850 made it safe, Hasenflug (who had been obliged to retire in 1837) reappeared in the Council-chamber, detested from old recollections; and loaded with recent infamy. He returned with the express mission of trampling down the constitution, and lost no time in

setting about his task. In direct violation of clause 144, he demanded a vote of money from the Chamber, but proposed no budget, and insolently refused all explanation of the purposes to which the money was to be applied. The Chamber did its duty, and refused the vote. Hasenpflug then dissolved the Chamber, and, in violation of clause 146, issued a decree ordering payment of the unvoted taxes. The Supreme Court of Appeal pronounced the decree illegal. The people, confident in the sense and patriotism of the civil authorities, remained stubbornly and provokingly tranquil, notwithstanding many sinister attempts to goad them into some uproar which might serve as a pretext for more violent proceedings. The Elector, however, issued a proclamation, placing the whole country under martial law, and directing the press to be silenced, and the taxes to be levied by force. The Supreme Court of Appeal immediately issued a counter proclamation, pronouncing all these transactions unconstitutional and illegal, and impeaching the general officer (Bauer) who had accepted the office of carrying them out. General Bauer resigned, and the Elector and his minister fled, baffled, dishonoured, and derided.

From his place of refuge the Elector appointed a new commander-in-chief, General Haynau, with unlimited powers. It now became necessary for the Hessian army to decide upon their course. They had to decide between their country and their oath on the one side, and their habits of military obedience on the other. The officers consulted together, and then waited on the General, and informed him that he might depend upon them only so far as was consistent with the oath they had been required to give to uphold the constitution intact. He gave them the choice between obedience or throwing up their commission: They chose the latter alternative almost to a man. He then took the step, quite without a precedent in Germany, of offering commands to the non-commissioned officers: They unanimously refused to accept them. The army was thus paralyzed, the press was silenced, the journals seized, the courts suspended, but the people remained resolute and passive; they simply did nothing, and by this attitude embarrassed the Elector far more than the most active resistance could have done. The taxes were still uncollected, for the financial *employés*, pointing to clause 146, refused to collect any which had not been legally imposed. The Elector was baffled by the pure inability to find among his own subjects a sufficient number of agents, either civil or military, base and unpatriotic enough to carry out his nefarious designs. With the exception of a few among the upper classes, the resistance and the virtue were strictly *national*.

Under these circumstances he applied to Austria for assistance

to reduce his subjects to obedience; and the Emperor, too happy to have an opportunity of interference, marched a body of Austrian and Bavarian troops into Hesse, and took military possession of the Electorate. Prussia, as usual, blustered, threatened, and gave way, leaving the unhappy Hessians to the tender mercies of an ill-disciplined and hostile soldiery.

These troops—the army of execution, as they were called—have entirely eaten up the resources of the Electorate. They were billeted on the refractory *employés*, till they either resigned or gave in their adherence to the illegal decrees of the Elector. Few have been found to do the latter. Judges of the Supreme Court had fifteen to twenty Bavarian brutes quartered on their families, with a threat of an additional number each day, if they would not resign their functions to more compliant successors. The members of the Town-council, in addition to this, were menaced with a court-martial and corporal punishment, if they would not declare (which as men of conscience it is impossible they could) that the decree of martial law was in accordance with the Constitution. Individuals of every class, rich and poor, were oppressed and extortionized in the same brutal manner; and daily subjected to all the indignities which could be offered to them by a coarse and savage soldiery, whose express duty was to make them as miserable as they could, for the sake of more promptly reducing them to submission.

Such is a brief outline of the Hessian tragedy;—such the deliberate abolition by foreign force of a constitution like our own;—such the treatment of a people who have shewn that they knew how both to value and to use their rights, and whose conduct will lose nothing by a comparison with that of the constitutional heroes of our own country—the goodly fellowship of our political Reformers—the noble army of our civil Martyrs. Its consequences will probably be far wider and more serious than might, at first sight, seem likely to ensue from a mere piece of cruel tyranny on the part of a petty sovereign of central Europe. There exists an element of revolutionary disturbance in Germany which deserves far more attention than it has hitherto received, which is fraught with menace not only to the present order of things, but to monarchy *per se*,—a source of strength to the people, and of weakness and danger to the princes, and which no mere political reaction, no mere military oppression, can put down. The Germans are, on the whole, especially the middle classes, a sincere, loyal, virtuous, and reverential people. They are attached to all the homely and substantial excellencies of character. They love truth and honesty; they value the decors and respectabilities of life; and they are naturally disposed to respect, even to enthusiasm, the authority of rank and gran-

deur. But this disposition and habit of reverence has of late been rudely shaken, and is now entirely rooted out. As they look round upon their princes and rulers, they can find but few who are worthy of respect, either for capacity, truthfulness, or propriety of private character. Many of those who are placed in hereditary authority over them, are persons whom no man of sense could converse with without despising—whom no honest man could trust in the common transactions of life—whom no man of correct morals would willingly admit into his family. The secret—sometimes the notorious—history of many of their courts for the last forty years has been a tissue of oppression, duplicity, and profligacy. Putting aside the King of Hanover—of whom, wishing to say no evil, we shall of necessity say nothing at all—and the Kings of Prussia, the late as well as the present, whose perfidious conduct can find its only excuse in the supposition of impaired capacities—the present virtual rulers of Austria, Prince Schwartzemberg and the Archduchess Sophia, are persons whose private character will bear no examination, and whose scandalous chronicle is well known upon the Continent;—the old King of Bavaria made himself the disgrace and ridicule of Europe, by his open and vagabond amours;—while the Elector of Hesse-Cassel is a man whose profligacy has set at nought all the bounds of secrecy and decorum, and whose personal honour is stained, in addition, with proceedings worthy only of a low-lived sharper. Yet this is the very prince for whose pleasure a noble and high-spirited people have been subjected to military outrage, to restore whose despotic authority a free constitution like that of England has been violated and annulled; and Austria and Bavaria, sharers in his impurities, have been the chosen and willing instruments in this high-handed oppression. We cannot wonder that all this has spread an anti-regal spirit in Germany, which will one day—probably an early day—bring bitter fruits; and when we remember that it has needed all the honest benevolence of William IV., and all the spotless purity and domestic virtues of Victoria, to enable the loyalty of Englishmen to recover from the shock it received from the contrasted conduct of their predecessor, we may form some conception of the state of feeling among a people like the Germans, who, wherever they turn their eyes, can see nothing above them to love, reverence, or trust. “Spiritual wickedness in high places” has dissipated the *prestige* which should “hedge in” greatness, and hal-low rank and rule; there is growing up among them a deep-rooted conviction that the royal races are incurably bad, untrust-worthy, and incapable; and in the very next period of disturbance or political enthusiasm like 1848, the consequences of this conviction will be too plainly seen.

Another sad and dangerous opinion which the transactions in Hesse have impressed upon the German mind is this:—that no moderation in a free constitution, and no forbearance or strict adherence to law and written contract on the part of those who enjoy it, will be any guarantee of safety, or any protection against the enmity of those courts to whom any degree or form of liberty is an eye-sore, an abhorrence, and a reproach. The destruction of the Hessian constitution is a declaration of war against freedom *in the abstract*. The reaction in many states against the democratic proceedings in 1848 has some excuse, and met with some sympathy, even from the liberal European states, because the popular party had neither used their victory with wisdom, nor confined it within the bounds of moderation; but the violation and forcible suppression of the Hessian constitution, which had no fault except that it *was* free, and which contained no more freedom than was necessary to make its provisions a reality and not a mockery, and the tyrannical treatment of the Hessian people, who had committed no definable offence, and had been guilty of no disturbance which could afford even a pretext for the use of force against them, have proclaimed too clearly the code and creed of the despotic princes of Germany, and the principles on which their course will henceforth be guided,—viz., that no semblance of a free constitution shall raise its head within the limits of their influence—that the object of their dread is not popular excess but popular rights—that it is not radicalism or republicanism against which they wage implacable and interminable war, but liberty *as such*, liberty in the most moderate degree, liberty in the most unobjectionable form. A more perilous, demoralizing, revolutionary lesson could not have been taught to the German people, nor one which, when the day of opportunity arrives, will recoil with more fearful retribution on the heads of its foolish and fanatical propounders.

After this account of the destruction of the only really free constitution which Germany could boast of previously to 1848, it may seem paradoxical to say that we are deliberately of opinion that the cause of liberty and progress has on the whole been a gainer by the events of that year, in spite of the extensive and general subsequent reaction. The superficies of European society speaks only of retrogression: but a somewhat deeper and more careful glance will discover many indications which point to a very different conclusion. A few of the more prominent of these we shall endeavour concisely to enumerate.

1. The gain to freedom has been immense—and such as can be cancelled by no subsequent contradictory occurrences—in the discovery of the first fact which the Spring of 1848 proclaimed so emphatically to the world, of the utter hollowness of the ap-

parently solid and imposing structure of European policy, of the internal rottenness of what had looked to the common eye so stable and so sound, of the intrinsic weakness of what had seemed externally so strong. To a few observers, indeed, keener and profounder than the rest, to a few statesmen like Metternich,*—whose long experience, vigilant sagacity, and native instinct, enabled them to pierce below the surface of society, and discern all that was feeble in its seeming strength, all that was unreal in its superficial prosperity, all that was boiling beneath its smooth tranquillity—a suspicion of the truth may have presented itself. But the astounding facility with which revolution after revolution was effected; the feeble pusillanimity with which monarch after monarch succumbed without a struggle or a stroke; the crash with which throne after throne went down at the first menace of assault, like the walls of Jericho before the mere blast of hostile trumpets; the instantaneousness with which institutions of the oldest date crumbled away at the first touch of the popular arm,—betrayed at once to the rulers the secret of their weakness, and to the people the secret of their strength, and inculcated a pregnant lesson which will not be forgotten by either party. Paris, Berlin, Venice, Lombardy, Munich, Turin, Florence, Naples, and Rome—all revolutionized within a month, and all by independent and internal movements, without concert and without co-operation—shewed how ripe for revolt every country must have been, and how ludicrously feeble must have been

* The profound sagacity of this remarkable man was never more shewn than in the accuracy with which he read the signs of the times in the last few years which preceded his downfall. With the gallant resolution of a man of distinct and unshaken purpose, he had conscientiously adhered through life to the principles and ideas of a past age; and our conviction of the entire erroneousness of his aims cannot blind us either to his admirable consistency, his dignified firmness, or his lofty powers. He was a statesman of the order of Richelieu: he knew exactly what he wanted, what he deemed best for his country, and how best to obtain it. But he was at variance with the spirit of the age, and lived a century too late. Still he struggled on. For a long while he trusted that the deluge of democracy which he foresaw could be stayed during his lifetime. But latterly even this hope had deserted him. In the Autumn of 1848, we have the following account of his feelings from the pen of M. von Usedom, a Prussian diplomatist:—"From my personal knowledge I can testify, that he foresaw with absolute certainty the great shipwreck of last Spring (1848.) He spoke to me much at length of the political ruin which threatened to fall on Europe soon, perhaps very soon, and of the even deeper growth and wider range of Radical and Communistic ideas, against which means of repression had proved ineffectual. I could not at that time believe that things had gone so far; but rather thought that the age would take counsel from these events, and learn prudence from the failure of such a policy. 'I am no prophet,' said the Prince, 'and I know not what will happen: but I am an old practitioner, and I know how to discriminate between curable and fatal diseases. This one is fatal; here we hold as long as we can, but I despair of the issue.'" Mazzini gives, in his work, some curious extracts from Metternich's diplomatic correspondence, shewing how much more truly he read the course of events than the generality of politicians of whatever section.

the power which had been feared so long. The moral influence of such events can never be got over or forgotten; the *prestige* of power is gone; some leaves fall off every time the tree is shaken; and authority once so rudely handled and so easily overthrown, can never resume its former hold upon the mind. Those who have learned how impotent before the fury of an aroused people are all the weapons and array of despotism, will never dread that despotism as they did before; and those who have felt

“The might that slumbers in a peasant’s arm,”

will live in perpetual fear lest it should be again awakened. For a while the wrath of terror may excite monarchs to make a savage use of their recovered power, but this will only be for a time: they have learned the resistless force of their subjects, when once put forth, too recently, not to make them timid and cautious in again arousing it. They know now that they hold their power only on the tenure of a people’s forbearance, and that that forbearance will give way if strained too far. On the other hand, the people who have once, by one great single effort of volition, brought their rulers to their feet, and seen how human, how feeble, how pusillanimous they were, will, in oppression and defeat, remember the events of 1848 as the proof of their own inherent strength, and the earnest of a future day of more signal and enduring triumph.

2. Again: when it came to actual war, in two cases at least, the people proved stronger than their masters. It became evident either that disciplined armies were not altogether to be relied upon, or that there was something in national determination which even disciplined armies could not make head against. In Hungary and in Rome the cause of freedom shewed itself mightier and more stubborn in arms than the cause of despotism. In Hungary, notwithstanding all the difficulties arising from divided nationalities, and the crippling errors of the only just abolished feudalism, the people made head against the whole force of Austria, gained ground month by month, and were morally certain of a complete and final victory, when the aid of Russia was called in, and, in an evil hour for Europe, granted and permitted. Even then the result was doubtful, till aided by internal treachery. That is, it required the combined efforts of the two great Empires of Russia and Austria to conquer the Hungarian people. Hungary, single-handed, was more than a match for the whole Austrian Empire single-handed. If the prompt and vigorous interference of England, France, and Prussia had forbidden, as it easily might have done, the intervention of Russia, how different now would the whole aspect of Europe have been! The whole subsequent oppressions and in-

solences of the Viennese Court would have been prevented. With Hungary triumphant and independent, Austria could not have bullied Prussia, could not have trampled on the constitution of Hesse, could not have conquered Venice, could not have retained even though she had recovered Lombardy, could not have given France even the paltry and miserable pretext for that attack on Rome which has covered both her arms and her diplomacy with indelible infamy. The permission of the interference of Russia was the one great glaring mistake of the time, —the *teterrima causa* of the subsequent reaction, and the present prostration of Continental liberty. Why it was permitted by the three great powers, is a question which we fear admits, in the case of two of them at least, of no reputable answer. It is alleged that England's repeated interventions and favour of the constitutional cause in Spain and Portugal deprived her of any just claim to protest against a corresponding intervention by an absolute monarch in favour of absolutism in the case of an allied power. But France could be withheld by no such consideration, and her sympathy and her interest lay in the same direction, viz., in crippling the power of Austrian despotism. Prussia by herself could do little; and whatever were the sentiments of the Prussian nation, the Prussian Court was never itself desirous of the triumph of liberty in any quarter.

In Lombardy, the cause of independence was lost from causes which had no relation to its intrinsic strength. There can, we think, be little doubt that the people who, by no sudden surprise, but by five days' hard and sustained fighting, had driven the ablest warrior and the picked soldiers of Austria out of Milan and to the borders of the Alps, would, if left to themselves, have completed their victory and made good their ground. But it is impossible to read Mazzini's and Mariotti's account of the war, without admitting that the cause never had fair play from the beginning. Charles Albert joined the Lombards from pure dread of a republic so near him being followed by a republic in his own territories; he fought therefore gallantly and well, but he fought for his personal ambition, and to prevent the Lombard republicans from fighting, and his great anxiety throughout was to gain the campaign without their aid. The republicans, on the other hand, mistrusted the king, and were little disposed to shed their blood for the aggrandizement of a dynasty which they had little reason to respect or love; and thus the real cause of Italian independence was compromised and paralyzed at the very outset by mutual and well-grounded mistrust.* Still enough remains, and enough was done, to shew what

* One of the most melancholy features of Mazzini's book is the rooted mistrust, and even hatred, he displays towards the moderate party, whose sincerity and

might have been done, and what may be done again, if either the monarchical party would abstain from encumbering the republicans with aid, or if a monarch would arise whom even the republicans would fight for, and could trust. Enough was done to shew how simple the condition, and how practicable the combinations, by which the battle may be won.

In Rome, too, when the people and their sovereign were pitted singly against each other, the victory was not a moment doubtful. The Pope was powerless—the people were omnipotent; and this, though they, a Catholic and superstitious people, had to fight against spiritual terrors as well as temporal arms. The Pope fled, and was not missed. His return was, indeed, formally asked for; but a republic was organized without him, and, for the first time, the Romans had a glimpse of what good government might be. It was reserved for a foreign, a friendly, and a republican government again to interfere, and deprive a people of the opportunity of shewing how well they could use, and how well they had deserved their freedom. France, which had just chased away her own sovereign, which had just established her own republic, which had just proclaimed the inalienable right of every nation to choose its own rulers, and work out its own emancipation—France was not ashamed to interfere to crush a sister democracy, on the most flimsy, transparent, and inadequate pretext ever urged to palliate a flagrant crime. France, noted throughout the world as the least religious nation in Christendom, was not ashamed to be made the instrument of replacing on the necks of a free people, the yoke of the most corrupt priesthood and the narrowest creed that Christendom ever saw. France, with her 40,000,000 of people, and her army of 500,000 men, was not ashamed to attack a state only just emerged from slavery, and a city garrisoned only by a few thousand untrained and inexperienced soldiers, and *was kept at bay for weeks*. The nineteenth century has recorded no blacker deed within its annals! The recording angel of the French nation, in all her stained and chequered history, has chronicled nothing worse!

Hungary and Rome, then, had cast off the yoke by their own unaided efforts; and their masters, by their own unaided efforts, were powerless to replace it. If the revolutionary years had brought to light no other fact, this alone would have been worth all their turmoil and their bloodshed. The sovereigns of these people at least reign only by the intervention of foreign mercenaries. The Pope is a French proconsul; and the Emperor of Austria is a vassal who does homage for his territories to the Czar of Russia. The people are no longer slaves to their own

capacity he seems entirely unable to admit. It is an ill-omen for the Italian cause when a man like Mazzini is unable to appreciate a man like Azeglio.

rulers, whom they had conquered and expelled. They are simply prisoners of war to a foreign potentate.

3. It is impossible that so many experiments should have been tried, and so many mistakes made, so many failures incurred, so many catastrophes brought about, without leaving much sad but salutary wisdom behind them. Those who were concerned as actors in the events of 1848, and those who regarded them merely as spectators, will, by subsequent reflection, be able to elicit from them much guidance for the future. It was the first time that the popular party, in Germany at least, went fairly and *practically* to school. It was their first attempt in organization and administration, and its lessons cannot have been altogether lost. It may at least be hoped that the *same* mistakes will not be made in future, that in their next voyage they will avoid shipwreck on the same rocks. It would lead us into too protracted a digression were we to attempt a specification of their errors and their faults; two only of the principal ones we can briefly indicate. In the first place, the want of definite purpose and of moderate boundary, which generally distinguishes popular movements, was early and almost universally apparent. The patriots seldom knew exactly what they wanted, and seldomer still, knew exactly where to stop. Up to the month of May, success and sympathy had everywhere gone with the insurgents. But about that time, it began to be painfully manifest how defective was their wisdom; how imperfect their conception of their cause and their position; how ignoble and impure were often the motives which actuated their leaders; and how completely the sober, the moderate, and the honest were everywhere outbid by the selfish, the ignorant, and the violent—by men whose ambition was restrained by no principle, and whose measures were guided by no reflection—the demagogue by nature, the rebel by temperament, the malcontent by misery, the *émeutier* by profession. One blunder was followed by another, still more serious and criminal; one leader was cashiered, to be replaced by another of a deeper colour and a lower stamp; checks and reverses succeeded one another, but seemed to inspire only desperation—not wisdom, nor repentance and retractation; till, throughout Europe the constitutional cause seemed not so much defeated as dishonoured, betrayed and thrown away.

In every country, the friends of movement committed precisely the same series of blunders. They had not yet learned the lesson now taught them, we trust, alike by the successes and the failures of that memorable year—that concessions wrung from sovereigns form the surest basis of a nation's freedom—that it is only by making the most of these, by consolidating and using them, not by pushing them to excess, that constitutional liberty is secured;

and that to push victory so far as to drive away the sovereign, is, in nine cases out of ten, to resign themselves, bound hand and foot, to the dictation of the mob. They became excited instead of being contented with the vast concessions they had won ;—

“ Nil actum reputans dum quid superesset agendi,”

they grasped at more, in place of employing and securing what they had. They shewed by their attitude, their proposals, and their language, that they were neither intellectually nor morally *masters of their position* ; they were not educated up to the requirements of their new station ; their minds could not rise to a full comprehension of its duties, nor their consciences to a clear comprehension of its responsibilities ; they alarmed where they should have soothed, disgusted where they should have conciliated, (and, alas ! conciliated and temporized where they should have repressed,) dared where they should have shrunk, and, “ like fools, rushed in where angels fear to tread.” They did not understand the business, nature, and limits of constitutional freedom. They committed the fatal error—in their position so difficult to avoid—of tolerating and encouraging even, rather than suppressing, popular turbulence and mob-dictation—of relaxing the arm of the law at the very moment when its strength and its sternness required to be most plainly felt. By these errors and deficiencies they signed the death-warrant of their own ascendancy, by convincing the wise and patriotic that liberty was not safe with them ; the proprietary body that property was not safe with them ; the commercial classes that credit was not safe with them.

In the spring of 1848 there were at least five constituted representative assemblies, sitting in their respective countries, as democratic in their composition as could well be desired,—at Paris, Berlin, Frankfort, Vienna, and Naples. Of the last we shall say nothing, because it had little real action, and we know little of the elements which composed it : but the others were elected by universal suffrage, or nearly so, and presented as motley and miscellaneous an assemblage as could be imagined. Every rank, every class, every passion, every prejudice, every desire, every degree of knowledge and of ignorance, was there faithfully mirrored. Exclusiveness was the only thing excluded. Two of the German assemblies comprised, we believe, upwards of sixty *bonâ fide* peasants each. Here surely, if ever, was the means presented of trying advantageously the great experiment of a popular yet constitutional rule. Yet in every case the experiment failed, and in every case from the same error. These popular assemblies all lost themselves and discredited their cause by the same grand mistake, of stepping beyond their appropriate and allot-

ted province, and usurping functions that did not belong to them. Nowhere do they seem to have understood with any precision the nature of their duties, or the limits of their powers. Where they were *constituent assemblies*, they encroached on the province of permanent legislation; where they were *legislative bodies*, they endeavoured to assume the functions of the executive. Their whole history was one pertinacious effort to concentrate in their own hands all the powers of the State; and in the course of their attacks on the executive, (though we are far from saying that they were always indefensible or without valid grounds for mistrust,) they contrived, by demands which no rulers with the least comprehension of, or respect for, their own position could dream of conceding, to put themselves so completely in the wrong that public sympathy had deserted them long before their fall.

The second mistake, to which we have referred as committed by the friends of freedom in 1848, was the mixing up of two objects, wholly distinct in themselves, and of which the desirableness was by no means equally clear,—constitutional rights and national unity. Both in Italy and Germany, instead of concentrating their efforts on the attainment of free institutions for each separate State, they complicated their cause, and distracted and weakened their party, by raising the standard of freedom and that of unity at the same time. Each object was gigantic in itself; the two together were nearly hopeless. Representative assemblies, a free press, an open administration of justice, were boons which every one could appreciate, and which every one was willing to fight for. The creation of one great state out of the various nationalities of Italy and Germany, respectively, was a dream of enthusiastic theorists, and however important or beneficial it might ultimately have proved, it was not universally desired, and it was surrounded with difficulties which, if not insuperable, demanded at least a peaceful era and a patient incubation for their solution. Many states were by no means willing to merge their distinct individualities for the very questionable equivalent of forming inadequate or inappreciable portions of one unwieldy nationality. How could reasonable men hope that the mutual jealousies, differences, respective claims of Prussia, Austria, Bavaria, Hanover, and Wurtemberg, on the one side, or of Naples, Rome, Florence, Piedmont, and Lombardy, on the other, could be harmonized and reconciled by a constitution struck out at a heat? Moreover, it might well be doubted whether the fusion of so many states into one great and powerful empire, however desirable as an object of European policy, would contribute to the wellbeing of the constituent elements. Hear what Goethe says on this point:—

"I am not uneasy about the unity of Germany; our good high-roads and future railroads will do their part. But, above all, may Germany be one in love, one against the foreign foe. May it be one, so that dollars and groschen may be of equal value through the whole empire; so that my travelling chest may pass unopened through all the six-and-thirty states. May it be one in passports, in weight and measure, in trade and commerce, and a hundred similar things, which might be named. But, if we imagine that the unity of Germany should consist in this, that the very great empire should have a single capital, and that this one great capital would conduce to the development of individual talent, or to the welfare of the mass of the people, we are in error.

"A state has justly been compared to a living body, with many limbs; and the capital of a state may be compared to the heart, from which life and prosperity flow to the individual members near or far. But, if the members be very distant from the heart, the life that flows to them will become weaker and weaker. Whence is Germany great, but by the admirable culture of the people, which equally pervades all parts of the kingdom? But does not this proceed from the various seats of Government? and do not these foster and support it? Suppose we had had, for centuries past, in Germany, only the two capitals, Berlin and Vienna, or only one of these, how would it have fared with German culture? or even with that generally diffused opulence which goes hand in hand with culture? Germany has about twenty universities, distributed about the whole empire, and about a hundred public libraries, similarly spread. How does France stand with regard to such?

"And now, think of such cities as Dresden, Munich, Stuttgard, Cassel, Weimar, Hanover, and the like; think of the great elements of life comprised within these cities; think of the effect which they have upon the neighbouring provinces,—and ask yourself if all this would have been so if they had not for a long time been the residence of princes. Frankfort, Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck, are great and brilliant, their effect upon the prosperity of Germany is incalculable. But would they remain what they are if they lost their own sovereignty, and became incorporated with a great German kingdom as provincial towns?"*

The great axiom of political wisdom which we trust the friends of liberty and progress will have learned from the events of 1848 is this, that constitutional freedom must be gained by degrees, not by one desperate and sudden snatch. People must be content to conquer their political and civil rights step by step, as not only the easiest and surest, but in the end the speediest way. Their true and safe policy is to accept and make the most of all concessions which either a sense of danger or a sense of

* *Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann*, vol. ii. p. 104.

justice may dictate to their rulers ; to remember that these, small though they may seem to one party, probably seem great to the other, and may have cost harder efforts of self-sacrifice than we can well appreciate,—and that, at all events, they are much as compared with the past ; to use them diligently but soberly, as not abusing them ; to grow familiar with them ; to become masters of them ; to acquire, by constant practice, dexterity in the use of them ; to consolidate and secure the possession of them ; and then to employ them gradually, and as opportunity shall serve, as the stepping-stone to more ;—but never, save in the last extremity, to supersede or weaken the executive authority, or to call in the mob. Any attempt on the part of the people to snatch, in the hour of victory, more than they know how to wield, more than they can use well, is a retrograde and fatally false step ; it is in fact playing the game of their opponents. If they employ their newly acquired rights and institutions in such a manner as to shew that they do not understand them and cannot manage them, and that, therefore, public tranquillity and social security are likely to be endangered by the mistakes of their excitement and inexperience, the great body of sober and peaceful citizens are quick to take alarm, and carry back the material and moral weight of their sympathies to the side of the old system. Their *feeling*, when expressed in the articulate language of a principle, is simply this—and it is just and true :—all wise and educated people will prefer a free to a despotic government, *ceteris paribus*, i. e., *order and security being predicated in both cases* ; but the worst theoretical government which assures these essential predicates, will be, and ought to be, preferred to the best theoretical government which endangers them. The majority of the sober and influential classes will always be found on the side of that party which best understands *the practical act of administration*, however defective or erroneous may be its fundamental principles, however medieval may be its name. If the year 1848 has taught this truth to the movement party, the cause of rational freedom will have gained incalculably by its first disasters.

4. It is not to be denied that the character of the Italians stands far higher in the eyes of Europe than it did before 1848. The various nations of the Peninsula came out of that fierce ordeal with a reputation for bravery, for sustained enthusiasm, for pure devoted patriotism, for capacity of self-government, such as they never before enjoyed. Their conduct in 1848 was of a nature to redeem all their previous failures and miserable exhibitions. It is true that the Lombards, whatever be the true explanation of their supineness, did nothing to fulfil the promise of their first brilliant exploit. It is true that the Sicilians, by a strange fatality of mismanagement, lost all the liberty for which

they had fought so ably and so gallantly, and which they had so nearly won. Still the expulsion of Radetsky, and the entire defeat of Ferdinand, shewed capacities for which neither Milan nor Palermo could have previously gained credit. Both the Piedmontese regulars and the Roman and Tuscan volunteers distinguished themselves by a steady and determined courage, on numerous occasions, which the soldiers of no country could surpass. But it was at Rome and Venice that the Italian nation won her spurs, and made good her claim to join the communion of the noble and the free states of the earth. In the former city, when the Pope had fled, the Republicans organized a government which for five months preserved order throughout the land, such as Romagna had not known for generations, with no bloodshed, and scarcely any imprisonment or exile; indeed, with a marvellous scantiness of punishment of any kind. While, during nearly the whole of this period, Rome, with 14,000 improvised troops, made good her defence against 30,000 French, supplied with the best artillery, and commanded by experienced generals, and Garibaldi drove the invading army of Naples before him like frightened sheep. With such means and against such antagonists it was impossible to have done more: in the face of such hopeless odds few people and few cities would have done as much. For a space of time yet longer, Venice, under the elected dictatorship of one man, put forward energies and displayed virtues which were little expected from the most pleasure-loving and sybaritic city of the world. The wealthy brought their stores, the dissolute shook off their luxury, the effeminate braced themselves to hardship and exertion, and without assistance or allies these heroic citizens kept at bay for many months the whole force of the Austrian Empire, and at last obtained liberal and honourable terms. After two such examples as these, the Italians can never again be despised as incapable and cowardly, or pronounced unfit for the freedom they had seized so gallantly and wielded so well. The comparison of 1848 with 1821 indicates a whole century of progress; and makes us confident, in spite of the cloudy and impenetrable present, that the day of the final emancipation of Italy must be near at hand.

Then Italy and Hungary—how unlike France and Germany—have shewn themselves rich in men not unequal to or unworthy of the crisis. While in the two latter countries, convulsions so deep and startling, exigencies so suggestive and imperative, as seemed especially fitted to call forth whatever genius and greatness might be lying dormant in obscure inaction, waiting for its hour, have brought to light no single man of eminence or commanding character,—while, in those times of trial which test of what metal men are made, many reputations

have been ruined, and none have been created,—in the east and in the south men have sprung up as they were wanted, and such as were wanted. Hungary has produced Kossuth, a writer and a statesman, fitted for any station, “equal to either fortune,” revered, loved, and almost worshipped by his countrymen, in despite of that failure generally so fatal to all popular idols. In Italy—not to speak of Balbo, Capponi, and other less known names—three men of tried capacities and characters have appeared, and made good their claim to be the leaders and organizers of Italian independence, Azeglio, Mazzini, and Manin. As patriotic writer, as gallant soldier, as prime minister of a constitutional kingdom, the first of these has shewn his devotion to Italy and his ability to serve her; and, both as virtual ruler of Piedmont, and head of the moderate party, is probably now the most essential man in the Peninsula. Mazzini, who previously had been regarded as merely an impracticable, fanatical enthusiast, displayed, as chief of the Roman Triumvirate, capacity both for administration and for war, which mark him as the future statesman of Rome, when Rome shall again be in her own hands: while Manin, who, as far as we are aware, was wholly unknown to fame, appeared at the critical moment when the fate of Venice hung in the balance, gifted with the precise qualities demanded by the emergency. When Italy shall be free, we need not fear any lack of men competent to guide her destinies.

5. All these, however, may by some be undervalued or denied as imaginary gains. But one great material fact stands out, an unquestionable reality. The revolutionary and the reactionary deluge have alike swept by, and the Sardinian constitution is left standing. The free institutions established by Charles Albert on the 4th of March 1848, have survived his death, the utter defeat of the Piedmontese army, and the attempts of internal foes, and are still in active and successful operation under the successor of the monarch who granted them, and under the ministry of the nobleman whose labours were mainly instrumental in procuring them. A short sketch of the chief provisions of the constitution will shew its real value, and the immense importance not only to Piedmont, but to all Italy, of its permanence and successful working.

“The State of Sardinia is a Representative monarchy: the throne is hereditary, and the person of the king inviolable. In him is concentrated the whole executive power of the State. He makes peace and declares war; appoints to all offices, and concludes all treaties—with this proviso that any treaties involving taxation or a variation of territory are invalid without the consent of the Chambers.

“The Legislative power resides in the king and the two Chambers

collectively. The Chambers must be convoked every year, but the king has the power of dissolving the Chamber of Deputies. The initiation of laws is common to all three branches of the Legislature. The civil list of the king shall be fixed by the Chambers on his accession to the throne, when he shall take a solemn oath of allegiance to the constitution.

"The Chamber of Deputies is chosen by electors of all classes, who pay a very small amount of direct taxes, all heads of trading or industrial establishments, and parties engaged in arts and professions, (employment in which is assumed to indicate *capacity* and education.) The Deputies are required to be thirty years of age; they are inviolable during Session except for flagrant crime; they are *representatives*, not *delegates* bound by authoritative instructions; they are chosen for five years; and have the right of impeachment over the Ministers.

"The Senate is composed of Members nominated by the King for life, out of a variety of classes; *e.g.*, the Archbishops and Bishops, President and experienced Members of the Chamber of Deputies, the Ambassadors and Ministers of State, the Chief Magistrates and Judges, Generals and Admirals, Members of the Academy of Sciences, and generally all who have rendered eminent services, or done honour to their country. The Senate is, like our House of Lords, the Supreme Court of Judicature of the Realm.

"All citizens, of every class, are equal before the law, and all contribute to the State in proportion to their means. No man can be arrested without legal warrant. The press is free; the right of public meeting is guaranteed; and no taxes can be imposed without the consent of the Chambers.

"The Judges are irremovable after they have served three years. All judicial proceedings are to be conducted in strict conformity to the written law."

This constitution, which secures civil rights and equal freedom to every citizen—and is, in fact, our own, minus an hereditary House of Peers—has now been in active operation for more than three years, to the general satisfaction of all parties. The Marquis Massimo d'Azeglio, who is at the head of the Ministry, is an able, popular, and well-tried man, who appears thoroughly to comprehend the working of free institutions, and can generally command in the Chambers a majority of two to one. As long as he lives and remains at the helm we have little fear of any mismanagement or serious imbroglio; and it is to be hoped that a few years' practice may train up many statesmen fitted to succeed him when he shall retire or die. It is scarcely possible, we think, to estimate too highly the ultimate gain to the cause of liberty and good government throughout Italy, by this establishment of a constitutional limited monarchy in one corner of the Peninsula. It will be impossible for either Austria or the smaller states to govern so despotically as they have done, with

such a reproach and such an example at their side. It will be impossible, also, for the radical party any longer to declare that no substantial liberty can be enjoyed by Italy except under a Republic. On the one side it will shame tyrants: on the other, it will instruct freemen. In time of peace it will train up patriotic Statesmen for future emergencies; in time of disturbance it will be a banner to rally round. It will give Italians a definite example to follow—a definite object to demand. It will shew that even in Italy liberty is not incompatible with order and progress, and will, we trust, pave the way to a national prosperity, that may excite at once the admiration and the emulation of surrounding States. Piedmont, though defeated at Novara, may yet on another field, with nobler weapons, and in a higher sense, be the regenerator and emancipator of Italy.

In the other States of Italy, though not a trace remains of their transient liberal institutions, though the press is silenced, and every book of interest or value is prohibited, though the most stupid and cruel oppressions are daily accumulating wrath against the day of wrath, though the Pope has returned to his vomit, and the Neapolitan sow to its wallowing in the mire, yet no man who is acquainted with the internal feelings of the country has lost heart. The passion for liberty, independence, and nationality, has enormously gained ground; the municipal jealousies which divided the several sections and cities of the Peninsula have been materially weakened; the Papal tyranny is becoming daily more odious;—the Mazzini party, as it is called, is admitted even by its opponents to be rapidly spreading;—and if the impatient man who is at its head can have forbearance to bide his time, and wait his opportunity, it may well prove that the day of deliverance is far nearer than is thought. When that day comes, it is more than probable that the conduct of the people, and the result to princes, will be very different from those last displayed.

- ART. IV.—1. *A Manual of Botany, being an Introduction to the Study of the Structure, Physiology, and Classification of Plants.* By JOHN HUTTON-BALFOUR, M.D., F.L.S., F.R.S.E., Professor of Medicine and Botany in the University of Edinburgh. 1849.
2. *The Plant: a Biography.* By M. T. SCHLEIDEN, M.D., Professor of Botany in the University of Jena. Translated by ARTHUR HENFREY. 1848.
3. *Principles of Scientific Botany; or Botany as an Inductive Science.* By Dr. J. M. SCHLEIDEN. Translated by EDWIN LANKESTER. 1849.
4. *On the Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton.* By RICHARD OWEN, F.R.S. 1848.
5. *On the Nature of Limbs.* A Discourse by RICHARD OWEN, F.R.S. 1849.
6. *The Typology of Scripture. Investigation of Principles and Patriarchal Periods.* By Rev. PATRICK FAIRBAIRN, Salton. 1847.
7. *The Typology of Scripture. Mosaic Dispensation.* By Rev. PATRICK FAIRBAIRN, Salton. 1847.

Two great principles, as it appears to us, run through every part of the works of God. The one is the principle of Order, or a General Plan, to which every given object is conformed with amazing skill. The other is the principle of Special Adaptation, by which each object, while formed after a general plan, is at the same time and by an equally wonderful skill, accommodated to the situation which it is meant to occupy, and the purpose which it is intended to serve.

These two principles are characteristic of intelligence. They may be discovered, though necessarily to a limited extent, in human workmanship. When circumstances admit, man constructs his works upon a general plan. We see it in the corn-yard of the farmer, who builds up his grain in forms which are after a particular mould. We detect it in the shop or wareroom of the merchant, where the articles are disposed in drawers of a like shape, or bound up in parcels of equal weight. Human intelligence delights to employ itself in forming such models. They seem to have a beauty to the eye, or rather to the mind, which contemplates them. Human convenience requires them. It is only when his possessions are so arranged that man can be said to have the command of them. Were his property not so disposed, were his grain gathered into heaps of all sizes and

shapes, were his merchandize scattered in every corner of the apartment, the possessor would become bewildered in proportion to the profusion and variety of his wealth.

While we see so obviously in the works of man the general model, we may also discover the principle of special adaptation. The farmer's stacks are all formed after a general mould, but we may observe a departure from it on either side to suit the quantity or quality of the grain. The merchant's shop seems to be regulated by forms and weights, but there is a special form and a model weight for every separate article.

We insist on having these two principles of uniformity and variety in all the higher works of man. We have them in a well-furnished house, where we see the one side of the chair and table of the same shape and size as the other side, but where there is also a variety in one kind of chair or table being after a different model of beauty from another. We see both illustrated in those pieces of furniture, in which there is something on the one side not of the same shape as something on the other side, but the counterpart of it, and intended to balance it. It is in the way of exhibiting these great principles, that we find in all the higher forms of architecture, a general correspondence in the whole, with a graceful diversity of particular parts. It is possibly because we insist on having these two principles in all the higher kinds of art, as we certainly find them in all the nobler departments of nature, that we have a central figure with other figures grouping around it, in all our finest historical paintings. The mind naturally constructs its workmanship in accommodation to these rules, and finds as it does so that it is ministering at once to the convenience and the delight of all intelligent beings.

Now, if this world proceeds from intelligence, if it is addressed to intelligence, we may expect to find in it the same two grand principles. We do find, we think, abundant illustrations both of the one and of the other.

The Principle of Order assumes a great diversity of forms. It may be an order, for instance, in respect of number, as when we find the threefold and fivefold symmetry prevailing to such an extent in the vegetable kingdom, and find all the laws of nature capable of a quantitative expression. It may exhibit itself in a beautiful conformity of colours, such as we find in the plumage of so many birds, and the spots and stripes on the skins of so many wild beasts, a conformity which does not, as Mr. Ruskin tells us, follow the physiological or anatomical structure of the animal, but follows a beautiful order of its own. Or it may be a uniformity in respect of form, and it is this that we are now specially to investigate. It cannot surely be either an unpleasant

or unprofitable inquiry which carries us into the very midst of that order and harmony which are so characteristic of works, which proceed, we must believe, from Infinite Intelligence.

But coincident with this principle, there is another, that of Special Adaptation, also running through the works of God. While there is a general form of limb, for instance, found in all mammals, there is a particular form to suit every given species, and the particular form is admirably suited to the circumstances in which the animal is placed, to the food provided for it, and the purposes which it is meant to serve. It must be no less interesting surely to discover the exceptions as well as the rule, to perceive how the exceptions fall under a different rule, and to find that the diversity is as beneficent as the uniformity.

After tracing this mingled uniformity and diversity throughout the more important kingdoms of nature, the vegetable and the animal, we may further inquire whether we do not meet with something similar in the dispensations of grace also, as revealed in the word of God, especially in the typical symbols, persons, and events described in the Old Testament. We say something similar—for it will at once be seen, that if our views are correct, there will with the uniformity be also a diversity. The typical system of the animal kingdom is of a different order from the typical system of the vegetable kingdom; and when we rise from matter to mind, from nature to revelation, we may expect to find the typical system, if there be a typical system, of a higher kind than that which pervades the organic world. But we can shew that each furnishes like evidences of lofty intelligence, and that all are equally suited to the same or similar principles in the constitution of man's mind. With such diversities as we might anticipate, and these diversities meant to serve a special purpose, we find a *system of types* running through the works of God, and this system adapted with wonderful skill to the objects to which it is applied.

To begin with the inorganic world. According to the creed which has been commonly adopted in modern times, matter is composed of atoms, and these atoms have regular forms. According to Sir Isaac Newton they are spherical, according to Dalton each has a specific magnitude. If these views be correct, we discover forms playing an important part in the original structure and composition of the material universe. On breaking up the rocks of the earth, we find in most of them a regular or crystalline form in the component parts, from which it has been argued that they are crystalline throughout. It is distinctly ascertained that minerals crystallize in the most regular manner, and that each mineral has its own crystalline form. Haüy, Mohs, and others, have reduced these crystals to certain

primitive forms, and minerals have been classified according to the form which they assume in crystallization. But it is evident that the rocks, as ordinarily presented to the eye, do not take any such regular form. On the contrary, nothing can be more disorderly than the common appearance of the rocks and earths, as they are found on the surface of our globe. At first sight we might be apt to complain of this, but on reconsideration we may easily be convinced, that if the surface of the ground had been covered with crystals, even though these had been crystals of gold or diamond, it would have been as inconvenient for man as the power given to Midas of turning all things which he touched into gold, and would not even have gratified his sense of beauty. The system of nature is a system of regularity amidst regular irregularity. The graceful forms of the organic world rise most beautifully from amidst the prevailing irregularity of the soil and rocks on the surface of the ground.

Still, the inorganic world is not without its morphological regularities. Each satellite is of the same form as its planet, and the planets are of the same shape as their sun. All the heavenly bodies seem to move in similarly shaped, that is, elliptic orbits. No doubt there are irregularities, as in the ring of Saturn; but occasional irregularities under the same grand law are as much the rule of God's kingdom as fixed and squared regularities. But it is in the Vegetable and Animal Kingdoms that we find *morphology* coming forth most prominently.

As all matter, organic and inorganic, is supposed to be formed of regularly shaped atoms, so organic matter, vegetable and animal, is now believed to originate in cells. The cellular structure of plants was discovered as early as the seventeenth century, by Robert Hooke, who used an instrument brought from the Continent, and was farther developed soon after by Malpighi, a professor at Bologna. It is now acknowledged that cells are the primary elements of all vegetable life, and by means of improved microscopes, physiological botany is trying, though as yet with but partial success, to penetrate the mystery of life, and to discover the way in which cells are formed. These cells are little vesicles, composed of a membrane usually transparent and colourless as water. According to Schleiden, the cell membrane, in its young state, is perfectly closed, but permeable to all fluids. It contains a fluid thicker than water, and this fluid having commonly an affinity for water, there is a constant passing in of water, and a passing out of the concentrated fluid from the cell. These cells vary in size, but may average about part of an inch in diameter. It is calculated that in some fungi they are generated at a rate of sixty-six millions in a minute. When allowed to develop themselves freely, they take a glo-

bular form. When supplied with nutrition unequally, they take more flattened or elliptic shapes. When a number of cells press on one another they become many-sided. When perfectly formed cells of the same size are allowed to press against each other, they will be seen as beautiful rhombo-dodecaedrons under the microscope. The individual cells are grouped together in a variety of ways into great masses called tissues, which are of various kinds, and go by various names. The simplest is the parenchyma, formed by an agglomeration of cells. Then there are the vessels, formed by a row of lengthened cells, whose cavities through resorption have been brought into continuous communication; and there are the vascular bundles composed of a mass of lengthened cells, formed partly into vessels and penetrating the parenchyma. "The cell," says Professor Balfour, in his admirable elementary work on Botany, "is the basis of all vegetable structure. It is of equal importance as regards function. In the lowest plants cells constitute the whole substance, they absorb and assimilate, thus performing the functions of nutrition and secretion, and they form new cells, thus reproducing individuals like themselves. When a more complete structure exists, as in the higher tribes of plants, certain cells are appropriated for absorption, others are concerned in assimilation, and others in forming and receiving secretions. When a certain degree of solidity appears to be required to support the stem, leaves, and flowers, ligneous substance is deposited, and woody fibre is formed. When the transmission of fluids and air is carried on rapidly, the elastic fibres of the fibrovascular tissue seem to keep the elongated cells and vessels pervious; and when the elaborated sap is conveyed continuously, without interruption, anastomosing tubes occur in the form of laticiferous vessels." It is out of these cells, chemically and mechanically compound, but vitally simple, each possessing a perfectly independent life, the law of which has not been ascertained, that all the plants of the earth with their infinitely diversified shapes and functions are formed. These cells are the living stones of which this great temple of nature is built. The life of the plant is the result of the life of its individual cells. It is not unworthy of being noticed, though at present little can be founded upon it, that certain numbers occur in the formation of young cells, in by far the majority of cases, two, four, and eight young cells being formed within the parent cell.

The natural shape of the cell is the globular, a form unseen by the naked eye. The first regular form which falls under the notice of the unassisted vision is the spiral, a figure which combines in itself our two principles of unity and variety. The microscope first of all shews us this form, appearing in the inner

surface of the cell. When the cell has reached a certain degree of development, the cellulose is deposited upon it as a concrete layer which takes the figure of a spiral band. But the spiral figure also appears in parts of the plant which strike the naked eye. The arrangement of leaves and of other appendicular parts round the stem or axis of a plant is very frequently spiral. Leaves seem to be arranged in a more or less spiral manner. Thus, in the case of the apple, the pear, the willow, the oak, and many other trees, if a line be drawn round the tree, from the base of one leaf to the base of another, it will be found that a perfectly spiral line has been described. Lindley thinks it probable that the normal position of all leaves upon the stem is alternate, and consequently that a line joining these bases will be an elongated spiral. The scales of the pine and fir cone are arranged in spires, and between these spires there are certain arithmetical or mathematical relations of a most singular description, which have given rise to curious speculations. It has been laid down by some botanists as a general fact, that beginning with the cotyledons or seed-lobes, the whole of the appendages of the axis of plants, leaves, calyx, corolla, stamens, and carpels, form in their normal state an uninterrupted spire governed by laws which are nearly constant. The spiral tendency is likewise seen in climbing plants and the tendrils of plants, as also in the twining stem of some plants, which look as if they were twisted round their own axis.

With the exception of the spherical forms of individual cells, which are unseen by the naked eye, no regular mathematical figures are to be found in the shape of plants or the parts of plants. All this is in striking accordance with the native principles of beauty implanted in the human mind. Had our trees been triangular, our shrubs quadrilateral, and our grasses spherical, we feel that we should have been constrained to do what Pascal did, to shut up our casement, that we might not see the landscape; but from motives very different from those of Pascal, for while he durst not look on Nature's scenes because they were so beautiful, we would not be able in these circumstances to look upon them because they were so ugly. When the commonwealth of taste is properly constituted, one of its first laws will be passed against the clipping of boxwood and holly, and the common pruning of trees, which has no respect to their natural form. We can excuse the old Scotch earl who planted his trees in groups to represent the troops which gained a victory under him, because, while he thereby spoiled the beauties of nature, he gave us some insight into the military art; but those who form spherical yews and conical laurels, should themselves be subjected to a similar pruning process, because of the offence which

they commit against nature without, and nature within us. Meanwhile, let us be grateful that no such enormities are committed in the works of God. There is attention at once extensive and minute paid to form in the vegetable kingdom, but this form intentionally admits of variety along with the unity. The unity is sustained by the symmetry, or the two equal or balancing sides, which appear in the plant as a whole, and in all its foliar appendages; and the variety is exhibited in the infinitely diversified waving lines of their outline as seen between us and the sky in the back-ground. It is a circumstance worthy of being noticed, that while the even numbers, 2, 4, 8, prevail in the formation of cells which are unseen without artificial aid, the uneven numbers, or a centre with two sides, appear in the ramification of branches, the venation of leaves, and the whorls of flowers. Naturalists divide the vegetable kingdom into monocotyledonous, which are also endogenous, and dicotyledonous, which are exogenous plants; and it is found that three is the typical number in the former, and five, the typical number, in the latter class.

But it is in the external forms of plants that we see this doctrine of types most strikingly exhibited. The department of botany which treats of these forms is called Morphology. Lindley represents it as the basis of all scientific knowledge of vegetable structure; Schleiden speaks of it as the most important section of botany; and Professor Balfour says, it is now the basis of organography, and he has kept it in view throughout his whole treatment of the organs of plants. This department of botany was unknown before the time of Linnaeus, and even he had but a limited notion of its importance. It was first presented in its true light by the great German poet Goethe, who, though not learned in the artificial systems at that time taught in the schools, had a fine eye for the objective world. As Goethe had no name among the initiated, his views were long neglected by the scientific world. It was about thirty years after they were published that they were brought into notice by De Candolle and others. Under some modifications they have now commanded the assent of the most sagacious and practical of British naturalists, men slow to admit German theories in any case, and who never do admit them till they have accommodated them to their own common-sense type.

The fundamental law of morphology is, that certain plants are constructed upon the same general plan. The perfect plant may be regarded as composed of two essentially distinct parts, the STEM and the LEAF. Looking first to the STEM, we find the whole skeleton of the plant composed of a number of stems developed the one from the other, in lineal succession. The stem going downwards becomes the root, and proceeding up-

wards becomes the trunk. From the main stem, both in its upward and downward course, there proceed lateral stems or branches, and these lateral stems may again send out other stems or branchlets. It is to be observed, that these stems are all as it were repetitions of each other. The main stem, all the lateral branches, and the branchlets proceeding from these, are of the same structure, and tend to assume the same form. "If a thousand branches from the same tree are compared together," says Lindley, "they will be found to be formed upon the same uniform plan, and to accord in every essential particular. Each branch is also, under favourable circumstances, capable of itself becoming a separate individual, as is found by cuttings, bud-dings, grafting, and other horticultural processes. This being the case, it follows, that what is proved of one branch is true of all the other branches." Thus the smallest branchlet becomes a type of the branch on which it grows, and the branch a type of the trunk from which it springs. Knight and Du Petit Thouars delight to represent every plant as composed of an assemblage of individuals, each, as it were, with a separate life, and capable in certain circumstances of living independently, and it has been customary to designate the individual part or plantlet by the word *phyton*. It should be remarked at the same time, that though the plant is composed of a number of individuals, yet that these are so arranged as that the whole is one individual.

The other essential part of the plant is the LEAF. First we have the leaves properly so called, which commonly have a simpler form low down on the stem, assume their fully developed figure farther up, and return to greater simplicity at the extremity. Then we have leaves metamorphosed into a number of other organs; indeed, it is now acknowledged that all the other parts of the plant, except the stem, can be reduced to this type. "Linnaeus," says Schleiden, "had a presentiment of something of the kind, and in his *Prolepsis Plantarum* carried it out in such a way that, starting from the consideration of a perennial plant, with regular periodicity of vegetation, as in our forest trees, he explained the collective floral parts, from the bracts onward, as the collective foliar product of a five-year old shoot, which by anticipation and modification was developed in one year. This view is, in the first instance, taken from the most limited point possible, from the examination of a plant of our climate; and, secondly, imagined and carried out with great want of clearness." The first correct statement of the doctrine was made by C. Fr. Wolff, (*Theoria Generationis*, 1764,) but his treatise lay neglected till the truth had become established through the influence of others. Goethe wrote his *Versuch die*

Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären, in 1790, a work which has laid the foundation of morphology as a department of botany, and of scientific botany as built upon it. The botanists paid little attention to his ideas, till long after when they were mentioned by Jussieu, and brought into general notice by the *Organographie* of De Candolle, published in 1827. The doctrine of the metamorphosis of plants is now acknowledged by all the great doctors, and has been sanctioned by the great councils of science.

Looking to the flower or inflorescence of a plant, we have first of all the outer cup or calyx, composed evidently of leaves called sepals, which are commonly of a green colour. Within this we have the corolla, or flower in the narrow sense of the term, composed of leaves called petals, alternating with the leaves of the calyx. Within this whorl we have the stamens, which are metamorphosed petals, and which do, in certain circumstances, become petals. In the centre of the inflorescence is the pistil with the seed vessels. Linnaeus had no idea that this could be a foliar organ. We owe the proper conception of the seed vessels to Goethe, who thus writes, "Keeping in view the observations that have now been made, there will be no difficulty in discovering the leaf in the seed vessel notwithstanding the variable structure of that part, and its peculiar combinations. Thus the pod is a leaf which is folded up and grown together at its edges, and the capsule consists of several leaves grown together, and the compound fruit is composed of several leaves united together round a common centre, so as to form a communication between them and their edges adhering together." Thus we have the organs of the inflorescence, calyx, corolla, stamens, and pistils reduced to foliar organs. Not that we are to regard them as leaves properly speaking, or even as metamorphosed leaves, for they never have been leaves, but they are formed after the same plan as leaves, but modified to suit the special purpose which they have to serve.

According to this idea a plant is composed of two essentially distinct parts, the stem and leaf. The leaf is formed upon the ascending stem, and besides its common form it assumes, while obeying the same fundamental laws, certain other forms, as bracts, sepals, petals, stamens, and pistils. Schleiden in his "Plant, a Biography," gives us a picture of a typical plant constructed on this principle. This makes a plant a dual, or composed of two essentially different parts.

But we have at times thought it possible to reduce a plant by a more enlarged conception of its nature to a unity. According to our idea, it consists essentially of a stem, sending out other stems similar to itself at certain angles, and in such a regular

manner that the whole is made to take a predetermined form. The ascending axis, for instance, sends out at particular normal angles for each tree branches similar in structure to itself. These lateral branches again send out branchlets of a like nature with themselves, and at much the same angles. The whole tree with its branches thus comes to be of the same general form as every individual branch with its branchlets, and every branch with its branchlets comes to be a type of the whole plant in its skeleton and outline.

Taking this idea of a plant along with us, let us now inquire whether there may not be a morphological analogy between the stems and the ribs or veins of the leaf. The veins of the leaf are vascular bundles proceeding from the fibrous matter of the stem, and may very possibly tend to follow the same laws. We are quite aware that in respect of physiological development there is a difference between the two, but this shall just render the morphological resemblance if it exists the more striking. We begin with the examination of those plants which have a fully veined or reticulated leaf. In maintaining that there is a morphological analogy between the ramification of the stems, and the venation of the leaves, we always assume, *that both stem and leaf are fully and fairly developed.*

In prosecuting this inquiry let us first inspect in a general way the leaf of a tree, with its central vein or veins, and its side veins. Even on the most careless inspection the central vein will be found to bear a striking analogy to the central stem or axis of the tree, and its side veins to the branches. Having viewed the leaf in the first instance, let us then look at the tree when stripped of its leaves in winter, and we may observe how like it is in its disc and in its skeleton to the disc and skeleton of the leaf. We shall be particularly struck with this if we view it in the dim twilight, or the "pale moonlight" between us and a clear sky. In both leaf and tree we see a central stem or stems, with lateral stems going off in a ramified manner at certain angles, and we may observe that the tree in its outline tends to assume the form of a leaf.

The general impression produced by a first glance will be confirmed on farther inspection. The analogy between the skeleton of the leaf and the skeleton of the whole tree may be seen in a number of special points, as well as in the general fact that the stems and the veins are both ramified. (1.) Some trees, such as the beech, the elm, the oak, and the greater number of our ornamental lawn bushes, as the holly, the Portugal and bay laurels, the privet, the box, will be found to send out side branches along their stem from the very root, or near the root, and the leaves of these trees will be found to have little or

no petiole or leaf-stalk. Other trees, again, such as the common sycamore (the Scotch plane), the birch, the chestnut, the lime, the pear, the cherry, the apple, have a pretty long unbranched trunk, and the leaves of all these trees have a pretty long leaf-stalk. (2.) Most of our low, bushy, branching herbaceous plants, such as tussilago, rhubarb, mallow, marsh marigold, lady's mantle, send out simultaneously a number of stems or stalks from the root or near the root; and it will be found in exact correspondence with this, that there run off from the base of the leaf a considerable quantity of main veins or ribs, which make the leaf assume more or less of a circular form. In this respect these plants are different from our forest trees, which send up commonly one main axis with lateral branches, and have in their leaves one leading vein with side veins. (3.) Some trees, such as the beech, the birch, the elm, the oak, send up one large main stem, from which, throughout its length, there proceed comparatively small branches pretty equably along the axis, and it will be found in such cases that the leaf has a central vein with pretty equally disposed veins on either side. Other trees, again, tend rather to send off at particular heights a number of comparatively thick branches at once. This is the case, for instance, with the common sycamore, the chestnut, and laburnum. The trunk of the plane tree, about eight or ten feet above the surface of the ground, commonly divides itself into four or five large branches, and in precise analogy, we find the leaf, at the top of a pretty long leaf-stalk, sending off five large veins. The chestnut often sends off at the top of its unbranched trunk a still greater number of branches, and we find in correspondence with this that its leaf is commonly divided into seven leaflets. The laburnum (and also the broom and clover) go off in triplets both in respect of veins and branches. In such cases it will commonly be found that the leaf is compound, *and we are to regard all such compound leaves as the proper representative of the whole tree.* (4.) The leaves of some plants, such as the rhododendron, the azelia, and the lupin, have a tendency to assume a whorled arrangement, and the branches of these plants also tend to become verticillate. (5.) The stems of some trees, such as the thorn and laburnum, are not straight, and the branches have a twisted form, and it will be found in such cases that the venation is not straight, and that the leafage is not in one plane. (6.) In some trees, such as the beech, the branches go off in nearly straight lines, and the leaves are found to have a straight venation. In other trees, again, such as the chestnut, the branches have a graceful curve, and the veins of the leaves are curved in much the same manner. (7.) In most plants the angle at which the side stems

go off will be found to widen as we ascend to the middle of the tree, and thence to decrease as we ascend to the apex; and the venation of the leaves will be found to obey a similar law. This structure helps to give to both tree and leaf the graceful curve by which their outline is distinguished. In other trees, such as the birch and poplar, the angle both of ramification and venation is widest at the base, and will be found to decrease as we ascend, giving both to the coma of the tree and the leaf a kind of triangular form. (8.) Generally, after having made a number of measurements, we think we have discovered a general correspondence between the angle of the ramification of the tree and the angle of venation of the leaf. This investigation, however, requires to be conducted with a considerable amount of caution. For while it is not difficult to discover the angles of the veins of leaves, it is far from being easy to find the normal ramification of a tree, for the angle at which the branch goes off is modified by a vast number and variety of circumstances, natural and artificial. All that we argue for is a *tendency* in the ramification and venation to obey the same laws.*

We are strongly inclined, then, to the opinion that in plants with leaves that strike the eye, the leaf and plant are typically analogous. The leaf is a typical plant or branch, and the tree or branch a typical leaf. We are quite aware of the differences which exist between these two distinct members of the plant. In particular, we find in the case of the full tree that branches go off all round the axis, whereas in the leaf the fibrous veins all lie in one plane. But then we have something to connect these two in the branch, the branchlets of which commonly lie in one plane. The principal difference between the tree and leaf may possibly be found to lie in this, that the cellular tissue or parenchyma, which in the tree and its branches is collected into the pith and bark, (which are connected by the medullary rays,) is in the leaf so spread out as to fill up the interstices in the fibrous matter which forms the veins.

The general order, as thus stated, can apply only to plants which have pith and bark, and which have fully formed veined leaves intended to strike the eye. In the plants with linear unbranched leaves, such as firs and pines, the order is modified to suit the different physiological structure and different form of the plant. Here the leaf does not correspond to the branch or tree, but merely to the stem. But here, too, we discover the same grand typical principle in every internode being of the

* We use this language because it will require farther investigation to determine the extent or limits of the general view now advanced. We shall be satisfied if this article leads men of science to pursue this investigation, even though this should occasion the partial modification of some of our special statements.

same form as every other, in every branch taking the form of the whole tree, in the growing or topmost internode with its leafage being of the same outline as the whole tree or branch on which it grows, and in the very cones being in many instances types of the whole tree and of every branch.

We are not prepared to say how this principle is carried out in the monocotyledonous plants. Some of these, such as our common grasses and lilies, have no branches, and the leaves of these plants have their veins parallel, or nearly parallel, to each other. In order to discover the law of order in the case of the palms, they would require to be examined in their native climes. Some plants of this class, such as the dictyogens of Lindley, to which belong yams, have branches like our ordinary forest trees, and it is a curious circumstance that the leaves of these plants have a reticulated structure.

So far as fungi, lichens, algae, and the whole acotyledonous plants are concerned, it is evident that they present a repetition both of homotypal parts and of homotypal arrangement of parts or forms, and thus illustrate our general doctrine, that throughout the vegetable kingdom the parts are similar to one another, and in nice accordance with the whole.

Generally, we are inclined to regard the fibrous veins of the leaf as bearing a morphological analogy to the stems of the tree. The root, the stemage, and the leaf are, in our view, the three distinct members of the fully developed plant,—these three parts, however, being morphologically allied, so that, to adopt the phraseology of Professor Owen as applied to another subject, (which we are now to examine,) they may be called homotypes. The plant thus becomes a unity with unnumbered diversity of parts.

We turn to the science of Comparative Anatomy, which furnishes illustrations of the same great principles. There was in the last age a famous controversy, which may be summarily represented as a dispute as to which of these two great principles we should discover in the animal structure. This controversy should now be regarded as settled in the discovery of both principles. The most illustrious comparative anatomist of the last, or indeed of any age, proceeded in all his investigations on the principle that every particular member of the animal body had a special use or final cause. Attached to this principle, and having found how prolific it was, in his hands, of brilliant discoveries, Cuvier was not very willing to admit a general correspondence of parts which could have no reference to the well-being or special functions of the animal. On the other hand, his great co-operator and rival, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, was accus-

toned to speak in a scoffing manner of the doctrine of final causes, and delighted to trace a unity of plan running through the bones of the skeleton. The doctrine of final causes, as illustrated by the former, was made to furnish numerous and, we believe, incontrovertible proofs of the existence of a Supreme Intelligence; while the doctrine of a general plan, irrespective of the animal wants, was turned, as we think, most illogically, against the cause of natural religion. This controversy became still more embittered when Lorenz Oken, attached to the pantheistic school of Schelling, developed his doctrine of the brain being a vertebrate column. Some we suspect supported the doctrine of a physical uniformity of parts because it seemed to deliver them from the necessity of calling in final causes, while not a few regarded it with suspicion because it seemed to be atheistic or pantheistic in its tendency. There was a still greater repugnance felt to the doctrine of Oken on the part of many British anatomists, because of the transcendental method which he employed in developing it, and the mysticism in which it was embedded. We owe to the greatest of living comparative anatomists, the clear and correct statement of the great truth of a unity of plan running through the whole vertebrate skeleton; and his statement of the doctrine has been followed by its almost universal adoption. Professor Owen's views were first partially given to the public in the *Geological Transactions* for 1838, and were afterwards more fully developed, and communicated to the Royal College of Surgeons in the *Hunterian Lectures* for 1844 and subsequent years, and to the British Association at its meeting at Southampton in 1846. The public have now the matured and complete results in the great work on the *Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton*, published in 1848, and in a *Lecture on Limbs*, published in 1849,—works which will constitute an era in the progress not only of comparative anatomy, but of the theistic argument as founded on the structure of the animal frame. The old controversy should now cease in the adoption of both doctrines, that of a general homology and that of a special adaptation of parts; and the former properly interpreted will be found, we are convinced, to yield as rich a contribution to the cause of natural theology as the latter.

By a "Homologue," Owen means the same organ in different animals under every variety of form and function. Thus, the pectoral fins of the fish, the wings of the bird, the fore-feet of the mammal, and the arms and hands of man, are said to be homologous parts, because they are really the same organs under different modifications. Such homologies as these have long been noticed even by the unscientific observer. But anatomists have now demonstrated, that in comparing one species

of animal with another there are similar homologies in every part of the skeleton. Professor Owen furnishes us with a plate forming a perfect study in itself, in which we have a series of about seventy homologous parts traced through all the vertebrate series of animals from fishes up to man. In this plate we have, first, an imaginary figure, an archetypal skeleton; secondly, the skeleton of a fish; thirdly, of a reptile; fourthly, of a bird; fifthly, of a mammal; and, sixthly, of man. In contemplating this plate we are invited to observe how an immense number of bones marked each by its number in the skeleton, and designated by its common scientific name in the margin, are to be found in the fish, the reptile, the bird, the mammal, and man, thus proving that they are formed after a common model. But while the same parts or organs are found in each of these classes of vertebrate animals, they are made to assume very different positions and sizes, in order to suit the particular species of animal. Thus, the fore-limbs become fins in fishes, claws in reptiles, wings in birds, long bounding legs in mammals, and arms and fingers in man. There is shewn to be a similar transformation of the rest of the seventy homologous parts to suit the convenience of the living creature.

In his great work on the Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton, Professor Owen treats, first, of special homology, or the homology of special organs. He next discusses general homology, and shews that there is not only a homology of certain organs, but a general plan or homology for the whole vertebrate skeleton. In the third place he treats of serial homology, and shews that the vertebrate skeleton is made up of a series of segments, which he calls "homotypes," repeating each other. We shall dwell for a little on these serial or repeating homologies, as illustrating our doctrine of similar parts being made to appear over and anon throughout the kingdoms of nature.

The characteristic of the higher class of animals is the possession of a back-bone or vertebrate column. This column is composed of a series of segments or similar parts succeeding each other in the axis of the body. "These segments are not, indeed, composed of the same number of bones in any class, or throughout any individual animal; but certain parts of each segment do maintain such constancy in their existence, relation, position, and offices, as to enforce the conviction that they are homologous parts, both in the constituent skeleton, and throughout the series of vertebrate animals. For each of these primary segments, I retain the term vertebra." Professor Owen then exhibits what he reckons an ideal typical vertebra. It has a solid central part, a centrum which serves to give rigidity to the body, and support to the limbs. Above it, and forming a protection to the great

nervous chord which comes down the back, is the neural arch, composed of two neural processes (apophyses), surmounted by the neural spine. Below it, and covering the great descending artery and the other vital organs of the body, is the hæmal arch, composed of two hæmal processes, with the hæmal spine. On each of the sides of the centrum there is also a canal circumscribed by a costal process, and by two transverse processes. Besides these processes, there are also two articular processes connecting the parts of the neural and hæmal arches. The typical vertebra is thus composed of ten separate parts, a centre, a neural and hæmal spine, and seven processes which also support diverging appendages to be afterwards spoken of. Now, if we examine the several joints of the back-bone we find these essential parts appearing, though under very different modifications, from the top of the neck to the tip of the tail. These parts, indeed, are in some parts of all animals so altered from their typical form, that it is difficult to detect them. Still the skilful anatomist can trace them under all their various modifications, and finds it convenient to describe them by common names. Certain of the processes (apophyses) are in the body of the animal, ribs to protect the great vital organs. In the neck we do not find ribs, because they would injure the free motion of the neck; but we do find the rudiments of ribs. In the tail we have no ribs, but we have the homologous processes employed to embrace certain blood-vessels. Thus, from tail to neck inclusive, the vertebrate skeleton is composed, throughout all animals from fishes to man, of a series of parts essentially of the same order, but wonderfully modified to suit the function which the organ has to perform in the given species of animal.

So far these views will readily be acknowledged even by the anatomists of the school of Cuvier, who did much to establish the doctrine. But comparative anatomy is seeking to go beyond this, and would represent the skull itself as composed of a series of vertebræ. It would appear that Goethe had been dabbling in this subject also before the end of last century; but it was Oken, proceeding on a favourite idea of the school of Schelling that we are to seek the repetition of the whole in every part, who obtained the first clue to the discovery in August 1806. Walking one day in the Hartz Forest, he saw before him the blanched skull of a deer, and picking up and contemplating the bones, the thought flashed across his mind, "This is a vertebrate column." He afterwards tested and matured this idea, by examining the skulls of a cetacean, a chelonian, and a cod-fish, in the museum at Bremen, and published his generalization in a *Lecture on the Signification of the Bones of the Skull*. "As the brain," says he, "is a more voluminously developed spinal chord, so is the

brain-case a more voluminous spinal column." This idea has since been subjected to a sifting examination by various German, French, and British anatomists. Professor Owen, while adopting it so far, has considerably modified it. According to him the skull is not a separate column, but a series of vertebræ homologous to the series in the back-bone.

Proceeding onward from the neck we find the spinal chord becoming expanded in the brain into a globular mass, and we are according to this doctrine to regard the bony envelope which protects it as just a continuation of the series of vertebræ of the back-bone, these vertebræ being greatly modified to suit the end which they have now to serve. The skull, it is well known, is made up of parts which can be separated from each other, and these parts can be arranged in a series of segments, each of which contains the central cylinder, and the various processes which constitute the typical vertebra. Owen reckons the cranium as made up of parts corresponding to four vertebræ, but he does not seem to be sure whether there may not be other vertebræ in the cranium not fully developed. There are other anatomists who discover seven vertebræ in the skull, and perhaps this may be regarded as a proof that the doctrine, at least in some of its details, is not fully settled.

Proceeding on this method we have discovered the morphological signification of the back-bone, the tail, the ribs, and the skull itself. The question now comes to be started, what are we to understand by the limbs of animals? Professor Owen answers this in a deeply interesting and eminently suggestive Lecture on *Limbs*, delivered before a distinguished audience in February 1849, with all that grace of manner and elegance of language which, together with his learning and the comprehensiveness of his views, render him one of the most accomplished of living lecturers. In this lecture he shews that there are homologous segments appearing in the limbs of fishes, reptiles, birds, mammals, and man, though the limbs have to perform very different functions in each of these kinds of animal. He exhibits to us, first, the pectoral fin of the marine animal, the dugong; secondly, the fore-limbs of the mole; thirdly, the wing of the bat; fourthly, the leg of a horse; and, fifthly, the arm of man; and he shews how certain essential parts run through all these limbs, and maintain a uniform structure even when such different functions have to be performed as that of diving and swimming, burrowing and running, climbing and flying. It is a curious circumstance that every segment, and almost every bone present in the human hand and arm, exist also in the fin of the whale, though they do not seem required for the support and movements of that undivided and unflexible paddle. In many ani-

mals, indeed, some of the homologous parts, as for instance, certain of the fingers and toes, are not fully developed or are wanting, but in such cases they will often be found in a kind of rudimental state, or when absent we can tell what precise homologous parts are wanting, and what are present. The fore-leg of the horse wants the first and fifth finger, but has the second and fourth in an undeveloped state in the splint-bones, while the foot corresponds to the mid-finger, and the hoof is just the nail of that finger enlarged beyond the normal size.

Professor Owen next seeks to settle the higher question, what are we to understand by limbs in relation to General Homology? We cannot give his processes; we must content ourselves with giving his results. We have already said that in the vertebra, besides the central part and the apophyses running off from it, there might also, though not essential to the vertebra, be certain appendages. From the hæmal or lower arch of the vertebra in particular, certain appendages are found to proceed. Owen traces them in a rudimental state in various vertebræ of the animal frame, and after an extensive induction, he comes to the conclusion that the scapula is the hæmal arch, and the human hands and arms the diverging appendages of the hæmal arch, belonging to the lowest segment, the occipital segment of the skull. The hind-limbs are shewn by a similar process to be costal appendages of a pelvic vertebra. The whole skeleton, skull, back-bone, and limbs, including the whole vertebrate axis from the head to the tail, and all lateral parts, such as ribs and feet, are thus reduced to a unity, in a series of segments repeated in their essential characters, though infinitely diversified, to suit the particular purpose of the member.

We may state the conclusion in the words of Professor Owen:—"General anatomical science reveals the unity which pervades the diversity, and demonstrates the whole skeleton of man to be the harmonized sum of series of essentially similar segments, although each segment differs from the other, and all vary from the archetype."

"If," says Professor Sedgwick, in the fifth edition of his Discourse, in commenting on these speculations, "there be an archetype in the vertebrate division of animated nature, we may well ask whether there may not be a more general archetype that runs through the whole kingdom of the living world. In a certain sense there is. All animals, if we except the radiata, which come close to a vegetable type, are bilateral and symmetrical, have double organs of sense, and have a nervous and vascular system, with many parts in very near homology, even when we put side by side for comparison the animal forms taken from the opposite extreme of Nature's scale. And even in the

radiata, where we at first sight seem to lose all traces of the vertebrate type, on a better examination many of the genera are proved still to be bilateral and symmetrical."

These types appear not only throughout the whole series of animals, from the lowest to the highest, but throughout the whole Geological Series, from the earliest to the latest. It is now asserted that so long ago as the age when the old red sandstone was deposited in a district of what is now North America, there was a reptile who left the print of his foot in the sand, and this footprint turns up in the present day to shew that the animal had five toes. Coming down to the age of the new red sandstone, we have numerous footprints of reptiles, where again the five toes appear. In due time man appears, and is found too with five fingers on each hand, and five toes on each foot. Buckland tells us that in the "fore-paddle of the plesiosaurus, we have all the essential parts of the fore-leg of a quadruped, and even of a human arm; first the scapula, next the humerus, then the radius and ulna, succeeded by the bones of the carpus and metacarpus, and these followed by five fingers, each composed of a continuous series of phalanges. The hind-paddle also offers precisely the same analogies to the leg and foot of the mammalia: the pelvis and femur are succeeded by a tibia and fibula, which articulate with the bones of the tarsus and metatarsus, followed by the numerous phalanges of five long toes."

We cannot dwell on this part of the subject, but we must be permitted to say in passing, that the doctrine we are now expounding gives, if we do not mistake, the true meaning of such authenticated facts as the author of the *Vestiges of Creation* has woven into his plausible, yet withal exceedingly superficial work. But it gives no foundation whatever to the theory which he has reared on these facts, after having mingled with them many unauthenticated and mistaken statements. That there has been an order, and upon the whole a progression in the animal creation, should be admitted by all geologists. But it is an order, not in the nature of things, but in the plan of the Creator. It is not that one species has run into a higher by physical laws, but it is that the higher species is constructed after the same type as the lower.

He who maintains, that because there is a progression in the works of God, therefore the inferior has developed itself by natural law into the superior, is about as far-sighted and sagacious as the child who, on seeing a great number of vessels in a pottery, made all after nearly the same mould, but of different sizes, concluded that the large vessels had grown from the little ones. This progression is one of those collocations which John Stuart

Mill would call ultimate facts, that is, in physical investigation they are ultimate facts; and if we wish to go farther, as we think we ought, we must trace them to the designing mind of the Creator. For there has been no authenticated instance of one species of animal being transmuted into another; and there has been as perfect an induction, as physical science admits, in favour of the necessary separation of species and genera. We do not know of any law of nature which has been established on a larger or more invariable induction. He who would set it aside, on the pretence of explaining all things by natural law, must in the very act be setting aside natural law. The nameless author of "*The Vestiges*" should best know his own genealogy, and he may owe his insight into man's origin from the monad through the mollusc and mammal, to the circumstance of his having been himself generated in this manner; but until he manfully discloses himself, and produces such a fact in favour of his transmutation theory, we must claim to ourselves a nobler, if not so "endless" a genealogy, and assert that man is the "son of Adam, which was the son of God." When he has convinced us of his theory, we shall expect, as the next product of natural law, to hear of one who has risen so far above his ancestors, begetting a son belonging to a species as far above the human species as man is above the brutes. But we may safely leave the author of "*The Vestiges*" in the hands of Mr. Hugh Miller and Professor Sedgwick.

If there be then such a prevalence of typical and archetypal forms, the question arises, what is the final cause of it? Professor Owen does not seem to know what to make of the doctrine in this respect. He protests, indeed, that it cannot be employed to favour Atheism, but he does not seem to have a settled conception of its true religious signification. He is ever asserting that the facts of anatomy do not admit of an explanation on purely teleological principles; and so far we agree with him, if by teleology a reference be meant solely to the wellbeing of the given animal. "I think it will be obvious that the principle of final adaptation fails to satisfy all the conditions of the problem. That every segment, and almost every bone, which is present in the human hand and arm, should exist in the fin of the whale, solely because it is assumed they were required in such number and collocation for the movement of that undivided and inflexible paddle, squares as little with our idea of the simplest mode of effecting the purpose, as the reason which might be assigned for the greater number of bones in the cranium of the chick, viz., to allow the safe compression of the brain-case during the act of extrusion, squares with the requirements of that act." (Lecture

on Limbs, p. 40.) And again, (Homologies, p. 73,) "The attempt to explain by the Cuvierian principles the facts of special homology on the hypothesis of the subserviency of the parts so determined to similar ends in different animals—to say that the same or answerable bones occur in them because they have to perform similar functions—involves many difficulties, and is opposed by numerous phenomena. We may admit that the multiplied points of ossification in the skull of the human fœtus facilitate, and were designed to facilitate, child-birth; yet something more than such a final purpose lies beneath the fact, that most of those osseous centres represent permanently distinct bones in the cold-blooded vertebrates. The cranium of the bird, which is composed in the adult of a single bone, is ossified from the same number of points as in the human embryo, without the possibility of a similar purpose being subserved thereby in the extrication of the chick from the fractured egg-shell. The composite structure is repeated in the minute and prematurely born embryo of the marsupial quadrupeds. Moreover, in the bird and marsupial, as in the human subject, the different points of ossification have the same relative position and plan of arrangement as in the skull of the young crocodile, in which, as in most other reptiles, and in most fishes, the bones so commencing maintain throughout life their primitive distinctness. These, and a hundred such facts, force upon the contemplative anatomist the inadequacy of the teleological hypothesis."

While we admit all this, we do not think that he is justified in saying, "We feel the truth of Bacon's comparison of final causes to the vestal virgins, and feel that they would be barren and unproductive of the fruits we are labouring to attain, and would yield us no clue to the comprehension of that law of conformity of which we are in quest." His own favourite idea might, we think, have led the learned professor up from the *special* doctrine of final causes to a *general* doctrine. Just as there is an archetype or general plan in the structure of the skeleton, so there may be a general scheme of final causes to accomplish a higher end than the special adaptation. It is not difficult, as we conceive, to perceive the final cause of this grand homology of parts. While the special modifications, or adaptations, investigated so carefully by Cuvier, are intended to promote the well-being of the particular species of animal, the archetypal plan investigated by Owen is intended to make the animal comprehensible by the intelligent creation.

We are not willing, at this far advanced stage of our Article, to enter upon an analysis of the powers of the human mind, otherwise we could demonstrate that this general type is admirably suited to the nature of man's faculties. Man's original,

immediate, and fundamental knowledge is obtained, we believe, by sense-perception, self-consciousness, and other forms of intuition. Upon the materials thus furnished, the faculties of understanding operate in discovering relations between the objects which have become known by means of the faculties of direct intuition. And chief among these faculties, which perceive relations, is that of comparison, or of perceiving resemblances. We hold this to be the most useful of all the faculties of the understanding, whether for practical or scientific purposes. We see it actively operating in early life. The child is taught most effectively by signs and comparisons. In the simpler stages of society, mankind can be instructed in the knowledge of abstract truths only by symbols and parables. Hence we find most heathen religions becoming mythic, or explaining their mysteries by allegories or instructive incidents. Nay, God himself, knowing the nature of the creatures formed by him, has condescended, in the earlier revelations which he made of himself, to teach by symbol; and the greatest of all teachers taught the multitudes by parables. The great exemplar of the ancient philosophy, and the grand archetype of modern philosophy, were alike distinguished by their possessing this faculty in a high degree, and have both told us that man was best instructed by similitudes. "It is difficult," says the Guest in the *Statesmen* of Plato, "fully to exhibit greater things without the use of patterns," (*παραδειγματα*.) Lord Bacon, in more than one place, has expressed the sentiment, "As hieroglyphics preceded letters, so parables are older than arguments. And even now, if any one wishes to pour new light into any human intellect, and to do so expediently and pleasantly, he must proceed in the same way, and call in the assistance of parables."

Now, the homologies of nature are suited to this faculty in man, and it may be also to the same, or a similar but higher, faculty in the minds of higher intelligences. Without the repetition and correspondence of parts, man would have felt himself lost in the midst of God's works, and this because of their very profusion. It is by means of points of analogy that man is enabled practically to recognise, and scientifically to classify, the objects by which he is surrounded. The more obvious resemblances furnish us with our practical knowledge. It is by means of the more fixed points of resemblance that science is enabled to form its classifications. It is by the grand archetypes of nature that we are enabled to perceive unity in the midst of diversity, and dispose all the works of God into sublime groups. It is the prevalence of archetypal forms which imparts to nature its unchanging aspect, and gives us the stable in the midst of the unstable.

Plato seems to have pointed to these archetypes, and so to have bodied forth a great truth, without, however, perceiving its precise meaning, in his doctrine of ideas and patterns, (*ιδεαι και παραδειγματα*) Not that we are willing to accept the doctrine as it seems to have been understood by Plato and stated by Aikenside :

“ There deep retired,
In his unfathomed essence viewed the forms—
The forms eternal of created things.”

It is quite true that these archetypes existed prior to the particular objects which are accommodated to them. But then they have no existence independent of God—they are the creation of God's intelligence, and are just the plan after which all things are formed. These archetypes proceed from intelligence, and are suited to intelligence. The prevalence of them throughout long geological ages, and possibly also throughout many different worlds, seems to shew that they are to be observed by various orders of intelligent beings. In this we have a sufficient final cause for the existence of these typical forms, and Owen has developed unconsciously a teleology of a higher and more archetypal order than Cuvier. It is just because such archetypes exist in nature that Owen has been enabled to group the whole vertebrate race of animals into one grand system.

The time has now come, we think, when Natural Theology should admit that there is more in nature than a mere adaptation of means to serve an immediate object. It will not lose, but rather gain by this, inasmuch as it will thereby be furnished with a new argument, and that of a different genus from that derived from the mere adaptation of parts, in favour of the existence of a Divine intelligence. The prevalence of model forms shews that all things are after a predetermined pattern. We are farther inclined to think that this new doctrine just rising into sight, while it is fitted to give us a more profound view of the intelligence displayed in creation, also furnishes a new analogy between natural and revealed religion. Revealed religion has long been known to possess a typical system. Many in these later days have, we fear, been entertaining a suspicion of the whole typical system of the Word of God,—it has appeared to them so visionary; and this suspicion has been confirmed by the indiscriminate way in which the types have often been treated. Possibly some may be more reconciled to the Scripture system when they are led to discover an analogous system pervading the works of God. We think, too, that a comparison of the principles involved in both systems might enable us to

construct a philosophical, that is, an enlarged system of Scripture Typology.

By types we are not to understand mere prefigurations of a certain greater form, but certain forms all after one great model. A type in this sense may point to an archetype, but does not imply an antitype. It is in this enlarged sense of type and archetype that the words types and figures are used in the Scriptures. We are, in closing this Article, to trace the appearance and re-appearance of like forms throughout the supernatural dispensations of God. This prevalence of typical forms in the supernatural as in the natural economies is addressed to the principles of man's mind. We can conceive no other system furnishing such unity amid diversity, and such means of raising men's minds to the comprehension of grand and sublime truths.

It strikes us that the typical system runs through the whole Divine economy revealed in the Word. First, Adam is the type of man. He and his posterity are all of the same essential nature, possessing similar powers of intuition and understanding, of will and emotion, of conscience and free agency, and God acts towards them in the dispensations of grace as in the dispensations of nature, as being one. Then, from the time of the Fall, we have two different typical forms—the one after the seed of the serpent, the other after the seed of the woman. Henceforth there is a contest between the serpent and Him who is to destroy the power of the serpent, between the flesh and the Spirit, between the Church and the world. Two manner of people are now seen struggling in the womb of time—a Cain and an Abel, an Ishmael and an Isaac, an Esau and a Jacob, an Absalom and a Solomon—the older born after the flesh, and the younger born after the spirit. It is this, fully as much as even the harmony of its doctrines, which gives a unity to our religion in all ages, which enables the Christian to profit to this day by the teaching of the Old Testament, to sing to this day the song of Moses and the psalms of David, and to perceive and feel that there are the same contests now as then, the same contests in the heart, the same contests in the world, between the evil and the good principle, between the first or nature-born, and the second or grace-born. In short, there are now as there have ever been, but two men on our earth, typical, federal, or representative; the first man which is Adam, and the second man which is Christ. "And so it is written, The first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven."

Had our limits permitted, we might have shewn that there

appear from age to age certain great leading powers of the first or earthly form, distinguished for their boldness and the oppression which they exercise over the Church, such as Cain and Lamech, Ham and Nimrod, Egypt and Babylon. "They have consulted together with one consent: they are confederate against thee; the tabernacles of Edom and the Ishmaelites, of Moab and the Hagarenes, Gebal and Ammon and Amalek, with the inhabitants of Tyre; Assur also is joined with them; they have holpen the children of Lot." These are represented in Christian times by Gog and Magog and Babylon. But we must confine ourselves to the figures of the better type which appear and re-appear throughout successive ages.

The Old Testament types may be divided into three classes, typical ordinances, personages, and events. *First*, there is a number of ordinances, all more or less of the same general mould, all imparting substantially the same instruction, all pointing to guilt contracted, to God offended, to a propitiation provided, and to acceptance secured through this propitiation,—the four great cardinal truths of revealed religion as addressed to fallen man. There were sacrifices in which the offerer, placing his hand on the head of the animal, and devoting it to destruction in his room and stead, expressed symbolically his belief in these great saving truths. There was the tabernacle, with its people worshipping outside, and the shechinali which had to be sprinkled with blood in its innermost recesses, pointing to an offended God, but a God who was to be propitiated through the shedding of blood. *Secondly*, there were typical persons, such as Abel and Enoch, Noah and Abraham, Moses and Joshua, Samuel and David, Elijah and Elisha, shadowing the prophetic, priestly, and kingly offices of Christ. From the fall downward, there is a succession of personages with their individual differences, but all after a predetermined model, exhibiting certain features of character in as marked a manner as the Jewish race shews certain features of countenance. Then there are, *thirdly*, certain typical events exhibiting the same truths in a still more impressive form. There is the flood in which many perish, but a few—that is, eight—souls are saved in an ark symbolical of Christ. There is the destruction of Sodom, in which the inhabitants of the city perish, while Lot and his family are rescued by heavenly interposition. Most instructive of all, and therefore occupying the most important place, there is the deliverance from Egypt. The state of the Hebrews as bondmen, the deliverer raised up, the method of the deliverance in the midst of judgments, the deliverance itself and the wonderful journey to Canaan, with the provision made for the sustenance of the people, are as certainly anticipations of

a higher redemption as the fish and reptile's limbs are an anticipation of those of man. It is all true history, and yet it looks as if it were a parable written by some man of God for our instruction. We are trained in the training of the children of Israel, and by means of this discipline through which they were put, our representative faculty has supplied us with some of our clearest and liveliest, our most profound and comforting notions of the plan of redemption.

In all these we may observe the same two general truths, the principle of general homology with the principle of specific adaptation. These typical ordinances, persons, and events, are all after the same general plan, and exhibit the truths which the sinner most requires to know, and especially the person and work of the expected ONE, under interesting and instructive aspects. But they were all at the same time adapted with exquisite skill to the age and to the circumstances of which they formed a part. The ordinances, for instance, were appropriate worship on the part of those who were required to observe them, and in some cases subserved certain national and civil purposes. The persons who figure as types, were all the while doing a work for their own day, and were in most cases, we believe, unconscious that they bore a representative character. The events, too, were in most cases important links in the chain of Providence. But, just as the paddle of the whale serves its special purpose, but contains divisions not needful to its special purpose; just as the chick's head contains typical bones not needed in order to its extrusion from the egg—so the Old Testament ordinances, personages, and events, have an additional importance given them by their prefigurative character. Like the different species in the vegetable and animal kingdoms; like the same organs in the different species—they diverge on either side in order to suit a special purpose, but still they all retain a predetermined pattern. In human architecture, the portico, and the passage leading from it, have commonly a homology to the temple itself. It is the same in the temple of God. The gateway, and the pillars and the avenues of approach, are all after the same outline as the temple to which they form an entrance.

But we cannot dwell on these Old Testament types; we must refer for the farther discussion of them to the able and learned work of Mr. Fairbairn, on the *Typology of Scripture*. In referring to this treatise, it would be entirely out of place to offer any analysis of a work which has been for some years in the hands of the public, and which has already taken its place among our standard theological literature. It is saying but little of it, to affirm that it is the best book with which we are acquainted on the subject of typology; for we know of no other work in which

the topic is treated in a manner at once evangelical and judicious, with learning, and yet with soundness in the faith. In the first volume the author clears the ground, enunciates his definitions, explains his principles, and presents a pretty full discussion of the Patriarchal period. In the second volume he treats of the Mosaic period, and develops his view of the true signification of the Exodus from Egypt, and the Law as delivered from Sinai.

We like, particularly, the opening chapters, in which the learned author lays down his principles, which seem to us in many respects original, and generally judicious. His orbit and ours do not lie exactly in the same plane, and there are one or two points at which we might cross each other, but, upon the whole, we very much coincide both with his principles and the application which he has made of them.

"If we inquire concerning these resemblances, of what kind or nature they behoved to be, and actually were, a very little reflection must convince us, that they must somehow have exhibited the same great elements of truth with the things they represented, and that too in a form more level to the comprehension, more easily and distinctly cognizable by the minds of men. There must have been, first of all, the same great elements of truth,—for the mind of God and the circumstances of the fallen creature are substantially the same at all times. What the spiritual necessities of men now are, they have been from the time that sin entered into the world. Hence the truth revealed by God to meet these necessities, however varying from time to time in the precise amount of its communications, and however as to the hue and form in which it might be presented, must have been, so far as disclosed, essentially one in every age. . . . But then, as the full-grown man, when pursuing the tenor of his way through the perplexing snares and busy avocations, reaps every day the benefit of his early culture, so, doubtless, it was the intention of God that the measures adopted with the ancient Church should not only minister to the growing light and comfort of its own members, but also furnish materials of consolation, guidance, and improvement to the Church of the New Testament."

But to return to our own theme, for it will be observed that while Mr. Fairbairn treats of types in the theological sense, or of prefigurations of Christ, we treat of types in the larger, and, we believe, scriptural sense, as model or pattern figures. (*Τύποι καὶ ὑποδείγματα* ; see 1 Cor. x. 6 ; Phil. iii. 17 ; 1 Peter v. 3.) Under the Old Testament the shadow becomes more and more defined as the substance draws nigh, till in the later prophets we have a complete anticipation. The figure, indeed, as presented in the first prediction, is as large as it ever is afterwards, but its lines come out more and more distinctly as we approach

the fulness of time. The doctrine which we are expounding, be it observed, is not the vulgar one of type and antitype, but that of typical forms, serving most important purposes in the age in which they appear; but, at the same time, epitomes of an archetype to appear. When the archetype appears, what had been seen before merely as shadow, now comes forth clearly. The older saints had merely the shadow—but we, with open face, looking into the New Testament as into a glass, see the very image, (Heb. x. 1; 2 Cor. iii. 18.) In the scene on Calvary, in particular, we have the truths which the sinner is most concerned to know, of sin and salvation, of God offended, and God pacified, set forth in the most awfully, and yet most winningly, impressive manner.

Nor does the scheme of types, as now explained, cease on the appearance of Christ. We still live under a system of types. Just as all the figures in the Old Testament look forward to him who is the principal figure, so do the figures in the New Testament look back to him. But there is this difference between the former and the latter types, that the latter, as becometh the dispensation, are not so much outward and ceremonial as inward and spiritual. The miracles wrought by Christ in person, when on the earth, are typical of the supernatural power which he is exercising by his Spirit; the healing of diseases is representative of his power to cure spiritual maladies. There is a close mystical union between him and each of his people—he and they are said to be one. They are one in respect of their human nature. “It behoved him to be made like unto his brethren; and forasmuch as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also likewise took part of the same,” and “took on him not the nature of angels but the seed of Abraham.” Then he is their surety and representative, and they are reckoned as righteous in him. He stood in their place guilty, “stricken, smitten of God,” and they stand in his room accepted, righteous. He has become, too, “the head of the body, the Church,” “the beginning, the first-born from the dead,” and “has in all things the pre-eminence and is the first-born among many brethren.” They are priests under him as chief-priest, kings under him as sovereign. By his appointment they are “predestinated to be conformed to his image.” The Godhead once more issues the decree in reference to this man and that man, “let us make man in our image after our likeness;” “so God creates man in his own image, in the likeness of God creates he him.” In the performance of this work they are “crucified together with him,” “dead with him,” “buried with him,” and as they die with him, so they “rise with him,” and “reign with him.” In this household there are many children, and there are differences between

them of gift and taste to suit them for the different employments to be allotted to them ; but still, we may discern in them all a family likeness, for they are all begotten of God. In this perfect system of types the whole has a representative in every part, and every part is a symbol of the whole. Each living stone in this temple is carved after the similitude of the whole temple. Each leaf, each branch of this tree of life is an image of the whole tree. The Church is his body, and every member in particular is after the pattern of the whole body.

When objects become far removed from us, we must be on our guard against taking clouds for realities, but we think we see some real truths—lying we grant—on the very horizon of our vision. All animal bodies, as we have seen, point to man as the top of the earthly hierarchy. Professor Owen tells us that “all the parts and organs of man had been sketched out in anticipation, so to speak, in the inferior animals;” and that “the recognition of an ideal exemplar in the vertebrated animals proves that the knowledge of such a being as man must have existed before man appeared. For the Divine mind which planned the archetype, also foreknew all its modifications. The archetypal idea was manifested in the flesh long prior to the existence of those animal species that actually exemplify it. To what natural laws or secondary causes the orderly succession and progression of such organic phenomena may have been committed, we as yet are ignorant. But if, without derogation of the Divine power, we may conceive the existence of such ministers, and personify them by the term ‘Nature,’ we learn from the past history of our globe, that she has advanced with slow and stately steps, guided by the archetypal light amidst the wreck of worlds, from the first embodiment of the vertebrate idea under its old ichthyic vestment, until it became arrayed in the glorious garb of the human form.”

But may not this highest form on earth point to a still higher form? Man’s body on earth may be but a prefiguration of his body in heaven. “But some will say, how are the dead raised up, and with what body do they come?” The Apostle does not give a direct answer to this question, but he points to certain analogies which shew that though the body will preserve its identity, it will be changed to a nobler form, as the seed is changed when it becomes grain. “It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body; for there is a natural body and a spiritual body, and we read of bodies terrestrial and of bodies celestial.” In heaven then our bodies are to be after a higher model, “spiritual” and “celestial.” It doth not, indeed, appear what we shall be, but when He appears we shall be like Him, and our bodies fashioned after his spiritual body, which we may

believe to be the most sublimated form of matter—and modern science, while it cannot efface the distinction between mind and matter, is every day enlarging our conceptions of the capacities of matter. Thus the simplest organism, points by its structure upwards to man, and man's earthly frame points to his heavenly frame, and his heavenly frame points to Christ's glorious body, and we see that all animated things on earth point onward to His glorified humanity as the Grand Archetype of all that has life.

Professor Owen has another idea. He supposes that in other worlds, as there are the same laws of light and gravitation as on our earth, there may be also a similar organic structure. "And the inference as to the possibility of the vertebrate type being the basis of the organization of some of the inhabitants of other planets, will not appear so hazardous, when it is remembered that the orbits or protective cavities of the eyes of the vertebrata of this planet are constructed of modified vertebræ. Our thoughts are free to soar as far as any legitimate analogy may seem to guide them rightly in the boundless ocean of unknown truth. But if censure be merited for here indulging, even for a moment, in pure speculation, it may, perhaps, be disarmed by the reflection that the discovery of the vertebrate archetype could not fail to suggest to the anatomist many possible modifications of it beyond those that we know to have been realized in this little orb of ours."

If there be any truth in this idea, then the animated matter of other worlds may point to the same Archetype as the animated matter of this world. And on this supposition what a significance would be given to the humanity of Christ. When the Word became flesh, the Divinity was in a sense humbled; and when the Incarnate Word ascended into heaven, flesh or matter was exalted and made to serve the highest purposes. We thus obtain a glimpse of a way in which matter throughout all its domains may be exalted by its association with the Son of God taking our likeness; and of a way, too, in which other worlds or all worlds, and other creatures, even principalities and powers in heavenly places, may be instructed by this "manifold wisdom," and by which God may "by him reconcile all things unto himself; by him, I say, whether they be things in earth or things in heaven."

But as we stand gazing on our ascending Lord, a cloud wraps him from our view, and we hear as it were a voice, saying, "Why stand ye here gazing?" and bidding us return to the observation of objects on the earth clearly within the range of our vision.

- ART. V.—1. *Mary Barton: a Tale of Manchester Life.* 2 vols. London, 1849.
2. *Passages in the Life of Mrs. Margaret Maitland of Sunnyside.* Written by Herself. 3 vols. London, 1850.
3. *Merkland.* By the Author of “Mrs Margaret Maitland.” 3 vols. London, 1851.
4. *The Initials: a Story of Modern Life.* 3 vols. London, 1850.
5. *The Ogilvies: a Novel.* 3 vols. London, 1849.
6. *Olive: a Novel.* By the Author of “The Ogilvies.” 3 vols. London, 1850.
7. *The Ladder of Gold: an English Story.* By ROBERT BELL. 3 vols. London, 1851.
8. *Caleb Field: a Tale of the Puritans.* By the Author of “Passages in the Life of Mrs. Margaret Maitland.” London, 1851.
9. *Rose Douglas; or, Sketches of a Country Parish: being the Autobiography of a Scotch Minister's Daughter.* By G. R. W. 2 vols. London, 1851.

SENTIMENTAL is a word continually on the lips of those—and they are a not very small class in the reading world—who object to works of Fiction altogether, and consider time given to their perusal absolutely wasted. But the word is sufficiently vague and indefinite in popular use. Granted, that there is a something faulty, which we seek to denote by the term, it may be worth while to endeavour to define the accusation, before considering whether the works in question are bound to plead guilty to it, or not. Sentimentality is not simply an excess of passionate feeling, for its chief characteristic is feebleness rather than strength of any kind. It is not hypocrisy; nobody would dream of confounding the two, a vice and a foible. Nor is it that more mitigated form of deceit which we call affectation, for the habit of mind intended is not of necessity one consciously assumed; more generally it exists as a sort of reality, however weak and colourless, in the character: a really sentimental person and one that only wishes to be thought so, are not the same. On the whole, difficult as it is to seize the precise meaning of “winged words,” it would perhaps be tolerably near the mark to say, that sentimentality is not merely an exaggeration of feeling, unregulated by reason, and ludicrously incommensurate with the triviality of its object; but, further—and this is an essential part of it—that it is an indulgence of feeling for feeling's sake; that it lives in the atmosphere of fancy, and collapses instantaneously, if brought into contact with the actual; in a word,

that it is a caricature of really strong deep feeling. For example, the jealousy of Othello, founded though it be on trifles, is not sentimental; for the emotion penetrates his whole nature, it absorbs him—it *necessitates action*. On the other hand, for an instance of what is really sentimental, no one can be at a loss who has ever read a page of Sterne.

Now, it is scarcely fair, we think, nor reasonable, to connect this fault with novels in general. It is true that there have been many, and still are some, sentimental novels in the literature of Great Britain. Is this cause for tabooing those that are not? It will not be denied by any one conversant with the subject, that there has been a great improvement of late in this respect. Novels, as is natural, have kept pace with the poetry of the day. Sometimes, however, the objection takes a wider aim. Everything, it has been urged—among others, by an able living writer*—everything that excites the feelings, without affording them the natural relief of action, tends to chill and harden them into callousness. This objection, in consistency, would exclude all fiction—poetry as well as novels; it would banish all appeals to highly wrought feeling, except such as address themselves to some result in hand; it would involve some such proscription of all not-scientific literature as Plato is accused of having contemplated. But the principle may be accepted in its full force, without disparagement to poetry in any shape, even in that of three volume novels. For it is in the power of every reader to apply the remedy, or rather the preventives for himself. The book has done its part if it has suggested the train of thought and emotion: it remains only to carry this impulse into the living sphere of action; opportunities cannot fail to present themselves for giving it free play. The circumstances in the fiction may have been ever so dissimilar to those that shall occur; but the impulse has been given; and the real identity, which lies at the bottom of human life, and human nature, will reconcile the disparity. It is only an undue quantity of novel reading that will cry “Wolf” so often as to blunt the natural tendency to energize. When it has been conceded that works of fiction are too apt by their fascination to encroach on graver hours, and to leave a distaste for graver studies, we have allowed all that can justly be alleged against clever truthful novels, which help to unriddle the mystery of life.

The novel may be regarded as a species of poem, at least in one aspect. But perhaps it would be more accurate to regard it as what Coleridge would call the synthesis of history and poetry, if we comprehend under the former head not “history proper” only, but the history of individuals, commonly called

* Rev. J. H. Newman.

biography. The novel is an idealized form of history. And, if the eye be indeed that of a philosopher, and the hand gifted with the painter's skill, it is scarcely a paradox to say that the novelist is not without his advantages in the great art of teaching by examples. If truth is at times more strange than fiction, fiction is at times more true than truth. As history, real living history, gives a more faithful representation than the most elaborately minute annals; as the daguerreotype is less true than a portrait by Richmond; as a landscape by Claude or in Tennyson is instinctively felt to be true, though it may be not literally accurate; as correct perspective always implies a violation of details; or, to pass from imitation to realities—as the expression of the human face far rather than its component features makes it identity;* as the spirit of a law is above its letter in importance; so a really first-rate novel is no unworthy rival of the dignity of history. We do not mean merely that historic novels like *Ivanhoe* or *Quentin Durward*, (Scott by the way is proverbially inexact in antiquarian details,) or like a very recent *History of England*—Mr. Macaulay must pardon our classification—are ancillary in no slight degree to the less interesting fac-similes of times gone by, more easily apprehended, less easily forgotten; nay, that they are more true in proportion, grouping, tone; but, beyond and besides all this, that, in the peculiar province of the novel, the study of character, the creations of a truthful imagination will convey a longer, fuller, more complete truth, than any fragmentary specimens of humanity can, however carefully extracted from the world of fact.

Very rare, however, it must be confessed, are those who may safely venture thus to idealize: novelists of sufficient calibre, we might almost be told, are themselves ideal. Certainly it would not be easy to cite a large number. Consider only how many fitnesses ought to meet in the novelist. History is allowed to be one of the most comprehensive and many-sided studies. Novel-writing is even more emphatically so. Poetry and ethics are its very life blood; (physics, metaphysics, politics, and polemics, we beg to demur against;) manners, scenery, costume, physiognomy, are some of its materials; the beautiful in every art, in every aspect of nature, it must be capable of recognising; like the greatest poet of Ancient Greece, it is half epic, half dramatic;

* "I mean to say, that the face of any one, to whom we are strongly and tenderly attached—that face which is enshrined in our heart of hearts, and which comes to us in dreams, long after it has mouldered in the grave—that face is not the exact mechanical countenance of the person beloved, nor the countenance that we ever actually beheld, but its abstract, its idealization, or rather its realization; the spirit of the countenance, its essence and its life. And the finer the character, and the more varied the intellectual powers, the more must this true *ιδωλον* differ from the most faithful likeness that a painter or a sculptor can produce."—*Southey*.

it has its tragedy and comedy; lastly, and especially, it requires its own wondrous faculty of story-making, of weaving a web of adventures, the most artfully complicated evolutions of which shall never seem to outstep the modesty of nature. A great deal is wanted to become a Scott or a Lytton Bulwer, a Currer Bell, a Thackeray, or a Dickens; not a little to write "Pride and Prejudice," or "Ellen Middleton."

Without attempting in these limits to classify the novels of this and former times, one broad difference is too obvious to be passed over in silence between those of to-day and those of even thirty years ago. It is a change analogous to what we have witnessed in theology, philosophy, poetry, and politics. The recent novels, with a purer moral atmosphere, search much deeper into human nature; they partake more of autobiography. Few readers now have patience for the long-winded "Annals" of Sir Charles Grandison, or even of Camilla. The more pointed pages of Fielding and Smollett are interdicted, from a common sense of their indelicacy. The modern appetite scarcely goes back beyond the epoch of Sir Walter Scott. We are not bold enough to attempt to thrust Sir Walter from the throne which he occupies by well-nigh universal consent; although it could scarcely be called hypercritical to protest against the usually stilted movement of his dialogues. He is indeed the Wizard of the North,—great in pictorial passages and eloquent sentiments; unrivalled in the nice balance of character and incident, in exquisite harmony of plot; but, in every respect except the last, Scott has been nearly approached by one, the Scott of the present day, who surpasses him in depth of passion, in grandeur and sublimity of thought. For lofty conception of character, developed in all its heroic unity, there are few creations like Rienzi, Zanoni, and Harold; few more brilliant descriptions than the animated scenes of the Last of the Barons, with its almost dazzling variety of personages, passing in busy motion before the eye; few more boldly chiselled groups than those that stand in the contending shade of Night and Morning. That the author of such works should be too artificial in plot; too fond of "startling situations," as the French call them; too antithetical in his arrangements; often mystic; at times even vulgarly bombastic,—must be set down, we suppose, as one of the imperfections which mankind is heir to.

There is a style, the opposite of that of Scott and Bulwer. Independent of incessant excitement from the ups and downs of life, it devotes itself to the workings of the heart. The most notable example of this school is, of course, the "strong minded" Jane Eyre. And if no question be raised of the morale, and if an undue reliance on self, unamiable, it appears to us, if not

positively irreligious in such a degree, can be excused, if allowance be made for a worse than unfeminine coarseness of diction and even of sentiment, *Jane Eyre* with its more pleasing though less clever sister stands at the head of this category, for their searching revelations of nature and deep vein of poetry. Less unique in its beauties, but far more delicate and refined in tone, Lady Georgiana Fullarton's novels claim a very high place. In both *Ellen Middleton* and *Grantley Manor* the characters introduced are few, but finely traced and exquisitely shaded; the plot very simple, but profoundly interesting; both abound with intense feeling, often passionate, but at the same time elevating and pure; both are thoroughly imbued with a reverential love for all that is noble and beautiful, in the visible as well as in the moral world; in both the language is very fine.

A third species there is, analogous to the Comedy of the Drama; represented of old by Fielding and Smollett, and carried now to something like culmination by Mr. Thackeray and Mr. Dickens. The latter, inasmuch as he gives his readers more story, stands less removed from the common idea of a novelist. But, even in him, the interesting is almost secondary to the amusing; scenes rich in the ridiculous atone for too great intricacy of plot, and other infringements on the laws of nature. It would be hard to say which is the more popular. Perhaps a comparison would turn on the general question, Whether ideal or actual comedy is best? and, perhaps, that is a matter of taste. Some readers will prefer to revel in the pure humour of *Pickwick* or *Dombey*; others will find a more intellectual zest in the humorous wit, if we may combine two notions generally contradistinguished, which flavours the sparkling pages of *Vanity Fair*. For ourselves, we confess a leaning to the side of the great satirist. Grateful, as we cannot but feel, to Mr. Dickens for many a laugh, for many high and generous thoughts, and above all, for the beautiful images of childhood, which hallow his scenes with their fresh and loveable innocence; for the quaintness of Little Paul, the graceful guilelessness of David Copperfield, the winsomeness of his child-wife; still we relish even more the careless and inimitable graces of his compeer; the even stream of pleasantry, inexhaustible, and, we had almost said spontaneous, so little effort does it betray in the writer, so unfatiguing to the reader is it; the unmistakable fidelity of every, even the lightest touch; the pensive pathos lurking under the merciless castigation of the vices and sillinesses of the world,—who would ever be tired of these? If there be a tinge of Cynicism, it is as of one who pities, not hates, the undeniable follies around him. Iconoclast of spurious “gentility,” resolute to strip pretence of its disguise, he never fails to yield homage to all that is truly noble; he loves even to say a good word for the

gentle dulness which the world holds in contempt. He appreciates fully the distinctions of birth and money as necessary to our life in this world, but loves to remind us, that they are nothing more. Let Thackeray and Dickens continue to hold their divided sovereignty. Let their readers correct the optimism and rather indiscriminate benevolence of the latter by the darker view, which regards society as too apt to degenerate into what Carlyle has called it, "an armed neutrality, or, at best, a hollow commercial league." And let us all be thankful, that writers who exercise so great a power use it on the whole so well; that the prurient ribaldry of past days is now a thing gone by; that vice and folly are rightly selected as the proper butts for ridicule. In the same sort of style, Gilbert Gurney and Jack Brag, Peter Simple and Midshipman Easy, claim mention, but, in every respect, in a much lower place. Miss Austin's characters, "to sense and nature true," as they have described, would please our taste more, if they were in the habit of talking more naturally and easily—more like those of Miss Martineau for example.

Having thus paused to pay a passing tribute to some former productions in this department, we must proceed to our more immediate duty, of introducing some of the most recent notabilities; premising that, as it is confessedly hopeless to attempt to convey an adequate idea of most books, and especially of novels, by extracts, and as a sketch of the story, however summary, is apt to detract from the pleasure of reading afterwards, we shall content ourselves almost entirely with such occasional comments as our space admits.

The authoress, for there is internal evidence of a lady's pen, of "*Mary Barton, a tale of Manchester Life*," has chosen a good subject, and has not done injustice to it. Not that it is a new topic with novel writers. The great problem of the condition of the poor, with reference too to this very locality, has often of late found a graphic and popular expression in this way; with more formal display of political economy, and possibly with more scenic effect, but seldom with so much appearance of truth and nature. Most readers will think the book all the pleasanter for being dogmatic, not controversial; for its indirect, unconscious mode of teaching through the medium of facts, in preference to long-winded interruptions to the plot, in the shape of didactic dialogues. Indeed, it does not profess to lecture on the vexed questions of the art politic. To describe some of the anxieties with which the artisans of Lancashire have to struggle in their battle of life; and especially to give voice to "the bitter complaints," whether well founded or not, made by them of the neglect which they experience from the prosperous, especially from the masters whose fortunes they have helped to build up; "to give

some utterance to the agony, which from time to time convulses this dumb people ; the agony of suffering without the sympathy of the happy, or of erroneously believing that such is the case,"—this is the moral purpose announced in the preface. And this principle is consistently observed. There is no inculcation or suggestion of Socialism or Communism in any political significance of the words. Mutual duties are prominently recognised in the relations of master and men ; faults on both sides are allowed in the unhappy occurrence of a strike for wages ; but there is no oracular dijudication in exact balance of rights and wrongs. On the whole, its readers will gather an impression, we think, and that a tolerably decided one, that there is only too much foundation for the old complaint, that the employed are regarded rather as hands than as brother men, with souls that should not die ; or at least, (and this seems a deeply rooted conviction in the mind of our authoress,) that sufficient care is by no means taken to prevent the estrangement arising from apparent indifference. Nor would it be easy to refuse assent to the earnest warnings of one, evidently familiar with the places and persons in question ; tenderly alive to the hopes and fears, the joys and sorrows of the poor, but preserved by calm common-sense and modesty of judgment from sentimentality or fanaticism.

The peculiar charm of "*Mary Barton*" is its extreme naturalness, not, however, without sufficient elevation of tone and sentiment to raise its lifelike delineations above the level of mere Dutch painting. The poor are not sublimated into models of heroic excellence. There is, on the contrary, a beautiful mixture of vulgarity and delicacy, of wisdom and short-sightedness, of noble feeling and narrow contracted prejudices.

Even the heroine has not suffered, in this respect, from any unfair partiality. Mary, the daughter of one mechanic, and the wooed of another, is indeed a lady, one of those to whom nature has given their patent of nobility, for the authoress knows well that grace and beauty are not found only in gilt frames. Mary is endowed with that inexpressible grace, delicacy, and innate refinement, which accompanies a tender, unselfish, loving disposition, even among those who are jostled day by day against the rugged realities of work and penury. Withal, she is not too faultless morally ; in fact, the tragic interest of the story arises partly from a little coquetry on her part, not altogether unpardonable under the circumstances. One beautiful trait, in particular, of the poor, not perhaps generally appreciated, is very conspicuous—their charity to one another ; the ungrudging bestowal of time and trouble, of scanty resources, and rich sympathy on the part of those who are themselves not very far removed above the danger of starvation, if they discover a depth of misery

deeper still. Our readers need not be alarmed at the prospect of penetrating the recesses of Manchester. The king's daughter, washing the linen of the Phæacian palace, is scarcely more unsuggestive of anything like vulgarity, than are these descriptions of life in the crowded dirty alleys of the land of smoke. The deep pathos of the "short and simple annals of the poor" has often been acknowledged; but in these pages it is brought home to the reader with an especial force, not so much as if he were examining curious exotic specimens of the ways and habits of a foreign nation, but so that he cannot choose but identify his own life with that of beings similarly constituted to himself. These homely details, in which we conceive the principal merit of the tale to lie, are dispersed of course throughout it, in too intimate a connexion with the tenor of it to be extracted without great disadvantage. We beg to assure our readers, that if they have any liking for the poetry of common life, they will be gratified here. It is not every one that sees it through the disguise of conventionalities, and feels its wide human import without being betrayed into maudlin extravagance.

It is obvious how abundant the materials are for contriving an interesting story in the present aspect of Lancashire. Where in England are there more striking contrasts? The bold and irregular features of the country, not entirely lost amid huge workshops and swarming streets; the acuteness and scientific knowledge of the modern artisan engrafted on the rugged, hearty character of the northmen; the old Teutonic dialect and primeval customs transplanted from the sequestered vales of Westmoreland, and lingering still in their new ungenial soil; above all, the fond recollections of country life, faithfully cherished, though "pent up in populous town," and lulling the aged to their last sleep in a happy dream of childhood and green fields,—of all these pregnant associations use has been made. The plot is interesting, though rather too deliberate in its movements; the fortunes of Mary and her faithful lover being closely interwoven with the sufferings of the masses in the bad time. The characters are distinct, and the conversations easy and racy, with words of wisdom scattered throughout—*e.g.*, "An anxious heart is never a holy heart,"—not a little quaint dry humour withal. Only one passage occurs to our memory open to the charge of having a bad tendency; it is where Job Legh, a philosophical old weaver, a very worthy old man, makes a remark incidentally, to the effect that it is quite sufficient to thank the Deity at odd times by an inward ejaculation, without any express use of prayer or praise—a passage scarcely consistent with the otherwise religious temper of the book. Regarding it as a whole, we sincerely thank the authoress for a public

benefit of no slight value. It is by such temperate yet kindly advocacy, rather than by frothy declamation, that the just claims of the poor are most likely to be enforced to some purpose. We know that some will exclaim, "True, poverty is a hard lot; but then the poor are used to it." And so, generally speaking, they are, and unconsciously acquiesce in the gradations of rank, not without, strange as it sounds, a sort of reflex pride in their superiors. And it is only in extreme cases of apparent hopelessness that they are possessed with a frantic craving for equality. But sympathy and courtesy they do desire; and we feel convinced that "*Mary Barton*" tends to rouse its readers to a sense of this necessity, and to remind them that even in the smallest matters of daily intercourse, an impression may be left which must tend either to swell the list of grievances in the muttered chorus of revolution, or to cement the "two nations" securely into one. Our comments on the work have occupied space into which we should gladly have introduced some extracts illustrative of a book which, however, is, we hope, already familiar to many of our readers.

When we say, that in reading "*Passages from the Life of Mrs. Margaret Maitland*" we have been considerably reminded of a "*Diary of Mistress Mary Milton*," which appeared in one of the magazines* last summer, and has since been published, we believe, in a separate form, we intend no small praise. Both are remarkable for a singular charm of latent poetry and *naïveté*, to say nothing of the less uncommon beauties of quiet and simple pathos. In both the story glides through troubles and tribulations into a quiet haven of rest at last; in both the substance is too genuine to proceed from anything but experience of the heart, veiled though it be under an assumed style, and embodied in imagined characters; and in both books these fictitious exponents, as we must take the liberty of supposing them, are exactly adapted for the purpose. Mrs. Maitland's autobiography is a very complete work. Greater variety of characters, scenes of more effect, might have been introduced; but they would mar, we suspect, the unity of the whole. A graver deficiency, perhaps, is the absence of warm, rich colouring, to borrow an illustration from a sister-art—the same poverty and tameness in this respect which moderates the admiration of connoisseurs for Overbeck and Scheffer; but even this, perhaps, is better as it is. The thread on which the narrative is strung is the peaceful, uneventful autobiography of an old maiden lady who has known the unhappiness of an ill-starred attachment in her own youth, and has learned to live in the life of others, and in their anxieties to forget her own. Not that these past sorrows are

* Sharpe's London Magazine.

more than distantly alluded to. Time is a great physician, at least with docile patients, •

“And gently blows the wind to those
That are cast in a gentle mould.”

The same probations, that would leave rebellious and selfish spirits soured for life, appear only to have opened yet more widely the kindly temperament of Mrs. Margaret Maitland. She is naturally fond of young people—the “bit bairns,” as she calls them—herself carrying about with her in old age the perpetual spring of youth, its fresh and hopeful elasticity. And where can they find a better confidante than Aunt Margaret? Accordingly, a better view-point than her cottage at Sunnyside for watching the vicissitudes of the little world around it cannot well be conceived.

The outlines of the story are soon given. It is an evidence, like “Olive,” of the real dignity and happiness of an old maid’s life, if it be viewed aright. Of course the even tenor of the good lady’s own existence near a small out-of-the-way town—*unglicé*, village—affords few materials in itself. But she dwells among her own people, and in this group her very pretty niece, Mary, and a ward of the same age, Grace, entrusted to Mrs. Margaret under rather mysterious circumstances, are and deserve to be the most conspicuous figures. These young ladies are play-fellows in childhood of Claud, Mary’s brother, who, not very inconsequently, falls in love by and by with Grace. The progress of this attachment, and of one between Mary and a young Laird of Lillieshall, is anxiously watched by good Aunt Margaret. Readers will find it difficult not to share in her concern about the “bairns.” Not that the circumstances are strikingly unusual—the course of true love never did run smooth,—nor are the characters elaborately chiselled; but there is at least about both sufficient individuality to *realize* the story. The truthfulness of its minute details and touches of quaint humour, fully redeem it from dulness or insipidity; above all, the cheerful, serene, holy atmosphere of Sunnyside pervades every line. The pure and high morality by which it is marked, attempered by a loving spirit, never degenerates into harshness, rarely becomes prim or precise. The patriarchal domesticities of rural Scotland, if deficient in sublime features, are refreshing as a level landscape of green fields; above all, the serene atmosphere of Sunnyside diffuses itself throughout the book—from that quiet little nook flows comfort and consolation for everybody. Fortune may frown, or far worse, clouds may darken the inner life; but, interpreted by a faithful heart, the dreariest trials grow light; sorrow and anxiety are lulled to

rest in the dutiful recognition of a Providence, in the bright prospect of a world that shall know no change.

We must remind our readers that it is the *morale* of the story, its soothing temperament, rather than its materials, that we commend. The merit of the work appears to us to consist, for the most part, in the medium through which everything is regarded, and that is the integrity of a clear and unclouded, yet thoughtful mind. The authoress understands well the inexpressible significance which often lies in word, look, or gesture, unheeded, perhaps, by a careless or indifferent spectator; she knows how incalculable a share what are called "trifles" have in determining the happiness or misery of mankind, often as the indication of feelings which are by no means trivial, often as leading accidentally to large results, sometimes by reason of their own intrinsic value; she knows that nothing is a trifle in the eyes of Love—that an entire life may be embittered by the misunderstanding of a moment. Human life, like perfection, itself no trifle, is yet made up of trifles; and these have found an attentive and sympathetic observer in Mrs. Margaret. It is in delicate touches of this kind, in such insight into the secrets of the heart and its so often incommunicable bitternesses, that we see the master hand of the true artist, or rather, to speak with peculiar reference to the work before us, the unerring instinct of genuine feeling.

"Merkland" is a more ambitious attempt, and proportionately less successful. We do not mean to say that it is devoid of merit. Pleasant recollections of the loveliest, in Scott's judgment, of all the counties of Scotland, it cannot fail to awaken in all who have ever been there; of Scotch landscapes and Scotch hospitality, of the less artificial tone of society among the rich than in South Britain, of the superior intelligence and education of the poor. Especially we must mention the glimpses, not few nor far between, into the interior of the manse, as not the least interesting feature of the book. It is on a feeling essentially characteristic of the Scotch in its intensity that a considerable part of the story is hinged—the sacred obligation, as it would seem to be esteemed, of preserving a patrimony or hereditary rights; while, through some of the subordinate actors, we are familiarized with the ecclesiastical *régime*. Independently of its own importance, this latter topic affords an analogy peculiarly interesting now to members of the Christian Church. A spirit of acquiescent inactivity, as is well known, marked alike the English and Scottish Establishments in the eighteenth century. The same devoted zeal which animated Wesley and Wilberforce in the south is here described as forcing its way upwards to shake off the incubus. This outburst of un-

feigned piety was probably accompanied in both divisions of the island with many spurious imitations—parhelias, as it were, of the true sun. Our authoress, we need scarcely add, sympathizes cordially with the “Highfliers,” as they were called, in distinction from the “Slaves to the Book,” the “Preachers of Proprieties,” a class not unfitly represented by one Mr. Bairnsfather, a good easy man; although her candour allows, that one of her imaginary heroes in this way, a Mr. Lumsdaine, was not altogether free from a *penchant* for interfering with other parishes. One other trait, not peculiarly, but especially Scottish, a sense of the advantages of noble birth, even without wealth, is very sensibly defended in a short passage in the third volume. There is a very affecting episode of the eviction of a clan by a stranger landlord, too revolting, we trust, to be of frequent occurrence.

The story, we must confess, strikes us as somewhat tedious now and then; it scarcely advances perceptibly towards its conclusion; and, in consequence, occasionally flags, notwithstanding the mysterious horror that hangs about the lonesome house on the sands, and the secret of blood on which it is based. The principal characters, too, are rather too carelessly drawn, with the exception of Mrs. Catherine Douglas, an old-fashioned, upright, strong-minded, kind old lady, who lives in the Tower—a personage not altogether unlike the *Ma chère Mère* in Miss Bremer’s “Neighbours.” She is certainly a tolerably complete character. But one thing we must cavil at. She would not have been less pleasing or natural if she indulged less freely in a species of strong language—“Beasts! Vermin! I say it!”—almost corresponding to profane swearing in a man. The other characters scarcely stand out with sufficient relief of outline or distinctness of execution to challenge any remarks. But we must be allowed to protest against Anne for a heroine. Great earnestness of purpose, and signal devotion of self in rescuing her brother’s good name, and the most exemplary forbearance towards her peevish stepmother; this is all very proper, but a few personal attractions would not have disfigured all these sterling qualities. On this point our heroine is wrapt in a not exactly romantic mystery, if we except a casual hint that she was very plain, if not ugly. Now we are far from wishing to compress all taste for beauty into the particular type dictated by any one theory. It is a happy thing that there is such variety of tastes. It gives more chance of every one being suited without mutual interference. But, generally speaking, the admirers of what we cannot better designate than as the *Jane Eyre* style of physiognomy, take care to insist on some one feature or other, or at least on the pervading expression, as able to redeem a face not otherwise loveable. And our toleration scarcely extends to

a heroine, a nonentity as far as appearance goes, who lives with us during three volumes in daily intercourse, and leaves us at last in wondering uncertainty on the important point, what sort of looking person it is that we have known so well. Not even in what she says is there such striking colour or *contour* as to relieve this insipid insignificance of face and figure. And now that we have ventured on this engrossing question of the beautiful, with reference to the human face divine, we cannot refrain from observing, that both in "Merkland" and "Mrs. Margaret Maitland" we are reminded of the female picture gallery in "Olive" and "The Ogilvies." In all there is a decided preference for a pale spiritual face, "with eyes like a flood" over prettiness of complexion, symmetry of features, and the other elements of a more physical, popular, Hebe-like style of loveliness. Again, on a very different subject, in the condemnation of the cold and formal consolation—"It cannot be helped," sometimes administered to the bereaved by their pastors, instead of a higher and more hopeful tone, we have noticed a coincidence between our two authoresses, curious from the very close resemblance of the expressions used.

It would not be difficult to select several very powerfully written passages from "Merkland;" we must be content, however, with the following brief extracts:—

"She was now proceeding to the house of her most dear and especial friend: an ancient lady, whose strong will swayed, and whose warm heart embraced all who came within their influence, and whose healthful and vigorous spirit was softened in a manner most rare and beautiful by those delicate perceptions and sympathies which form so important an element in the constitution of genius. Mrs. Catherine Douglas had seen the snows of sixty winters. For more than thirty of these, her strong and kindly hand had held absolute dominion at the Tower, yet of the few admitted to her friendship and confidence, Anne Ross, the neglected stepdaughter of Mrs. Ross of Merkland, an ill-used child, a slighted woman, held the highest place.

"The October sun was gleaming in the brown waters of Oran as Anne approached the Tower. A grey, old, stately place it was, defiant of storm alike and siege, with deep embrasures on its walls, meant for no child's play, and courtyard that had rung to martial music centuries, in the days of the unhappy Stuarts. Deep woods stretched round it, tinted with autumn's fantastic wealth of colouring. The Oran ran so close to the strong, heavy, battlemented wall, that in the old warlike days it had been the castle-moat, but the drawbridge was gone, and there was peaceful access now by a light bridge of oak. A boat lay on the stream, moored to an overhanging rock, by which Mrs. Catherine herself was wont to make the brief passage of the Oran. It was a favourite toy of Anne's also, in her happier moods, but she was too heavy of heart to heed it now."—Vol. i. p. 16.

Here is a graphic description of the stately Mrs. Catherine :-

“ ‘I think you may let Mrs. Catherine have the whole merit of this, Jacky,’ said Anne, taking it down ; ‘and do you have a ramble through the garden and find something more fragrant than those sunflowers. You will get some roses yet,—run, Jacky. Mrs. Catherine—’

“ ‘Is trysted with undutiful bairns,’ said the lady herself, entering the room. ‘And wherefore did ye not come to me, Gowan, and me in urgent need of counsel ? And wherefore did ye not open the door, ye elf, Jacky, unless ye be indeed a changeling as I hae aye thought ye, and were feared for learned words ? Come down with me this moment, Gowan ! Ye can fiddle about these bonny things when there is no serious matters in hand. I am saying, Come with me !’

“ Mrs. Catherine Douglas was tall and stately, with a firm step, and a clear voice, strong constitutioned, and strong spirited. In appearance she embodied those complexional peculiarities which gave to the fabled founder of her house his far-famed name—black hair, streaked with silver, the characteristic pale complexion, and strongly-marked features, harmonizing perfectly in the hue—she was dark grey. It seemed her purpose, too, to increase the effect by her dress. At all times and seasons, Mrs. Catherine’s rich, rustling, silken garments were grey, of that peculiar dark grey which is formed by throwing across the sable warp a slender waft of white. In winter, a shawl of the finest texture, but of the simple black and white shepherd’s check, completed her costume. In summer, its soft, fine folds hung over her chair. No rejoicing, and no sorrow, changed Mrs. Catherine’s characteristic dress. The lustrous silken garment, the fine woollen shawl, the cap of old and costly lace remained unchanged for years.”—Vol. i. p. 22.

In this passage the feelings of a timid young girl at leave home and entering a strange house are not badly described :

“It was not a pleasant change ; to leave the cheerful voice and vivacious conversation of Lewis for those formal questions as to her journey, and the terrified stillness of little Bessie, as she sat tremulously by Mrs. Elspat’s side. Alice had scarcely ever seen before the dense darkness of starless nights in so wide and lonely a country, and as she looked out through the carriage-window, and saw, or fancied she saw, the body of darkness floating round about her, the countless swimming atoms of gloom that filled the air, her bounding heart was chilled. The faint autumnal breeze, too, pouring its sweeping, sighing lengths, through those endless walls of trees ; the excited throb of her pulse when in some gaunt congregation of firs she fancied she could trace the quaint gables and high roofs of some olden dwelling-place ; the disappointment of hearing, in answer to her timid question, that the Tower was yet miles away ! Alice sank back into her corner in silence, and closed her eyes, feeling now many fears and misgivings, and almost wishing herself at home.

"At last, the voice of the Oran roused her; there was something homelike in its tinkling musical footsteps, and Alice looked up. Dimly the massy Tower was rising before her, planting its strong breadth firmly upon its knoll, like some stout sentinel of old. The great door was flung wide open as they approached, and a flood of light, and warmth, and kindness beaming out, dazzled and made denser the intervening gloom. Foremost on the broad threshold, stood a young lady, whose graver and elder womanhood brought confidence to the throbbing girlish heart; behind stood the portly Mrs. Euphan Morison, the elfin Jacky, and, farthest back of all, a tall figure enveloped in the wide soft folds of the grey shawl, Mrs. Catherine's characteristic costume. Little Alice alighted, half stumbling in bashful awkwardness; the young lady on the threshold came forward, took her hand, and said some kindly words of welcome; Jacky curtsied; the tall figure advanced.

"I have brought ye the young lady—Miss Aytoun, Mem,' said Mrs. Elspat Henderson, and Alice lifted her girlish face, shy and blushing, to the scrutiny of her ancient kinswoman. Mrs. Catherine drew the young stranger forward, took her hand, and looked at her earnestly.

"'A bit bonnie countenance it is,' she said at last, bending to kiss the white forehead of the tremulous Alice. 'Ye are welcome to my house, Alison Aytoun. Gowan, the bairn is doubtless cold and wearied, do ye guide her up the stair.'"—Vol. i. p. 35.

We must confess to have been somewhat disappointed in reading the "*Ladder of Gold*." The subject of it—the upward progress from poverty to enormous wealth of a railway speculator, and his subsequent fortunes in his new sphere—is so promising, almost, in fact, a virgin soil; the mania in question combines so remarkably the historic interest of an era, now, we may hope, gone by, with the vivid, bustling actuality of the present, as to rouse expectations, which, we regret to say, are not realized. Richard Rawlings, who climbs this golden ladder that connects gods and men, is almost the only character of any note in the book. Long-sighted and capacious in his schemes, prompt and energetic in execution, unembarrassed by tender feelings, and embittered against society by circumstances, he is no bad type of the spirit that fights its way to pre-eminence by a very law of its being, in the camp or at the ledger, according to the temper of the times. With this exception, there is little to remark upon. A few less trite revelations of the esoteric doings of railway boards would have made the book more piquant, and not less instructive. The story "progresses," as the Americans say, slowly and heavily, without sufficient liveliness in the separate scenes to beguile the time. The lovers are insipid as waxwork; and the course of their true love, if it does not run smooth, has at all events found its way into a well-used channel. Finally, the

blemishes of the book, and they are neither very few nor unimportant, are aggravated by a stiff and pretentious style.

The three most remarkable books in our list we have still to mention—our limited space compels us to add, very cursorily. Of these, “The Initials,” in our opinion, quite deserves to come first. As the narrative of a year’s sojourn in Bavaria, it has claims of its own on attention, for graphic sketches of domestic German life in town and country; and this compensates for a certain degree of monotony in the incidents. The characters, too, are very good. The bewitchingly naïve Crescenzo, and her far more interesting yet equally unsophisticated sister, Hildegard; their strong-minded, good-natured, vulgar mother; their fastidious and indolent papa; the baron, a frank and genial sportsman, with his delightful wife; Count Zedwitz, honourable, manly, sensible, and ugly; and, not least, our handsome young Englishman, whom circumstances might have made *blazé* and selfish, but who, notwithstanding his tact and *savoir vivre*, is gay, generous, enterprising, amiable, with a strong dash of boyish vanity, a mischievous appetite for teasing, and an English habit of making himself comfortable: these make a very entertaining group. Besides all this, the masterly command over dialogue displayed, especially in subdued irony and dry repartee, with no small amount of easy, undidactic, practical sagacity; such qualities as those combine to make one of the most racy, chatty, life-like novels, that we ever remember to have seen: one not altogether unworthy to have proceeded from the pen of Mr. Thackeray himself. We have only to add that the tragic element is very small; and that “Flirtation” would be as good a name for the book as “The Initials.”

We regret much that our limits forbid us to indulge our readers with more than the following fragment:—

“To this speech no answer was made, and Hamilton followed them at a distance into the supper-room. He had lost so much time in the organ-loft that almost all the guests were already gone. The traveller, whose arrival he had witnessed, was in the act of lighting a cigar, with which he immediately left the room. An elderly, red-faced, stout gentleman, with a tankard of beer beside him, he soon discovered to be Major Stultz; nor did it require much penetration to recognise Mr. Schmearer, the painter, in the emaciated, sentimental-looking young man beside whom he seated himself. Hildegard and her stepmother were nearly opposite; the former, after bestowing on Hamilton a look, which might appropriately have accompanied a box on the ear, fixed her eyes on the table; the latter bowed most graciously, and commenced an interesting conversation about the weather, the barometer, and her dislike to thunderstorms in general. When these topics had been completely exhausted, Hamilton hoped

that something might be said of the present inhabitants of Seon, but a long and tiresome discussion on the merits of summer and winter beer followed. Strauss's beer was delicious—Bock had been particularly good this year. 'Bock,' cried Major Stultz, enthusiastically, 'Bock is better than champagne! Bock is ——' Here he looked up with an impassioned air to the ceiling, and kissed the two first fingers of his right hand, flourishing them in the air afterwards. Words it seems were inadequate to express the merits of this beverage.

"Did you see that picture at the Kunstverein in Munich, representing a glass of foaming bock, with the usual accessories of bread and radishes?" asked Mr. Schmearer. 'It was exquisitely painted! I believe his majesty purchased it.'

"There is some sense in such a picture as that," answered Major Stultz; 'I went two or three times to see it, and could scarcely avoid stretching out my hand to feel if it were not some deception.'

"A judicious management of reflected lights produces extraordinary effect in the representation of fluids," observed Mr. Schmearer.

"A pause ensued: Major Stultz did not seem disposed to discuss reflected lights; the picture had evidently had no value for him, excepting as a good representation of a glass of bock, and his attention was now directed towards Hildegard, whose flushed cheeks and pouting lips rather heightened than detracted from her beauty. *

"Perhaps you would like to see the newspapers, madam?" he asked, politely offering the latest arrived to her stepmother.

"Thank you, I never read newspapers, though I join some acquaintances in taking the *Eilbote*, on condition that it comes to us last of all, and then we can keep the paper for cleaning the looking-glasses and windows.'

"There are, however, sometimes very pretty stories and charades in the *Eilbote*; young ladies like such things," he observed, glancing significantly towards Hildegard.

"My daughters must read nothing but French, and I have subscribed to a library for them. Their French has occupied more than half their lives at school, and now I intend them to teach the boys.'

"I should have no sort of objection to learn French from such an instructress," said the Major gallantly.

"Indeed, I don't think any one will ever learn much from her," said Madame Rosenberg, severely; 'but her sister Crescenz is a good girl, and the children are very fond of her.'

"You have two daughters!" exclaimed the Major.

"Stepdaughters," she replied, drily.

"That I took for granted," he said, bowing as if he intended to be very civil. 'The young ladies will be of great use to you in the housekeeping.'

"That is exactly what has been neglected in their education; if they could keep a house as well as they can speak French, I should be satisfied. When we return to Munich they must both learn cookery. I intend afterwards to give the children to one, and the housekeeping to the other alternately.'

" 'You will prepare the young ladies so well for their destination that I suspect they will not remain long unmarried !'

" 'There's not much chance of that ! Husbands are not so easily found for portionless daughters !' replied Madame Rosenberg, facetiously ; ' however, I am quite ready to give my consent should anything good offer.'

" Hamilton looked at Hildegarde to see what impression this conversation had made on her. She had turned away as much as possible from the speakers, and with her head bent down seemed to watch intently the bursting of the bubbles in a glass of beer ! Had it been her sister he would have thought she had chosen the occupation to conceal her embarrassment ; but embarrassment was not Hildegarde's predominant feeling ; her compressed lips and quick breathing denoted suppressed anger, which amounted to rage, as her stepmother in direct terms asked Major Stultz if he were married, and received for answer that he was ' a bachelor, at her service.' With a sudden jerk, the glass was prostrated on the table, and before Hamilton could raise his arm its contents were deposited in the sleeve of his coat.

" ' *Pardon, mille fois !*' cried Hildegarde, looking really sorry for what had occurred.

" ' You irritable, awkward girl !' commenced her mother ; but for some undoubtedly excellent reason, she suddenly changed her manner, and added, ' You had better go to bed, child, I see you have not yet recovered from the recent alarm in the church.'

" Hildegarde rose quickly from her chair, and with a slight and somewhat haughty obeisance to the company, left the room in silence. Madame Rosenberg continued volubly to excuse her to Hamilton, and, what he thought quite unnecessary, to Major Stultz also !

" The Major listened with complacence, but Hamilton's wet shirt-sleeve induced him to finish his supper as quickly as possible, and wish the company good night."

" The *Ogilvies* and *"Olive"* are by the same authoress : both considerably above the average of novels ; far superior to the insipid, artificial platitudes of works like *Emilia Wyndham* ; —not unlike *Lady Georgiana Fullarton's* in their framework, while in morale they are more akin (with a difference be it observed) to *"Jane Eyre."* Like the former, they have in their favour no crowd of persons or events ;—in *"Olive,"* indeed, there is a positive want of something going on, a sort of blank void in the action ;—a few pronounced characters fill the stage, and a good deal of space is devoted, not unprofitably, to the sensations of the inner life. Of the latter we are reminded by the heroes : they are so decidedly of the Mr. Rochester stamp, without his vices ; their beauty is strength, an imperious majesty of intellect, that relaxes itself only at the magic touch of love. Of the two we certainly prefer the *"Ogilvies"* to *"Olive."* The main idea of the former, a woman's love slighted, afterwards revenging itself by a feigned show of indifference, when time has brought

her idol to her feet, and yet has destroyed the possibility of their happiness, and while her heart is breaking all the time,—if not altogether new, is at least very forcibly expressed. Almost all the interest is centred in Katherine Ogilvy. Her idol, Paul Lynedon, is a strange choice; a cold, worldly, artificial man. The other characters are not very much developed. The most prominent of them, one Philip Wychnor, inclines to the opposite fault from Paul Lynedon, of a morbid susceptibility. Although intended, it would appear, rather as a model man, he will strike most readers, we anticipate, as what would be called in the Attic slang of the day, a “muff.”

“Olive,” in like manner to “The Ogilvies,” is devoted for the most part to the embodiment of one leading thought—the happiness of an unselfish life, and the possibility of inspiring love without advantages, nay, with positive drawbacks in personal appearance; we have already alluded to the apparent preference for pale women, and unapproachable men. With regard to the moral character of the book, it is very good, with the exception of occasional flights of philosophy, vague and not very intelligible, sometimes even rather morbid. Most readers will complain, we suspect, that there is too much preachment in Olive; more, we mean, than is appropriate or seasonable in works of a light texture. It would almost lead one to imagine that the unquestionable success of the Ogilvies had “impeded the wings” of Olive with too confident reliance on a like reception, and a consequent disregard for the popular judgment. May we suggest, that a more frequent use of a *condensing* process would be an improvement in the future novels which we hope to have an opportunity of welcoming from the same pen?

We could gladly linger on this enchanted ground a little longer. It is almost like parting from living friends to say goodbye, as we turn the last page of a novel, to those in whose hopes and fears we have for some time had a part. Stupid beyond measure must that novel be which does not wake some common chord; which does not present some embodiment to its readers with which he may identify his own emotions, and soothe them by the very act of doing so; which does not treat of wants and anxieties, in which he may trace his own reflected, and thus be beguiled into forgetfulness; which does not recall the loved images of many absent friends, and introduce him to some new phases of human nature. And we have had very satisfactory materials to analyze in the books before us. One among many modes, at least, if not the highest or most direct, of inculcating truth and encouraging goodness, is a good novel. For this reason, such books as those which we have noticed deserve a hearty welcome. And even those readers who only desire

rest and recreation, may expect, if they will believe us, to find more amusement from them, in all the luxury of slippers, an arm-chair, and a bright fireside, than polished boots and crowded *conversazioni* usually afford.

We must, however, avail ourselves of the two last novels on our list, "Caleb Field" and "Rose Douglas," both of which have very recently appeared, as an apology for lingering a little longer in this fairy land of literature. "Caleb Field" is just what might be expected from the graceful pen of the Authoress of "Mrs. Margaret Maitland" and "Merkland." It is more akin to the former of these works; decidedly not unworthy to stand beside either of its precursors. In one respect it differs considerably from both of them. It purports, as the preface informs us, to vindicate the Nonconformist divines of Charles II.'s time from unmerited neglect. That extraordinary epoch, "the climax of the old world, the seed-time of the new," as it is well styled in the preface, branded too as it was by the awful visitation of the great Plague of London, affords a grander theme than secluded villages in North Britain. But it is not in large and elaborate description, in gorgeous colouring, or theatrical effect that the merits of Caleb Field are to be found. On the contrary, any expectation of such panoramic views as Manzoni has given of the horrors of the Plague of Milan, or even of the Hogarth-like touches of our own Defoe, will be disappointed here. But this, and other deficiencies—for example, the want of a good plot, and of incidents to diversify the rather monotonous level of the story—are amply compensated for by peculiar beauties; by the true sublimity of a wise and reverent spirit; by lofty representations of calm heroic fortitude; by a kindly and penetrating perception of character; by the quiet tastefulness of a pure and simple style, the fit vehicle of an earnest, tranquil, harmonious mind.

It is a new aspect of the reign of the licentious Charles to introduce the reader to the doings and sufferings of some of the two thousand ministers who were deprived of their position in the English Church by the Act of Uniformity. Three or four of these are brought into the story; very graphically are they portrayed, and very pleasant it is to contemplate such gentle magnanimity. And yet controversy is not allowed to mingle its uncongenial ingredients in the story.

The following passage, and we wish that we could find room for more, exhibits the conclave of Presbyterian ministers during the fury of the pestilence :—

"So they went forth together. Their meeting was in a vestry attached to the old church of St. Margaret's in Westminster. The

Presbyterian ministers of London were assembling in their classes when Vincent and Field entered the room.

"In the chair sat a little quick, lively man, with small vivacious features and keen dark eyes. He was one of that peculiar class whose names are redolent of solemn quip and quaint antithesis, balanced with a nice art and dexterity forgotten in our times. A study-chair in some fair vicarage, in 'the leisure of the olden ministry,' elaborating courses of quaint sermons, and decking his beloved Bible with the flowery gathering of an antique philosophy, somewhat artificial it may be, yet having life in its veins withal, would have better realized the abstract idea of suitability in the case of Master Chester, than did the Moderator's chair of this small but solemn assembly within the bounds of stricken London. But that race of quaint commentators was a race fearing God truly and faithfully, and their representative here, strengthened by such loyal love and reverence, had risen to the top of this bitter wave, and, relaxing the scrupulous cares of composition which formed his most congenial work, was now labouring in the fervent inspiration of that dire and solemn necessity, no less zealous and manful than any there.

"Beside him sat a good-looking, portly, middle aged man, with a ruddy and healthful face. He belonged to another distinct class. Master Franklin had not the gift of originating or suggesting; but he had in an especial manner, in that docile, laborious, patient strength of his, the gift of carrying out. An unobtrusive, placid, humble man, he accomplished heaps of work unwittingly, and went on day by day in a series of dumb unthought of heroisms, appreciated by few men, least of all by himself; for there was little light, save the quiet radiance of goodness to set off his labour withal, and in the unfeigned humility of his honest heart he himself would have been the first to repudiate the praise due to his constant devotion.

"The preacher, Vincent, had an individuality strikingly distinct from these. Prone to examine the depths of his own sensitive spirit, he had endured at the outset of his career a fiery ordeal akin to that of the famed dreamer of Bedford; and, fighting through spiritual perils, like the pilgrim of that wondrous vision, had become at last a great master in all the subtle processes and unseen movements of the heart. 'Cases of conscience,' such as formed no unimportant part of the ministerial labours of those zealous times, were referred to him from all places. In probing the wounds, disentangling the twisted threads of motive and design, elucidating the hidden working, and evolving the secret struggles of the soul, he was at home and strong; and, joined with this peculiar gift, was a melancholy bias of mind, a tendency to despondency and speculative grief, a mood akin to that of the preacher of old, who, as the conclusion of his experience, leaves the sorrowful record to us, that all is vanity. A certain melancholy vivacity of expression and overwhelming earnestness made him, as it makes his class still, an especially effective preacher, and in this time of singular distress the effect was proportionally increased.

"Caleb Field was less a man peculiar to that age than any of all these. No youthful cavalier in the gay court of Charles had a more

gladsome enjoyment of life than this sombre Puritan minister of doomed London. No tender-hearted maiden or loving mother had a sympathy more quick, a compassion more gentle than was his. So full of joyous congenial life with all that was true and honest, lovely, and of good report, and withal in his strong vitality having so great a fountain of deepest pathos within—a truly human man, akin to all who wear the wondrous garment of this mortality.

“And so it happened that this man’s influence was less subject to ebbs and flowings of popular appreciation than the rest. It was as perennial and constant as life itself, for, in all that pertains to life, many-sided and various, his warm humanity made itself a part.

“The other members of the Church-court were but different phases of those various kinds of men, devoted with all their differing individualities to the one fervent solemn work, upon which lay the awe of martyrdom, the almost certain conclusion of death.”

“*Rose Douglas, the Autobiography of a Minister’s Daughter*,” has been kept back hitherto from publication, through a fear in the writer, as the preface says, of following too closely in the track of Mrs. Margaret Maitland. But there is no slight difference between the two books. *Rose Douglas* is much longer, and less diversified by the “moving accidents” and vicissitudes of a story. Another and a cognate difference is, that the descriptions in *Rose Douglas* have the air of a literal copying from the pages of past experience, rather than of proceeding from that creative imagination, the half-poetic, half-philosophic instinct of generalizing, which presents the veriest truth in the most interesting form, by digesting, discriminating, and reproducing as its own the impressions which it has imbibed. In fact, *Rose Douglas* is scarcely to be ranked with novels. With due allowance for the diametrical opposition between one of the gayest courts that has ever been in Europe, and the domestic life and retirement characteristic of a Lowland manse, there is something in the work to remind the reader of “*Mr. Pepys’s Diary*.” Or, regarded as a work of art, perhaps it would be nearer the mark to say that the opening chapters, especially, would naturally be classed under the same category as the disjointed scenes and fragmentary narratives of “*Sam Slick*,” or its twin-brother, the “*Attaché in England*.” For fidelity, accuracy, and excellence of intention, at least, if not for higher artistic excellencies, in the descriptions of quiet everyday life in Scotch society among the middle classes, *Rose Douglas* deserves much approbation, and may be included among those genial works of fiction which tend to purify the character and tranquillize the mind.

We have already expressed satisfaction at the general improvement in novels of recent date, particularly because they bear the marks of a more searching analysis into human character, its impulses and motives, and a disposition not to rest contented with

the superficial traits and conventional peculiarities, however striking, of men and manners, but to grapple in earnest, and in a deep moral spirit, with the great riddle of human life. For it cannot be deemed an intrusion into the sacred precincts of religion—it is a very different thing from the controversies of so-called religious novels—it is of almost inestimable importance as subsidiary to the dogmatic teaching of creeds and commandments, for the novelist to throw what light he can on the strength and weakness of the heart of man, and to suggest how his affections and passions may best be cultivated to the true purpose of his being. It is not too much to say, that the novelist has it in his power to bring medicine to the soul; to aid in soothing its perplexities and regrets; to animate its flagging energies. Even to those persons who decry novels as frivolous, it must be obvious, that they testify to the drift of the literature of the day—“*vento paleæ jactantur inanes.*” Much more may those, who regard novels as no inadequate vehicle of precious truths, rejoice in their present tone. And this congratulation applies to the *Scotch* novels under our notice, with especial emphasis. We do not mean to imply that there is any very strong contradistinction between the literature on this side and on that side of the Border. Will any one deny, that there is almost as much difference between the northern and southern counties of England, as between Scotch and English at the present day? With such incessant intercourse as now exists, especially among the literary, between North and South Britain, it would indeed be strange if the literature of the one district did not keep pace with the other, either for improvement or the reverse. Nevertheless, each nation has its own appropriate contribution to bring to the common fund. Difference of race, difference in the system of education, the accumulated inheritance of customs and traditions transmitted from age to age, and, in the Highlands, the additional difference arising from the remains here and there of the old patriarchal régime—all this gives an unmistakable individuality. Nor will any thoughtful observer, however anxious for the closest unity and reciprocal influence in progressive civilisation, desire such characteristics to be effaced. There is quite enough that is distinctively Scotch about the novels in question, to give the relish of novelty to the English reader; and, we venture to predict, that such readers will not be least ready to confess their obligations, not for amusement merely, but of a more solid kind; after dwelling for awhile in thought among the primitive simplicities of homely life, which still linger in the bracing air and stern scenery of Scotland, and listening to the practical wisdom, stamped with the marks of a grave and conscientious temperament, for which her children have always been remarkable.

- ART. VI.—1. *The Saint's Tragedy; or, The True Story of Elizabeth of Hungary, Landgravine of Thuringia, Saint of the Romish Calendar.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, JUNIOR, Rector of Eversley. With a Preface by Professor MAURICE. Second Edition. London, 1851.
2. *Twenty-Five Village Sermons.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, JUNIOR, Rector of Eversley, Hants, and Canon of Middleham, Yorkshire. London, 1849.
3. *The Message of the Church to Labouring Men: a Sermon, preached at St. John's Church, Charlotte Street, Fitzroy Square. (June 22, 1851.)* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, JUN., Rector of Eversley. London, 1851.

THE "Saint's Tragedy" and the "Village Sermons" of Mr. Kingsley have been before the public for so considerable a time, that, having been prevented from bestowing on them earlier notice, we may be thought precluded from making them the subjects of remark. It might have been so were they writings in a more popular form, and thus likely to obtain a rapid circulation; but it so happens that neither a tragedy nor a volume of sermons belongs to the most generally attractive class of books. Unless either the reputation of its author, or some extrinsic circumstance, direct attention peculiarly to it, a tragedy, even of decided merit, may in these days easily escape the notice of all but a few; and of sermons, it may be said, that the individual species are often supposed, with much reason, to have a very limited *habitat*, and to be regarded with little interest out of their native region. We are now glad to make the publication of a second edition of the tragedy the occasion of offering some remarks upon the two works whose titles we have placed first at the head of this Article.

An interesting, and, it must be admitted, an important question is naturally enough suggested by a volume of sermons from the author of a dramatic poem. The question is, What sort of sermons are we to look for from a poet? or, in other words, What relation does the gift of poesy bear to the gift of preaching? It can hardly be necessary for us here to premise, that in using such language we have regard only to the natural endowments or intellectual capacities and tendencies of the preacher; the deep inward and spiritual life, of which, in all true preaching, these are but the organs and exponents, we well know to be confined, thank God! to no single form of mental structure, nor stage of growth.

To the question which we have thus ventured to propose, we

believe the answers given by any considerable number of readers would indicate by no means unanimity. To many, what cannot be formally called sacred in science or literature, still seems profane, and the field over which it is permitted to the Christian to range a very narrow one; for the heresy by which reason is divorced from religion still lives and does its work,—fatal to each, because neither singly, but only both in union, can be productive of any worthy offspring. It is probably not without reason that Mr. Maurice, in the valuable preface by which his friend's tragedy is introduced, anticipates from some quarters serious blame to any clergyman who shall write a true drama, exhibiting human beings engaged in some earnest struggle, even while the privilege of expressing his own thoughts, sufferings, and sympathies in any form of verse may be easily conceded to him.

That such views should still linger among us, will hardly surprise any who have considered how low an estimate had come to be entertained of poetry, and particularly of the drama. Poetry, which had from the beginning given, as it will doubtless to the end continue to give, expression to the deepest, the highest, the holiest of human thoughts, had come to be regarded as something almost too trivial even for the most vacant hour; and the tragedy, which exhibits the fateful struggle of man with circumstance or with himself, terrible in its aspects, momentous in its issues, the elder drama teaching of the fightings without, the christian rather of fightings within, had lost all significance for an age in which the struggle itself was all but disregarded, or counted as childish enthusiasm. In determining how far the required qualities of a poet, and more particularly of a tragic poet, are also the required qualities of a preacher, it will be necessary to consider in succession their respective functions. What is implied in being a poet? what in being a preacher? We are not here forgetting, that in thus stating the question we seem, in words at least, to be comparing things which do not admit of comparison; the word poet being expressive of peculiar mental structure and powers, the word preacher merely meaning the holder of a recognised office. Of course it is not in this sense that we use the latter word, when thus comparing the two functions. It would indeed be well for us if all whose office it is to preach had, in a much larger degree than with truth can be said of them in any of the Churches, the appropriate endowments; and for our present purpose we shall term preachers only those who have these endowments in such considerable measure as to make it possible for us to compare them with poets.

In saying of the Drama that it essentially represents a struggle, it is implied that the dramatist must be in possession of some

form of earnestness; for he must have had the means of first representing to himself, through sympathy, the contest which he is able effectively to depict. The general truth of this remark will be admitted, although certain modern dramas (Goethe's, for instance) would seem to lead to the conclusion that it is liable to some exceptions, there being those who can achieve through sheer force of intellect, a result which is attained by others only through a deeper sympathy. In one way or other, at least, the tragic author must be able to express, with a power peculiar to himself, human desires and passions, and that not merely singly, but in their mutual relations; for he represents them not in the abstract, but in the concrete form, and has to produce men, not monsters. The concrete form of all true poetry will explain to us how great poets have been also men of practical sagacity in the management of affairs, which cannot be said of abstract thinkers; and if we regard the Germans as the most highly gifted in the latter respect, but comparatively poorly endowed in the former, the political incapacity which is now grieving all right-minded men may perhaps be traced to a foundation deeper than the long want of appropriate institutions. Perhaps no better instance could be chosen of the falseness of popular judgments on such matters than the very common one of regarding poets as capable only of dreams, and therefore powerful only in dreamland, but having, in truth, no work to do on this solid earth. Looking only at the sensitive poetical temperament, but not at the informing mind which lies under it, perhaps one might easily fall into the mistake, which yet a little thought might as easily correct. Either the study of any of the great poems, or the history of their authors, would lead us to a better conclusion. What piece of business will it be supposed that Shakspeare could not have transacted? Surely he could have done all that he has enabled his embodied conceptions (called with perfect propriety in one sense his creatures) to do. Cardinal Wolsey, for instance, the sumptuous Wiseman of those days, looks very like a man who knew something of this world—of men, their strength, weakness, motives, subjection to management; or going up into higher regions, what form of social agency is there which is not better seen in these pages than almost anywhere else? It did not, indeed, happen to be Shakspeare's particular work to transact in great affairs, but he managed the Globe Theatre at least successfully, which sufficed him. Dante, Milton, and Goethe, to name no more, were all men of affairs. Our readers will not extend these remarks to other departments of poetry than the epic and the dramatic; although even among the lesser poets might be found something corroborative of our views. We have been the more anxious to call attention to this prac-

tical sagacity as a poetical faculty, because it will be seen to have much value for our present purpose, and because it is often overlooked.

As the dramatic poet must have much knowledge of Man, so also of Nature. "All language," it has been said, "is symbolical;" certainly much of it is so, and Mr. Emerson has well written that "Nature is an interpreter by whose means man converses with his fellow-men." It is only an intimate relation and a close familiarity with Nature that enables the poet to find the proper symbols of his thoughts, and thus to import from Nature into language what shall in future become current coin, the worth of which is well known and generally recognised. But a poet must not only import the new; he must also use the old with a peculiar unequalled significance. This is attained by the same innate sense of their fitness and relation to things by which he appropriates the new, and without the possession of this delicate indescribable faculty seems unattainable. Study will do much, but no man can study himself into being a poet. Most men and women may be taught to write verses—many to write them with great facility; not a few to write what will win for them the applause and wonder of their little circle; but the old saw still stands impregnable—"Nascitur, non fit, poeta." Besides being much else to him, Nature is thus the poet's vocabulary; and when intently gazing and supposed to be dreaming, he may, in fact, be looking for a word. In poetry, then, as we have perhaps the earliest, so we have the latest and highest form of human speech. Scientific speech is but partial, and of the understanding—abstract, with no human sympathies; but whenever the whole being is moved and would express itself, the language is poetical.

Of the pervading formative idea in all true poems, of the reverence which seems essential to poets of the higher class, and of a hundred other things which our readers have learned to associate with the writings of these "our first of men," we have no need to write here; enough if we have given them a few examples of the kind of qualities we mean to make use of in our present argument,—and so let them conceive of the Poet.

Before turning to the other branch of our inquiry, a few words may be said on the nature of the particular drama which has given occasion to these remarks, for the sake of such of our readers as may have no acquaintance with that distinguished poem.

In the *Saint's Tragedy*, Mr. Kingsley has attempted to exhibit some of the most interesting and important features of life as it existed in the Middle Ages; the period referred to being the first half of the thirteenth century. The most pro-

minent of these are well expressed in the following passage of the introduction :—

“In deducing fairly, from the phenomena of her life, the character of Elizabeth, she necessarily became a type of two great mental struggles of the Middle Age ; first, of that between Scriptural or unconscious, and Popish or conscious purity : in a word, between innocence and prudery ; next of the struggle between healthy human affection, and the Manichean contempt with which a celibate clergy would have all men regard the names of husband, wife, and parent. To exhibit this latter falsehood in its miserable consequences, when received into a heart of insight and determination sufficient to follow out all belief to its ultimate practice, is the main object of my poem. That a most degrading and agonizing contradiction on these points must have existed in the mind of Elizabeth, and of all who with similar characters shall have found themselves under similar influences, is a necessity that must be evident to all who know anything of the deeper affections of men. In the idea of a married Romish saint, these miseries should follow logically from the Romish view of human relations. In Elizabeth's case their existence is proved equally logically from the acknowledged facts of her conduct.”

This may be termed the leading idea of the play. The story into which it has woven itself rests, at all important points, on a distinct historical basis ; and is, in the main, as follows :—Elizabeth, daughter of the King of Hungary, had been in childhood betrothed to Lewis, Landgrave of Thuringia, to whose court she had been duly brought “with vessels of gold, silver baths, jewels, and *pillows all of silk.*” When the play opens, she had arrived at womanhood ; and the bestowal of her ardent affections on Lewis had prepared the way for their marriage, which soon follows. In Lewis, the enthusiastic, devout, sympathetic Elizabeth found a generous, knightly, affectionate husband ; but not one in whom her deeper feelings could find repose or direction. For this was required an intellectual and spiritual cultivation which belonged not to him, nor, with rare exceptions, to the most accomplished of his order. The spiritual guidance which he could not afford she received from Conrad of Marpurg, a monk, the Pope's Commissioner for the suppression of heresy ; who is, excepting Elizabeth, the most important character in the play. In Conrad is exhibited the struggle between the intuitive direction of a true and noble mind, and that imposed upon it by a corrupt and debasing ecclesiastical system, by which the highest human relations are disowned and dishonoured. It is a key to some of the most distinguished and apparently anomalous characters in history, such as Dunstan, Becket, and Dominic, “whom,” as Mr. Kingsley justly says, “if we hate we shall never understand, while we shall be but too likely, in our own way, to copy them.”

By nature capable of the highest enjoyment of married life, hardly has Elizabeth tasted its rich blessedness when the subtle tempter, who has undertaken to make her a "saint," suggests the impurity of that union, which for us symbolizes all that is highest; and teaching that "*sister*" is a holier name than "*wife*," thus plants a worm in the bud which had else matured to full flower and fruitage. Five years of life thus divided between the husband and the priest—between the true purity which God would have and the counterfeit by which the Church supplanted it—having passed over Elizabeth, with watchings, and fastings, and ceaseless labourings among the meanest of the poor and in the most menial offices, she was left a widow. Lewis had joined the crusade (A.D. 1227) to Palestine, which he never reached, having died of fever at Otranto. Insults and cruel hardships were now heaped on her. She was driven from her castle, and with her two children left to wander houseless, exposed to hunger and bitter frost. Intent on making her perfect, according to his idea, Conrad removed from her her "carnal" children, and persisted in adding day by day to the load of suffering under which her macerated body at last gave way; her imagination being alternately excited with the strongest spiritual stimulants, and allayed with intolerable servitude. Amid dreams, and visions, and ravings she died, a wonder-working saint; and through the efforts of her director was duly canonized, on credible evidence of her saintly life, and of the miracles wrought by her holy relics. Thus lives Elizabeth; distinguished in history as a favoured patron of the poor. Conrad, in admitted violation of historical fact, is represented as hardly surviving her; having been, as was the case, put to death by some of the nobles and peasants whose wives and children he had burned as heretics.

This mere outline of the story, in which none of the subordinate characters have been even named, must have suggested to our readers the extreme difficulty of treatment inherent in the subject. It will probably seem to some of them that, to quote from the preface by Mr. Maurice, "in certain passages and scenes the author has been a little too bold for the taste and temper of this age;" and there are those who on this ground have deemed the subject unfit for dramatic treatment, a judgment in which we do not coincide. The author could not, of course, but be sensible of this difficulty of "satisfying at once the delicacy of the English mind, and that historic truth which the highest art demands," (*Notes*, p. 248;) and he refers "those who may be shocked at certain expressions in this poem, borrowed from the Romish devotional school, to the Romish booksellers, who find just now a rapidly increasing sale for such ware."

While it might be too much to say that Mr. Kingsley has

altogether overcome this difficulty, it may be said that he has at least combated it manfully, and with no small success; this his first dramatic poem being a work of much promise and of undoubted genius; in which, with a strict regard to historical truth, the spirit of the age to which it relates is so embodied as to leave on the mind of the reader a very definite and lasting impression. In some of the dialogues and soliloquies there is much power; but the excellence of the lyrical passages is the most remarkable. Some of these are exceedingly beautiful. Take, for example, that with which the Drama opens, sung by Elizabeth sitting on the steps of a closed rural chapel.

"Baby, Jesus, who dost lie
Far above that stormy sky,
In thy mother's pure caress,
Stoop, and save the motherless.

"Happy birds! whom Jesus leaves
Underneath his sheltering caves;
There they go to play and sleep;
May not I go in and weep?

"All without is mean and small,
All within is vast and tall;
All without is harsh and shrill,
All within is hushed and still.

"Jesus, let me enter in,
Wrap me safe from noise and sin,
Let me list the angels' songs,
See the picture of Thy wrongs:

"Let me kiss Thy wounded feet,
Drink Thine incense faint and sweet,
While the clear bells call Thee down
From Thine everlasting throne!

"At thy door-step low I bend,
Who have neither kin nor friend;
Let me here a shelter find—
Shield the shorn lamb from the wind.

"Jesu, Lord, my heart will break;
Save me for Thy great love's sake!"

As another example we may refer to the chorus of crusaders, in the eleventh scene of the second act.

Of the more passionate dramatic passages it is difficult to find one which will at all bear removal from its proper place in the play, but the following may be quoted from the fourth act. It is Elizabeth's soliloquy in a convent chapel, where she had been left to ponder the proposed withdrawal of her children from all her care for the future.

"*Elizabeth.* Give up his children? Why, I'd not give up
 A lock of hair, a glove his hand had hallowed;
 They are his gift, his pledge, his flesh and blood,
 Tossed off for my ambition! Ah, my husband!
 His ghost's sad eyes upbraid me! Spare me, spare me!
 I'd love thee still, if I dared; but I fear God.
 And shall I never more see loving eyes
 Look into mine until my dying day?
 That's this world's bondage: Christ would have me free;
 And 'twere a pious deed to cut myself
 The last, last strand, and fly: but whither? whither?
 What if I cast away the bird i' the hand,
 And found none in the bush? 'Tis possible—
 No, there's worse than that.
 What if He but sat still and let me be?
 And these deep sorrows, which my vain conceit
 Calls chastenings, meant for me—my ailment's cure—
 Were lessons for some angels far away,
 And I the *corpus vile* for the experiment?
 The grinding of the sharp and pitiless wheels
 Of some high Providence, which had its main-spring
 Ages ago, and ages hence its end?
 That were too horrible—
 To have torn up the roses from my garden,
 And planted thorns instead; to have forged my griefs,
 And hugged the griefs I dared not forge; made earth
 A hell for hope of heaven; and after all,
 These homeless moors of life toiled through, to wake,
 And find blank nothing! Is that angel world
 A gaudy window, which we paint ourselves
 To hide the dead void night beyond? The present?
 Why here's the present—like this arched gloom,
 It hems our blind souls in, and roofs them over
 With adamant vault, whose only voice
 Is our wild prayer's echo; and our future?
 It rambles out in endless aisles of mist,
 The farther still the darker—Oh, my Saviour!
 My God, where art Thou!"

We have no space for farther quotations; and with this slight notice of the Saint's Tragedy we shall now revert to our argument, of which we have to take up the second part, by inquiring into some of the constitutive peculiarities of the Preacher.

When it is asked, then, on the other hand, What is the preacher? one feels inclined to respond, What is he not? Is there any physical, mental, or moral endowment which may not be brought into his service? An imposing person, a rich musical voice, a glittering eye that holds one, fitting artistic gesture; whatever helps or makes the orator, does not the same also help

or make the preacher? That one may be an orator in the pulpit, whether that pulpit be such an one as the first we read of, the "tower of wood" from which Ezra expounded to the people standing round him in the Watergate-street of Jerusalem the long-forgotten law; or some appropriated humble implement, a cart or a barrel; or one of the "stones that name the underlying dead,"—in Wesley's case a father's grave,—over and around which a devout people, with much pains, are gathered to hear; or, as in our days usually, be a comfortable velvet-cushioned box, from which the speaker, distinguished by a classical gown, discourses to an audience as comfortably circumstanced as himself, while they rest in square or oblong boxes, ingeniously contrived, in defiance of apostolical denunciations, to prevent any possible contact with "vulgar brethren." From any of these it may be an orator who speaks; and the character of the oratory may have an appreciable relation to the nature of the pulpit.

This leads to an interesting inquiry. We remember a remark made by a friend, as we came out of church, after hearing a sermon by one of the most distinguished of our living preachers; "I have been thinking," he said, "how impossible it is to be at once an orator and a teacher." It is, we believe, perfectly true that the two functions are essentially opposed, although the same speaker may exercise each in succession; and it explains the fact that the hearers of sermons are in this divided into two classes, with contrary desires and judgments. Those who love oratory praise the orator; those who love teaching the teacher; while there are some whose rule it is to hear the orator now and then, but habitually to resort to the teacher. If it be asked to what extent there is room for oratory, speaking strictly, in the pulpit, our answer will assign to it a limited sphere. The immediate object of the orator is specific action; and indeed so directly does speech, in this instance, lead to action, that it seems rather action than words. Without understanding this we shall hardly appreciate or even admit the truth of the great Greek orator's thrice-told injunction, according to which *delivery* is everything; for what is plainly untrue of speech in general may be quite true of the kind of speech called oratory. Whenever the object of a speech is to produce a definite action it may come within this class; and the more immediately the action is to follow, the more successful, relatively, will be the oration. Where the action to follow is inevitably postponed, or is of its nature continuous and enduring, it is usual to make use of an oath or pledge, taken under the influence of the oration, before the judgment has had time to resume its sovereignty; feeling and the orator's power still predominating. Peter the Hermit's preaching of the

Crusaders, and Father Matthew's of Temperance, may be taken as examples. Oratory can do little to make a man repent or believe in any profound sense; but it may be most efficient in persuading him to submit to the external acts of baptism. It may thus be an invaluable weapon to the Romanist missionary, while the Protestant one will find it of little use. Indeed, in some of its aspects it seems to exert rather a physical than a rational influence, and to produce effects more nearly resembling those ascribed to Mesmerism than any others with which we are acquainted.

The strange manner in which an audience is brought into subjection to the speaker's will must have often suggested the analogy (if, indeed, it be not something even more nearly kindred) to which we have referred; the rather that a certain force of will, quite irrespective of power of thought, seems to belong to great orators. It will thus appear that the state of mind in his hearers desired by the orator is very different from that desired by the teacher; the one would rouse them to action, the other would still them to reflection.

We ought, perhaps, here to notice a very frequent modern use of oratory, where something different from immediate specific action is aimed at; that, namely, where the object is to inculcate a maxim, or to brand with a nickname. The extent to which this remark applies both to political and to so-called religious meetings we leave our thoughtful readers to consider. One who well deserves to be listened to has said, "The lower portion of the religious public in England scorns principles, delights in proper names." If it be so, we can well understand that here oratory may do much. It can deal easily with names, although hardly with principles. In the pulpit its most obvious use would seem to be found in what are called "Charity Sermons;" that is, in those comparatively rare cases where the discourse is directed to the announced end. Beyond this, it may perhaps be said with truth, there is little room for it; unless upon extraordinary occasions, when it may be thought necessary to urge to some particular act; and it must be here said that, inasmuch as (to quote from a familiar treatise) "oratory contemplates the investigation of truth only as a secondary object," the frequent practice of it is extremely perilous to the mind; which, if at all abandoned to it, may lose the power of estimating, with any justice, the relative weight of the truths which it has been accustomed to value only in so far as they could be made to serve an immediate purpose.

We are now come to a point at which it will be necessary for us to look at a very serious question. We have to consider

what is the subject-matter of which the Christian preacher has to discourse; for according to our view of that will be our estimate of the required endowments. In the threshold our readers may be reminded that, however modern usage may have assigned to such words as "preach" and "sermon" a definite or even a technical meaning, we find nothing of the same sort in the New Testament, which contains no indication of anything nearly resembling a modern sermon; and in which the terms translated by the word "preach" and its derivatives, suggest chiefly either the public announcement and proclamation of a message, or the impromptu outpourings of intense spiritual intuitions, closely related, if not identical with those of the ancient prophets; expressed most frequently, respectively, by the words *κηρύσσειν* and *προφητεύειν*; it can hardly be necessary to add that, etymologically, a "sermon" is but a speech. Upon any discussion of the subject now alluded to we have no intention of here entering; it is enough if we are not prevented in our inquiry by any biblical objections.

Christianity has been variously regarded, but chiefly in one of three aspects; as being a system of doctrine, theological or philosophical; a system of morals and a law; or, thirdly, as being characteristically neither of these, but a life; depending on a Spirit, and essentially related to a Person. The last view, which is becoming more and more felt to be the only one which will at all explain the phenomena exhibited in history, in its true sense includes the other two; inasmuch as a life, however spiritual in its nature, must have a morality, and can, at least to some extent, be explained and represented abstractly or scientifically. According to either of the two former views, but especially according to the first, the required powers of the preacher would be predominantly the scientific and logical, for he will have to treat of things considered abstractly; according to the last view they appear rather to be the poetical, for he will have to treat of things concretely, and to represent a life. If it be asked, by whom life has been most vividly portrayed in words, it must be at once answered, by poets; and if we were here at liberty to speak without reserve of the prophetic gift, we must be at once reminded that all our knowledge of it has been in union with the poetical—the same word frequently expressing both, as in the Greek language, so that Saint Paul (Tit. i. 12) writes of the poet Epimenides as "one of their own," that is, of the Cretan "prophets," (*προφήται*); and how much poetry has the world seen before or since which does not appear feeble beside the words of David or Isaiah and the other Hebrew prophets, or of the Apocalypse of Saint John? How largely the same element is to be found in the teaching of our Lord himself

must surely have been forgotten, when his living and life-giving words were regarded and treated as exact formal definitions. We seem, in short, brought to the conclusion, that to the higher kinds of preaching the poetical element has much to contribute; and that without it (if even with it in these days) we are not to look for prophecy. If the spiritual power of so piercing the present in the very essence of its life, as to be able, in some measure, to read in it also the future, which we may believe to be implicitly contained there, in its principles at least if not in its details, may be in some sense called prophetic, possibly we are not yet out of all reach of such foreseeings. Should this, however, be deemed a "devout imagination," there will still remain to the preacher who is poetically gifted, an insight into the realities of the things around him, which are hidden from other eyes by a veil of traditions and conventionalities. If he combine with a high measure of this insight a moral energy so intense that it cannot but express itself in great actions, he is likely to be one of the rare benefactors of mankind, who appear now and then to be wondered at, stoned to death, and abandoned to dishonour, until another generation shall build their sepulchres.

We have insisted upon the possession of gifts essentially poetical, as being of the highest importance to the preacher; but we must not omit to record wherein the poet, as an artist, fundamentally differs from the preacher. It will be to our readers quite a familiar and established rule of criticism, that the very nature of a proper work of art excludes any definite moral aim; while a definite and predominant moral aim would seem essential to the preacher. The artist's mind is absorbed in his own idea, and must be undisturbed by looking outwards; the preacher's is ever going out toward others to bring them into subjection to himself. One cannot, then, be at the same time the artist and the preacher; but there seems no reason why an artist should not also be a preacher, although the sermon will not be a work of art. If the author of the *Paradise Lost* could also write the *Christian Doctrine*, and unequalled political tracts, and if our general principle be true, that the poet is capable of effective social action, why should he not also be able to preach effectively? We see no reason to the contrary, unless in those rare cases where the active moral energy is so vast and constant, as not to leave to the mind the repose essential to the composition of a work of art, or perhaps even to the cultivation of the poetical faculty.

With reference to the distinction between the prophet and the poet, Mr. Carlyle observes: "The *vates* prophet, we might say, has seized that sacred mystery, (the 'open secret,') rather on the moral side, as good and evil, duty and prohibition; the

vates poet on what the Germans call the æsthetic side, as beautiful, and the like. The one we may call a revealer of what we are to do, the other of what we are to love. But, indeed, these two provinces run into one another, and cannot be disjoined. The prophet too has his eye on what we are to love: how else shall we know what we are to do? The highest voice ever heard on this earth said withal, 'Consider the lilies of the field; they toil not, neither do they spin: yet Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.' A glance, that, into the deepest deep of beauty. 'The lilies of the field,'—dressed finer than earthly princes, springing up there in the humble furrow-field; a beautiful *eye* looking out on you, from the great inner sea of beauty! How could the rude earth make these, if her essence, rugged as she looks and is, were not inwardly beauty? In this point of view, too, a saying of Goethe's which has staggered several may have a meaning, 'The beautiful,' he intimates, 'is higher than the good; the beautiful includes in it the good.' The true beautiful, which, however, I have said somewhere, 'differs from the *false*, as Heaven does from Vauxhall!' So much for the distinction and identity of poet and prophet."—*Heroes and Hero Worship*, pp. 127, 128.

In asserting the connexion between poetry and preaching, it never can have been supposed our purpose to include that gift among the necessary qualifications of one whose function admits of forms of fulfilment so indefinitely varied as does the preacher's. Assuming that, for the most part, the preacher can only be a herald, proclaiming a message of infinite grace; or a teacher, distributing to others the 'fruits of his own observation, study, reflection; or a witness, testifying of the elevating or renewing power of the Truth; and will in vain attempt to be a prophet, authoritatively interpreting the present, or announcing the future; still, even for the most unpoetical of men, there may be found here a sphere of labour with abundant profit. He may discourse of Christian Ethics, Dogmatical Theology, Biblical History and Criticism, or of whatever else he may happen to have more knowledge of than his hearers; or doing none of all these particularly, he may somehow or other let the spirit that is in him express itself, and confirm faith by sympathy.

It may be necessary here to say a few words on the relation of the preacher to the actor, inquiring how far histrionic art is admissible into the pulpit. We understand by the actor one who has so great an intellectual susceptibility of being impressed by the embodied thoughts of the poet, combined with unusual powers of speech and gesture, as to be able, more or less adequately, to represent in action what the poet has expressed in words. The actor is thus the exponent not of his own but of

another's mind, to which he has for the time lent his rare gifts of utterance; and, according to the highest view of the preacher's office, there is thus a distinct contrast between the two. The preacher says, "Because I believe, therefore have I spoken;" the actor says, "I have spoken because I have conceived."

At the same time, it will appear, we think, to the calm and thoughtful observer, that a great part of our actual preaching partakes largely of the histrionic character. The preacher, having for the time become saturated with the thoughts and words of some portion of Holy Writ, in which either an actual historical or an ideal character is portrayed, under the influence of such temporary possession utters his feelings with all the energy, although not always with the cultivated taste of the actor. It may perhaps be said, too, that the more the preacher is under the immediate influence of the Book, the more fully will this effect be produced; while, on the other hand, the more he has digested and incorporated into his own spiritual being its nutritious contents, the less will his discourse resemble the actor's. What has been said may suggest an explanation of a phenomenon which has sometimes perplexed us, and possibly also some of our readers; according to which we may have heard sermon after sermon, on all manner of subjects, by some preacher of much intellectual and physical vigour, each of the sermons apparently produced under a strong influence, very like that of specific belief; and yet the result of the whole has been to leave us in extreme uncertainty as to the actual personal convictions of the preacher on almost any one of the topics of his discourses. It may be thought superfluous to remark, that in so far as any preacher's power depends on this imitative art, a comparison of his sermons with his life is altogether out of the question.

To conclude these general reflections, let us attempt in a single sentence to indicate what, according to our view, will be the characteristics of a dramatic poet's sermons. We should look for the expression of an intense feeling of the awful ceaseless struggle of Good with Evil, soothed by the hope (for if quite hopeless why should he labour?) of the ultimate triumph of Good, of which we find some imperfect expression in these beautiful lines:—

" Oh, yet we trust that somehow good
Will be the final goal of ill,
To pangs of nature, sins of will,
Defects of doubt, and taints of blood.

" That nothing walks with aimless feet;
That not one life shall be destroy'd,
Or cast as rubbish in the void,
When God hath made the pile complete.

“ That not a worm is cloven in vain ;
 That not a moth with vain desire
 Is shrivell'd in a fruitless fire,
 Or but subserves another's gain.”

The persons of whom he is called to speak we should expect to be, not cold lifeless abstractions, but all full of human passions, and represented as men of like nature, and exposed substantially to the same struggles with ourselves, placed among circumstances often widely different from ours ; while the poet's imaginative insight into these circumstances will shed a strong light upon far off periods of history, into the spirit and life of which it will be given to him to see deeper than others. At the same time, it will hardly be possible for him to fall into the vulgar error, of supposing that the primeval or ancient men were in their habits, beliefs, and life, precisely what we are, or in so far as they differed from us were simply wrong ; for he will be able to represent them in the fulness of their vitality only by filling in the details in perfect harmony with the slender outlines which remain to us of their history. The oldest themes will thus teem for us with fresh germinant thoughts ; as, when the master's hand has cleared away the accumulated remains of unproductive decayed vegetation, and exposed to the sun the fertile earth and latent seeds, we see an unlooked-for and nourishing verdure. What has been said with reference to the sacred prophetic writings, has, in truth, a much wider application. “ Often the commentator is bringing a most prosaic mind to the consideration of the sublimest poetry. ‘ How can two walk together except they be agreed ? ’ and no book can be well understood unless it be read in somewhat of the same spirit in which it was written. ‘ The Apocalypse of Saint John,’ says Milton, ‘ is the majestic image of a high and stately tragedy, shutting up and intermingling her solemn scenes and acts with a sevenfold chorus of hallelujahs and symphonies ; ’ and though this is being over imaginative, yet Milton is much nearer in spirit to the Divine original than many that have presumed to handle the subject, altogether devoid of the sacred glow which would have conducted them along the footprints of the Apostle John. Instead of perceiving that the prophecies were written in the free and flowing outlines of poetry, they have gone on spelling figure after figure, as if they were slowly deciphering the hieroglyphics of some Egyptian temple.”*

The sympathy here referred to as necessary we may expect in a poet ; and the importance of it is probably far greater than is

usually supposed. What lengths of utter materialism it is possible for commentators to reach, by the rejection of all that is spiritual and supersensuous as contranatural and incredible, may be seen in such writers as Paulus; while, on the other hand, the poet, whose dwelling has ever been figured to be on some Parnassus, or other heavenly mount, seems most at home when standing on the finite and visible he is reaching out into the invisible and the infinite.

The little volume of sermons which has given occasion to these observations, is, in several respects, one of the most remarkable we have met with for a long time. It will be found to possess the merits which by anticipation, in virtue of its parentage, we have ascribed to it, with other merits of a high order. Discarding utterly the tasteless conventional pulpit phraseology, which with us is only not universal, and has the unhappy effect of either obscuring thought or concealing the want of it; with a deep sense of the reality and awful import of the things about which he has to speak, and not forgetting that if he would speak with effect he must use terms within the comprehension of the humble and not over-intelligent Hampshire rustics, forming the bulk of his audience, Mr. Kingsley has been able to express Christian thoughts, which the highest will not find unworthy of notice, in the simplest, homeliest language; which is so predominantly Saxon, that in whole pages one could hardly find a few dozen words of Latin origin.

The titles of some of these sermons are suggestive. Such headings as "God's World," "Religion not Godliness," "Hell on Earth," "Association," "On Books," shew that the writer aims at something more than playing round a text. He grapples indeed very boldly with subjects, and with subjects of immediate practical interest, extorting a blessing often from the most unpromising; fighting not against "extinct Satans," but against the actual existing Satans, the terrible enough evils which are now at work all around us. Not content with the mere amplification of the words of Scripture, applicable immediately to a different social state, and to forms of evil different from the present, the author's endeavour is rather to dive into the heart of the Scripture text, and become possessed of its very life and spirit, which is for all time and for all circumstances. One of his great objects is to undo that huge work of an unbelieving age, through which the Idea of Nature has been disjoined from the Idea of God, for whom, in this relation, has been substituted some dim notion of a changeless self-subsisting law, so that the earth we tread on is hardly recognised as in very truth God's world. But we shall not here enter upon any examination of the theology which is taught (implicitly, for all technical theological terms, and the inculcation of

any theological system are studiously avoided) in this work, having introduced it to our readers for a different purpose; and now leaving them to judge of its spirit from the extracts which follow, we recommend the little volume to them in some of their thoughtful hours, as a remarkable phenomenon in the department of literature to which it belongs.

“RELIGION NOT GODLINESS.

“Did you ever remark, my friends, that the Bible says hardly anything about religion—that it never praises religious people. This is very curious. Would to God we would all remember it! The Bible speaks of a religious man only once, and of religion only twice, except where it speaks of the Jews’ religion to condemn it, and shews what an empty, blind, useless thing it was. What does the Bible talk of, then? It talks of God—not of religion, but of God. It tells us not to be religious but to be godly. . . . And yet I believe we ought to think of it, and, by God’s help, I will one day preach you a sermon, asking you all round this fair question:—If Jesus Christ came to you in the shape of a poor man, whom nobody knew, should *you* know him—should you admire him, fall at his feet and give yourself up to him, body and soul? I am afraid that I for one should not. I am afraid that too many of us here would not. That comes of us thinking more of religion than we do of godliness—in plain words, more of our own souls than we do of Jesus Christ. But you will want to know what is, after all, the difference between religion and godliness? Just the difference, my friends, that there is between always thinking of self and always forgetting self—between the terror of a slave and the affection of a child—between the fear of hell and the love of God. For, tell me, what you mean by being religious? Do you not mean, thinking a great deal about your own souls, and praying and reading about your own souls, and trying by all possible means to get your own souls saved? Is not that the meaning of religion? and yet I have never mentioned God’s name in describing it! This sort of religion must have very little to do with God. . . . Yes, indeed, what would heaven be worth without God? But how many people feel that the curse of this day is that most people have forgotten *that*? They are selfishly anxious enough about their own souls, but they have forgotten God. They are religious for fear of hell, but they are not godly, for they do not love God, or see God’s hand in everything. They forget that they have a Father in heaven; that He sends rain and sunshine, and fruitful seasons; that He gives them all things richly to enjoy in spite of all their sins. His mercies are far above, out of their sight, and therefore His judgments are far away out of their sight too, and so they talk of the ‘Visitation of God,’ as if it was something very extraordinary, and happened very seldom, and when it came only brought evil, and harm, and sorrow. If a man lives on in health, they say he lives by the strength of his own constitution; if he drops down dead, they say he died by ‘the visitation of God.’ If the corn

crops go on all right and safe, they think *that* quite natural—the effect of the soil, and the weather, and their own skill in farming and gardening. But if there comes a hailstorm or a blight, and spoils it all, and brings on a famine, they call it at once 'a visitation of God.' My friends, do you think God 'visits' the earth or you only to harm you? I tell you, that every blade of grass grows by the 'visitation of God.' I tell you, that every healthy breath you ever drew, every cheerful hour you ever spent, every good crop you ever housed safely, came to you by 'the visitation of God.' I tell you, that every sensible thought or plan that ever came into your heads—every loving, honest, manly, womanly feeling that ever rose in your hearts, God 'visited' you to put it there. If God's Spirit had not given it you, you would never have got it of yourselves."—Pp. 13-18.

"LIFE AND DEATH."

"The text tells us that he gives life, not only to us who have immortal souls, but to everything on the face of the earth; for the psalm has been talking all through not only of men but of beasts, fishes, trees, and rivers, and rocks, sun and moon. Now all these things have a life in them. Not a life like ours; but still you speak rightly and wisely when you say, 'That tree is alive, and that tree is dead. That running water is live water—it is sweet and fresh; but if it is kept standing it begins to putrefy, its life is gone from it, and a sort of death comes over it, and makes it foul and unwholesome, and unfit to drink.' This is a deep matter, this, how there is a sort of life in everything, even to the stones under our feet. I do not mean, of course, that stones can think as our life makes us do, or feel as the beasts' life makes them do, or even grow as the trees' life makes them do; but I mean that their life keeps them as they are, without changing or decaying. You hear miners and quarrymen talk very truly of the live rock. That stone, they say, was cut out of the live rock, meaning the rock as it is under ground, sound and hard—as it would be, for aught we know, to the end of time, unless it was taken out of the ground, out of the place where God's Spirit meant it to be, and brought up to the open air and the rain, in which it is not its nature to be; and then you will see that the life of the stone begins to pass from it bit by bit, that it crumbles and peels away, and in short decays, and is turned again to its dust. Its organization, as it is called, or life ends, and then—what? does the stone lie for ever useless? No! And there is the great blessed mystery of how God's Spirit is always bringing life out of death. When the stone is decayed and crumbled down to dust and clay, it makes *soil*. This very soil here, which you plough, is the decayed ruins of ancient hills; the clay which you dig up in the fields was once part of some slate or granite mountains, which were worn away by weather and water, that they might become fruitful earth. Wonderful! but any one who has studied these things can tell you they are true. Any one who has ever lived in mountainous countries ought to have seen the thing happen—ought to know that

the land in the mountain valleys is made at first, and kept rich year by year by the washings from the hills above ; and this is the reason why land left dry by rivers and by the sea is generally so rich. Then what becomes of the soil ? It begins a new life. The roots of the plants take it up ; the salts which they find in it—the staple, as we call them—go to make leaves and seed ; the very sand has its use—it feeds the stalks of corn and grass, and makes them stiff. The corn stalks would never stand upright if they could not get sand from the soil. So what a thousand years ago made part of a mountain, now makes part of a wheat plant ; and in a year more the wheat grain will have been eaten, and the wheat straw perhaps eaten too, and they will have *died*—decayed in the bodies of the animals who have eaten them, and then they will begin a third new life—they will be turned into parts of the animal's body—of a man's body. So what is now your bone and flesh may have been once a rock on some hill-side a hundred miles away."

The "Sermon" mentioned last at the head of this paper, which has reached us as we are going to press, and which has already gained some notoriety from the circumstances attending its delivery, relates to questions too delicate and difficult to be even referred to in the close of an Article. To enter upon any consideration of its doctrine or objects is obviously foreign to our present purpose ; and having chronicled the fact of its publication, we must now take leave of Mr. Kingsley.

ART. VII.—*The Stones of Venice. Volume the First.—The Foundations.* By JOHN RUSKIN. London, 1851.

IN our Number for February 1850, we entered into a somewhat elaborate and novel investigation of the sources of appropriate character in the Egyptian and Greek Architectures, and we referred our readers for the only similar investigation of the Northern Gothic style, to an essay in another Journal. We stated and gave ample reasons for our belief that these three styles rank in the scale of integrity and merit conspicuously above all others. In this Article we shall carry on the task which we then commenced, by examining, with as little technicality as possible, the chief of the secondary and derived styles: and in doing this, we hope to arrive at useful practical results with regard to modern civil architecture, which, although it cannot be called a style, being an imitation of many styles, is yet sufficiently pretentious and expensive to justify a serious consideration of its defects and prospects.

We must set out by quoting our own words from the above-mentioned Article. "If to the mind's eye we recall the various kinds of architecture that from the beginning have arisen, we shall remark three kinds which, in a peculiar manner, stand out from and above the rest. It is almost needless to name the architectures of Egypt, Greece, and Christian Europe, in the middle ages, as constituting this conspicuous triad. These architectures are distinguished from all others by a simplicity, definiteness, dignity, and appropriateness of effect, resulting from the general subordination in each style, not only of decoration, but of total form, to a particular thought or sentiment, intimately allied with and strongly suggestive of the character of the religion to which it is applied. The leading expressions of the three architectures are, moreover, very strikingly and simply related. . . . The total forms become expressive, and even religiously symbolical, by a striking, and, in each case, a quite peculiar relativeness to the great law of gravitation. In fewest words, the general forms of Egyptian architecture are those of simple weight, and they express gloomy and everlasting material duration; those of Greek architecture convey the notion of weight competently supported, and are expressive of secure, conscious, and well-ordered power; finally, the prevailing forms of Gothic architecture shew weight annihilated—spire and tower, buttress, clerestory, and pinnacle, rise to heaven, and indicate the spirituality of the worship to which they are applied."

There are two other kinds of architecture, and only two, which

resemble these great styles in being founded upon a single idea, to the expression of which every detail is in strict subordination : these are the Arabian and Lombard. But these are essentially inferior to the former styles, in that the idea, which is the basis of their unity, has no such inherent symbolical character as is possessed by the ideas which severally unite and vivify the details of the Egyptian, Greek, and Gothic architectures. Weight, support, and ascension are ideas which, in all times and languages, have been accepted as the most direct and forcible material images of the three great mental phases of sensuality, intellectuality, and spirituality ; and these three phases are precisely those which it was desirable to express as adjuncts of the Egyptian, Greek, and Christian worship. All architecture (besides these five) deserving the name of architecture, must take a *third* rank, as being founded upon two or more ideas. It is to these architectures, at the head of which stand the Roman, Italian-Pointed, Renaissance, and Elizabethan styles, that we shall devote our chief attention in this paper.

Concerning these styles generally, it is to be remarked that, although inferior abstractedly, as branches of art, to the simple styles, they are superior in their fitness for civil purposes. The severe unity of the Greek temple is harsh and grossly *mal-à-propos* in a theatre, post-office, or museum ; and the heavenward energy which utters itself in every line of pure Gothic must be checked and stunted by combination with low and ungothic masses, before it can be tolerated in a town-hall or a parliament-house.

The architecture of ancient Rome affords little scope for æsthetical inquiry. The Corinthian order, which the Romans had the merit of developing, was only a highly ornamented Ionic, and exhibited no such radical difference from the pure Greek Ionic as was visible between this and the Greek Doric. This difference we were the first to investigate, and it will be found fully stated in the Article to which we have already referred. The merits or rather the demerits of Roman architecture, as a fine art, have been summed up by Mr. Hope with a completeness which has left little further to be said upon the subject. We must borrow largely from his chapter on the Roman style, as a necessary preparation for an analysis of the art of the Renaissance, which, though full of error and barbarism, really was an art, having certain comprehensible and consistent artistic principles. These it will be worth our while to understand, if it be only that we may succeed in avoiding them, as Mr. Ruskin, for one, would have us to do.

The whole system of Greek architecture was developed from the mechanical principle of the upright post and horizontal

lintel. This was the constructive principle of the wooden hut, from which the stone temple was, beyond all question, directly derived; and this continued to be the constructive principle as well as the external form of the Greek temple to the last. Every member of Greek architecture, although so selected and modified as to form a part of a wonderfully elaborate and perfect expression of balanced power of support and gravitation, was referable to its constructive antitype; and the artistic excellence of every detail was so far dependent upon this system of construction, that, although the forms might remain under different constructive conditions, they could remain only as a beautiful body remains when the life is gone,—their beauty producing a revolting sense of anomaly and falsehood, and doomed to further corruption and utter dissolution. The Romans, upon the discovery of the marvellous capacities of the arch, very rightly abandoned the Greek constructive system; but they most ignorantly retained, as far as possible, the Greek forms. In Greek architecture the column was the principal supporting member, the wall officiating chiefly as a mere veil to the interior: hence the column had a right to the position and decorations which made it the most conspicuous feature of the building. The Roman arched roof required a continuous wall of great power for its support, and columns, except in the case of an advanced porch, like that which faces the Pantheon, became superfluous. They continued, however, to be used as plentifully as if they had been as useful as ever; and their conspicuousness was increased rather than diminished by the addition of pedestals and by the new method of treatment which was called for by the mere fact of their comparative inutility. “Frequently,” says Mr. Hope, “as in the triumphal arches of the Emperors, the pedestal became so lofty, that, instead of raising the columns on a sort of cothurnus, it lifted them on a positive stilt, and not only cut off their connexion with the ground, but made them appear as if tottering in the air. Where the pedestal occupied a greater space between the soffit and the stylobate, less remained for the column, which became shorter, thinner, weaker, *requiring instead of affording support*; its apparent weakness exceeding its real debility, like an appendage not wrought for the building, but borrowed from some smaller structure, and only carried to the requisite height by the aid of materials which did not belong to it. As they became weaker, like the limbs of an unhealthy child, they were stretched to a greater distance from each other, and were no longer capable of bearing an entablature diminished to their own proportions. In order fully to confirm their inutility, they were not made to carry any such, but of an architrave directly supported by the wall itself, (a continuation of that wall indeed,

under a different denomination,) such projections or knots as did not exceed their own diameter, and appeared fitter for the purpose of steadying the useless pillar, than the pillar for that of carrying an unmeaning entablature. The effect produced was that of a second capital, mimicking the first; confusing its form and destroying its appearance; causing as great a multiplication of breaks and angles and of clumsy mouldings, as arises from the equally useless pedestal underneath." In other cases, column and entablature were included by independent arches, "so that the column carrying the entablature, but the entablature carrying nothing, the former only appeared for the purpose of supporting the latter, and the latter for that of tying together the former." The climax of the mal-appropriation of the column was its isolated employment as a high perch for a statue, while all its details and decorations retained a reference to the heavy entablature, as their origin and justification, and the main condition of their beauty. The misapplication of the column of course brought on a proportionate degradation of its form. Vague and arbitrary notions of symmetry, simplicity, variety, &c., took the place of a steady and intelligible reference to the powers of gravitation and support. The Doric shaft owed its effect of enormous and active might chiefly to the flutes, and to the fact that it sprang at once from the ground, without any preparations of base or independent plynth. The "Roman Doric" was a dead cylindrical lump, resting on a plynth surmounted by a base consisting of one great roll-moulding, that looked as if it had been formed from a mass of yielding matter by the pressure of the inanimate shaft. The Greek shaft, whether Doric or Ionic, never expressed its own weight, but confined itself to foretelling and manifestly preparing to meet that of the entablature. The capital of the column was the first point at which sufferance from weight was declared. Here the Doric and "Attic Ionic" architects shewed surprising skill and sensibility. Curves of great active force—always conic sections—were chosen for the outlines of the great feature of the Doric capital, the "ovolo." For these curves, the Romans substituted the insignificant quarter-circle, which expressed just nothing at all but want of skill to draw any other curve, or, at best, a childish and vain attempt to improve the shaft by "harmonizing" it with the semicircular forms of the new construction. The Greek Ionic capital is a powerful, though perhaps unjustifiable, representation of elasticity. The Ionic volutes would be formed by the pressure of the entablature upon a coach-spring, of which the two bars should be equal in length but unequal in strength, the lower bar being much more powerful in the middle than the upper bar, whose elasticity should be uniform. It seems to us that this suggestion of self-formation was intended to

be conveyed by the Ionic capital : if it was not so, we do not know how this member can be defended against Mr. Ruskin's charge of being an "exceedingly base" invention ; but if it was so, we cannot speak with any high praise of an expression, in stone, of a quality which it is manifestly impossible that stone itself should ever exhibit. How far the subtlety and quick perception of the Greeks may have pierced the obscurity which this inconsistency produces, in the Ionic capital, or how far the *abstract* effect, which was conferred upon form by the system of polychrome painting, may have concealed that inconsistency, we cannot estimate. But taking the Greek Ionic capital at the worst, as being obscure and inconsistent in meaning, it is vastly better than the Roman Ionic, of which the no-meaning was very distinctly pronounced by the character of its curves. In Greek Doric the abacus had a very important office as the member which separated the two great classes of supporting and supported members. It was a simple square-cut slab, and afforded the point of perfect repose, around which all other details grouped themselves in harmonious relation. The senseless Roman architects turned this beautiful figure into an actively supporting member, by crowning it with a moulding expressive of resistance to weight : but probably these persons had not the merit of intending even as much as this by their alteration ; for they seem to have considered the Greek mouldings as arbitrary decorations, which might be applied, without distinction, wherever it seemed desirable, to ornament a fillet, or to terminate a blank space with a pretty edging. When we arrive at the entablature, we find similar faults from the same causes. The Greek triglyph, in the frieze, represented the notched ends of the beams which stretched from architrave to architrave, and formed the foundation of the flat roof. The roof became arched, and these triglyphs lost their constructive significance, and ought to have ceased altogether. But they were superstitiously retained ; and, not only so, but they were made to seem more dependent than ever upon their departed meaning, by being placed rigidly over the centre of every shaft ; whereas the Greeks partially violated the constructive meaning of the triglyphs in favour of a higher artistic value, by binding the corner of the frieze with a pair of them, and so shifting them and those that were next to them out of their right constructive position over the supporting shafts. Equally little regard to the original sense was paid to the other details of the entablature, and the entablature itself lost its organic character by the loss of the originally distinct nature of its three members—the architrave, frieze, and cornice. The Romans failed most remarkably in the point about which they made the greatest ostentation of science, namely, proportion.

They shackled their practice by an elaborate code of arbitrary rules, none of which were ever dreamt of by the Greeks, whom they professed to follow; and, at the same time, they forgot the living centre of reference, which was the source of the exquisite Doric proportional system, namely, the simple mass of the architrave,* the *relative* breadth of which was increased or diminished in proportion to the degree of power to be expressed. "But," writes Mr. Hope, "of all the parts borrowed from Grecian architecture, that which came to be applied as the way most different from, most inconsistent with its nature and distinction in the original, was the fastigium, the part which we call the pediment. That pediment, which was only the termination of a roof, slanting both ways from its central line or spine, of which, throughout its whole length from end to end," (except in hypæthral temples,) "the continuity was never broken, which was never seen in Grecian buildings except on the straight line at the summit, and the gable formed by the extremity of the roof, in Roman architecture frequently appeared as if cut off from all that belonged to it, and grew out of, or was stuck under, the entablature which it should have surmounted, against the upright wall, over a door, a window, or a niche, even, as in the Temple of Balbeck, placed within a projecting portico—a situation in which it could not be useful even to carry off the wet. Instead of a single, large, and majestic pediment, naturally and magnificently terminating the building, several rows were sometimes seen of these small and inappropriate triangles; and, to complete the inconsistency, they were rendered as unnatural in form as in situation. They were sometimes rounded, sometimes broken, sometimes squeezed within others of larger, sometimes strung round others of smaller dimensions." The grossness of the Roman taste was, however, even more conspicuous in their decorative "improvements" and inventions than in their misunderstanding of what had been invented before them. They "improved" the Doric shaft by substituting for the exquisite horizontal neck-channels—for an account of which we refer our readers to our former Essay—a projecting band or "astragal," which, instead of proving the sufficiency of the shaft to do its work, by taking away from its power where power was most needed, seemed to indicate that the shaft required strengthening at that point; and in their stupid devo-

* See *North British Review* for February 1850, pp. 334, 335. We must refer those of our readers who wish to make a study of the subject in hand to the above Number of this Review: it is not possible fully to describe the extent of the Roman abuse of Greek forms without repeating much that was there said. Whenever, in the present Article, a principle in Greek architecture is assumed, it is because it has already been proved in the foregoing Essay.

tion to mechanical symmetry they made the slanting and horizontal cornices of the Doric order all alike, by introducing the dentils—representative of rafter ends—into the former, where rafters could not possibly occur. The Romans never seemed to have caught a glimpse of the possibility of inventing a system of decoration appropriate to their splendid discovery of the mechanical virtues of the arch. Where it interfered with Greek forms, they absolutely hid it away, instead of decorating and boasting of it; the horizontal entablature in Roman architecture being sometimes nothing more than a *mask* to a mass of *arched* construction.

It is not necessary that we should further describe the dull stupidities and senseless flippancies of Roman architecture. We have traced them thus far, however, in order that the reader may be fully prepared to understand the grounds upon which the architects of the Renaissance in Italy began their work. They were altogether ignorant of pure Greek architecture, and, by a superstition easy to account for, though not, therefore, altogether to be excused, they set out with an unquestioning faith in the plenary architectural inspiration of the Roman builders and of their critic Vitruvius. There had always been in Italy a hankering after heathenism, which had been kept for a thousand years in abeyance, but never quite destroyed, by Christianity and the influence of northern and eastern mind. Before the rise of the Renaissance school of art, the very soul of Christianity in Italy had been blasted and abolished by the corruptions of the Papacy. Mr. Ruskin eloquently and truly writes :—

“Against the corrupted Papacy arose two great divisions of adversaries—Protestants in Germany and England; Rationalists in France and Italy: the one requiring the purification of religion, the other its destruction. The Protestant kept the religion, but cast aside the heresies of Rome, and with them her arts, by which last rejection he injured his own character, cramped his intellect by refusing it one of its noblest exercises, and materially diminished his influence. It may be a serious question how far the pausing of the Reformation has been a consequence of this error. The Rationalist kept the arts and cast aside the religion. This Rationalistic art is the art commonly called Renaissance, marked by a return to Pagan systems, not to adopt them and hallow them for Christianity, but to rank itself under them as an imitator and pupil. In painting it is headed by Giulio Romano and Nicholas Poussin; in architecture by Sansovino and Palladio. Instant degradation followed in every direction; a flood of folly and hypocrisy. Mythologies ill understood at first, then perverted into feeble sensualities, take the place of the representations of Christian subjects, which had become blasphemous un-

der the treatment of such men as the Caracci. Gods without power, satyrs without rusticity, nymphs without innocence, men without humanity, gather into idiot groups upon the polluted canvass, and scenic affectations encumber the streets with preposterous marble. Lower and lower declines the level of abused intellect; the base school of landscape gradually usurps the place of historical painting, which had sunk into prurient pedantry; the Alsatian sublimities of Salvator, the confectionary idealities of Claude, the dull manufacture of Gaspard and Canaletto, south of the Alps; and on the north, the patient devotion of besotted lives to the delineation of bricks and fogs, fat cattle and ditch water. And thus Christianity and morality, courage and intellect, and art, all crumbling together into one wreck, we are hurried on to the fall of Italy, the revolution in France, and the condition of art in England (saved by her Protestantism from severer penalty) in the time of George II."

The architecture of the Renaissance is regarded by Mr. Ruskin as the most baleful of all the developments of Renaissance art:—

"The harm which has been done by Claude and the Poussins is as nothing when compared to the mischief effected by Palladio, Scamozzi, and Sansovino. Claude and the Poussins were weak men, and have had no serious influence on the general mind. There is little harm in their works being purchased at high prices; their real influence is very slight, and they may be left without grave indignation to their poor mission of furnishing drawing-rooms and assisting stranded conversation. Not so the Renaissance architecture. Raised at once into all the magnificence of which it was capable by Michael Angelo, then taken up by men of real intellect and imagination, such as Scamozzi, Sansovino, Inigo Jones, and Wren, it is impossible to estimate the extent of its influence on the European mind, and that the more because few persons are concerned with painting, and of those few the larger number regard it with slight attention; but all men are concerned with architecture, and have at some time of their lives serious business with it. It does not much matter that an individual loses two or three hundred pounds in buying a bad picture, but it is to be regretted that a nation should lose two or three hundred thousand in raising a ridiculous building. Nor is it merely wasted wealth and distempered conception which we have to regret in this Renaissance architecture; but we shall find in it partly the root and partly the expression of certain dominant evils of modern times—over-sophistication and ignorant classicalism; the one destroying the healthfulness of general society, the other rendering our schools and universities useless to a large number of the men who pass through them."

We have quoted these passages because they contain much just thought excellently well put, and because we think that they

also contain a certain injustice, the statement and correction of which will provide us with some considerations essential to a right understanding of Renaissance art in general, and of Renaissance architecture in particular. We have so much respect for Mr. Ruskin's artistic perception and cultivation, that we have had considerable hesitation in coming to any conclusion in direct contradiction of any conclusion of his: but we are compelled to say, that after having carefully read all that he has published, we can still retain a high degree of admiration and even of love, for works of art which he condemns, if we mistake not, as being wholly wrong and worthless. We do not feel qualified to speak technically of painting, but we have received a degree and kind of delight from the works of Claude and Nicholas Poussin, which we are deeply persuaded could never have been produced in us by pictures deserving the amount of censure which is heaped upon them by Mr. Ruskin. We acknowledge fully the surprising truthfulness of the painters of our own day, whom Mr. Ruskin has so eloquently defended. But let us take a picture by Millais or Holman Hunt—painters whose truthfulness Mr. Ruskin in his Letters to the "Times," rightly asserts to have been unequalled since the days of Albert Durer—and compare the feeling we receive from it with that which we receive from an unprejudiced contemplation of one by Claude or Poussin. Though actual outward nature is painted by the former with the most faithful conscience in every detail, and, violated by the latter in lesser matters without remorse, yet *the feeling which those who are susceptible constituted receive from nature*; seems to us to have been far more frequently and successfully expressed by the last than by the first. We would not for an instant under-rate the extraordinary powers of the painters we have named; they are generally understood to be very young men; and, as such, are perfectly right in adhering for the present with the severest self-denial to their plan of copying, rather than interpreting nature. "The light that never was on sea or land," will not fail to dawn from their works as soon as they shall have fulfilled the task which they have so manfully undertaken of painting more faithfully than has yet been done, that which is to be seen by the light of common day. We must, however, confess it to be our impression, that there is more of the "vision and the faculty divine" expressed in the pictures of Claude and Poussin, in spite of all their "over-sophistication and ignorant classicism," and neglect, or rather falsification of nature in details, than has yet been expressed by any living painter. Mr. Ruskin, in "Modern Painters," has referred a number of elementary powers of art to their direct and simple symbolization of the divine attributes. Now, unity in multitude is among the most mysterious and ad-

mirable to contemplate of all the perfections of God ; and we think that Mr. Ruskin has not given the famous painters and architects of the period in question, sufficient credit for its symbolization in their works. The moderation which results from the artificial necessity of every one of innumerable details, assuming, remembering, and working in concert with all the rest, ravishes the heart with a joy far greater than any that is to be obtained from our wretchedly imperfect means of transferring literally upon stone or canvass, the endless harmonies of nature. To this artificial necessity no merely outward knowledge and skill in art will ever enable a man to submit himself. Nothing but genius, which is a more lively impression than ordinary of the image of God upon our being, can enable a man to express this unity in multitude so as to touch the heart : but when a man has genius he can evolve this divine harmony out of the poorest materials, and can so combine things false in themselves, that they shall give utterance to this unity, which is the fundamental truth of the universe, spiritual and natural.

The architecture of the Renaissance is loaded with details, which in the hands of the Romans, who first abused them, were gross falsehoods, but which in their revival in the fifteenth century, should rather be looked upon as mere ignorance, superstition, and nonsense. What was Roman was right ; those who questioned in thought, and scorned in practice the Christian faith, would have been horribly scandalized by freethinking in matters of antiquity ; the plenary inspiration of Vitruvius was an article of the Renaissance creed ; and the hideous barbarisms of the out-worn and perverted civilisation of ancient Rome, were looked upon as constituents of a golden age of art, which it would be presumptuous to think of equalling, much less amending. If the Renaissance architects sometimes invented new details, or combinations of details, it was in the humble spirit with which a translator—Pope, for example—of a famous ancient poet might venture upon adding a “grace” or two of his own, in order partly to compensate for his inability to express the perfection of the revered original. They do not seem to have had the remotest suspicion that their modified translations were often incomparably superior to the originals. The Renaissance architects, in fact, were not bold enough to be as bad as the late Roman architects,—just as our church-builders are not bold enough to be as good as the mediæval architects. There is a nightmare-ish deformity and depravity about some of the remains of late Roman work ; an air of vast, but mal-appropriated, and even fiendish power, which revolts the rightly cultivated spirit, but simply awes and intimidates into cowardly

reverence the mind which is uninformed of better things.* To this bad eminence the Renaissance architects seldom or never attained. The barbarisms which, in Roman work, were foisted upon the eye, as the first objects for attention, generally hold a subordinate and—as we have above said—harmonized position in the total work of the fifteenth century architect. It is not often that the chaotic and insane get the upper hand.

A notice of a few of the principal features of Renaissance architecture may be interesting to the reader, and will enable him to give due credit to the architects who could evolve beauty out of combinations of such materials. The most conspicuous and abominable of Renaissance barbarisms, is the system of “rustication” and “rock-work,” *so far as it is not strictly and wholly subordinated to the exhibition of masonry and the expression of power.* The wall is seldom left plain by the Renaissance builders. The junction of the stones is generally made conspicuous by cutting away their edges, or by roughing the surface, except at the edges where they join. This exhibition of the construction of the wall is a highly valuable and perfectly legitimate method of effect, though it is often greatly abused: but it is in the means by which this exhibition is made that the great barbarism of “rustication” often lies. In our opinion there are only two legitimate methods of rustication—the stones should have their edges simply chamfered or sunk from the general surface; or the faces, rough from the quarry, may be chiselled smooth at the edges; all sorts of manifestly artificial roughing of the surface, in order to obtain the smooth edge, are totally false in principle and disgusting in effect. One of the commonest of these artificial roughings is the *vermiculated*, by which the stones are made to look *worm-eaten*. Mr. Ruskin vehemently reprobates rustication altogether, but we can agree with him only in his rejection of the kind we are now speaking of. As this artificial roughing is an important point, and hitherto an almost undebated one, we will quote what Mr. Ruskin says about it:—

“We have now to notice another effort of the Renaissance architects to adorn the blank spaces of their walls by what is called Rustication. There is sometimes an obscure trace of the remains of an imitation of something organic in this kind of work. In some of the better French eighteenth century buildings, it has a distinctly floral character, with a final degradation of flamboyant leafage; and some

* Flaxman in one of his illustrations of Dante's Hell, fills up the back-ground with forms of hellish architecture which seem to us to be peculiarly fine in their place. Chaos and insanity seem to be organized in the toppling towers, the wild battlements, and the horrible bridge. The feeling, however, is not new: it is merely a development of that which is obtained in Roman works by a more than usually bold employment of some of the barbarisms described above.

of our modern English architects appear to have taken the decayed teeth of elephants for their type ; but, for the most part, it resembles nothing so much as worm casts, nor these with any precision. If it did, it would not bring it within our sphere of properly imitative ornamentation. I thought it unnecessary to warn the reader that he was not to copy forms of refuse or corruption ; and that while he might legitimately take the worm or the reptile for a subject of imitation, he was not to study the worm cast or coprolite. It is however, I believe, sometimes supposed that rustication gives an appearance of solidity to foundation stones. Not so ; at least to any one who knows the look of a hard stone. You may, by rustication, make your marble or granite look like wet slime, honey-combed by sand-eels, or half-baked tufo covered with slow exudation of stalactite, or rotten claystone coated with concretions of its own mud, but not like the stones of which the hard world is built. Do not think that nature rusticates her foundations. Smooth sheets of rock, glistening like sea waves, that ring under the hammer like a brazen bell—that is her preparation for first stories. She does rusticate sometimes ; crumbling sandstones with their ripple marks filled with red mud ; dusty limestones, which the rains wash into labyrinthine cavities ; spongy lavas, which the volcano-blast drags hither and thither in ropy coils and bubbling hollows ; these she rusticates, indeed, when she wants to make oyster-shells and magnesia of them ; but not when she needs to lay her foundations with them. Then she seeks the polished surface and iron heart, not rough looks and incoherent substance."

The natural roughness of the stone, as it comes from the quarry, is, however, a valuable means of effect, apart from the opportunity it affords for marking the junctions by finished edges. The Renaissance palaces are almost always built in three stories—basement, middle, and attic. The middle story is devoted to the chief apartments, and is the part upon which all the splendour of the classic "orders" is lavished. The basement is carefully expressed as such, and is made to appear, as well as to be a ground and preparation for the principal portion of the edifice. Strength and comparative absence of finish are its proper expressions ; and these are legitimately obtained, the first by deeply chamfered masonry, the last, by the natural roughness of its surface.

The legitimate ends of rustication being these and these only, it is obvious that rustication can be properly employed only upon large and thick walls, or on solid masses of masonry. But the Renaissance architects, in imitation of their masters, the Romans, though they often employed rustication with admirable effect in the right places, often also lavished it in situations which converted it into unmitigated absurdity. Columns, the beauty of which, as all must feel, and as we proved in our former Article, depends almost entirely upon the uninterrupted perfection of the

outline of the shaft, were often rusticated by the Renaissance builders. Sometimes the frustra of the shaft are alternately cubical and cylindrical; sometimes they are roughed as if they had been wrought by the blows of cannon balls instead of chisels; and sometimes both kinds of enormity are perpetrated in the same shaft. The shafts of the gate of Burlington House in Piccadilly, have sheep-skins hung upon their recreant limbs; and the kind of excuse which the Renaissance architects and their followers have thought sufficient for this sort of thing, will appear from these words of Mr. Joseph Gwilt, who is a great admirer of "the orders," and of the "good old times" of Wren and Jones, in opposition to the mediæval innovations of our own days.—"Rustics and rock-work on columns are rarely justifiable, *except for the purpose of some particular picturesque effect, which demands their prominence in the scene, or street view*, as in the gateway at Burlington House in Piccadilly—a splendid monument of the great talent of Lord Burlington." Now, notwithstanding all Mr. Gwilt's learning, and his expressed scorn of the opinions of reviewers upon architecture, we venture to suggest that the same principle which he alleges in defence of the Burlington sheep-skins, would justify a lady, if she was fond of attracting attention, and could not do so otherwise, in standing upon her head in a ball-room. We fully allow, and it is our present purpose to attribute to this manner of architecture, the merit of evolving good out of evil; but far be it from us to say, that the architects of this school are therefore justified in doing the evil. A lie is a lie, though it be the cause of great immediate convenience or pleasure; a ballet-girl is a ballet-girl, though a whole opera-house of highly proper people receive delight from that which is at once her grace and disgrace; and the Renaissance architecture, in many of its details and principles, is a shameful perversion of the truth of art, none the less because we can enjoy its unity and beauty of combination, *so long as we can continue to forget its fundamental falsehood*. And let us remind those who would advocate the continuance of this style for civil architecture, that it will become every day more and more impossible that this condition of the enjoyment of Renaissance architecture should be rightly fulfilled by the people. So long as pure Greek architecture was to be found only in Greece, and in Stuart and Revett, the requisite ignorance of architectural truth might continue to flourish among the people. But now that, in their daily avocations, they pass before such buildings as Inwood's exquisite restoration of the Erechtheum in Euston Square, the New British Museum, and the Post-Office; and that every tenth doorway of the new private houses about London exhibits, however ill-placed, the purest Greek forms, it must inevitably come to

pass that a feeling will be slowly formed which will be revolted by the degenerated types of those forms everywhere abounding in the style in question ; and that such buildings as the New Club House in St. James's Square, will have all their general effects of unity and harmony swamped, in a consciousness of the want of truth in detail. It seems to us to be quite an unaccountable thing, that an architect capable of the merits of the building just mentioned, and instructed in the pure styles, should also be capable of tolerating its faults, which, however, are not his, but those of the Renaissance manner. Let us consider the falsehoods merely of rustication and rock-work which are apparent in this building, and for any one of which, no doubt, the architect can allege unquestionable authority. In the first place, the low podium or basement, which rises from the pavement, is rock worked in two distinct bands, one above the other ; the bands are separated by a smooth surface, having no object besides their separation ; the reason of that separation itself is a totally unmeaning difference in the kind of rock-work in the two bands, one being worm-eaten much deeper than the other. The little balustrades which surmount this podium are again worm-eaten with elaborate art, and in each case the worm-eaten surfaces are sunk below their frame-work of the smoothed stone, instead of rising from it, as they must have done, had they been produced by any conceivable natural process. Again, the pairs of shafts between the windows are, as shafts, literally overwhelmed and lost, at the first glance, by the alternate projections and recessions of their mass. Their frustra, however, are *all* cylindrical, which is a step beyond the barbarism of shafts, formed by alternate cylinders and cubes ; for in these we are at liberty to fancy that the mason had not time to cut out the pure shaft, so left every other block untouched, to be wrought into form some other time ; but there is no such safety-valve for the imagination in the shafts in question, the thick frustra being as highly finished as the thin ones—indeed, more so, for their angles are rounded with extreme delicacy. Furthermore, the alternate frustra, without any visible excuse, are of different *depths* as well as thickness, and all the lines produced by the rustication are continued from the attached shafts into the wall-surface, so that the distinction and contrast which ought always to be carefully maintained, and, as far as possible, heightened, between column and wall, is almost abolished ; and the diverse thickness of masonry, as marked by the rustication, being not diverse enough to be distinguished at once, the whole basement story wears an appearance of uncertainty and elaborate waste of labour most painful to an eye accustomed to the perfect and immediate intelligibility of Greek forms. Finally, the vertical slips of masonry between the win-

dows of the basement story are capped with the delicate Greek antæ-mouldings, (see our former analysis of Greek architecture,) the original significance of which is quite abolished by the deep rustications below them, and by the destruction by rustication of the columnar character in the neighbouring shafts, with the moulded capitals of which, in Greek architecture, the antæ-cappings are exquisitely calculated to contrast. Now, we doubt not that the architect had very good reasons for every one of all these, and many other unvaricities which we could point out in this building: all we maintain is, that very much better reasons may be alleged against them; and that very much better reasons are alleged against them in the simple presence, on the other side of Pall Mall, of the Reform Club, a building, as it seems to us, of extraordinary beauty and nobility; indeed, in the whole range of Renaissance art we know of no façade so void of offence against architectural truth—not even that of the Pandolfini Palace at Florence, in which the pediments of the windows, according to the most prevalent Renaissance practice, are alternately round and angular, without any excuse in the world but the love of variety. Now variety ought never to be, or at least seem to be, a primary object of even the slightest detail. The variety of the Renaissance compared to that of the Greek architecture, is like the variety of nonsense verses beside that of the verses of “Comus” or the “Princess.” In the Reform Club Renaissance forms are subdued to an almost Greek degree of purity, so that it can scarcely be said to belong to the Renaissance school at all—for the faults of this style of art may be almost said to constitute its principles.

The Renaissance architects generally made a great display of construction in the heads of apertures. The key-stone, in particular, was emphasized in various ways. Mr. Ruskin, whose profound hatred of the falsehoods of the style has not allowed him to give the praise which we think is due to some of its characteristics, objects that in an arch “one voussoir is as much a key-stone as another;” whence it would follow that the central stone has no claim to be more strongly expressed than the other stones. This, however, is not the case; and our old associations concerning, and figures of speech deduced from, the key-stone are perfectly correct. In a semicircular arch, for example, if constructed of many stones, the first two or three, or more, on each side will stand of themselves, as we may sometimes see in ruined archways; there is less of this simple support in every succeeding stone towards the centre, where the key-stone is suspended over clear vacuity by its own weight, which prevents it from being pushed out of its place upwards by the tendency of the stones on either side to fall in. It is evident, there-

fore, that not only is the central voussoir constructively distinguished from all the rest, but that each pair of the other voussoirs differs from every other pair in the degree to which the key-stone character is shared by it, the pair next to the key-stone exercising more resistance, and also demanding more support, than the next pair, and so on. Some of the most beautiful effects of the Renaissance architecture are obtained by simply expressing this principle. A common method of doing so, where the aperture-head consisted of only a few blocks, was to increase the dimensions of the block in all directions as it approached the key-stone, which was broader, deeper, and more projecting than any of the other stones.* The fondness of the Roman and Renaissance builders for the forcible expression of the masonry of the heads of apertures led them into several abuses. No doubt the decoration of the key-stones, with carved heads and other devices, was intended to heighten their architectural significance; but, if we mistake not, such decorations have quite an opposite effect. A difference in kind seldom serves with good effect for the expression of a difference in degree. Another abuse, which arose from the fondness for exhibited masonry, was the formation of the heads of apertures in arches, or, if horizontal, in several blocks put together upon the principle of the arch, when the aperture might have been covered by a single horizontal lintel. This practice is particularly unjustifiable when, as in the basement of Palladio's Palazzo Thiene at Vicenza, there are stones to be seen in the wall which would have done very well in the place of the expensive and elaborate composed lintels that at present crown the apertures. This same basement exhibits a further abuse of the principle in question; the line of horizontal voussoirs, of which we have been speaking, is obviously fitted for discharging superincumbent weight, but this operation is performed by an equally strongly expressed arch, which surmounts and renders meaningless the horizontal member. It is obvious that the first condition of beauty in displayed construction is, that the construction be useful. A very gross form of this species of abuse is the juxtaposition and confusion of the lintel and the voussoir system in one and the same horizontal aperture head; as in the principal windows of the before-mentioned Palazzo Thiene, and in the basement windows of L. da Sigoli's Renuccini Palace at Florence. Another temptation into which the Renaissance architects fell, through their desire to make the

* At the east side of the quadrangle of Somerset House there is a curious and pleasing accidental increase of conspicuity given to the key-stones by the lightness of their colour, produced by their greater exposure to the weather on account of their projection.

most of this means of effect, was that of introducing arches where arches were not required. When the arch is not the prevailing form of the heads of apertures, its admission is excusable only when the aperture is too broad for a straight lintel; but in Renaissance buildings we often find some of the apertures in a façade arched, and others of the same width horizontal, there being no better excuse for the difference than the already denounced itching for an inexpressive variety. It may further be laid down as a rule, that in a style of architecture derived from the Greek, of which the artistic life was based upon little more than a decorative ostentation of the horizontal construction, arches are always bad unless they bear their apology upon their faces, that is to say, unless they cover apertures which it would be difficult to cover horizontally. Small arches in a Renaissance edifice built of large stones are inexcusable. The pointed arch, in Gothic architecture, depends for its justification upon another principle than that of constructive utility, and it may be as small as the architect chooses without loss of significance. This is true also of the semicircular arch in Lombard architecture, partly by reason of the greater boldness with which the Lombard architects claimed it as a decorative feature, partly on account of the absence, in this style, of the principle of exhibited masonry, and the consequent non-expression of the constructive utility of the arch.

The Renaissance architects frequently and legitimately employed the principle of rustication to express additional strength in the quoins of their edifices. The Pandolfini Palace affords a beautiful example of this application of the principle; but in other instances we find it applied in a trifling and extravagant manner. The dados, for example, of the pedestals to some of Palladio's columns are bound at the corners with massive, deeply rusticated, and rock-worked blocks. For a very absurd instance of this kind of abuse, though in a different style of architecture, we refer our readers to the new Law Buildings in Lincoln's Inn Fields, where the ashlar work, which strengthens the tower, is carried up, for the sake of uniformity, into the shallow battlements that surmount it.* We have already observed, that perfect simplicity and intelligibility are essential conditions of good rustication. When the face of a block has more than four sides to it, there is danger of the construction becoming obscure; but what shall we say to the faces of the stones between the window

* We would not be understood to find fault with this mass of building upon the whole. On the contrary, we think it one of the most promising efforts of modern architecture. It is a real ornament to London, and one which will never have its attractiveness much impaired by the spread of architectural knowledge among the people.

heads of the Palazzo Gondi at Florence, each of which has fourteen sides! The basement rustication of this palace is, however, very fine: a very remarkable expression is obtained in it by variations in the thickness of the courses of stone, according to their position, but our space will not allow us to enter upon its analysis.

In estimating the propriety of the Renaissance basement-rustication, and in transferring the system to modern edifices, builders have too often forgotten that the edifices of the Renaissance which were most boldly rusticated, were justified in their expression of vast power in the wall, by the necessity of serving the double purpose of residence and fortress. The rustication of the Pitti and Strozzi Palaces in Florence would be absurd in a modern dwelling-house. The architect of Newgate Prison was quite right, however, in boldly rusticating his wall, and in yet further emphasizing its power by shewing that it could further afford to have niches excavated in its thickness. Deep rustication is not rightly admissible into any but the basement story, unless the building is intended for a fortress. Slight rustication, particularly that in which only the *horizontal* junctions of the stones are visible, is, however, extremely valuable in the principal story when columns occur in it. For a full account of the principle upon which rustication acts in this position, we must refer our readers to our former analysis of the Greek Temple architecture.

We might fill the rest of our space with other rules and interesting instances of good and bad rustication; but valuable and new as the investigation would be, we must say no more about it here. We have said enough to make hundreds of wall surfaces interesting to the general reader, which were never interesting to him before; and if any student wishes to pursue the subject further, he cannot do better than study it from the very full and satisfactory series of engravings which have appeared from the edifices and designs of Palladio,—the purest, by the way, of all the Renaissance architects; for though he abandons the essentially constructive, with its characteristic ornamentation, and is well satisfied if his decorations have a faint reminiscence of constructive meaning, yet there is not much utter nonsense—like triglyphs supporting balconies—in his works. There is a great deal of expression in his edifices, which, with regard to the constructive element, is inadequate or extravagant; but this inadequacy and extravagance are commonly sacrifices of one kind of excellence to another. The excellence sacrificed, is, we repeat, the excellence of *truth*; and it seems to us that in art as in morals such evil ought not to be done, however great an amount of good may appear to result from it.

All that we have said of the "orders" as employed and spoiled by the Romans is true of them as they appear in Renaissance buildings. A few timid alterations were ventured upon; and most of the great architects had "orders" called after their names, the main distinction of these from any other orders being, as far as we can understand, no more than an entirely arbitrary regulation of the proportions of member to member, the members themselves being, for the most part, equally arbitrarily chosen and unnecessary. "Vignola's Tuscan," for example, is a bald Doric, totally without any distinctive character, save that of baldness. The omission of triglyphs makes the separation of architrave and frieze unmeaning; the astragal, on the neck of the shafts, if it suggests anything, suggests weakness; the fillet above the abacus, and the filletless ovolo that crowns the cornice, are sheer nonsense, the fillet being a separating member where there is no separation operated, the ovolo* being a supporting member when there is nothing to support. The rigid and fixed proportional systems, of which the Greeks knew nothing, were, as we have said, arbitrary, and not founded upon the only right basis, namely, the expression of the due proportion of power of support to power of gravitation.

Some of the best features of Renaissance architecture are its cornices. The Reform Club is a fine imitation of one of the finest examples. A conspicuous cornice like this is particularly necessary where the "orders" are not used in the façade, and where consequently the wall may be allowed to express a capacity for supporting great weight, as well as for enclosing. Seen from the east corner of St. James's Square, the effect of the noble sweep of the wall, the ridged and massy roof, and the powerful cornice which operates their junction, is one of the finest architectural sights in London.

The windows of the Renaissance style have commonly had the architect's best skill devoted to them; and in many cases, with fine effect. Their peculiar decoration generally had the good effect of either denying or diverting the mind from the idea that the wall was weakened by them. The Greeks, in the few examples of their fenestration which remain to us, contented themselves with an extremely simple and satisfactory arrangement, consisting merely in the inclination towards one another of the single stones which constituted the sides, and which, together with the lintel that projected a little way beyond them,

* In Greek architecture the ovolo always bears a thin slab—sometimes erroneously called a fillet, the weight of which, as indicated by the strong supporting curve of the ovolo, is transferred by the mind to every equal thickness of stone in the whole entablature beneath.

were inclosed by a slight raised moulding. This amounted simply to a distinct exhibition of the fact of secure construction. But the simplicity and chastity of this arrangement would have been quite overwhelmed by the "striking effects" of which the Renaissance builders were so fond. It is accordingly most usually banished to the windows of the attic story; while those of the principal floor adopt means which, in addition to the expression of security, confer upon them the due "prominence in the scene or street view." The chief of these means is a massive projecting pediment, round or angular. This is a principal feature in most Renaissance façades, and certainly expresses the power of the wall to bear the aperture without danger, by conferring an otherwise unnecessary load, just where the weakening tendency if it existed would come first into operation. The only conceivable use of these great projecting members, when the apertures are glazed, is to afford a little shadow when the sun is at certain altitudes. No doubt, they were originally constructed for the defence of unglazed apertures from the elements; but the Renaissance architects had far too profound a reverence for their ancient masters to allow of their asking impertinent questions as to the origin and uses of things. Michael Angelo, in one of his designs, incloses the triangular in the circular window pediment, and innumerable instances might be cited to prove that, with most of the Renaissance architects, these and all other kinds of window decorations, had for their primary intention some effect or other which ought to have been only a secondary object.

As we shall have to speak of certain other details and principles of Renaissance architecture when we come to describe the more modern art, we must now close our notice of this subject. In doing so we cannot help remarking on the peculiar irritability which architects, and architects of this school particularly, evince towards unprofessional criticism. This is because architecture, far more remarkably than any other fine art, is a combination of two elements, one of which is properly artistical, and the other mechanical. These, by writers on Renaissance architecture, have almost always been more or less confused; or, what is worse, separated, instead of having been carefully discriminated and combined. Non-professional criticism has commonly neglected the constructive; professional criticism the artistic element. The amateur is apt to affirm, therefore, that modern architects are mere builders without the modesty of handicraftsmen; and the professor, in reply, protests that his critics are mere ignoramuses, and wonders at their insolence in pretending to judge of a façade, as much as the new married lady is reported by Charles Lamb to have marvelled at his assuming to know aught of the propagation of oysters. There is reason on both

sides ; but we hope that we are not biassed by party-spirit in siding chiefly with the amateurs. Of the two kinds of mistake, the most fatal, though not the most foolish, is that which is made by the architects. Knowing what great and numerous difficulties have to be overcome, and being, for the most part, without the genius to add to the builder's art of overcoming constructive difficulties, the architect's art—not of hiding those difficulties, but—of making an advantage and boast of them, by making them the root and meaning of new and unique architectural character, the professor angrily rejects all non-professional criticism, not only of matters of internal distribution, of which, of course, he is generally the best judge, but also of architectural effects, of which we humbly opine that every one with natural good taste and a moderate amount of instruction, is likely to be as competent a judge as himself. He would have uninitiated people, however, to believe that it is a prodigious instance of presumption in them to pretend to know whether the façade, which foists itself daily upon their sight, and whose prosperity, if prosperity it have, must be in the eye of the daily spectator, is good for anything or not : and the uninitiated, in fact, have been so long accustomed to hear works, from which they receive no pleasure, called architectural, that they have, for the most part, come to discredit their own capacity, and have very naturally contracted a profound indifference towards an art which seems to be without a message to themselves,—which, instead of fulfilling its right errand, as incomparably the most popular of the fine arts, has come to be considered by its professors as being scarcely less esoteric in its artistic than in its constructive departments. The present indifference of the people about architecture is, in itself, an excellent negative symptom of their capacity for enjoying it ; and they would probably be not slow to exhibit this capacity positively, should there arise amongst us many of the better kind of buildings, having even the qualified merits of some few by which London has been recently adorned.

We are now to speak of the “Italian-Pointed” style to which Mr. Ruskin has succeeded in attracting a wide and deep interest. Mr. Ruskin endeavours to prove that this style, as displayed in the Venetian palaces, especially the Palazzo Ducale, is the culminating point of the art of architecture. And he is perhaps right, as far as regards metropolitan palatial architecture, but, we think, no further.

The church architect cannot serve two principles without miserable failure ; but the house architect may and perhaps ought. The Egyptian principle was a good one for Egypt ; the Greek principle was a good one for Greece ; the Romano-Byzantine or Lombard was a good one too ; the pointed Gothic the

best of all for the architecture of temples: but none of these are good to build houses by, for the simple reason that they are excellent for temples. In Venetian architecture we have the Lombard principle, which is to make everything of the wall, and the Pointed principle which *tends* to make nothing of it, beautifully combined and reconciled; and a very decided mixture of the fantastical Arabian notion of throwing gravity and the law of gravitation overboard together, confers upon this style a light-hearted and smiling air, which is most delightful in its place and way, but which would be quite wrong in a church.

In describing this style, we must warn our readers and the readers of the *Stones of Venice*, not to suppose that it is peculiar to Venice. Venice contains perhaps the best examples; but the Palazzo Publico at Piacenza; La Mercanzia at Bologna; the Palazzo Publico at Sienna, and several other Italian town-halls and palaces; and also certain almost unknown *Spanish* buildings, as the palace Monterey, Salamanca, and that of the Dukes Del Infantado, Guadalajara, display the same or many of the same general characteristics. In Spain, the Gothic was even more affected by the Arab spirit than in Venice; and many valuable hints towards the new secular Gothic which is likely to spring up in England might be gathered from the Spanish specimens of this admixture. The south of France also affords examples of house Gothic, which, though inferior in splendour to those of Italy and Spain, are much more beautiful than anything ever produced by England in the same style. England may justly boast of the most exquisite cathedral, monastic, and parish church interiors in the world; but in exteriors, and in all departments of secular Gothic, we have been far surpassed abroad; and the sooner our extremely "national" writers upon the subject can be prevailed upon to admit this fact, the sooner are we likely to be able to boast of a good style of our own. We proceed to describe the Italian palatial Gothic, with double reference, first, to its vast inferiority to northern Gothic, as an ecclesiastical style; and, secondly, to its perfect adaptation for modern use in civil edifices.

The first characteristic of an edifice in this style is its grand and simple façade—a feature quite contrary to the northern manner of secular Gothic, which in this one particular seems, upon the whole, to be preferable to the Italian for ordinary purposes. In the northern house Gothic the exterior is the simple and most pleasing expression of internal convenience and comfort; mass is attached to mass, with total neglect of uniformity, but with a very real effect of unity. For country mansions this is not only the best style, but the only good style that ever existed. But in streets, where space is valuable, and especially in

public buildings, as exchanges, museums, banks, clubs, in which a few large apartments only are necessary, and a certain ostentation commendable, the Venetian Gothic is unequalled; and we hope that before long, it will have wholly superseded the quasi-classical and totally anti-national Renaissance in our great towns. Renaissance forms, should they be employed by us to the end of time, will always be felt to be repulsively foreign; whereas the façade of the ducal palace or the Palazzo Foscari, if transferred unaltered from Venice to Pall Mall, would be at once accepted by us as native to our feelings, educated as we have been to regard every moulding, cusp, arch, and leafy capital as almost a part of our ancient worship. This transference might, moreover, be made without the least alteration in the system of internal distribution at present adopted in such buildings as the Reform and Athenæum Clubs.

A very common feature of the Italian palatial Gothic is an open arcade in the place, or in advance of the apartments on the ground-floor. This, which is one of the most striking characteristics of the style, is that also which qualifies it beyond all other styles for a shop-architecture. An open basement and closed upper stories are conditions which no architecture besides the Italian Gothic and the Arabian was ever gracefully fulfilled: now these are the primary conditions of a good shop architecture. How far our present shop architecture, consisting generally of a load of Renaissance masonry superimposed—not on a powerfully expressed basement of rusticated blocks, but—on two or three square sheets of invisible plate-glass, fulfils these conditions, must be tolerably manifest to any who have thought one moment about the matter. In “New Oxford Street” five or six costly experiments in shop architecture have been tried; all of them utter failures in fundamental constructive good sense except one, in which the open arcade has been adopted, and this one, though thus far right, is hideously ugly, because there is no expressed relation whatever between the form and strength of the arcade and the forms and weights of the mass which it supports. The principal façade of the Doge’s palace might have been substituted with splendid effect, almost without alteration, and with far less expense, in the place of this or any of the other four or five rows of houses in question.

The basement arcade, however, is not an *essential* feature, and therefore this style of architecture is just as well fitted for rows of private houses as for rows of shops. It admits of uniformity or of infinite variety in the decoration of apertures. A whole street may have every window alike, or every window in the same house may be *unique* in its ornamentation, as in the exquisite Palazzo Pubblico at Piacenza.

The ecclesiastical character, which is indelibly impressed upon the genuine forms of northern Gothic, and which would both spoil, and be spoilt by adoption in, house or shop architecture, is quite absent in Italian Gothic. The solemnity of the pointed arch and the severe uniformity of style which is demanded by the prevalence of the semicircular arch, are both abolished by the constant admixture of the two—a favourite and most beautiful feature of the style being a pointed arcade surmounted by semicircular headed windows, as in the edifice just alluded to at Piacenza. The effect of aspiration in the northern sacred Gothic was disliked by the Italians, and, in adopting northern Gothic forms, they abolished it as far as they could. By doing so they destroyed the style for church architecture, and, as we have said, obtained from it one of the best styles in the world for civil purposes. In northern church Gothic the feeling of aspiration begins at the foundation, and is equally strong in all parts of the edifice up to the highest finial. In Italian house Gothic it is allowed to have some way at the base, but is checked or exhausted at the first or second story. A circular arcade above a pointed one checks this effect without rudeness; but the most subtle method is that which is adopted in the façade of the Doge's palace, in which the heads of the pointed arches in the second story are made to exhaust their upward power by continuing the arch mouldings beyond the apex of the arch, and permitting them to flow into foliated circles, which fill up square compartments. Above these rises a vast surface of plain wall, pierced with a few very large pointed windows, surmounted by a light fringe of Gothic battlements and pinnacles, and simply decorated with diagonal and intersecting courses of coloured marble. These features, without continuing much of the power of the Gothic basement, have the effect of harmonizing the wall with it. The windows, by their great size and absence of decoration fitted to express resistance to pressure, assume lightness in the wall. The crossing lines of coloured marble second this effect by diverting the mind from the vertical direction of the weight of the wall; and the fringe of pinnacles and pierced battlements confirms the lightness of the wall, and at the same time saves it from a suspicion of frailness, (which the breadth of the windows might otherwise have brought upon it,) by making that lightness a *living* lightness—a lightness of aspiration, not of gravitation. It is impossible to conceive a style better fitted than this to the purposes of northern shop architecture. The basement, without any sacrifice of constructive propriety, offers the largest possible spaces with the smallest possible supporting masses. The wall might be executed in common bricks, variegated with bricks glazed or coloured; the windows, by their

size, are excellently suited for a northern climate; and the brilliant upper termination of the wall, being the principal decoration of the building, and having the advantage of a position far removed from the causes which could distract the attention from the beauties of the basement, might be executed, according to the fancy or the funds of the proprietor, with almost any amount of labour and expense. The poorest man would find this style the cheapest of all decorated styles, and the richest might lavish his money upon it without limit, and with a thousand times the effect which he obtains by wasting it upon plaster, columns, pediments, entablatures, friezes, and the rest of the Renaissance frippery.

But all the characteristics which tend to qualify the Italian-pointed style for civil purposes, almost in the same proportion tend to disqualify it for churches. Mr. Gally Knight writes,—“In Italy, if the vertical principle was adopted, the horizontal was not discarded, and the latter was a constant check on the tendencies of the former. The Italian architects, obeying their employers, but obeying with reluctance, never acquainted themselves with the rules, the proportions and arrangements, through which the northern architects produced successful results. They worked at random, and, consequently, made mistakes. They consented to imitate, but they sought no more, and neither caught the spirit of the original, nor struck out new paths of their own.” This appears to us to be an injustice to Italian-pointed architecture in general. Its deviation from the northern style is too wide to have arisen from ignorance. In almost all examples there is a manifest attempt to reconcile conflicting principles,—an attempt which could not have been made without acquaintance with those principles; and, in some few cases, pre-eminently in Giotto’s celebrated Campanile at Florence, those principles are reconciled with the profoundest art. These last cases, though extremely few, alone can claim to be considered as examples of true Italian-pointed. An enumeration and analysis of the means by which the different principles are reconciled in these examples, would leave us no room to remark upon a style of incomparably more importance to us than the Italian-pointed ecclesiastical, namely, our own late “Tudor” style, which is another species of secularized Gothic.

Of this style there are various shades; we shall remark only upon the most striking general characteristics. It is an essentially Northern, and even an essentially English style; it is so admirably and unconsciously expressive of our national feelings of independence and love of *comfort*, that it can never be out of date. The principal façade is the consideration to which, in all other styles, the various members of an edifice are subordinated; but

the comfortable hearth seems to be the centre about which all the parts of the Tudor palace, or the Elizabethan mansion, are gathered, and from which they derive their cheerful life. Mr. Joseph Gwilt writes,—“The Elizabethan, or as some have perhaps more properly called it, the last Tudor style, is an imperfectly understood adaptation of classic forms to the habits of its day in this country. It is full of redundant and unmeaning ornament, creating a restless feeling in the mind of the spectator, which, in the cinque-cento work, the Renaissance of Italy, was in some degree atoned for by excellence of design, by exquisite execution of the subject, and by a refinement in the forms, which some of the first artists the world ever saw gave to its productions. In Italy the orders almost instantaneously rose in their proper proportions, soon leaving nothing to be desired; but in England they were for a long time engrafted upon Gothic plans and forms, producing nothing but heterogeneous masses of absurdity.” Such we believe to be a common *opinion*, it cannot be a common *feeling*, concerning our Elizabethan style; but a minute’s consideration will shew the erroneous nature of the comparison between it and the Italian cinque-cento. The form and arrangement of the general mass of an edifice are the fundamental causes of its peculiar character. Egyptian, Greek, Gothic, Lombard, and Italian palatial, whether Gothic or Renaissance, are each of them immediately and mainly to be distinguished from the other styles by the character of the masses; and it may be safely said, that the difference in this regard, between the late Tudor and the Italian Renaissance styles, is wider than between any other two styles whatsoever. Happily “the orders” have a very poor development indeed in Elizabethan buildings. They are of the essence of the Italian Renaissance, but are merely superficial decorations of the Elizabethan architecture. The character next in importance to the subordinations of mass to convenience, in the Tudor of Henry VIII.’s time and the Elizabethan Gothic, is, perhaps, that of fenestration. But this is a character which the house Gothic of England shares with that of other countries, France especially. The broad window, divided vertically into equal compartments by mullions, and horizontally into unequal portions by transoms, and surmounted by a dripstone, which admits of the most beautiful lines and mouldings, is the only window that ought ever to be seen in a northern house. It is unsurpassable in the expression as well as in the reality of convenience and safe construction; and upon the display of these qualities the beauties of private house architecture must always mainly depend. A most picturesque feature, common in house architecture of this period, is the successive projection of story over

story. This feature gave endless scope for architectural display, in the brackets and mouldings which were required for security; but it is one which the present universal employment of brick and stone, with no *visible* aid from wood, has rendered obsolete. It is true that an ordinary brick-house, if built in this manner, would have its walls defended from the rain, and would not be turned into a refrigerator by every shower; but the same end might be, and in some parts of the country is, infinitely better answered by glazing the bricks, and so preventing absorption. Even in places where wood is still the chief material of house architecture, this is not a manner of construction that could reasonably be adopted, since modern science has given us much less expensive and inconvenient means of defending timber against the effects of moisture. The loss of this source of architectural effect is, however, the less to be regretted, as a similar effect is obtainable by the projecting oriel window, a feature of extreme beauty, and one that is susceptible of great variety of treatment.

We believe that it may be laid down as a rule in civil architecture that all the characteristic effects of temple architecture may and ought to be reproduced in it, *but with less intensity*. This diminution of intensity, or secularization of the effects of temple architecture, is obtainable either by mixing those effects with others of inferior significance, or by giving a preponderance to those elements of effect which, though occurring in, are least characteristic of, the temple architecture. The last method is obviously the best; and, though it has rarely been employed without the former, it would have been better if it had been so. The phase of "Tudor" architecture which immediately preceded the introduction of the cinque-cento decorations in England, exemplifies what may be termed the *pure* secularization of Gothic; the proper "Elizabethan" being a product of this combination of both methods. For the revivals of our ancient house architecture which have recently been attempted, the phase commonly chosen has been that in which the decorations are borrowed from the most degraded Renaissance; but surely Gothic masses with Gothic decorations are better than Gothic masses with classic decorations. It is true that the pure Tudor style has a degree of gravity which some persons might deem unpleasant in common house architecture; but, if this be a fault, it is overcome in the cinque-cento Gothic only by the far worse fault of senseless flippancy.

The Tudor, like the Italian palatial Gothic architecture, has the great advantage of admitting of innumerable different degrees of enrichment, without altering its essential character; and, though capable of a dignity far surpassing that which is to

be obtained from the most splendid efforts of pure or mixed "classical" architecture, it is suited also for the humblest purposes. We hope for the day, however, when, by a combination of the merits of Italian Gothic decoration with those of Tudor masses, we shall be able to boast of a domestic architecture surpassing any that has yet existed. On some future occasion we may perhaps enter more fully than we have now been able to do on the detailed analysis of Tudor and Italian Gothic.

Civil architecture, public and domestic, in our own day is guided by no general laws whatever. The impartiality with which we adopt every style alike indicates nothing but a profound indifference to all styles. Mr. Ruskin most justly writes :

"The great evil of all recent architectural effort has not been that men liked wrong things, but that they either cared nothing about any, or pretended to like what they did not. Do you suppose that any modern architect likes what he builds and enjoys it? Not in the least. He builds it because he has been told that such and such things are fine, and that he should like them. He pretends to like them, and gives them a false relish of vanity. Do you seriously imagine, reader, that any living soul in London likes triglyphs, and gets any hearty enjoyment out of pediments? You are much mistaken. Greeks did; English people never did—never will. Do you fancy that the architect of Old Burlington Mews, in Regent Street, had any particular satisfaction in putting a blank triangle over the archway instead of a useful garret window? By no manner of means. He had been told it was right to do so, and thought he should be admired for doing it. Very few faults of architecture are mistakes of honest choice; they are almost always hypocrisies. So, then, the first thing we have to ask of the decoration is that it should indicate strong liking, and that honestly. It matters not so much what the thing is, as that the builder should really love and enjoy it, and say so plainly. The architect of Bourges Cathedral liked hawthorns, so he has covered his porch with hawthorn, a perfect Niobe of May. Never was such hawthorn; you would try to gather it forthwith, but for fear of being pricked. The old Lombard architects liked hunting, so they covered their works with horses and hounds, and men blowing trumpets two yards long. The base Renaissance architects of Venice liked masquing and fiddling, so they covered their works with comic masks and musical instruments. Even that was better than our English way of liking nothing, and professing to like triglyphs."

The profound oblivion of the *grounds* of architectural merit, as implied in the above complaint, is impressively set forth in the following observation of Mr. Ruskin, in connexion with a review of his former work, "*The Seven Lamps*."

"The writer noticed my constant praise of St. Mark's. 'Mr. Ruskin thinks it a very beautiful building; we,' said the architect, 'think

it a very ugly building.' I was not surprised at the difference of opinion, but at the thing being considered so completely a subject of opinion. My opponents in matters of painting always assume that there *is* such a thing as a law of right, and that I do not understand it; but my architectural adversaries appeal to no law—they simply set their opinion against mine; and, indeed, there is no law at present, to which either they or I can appeal. No man can speak with rational decision of the merits or demerits of buildings; he may with obstinacy; he may with resolved adherence to previous prejudices, but never as if the matter could be otherwise decided than by majority of votes, or pertinacity of partisanship. I had always, however, a clear conviction that there *was* a law in this matter; that good architecture might be indisputably discerned and divided from the bad; that the opposition in their very nature and essence was clearly visible; and that we were all of us first as unwise, in disputing about the matter, without reference to principle, as we should be for debating about the genuineness of a coin without ringing it. I felt also assured that this law must be universal if it were conclusive; that it must enable us to reject all foolish and base work, and to accept all noble and wise work, without reference to style or national feeling; that it must sanction the design of all truly great nations and times, Gothic, Greek, or Arab; that it cast off and reprobate the design of all foolish nations and times, Chinese or Mexican, or modern European; and that it must be easily applicable to all possible architectural inventions of human mind. I set myself, therefore, to establish such a law, in full belief that men were intended, without excessive difficulty, and by use of their general common sense, to know good things from bad; and that it is only because they will not be at the pains required for the discernment, that the world is so widely encumbered with forgeries and baseness. I found the work simpler than I had hoped; the reasonable things ranged themselves in the order that I required, the foolish things fell aside, and took themselves away so soon as they were looked in the face."

The great good which is likely to be done by Mr. Ruskin's fulfilment of the task he thus proposed to himself, may be estimated by the storm of anger with which his work has been received by architects. There are several points in the "Stones of Venice" which we hold to be extremely debatable; but these are trifles when compared with the quantity of vigorous criticism that constitutes the bulk of the book. How far Mr. Ruskin's works may aid in producing a living architecture we cannot tell; but we believe it to be pretty certain, that the "deadly lively" architecture which at present prevails, cannot long exist in the face of such truths as have now been uttered, with a voice that *will* make itself heard, however unpleasant it may be to some of the hearers. It will be an immense advance, or rather retrogression, towards the right, if Mr. Ruskin should do no more than make our house builders and house buyers heartily ashamed.

of the cheap splendour of false materials. Let us get back to the common brick walls—with stone dressings for the better sort of houses—of a hundred years ago, and we may then be in the way to something better. We shall have, at least, a footing in the truth, and may then take steps towards beauty.

The errors of modern house architecture are so numerous that we cannot pretend to enumerate even the chief of them; and close pressed as we are for space, we must content ourselves with referring the reader to Mr. Ruskin's bold and admirable attacks upon our entire modern system, and with stringing together a few of our own remarks, general and special, just as they come to mind—for any systematic arrangement would carry us far beyond our limits.

There is a common notion abroad that brick is a mean material, and only fit for poor men's cottages and cow-sheds. Now this is a great mistake. Brick is a very fine material, as good to look at, and better for enduring, than most kinds of stone; and some of the finest palaces in the world have been built of it. It is, in fact, an artificial stone, having nearly all the advantages of natural stone, and many other advantages which natural stone wants. It is capable of receiving inherent, that is, properly architectural, colour, for no colour is properly architectural which is liable to be washed or rubbed away; and being made in moulds, which may as well be of one shape as another, it is fitted to become the vehicle of a system of decoration far more elaborate than can be applied to stone, under any circumstances, but those of extraordinary magnificence and expense. This decoration is also capable of being made highly characteristic: not many persons, perhaps, are aware that the characteristic Norman decorations, which we admire so much in some of our cathedrals, and which we are now reproducing in many of our churches, with great expense and success, are properly brick decorations. Hear Mr. Hope:—"The natives of Lombardy became early celebrated as masons; early, therefore, they began in those parts of brick buildings, which like arches, imposts, friezes, cornices, and string-courses, at once admitted and required somewhat more ornament, to shew their ingenuity, by laying the materials in such a way that their sides and angles should offer various combinations, resembling the teeth of a saw, the spine of a fish, the zig-zag of a fish-net, and others of easy execution, and showy in their effect: and these we behold throughout Lombardy, and at Rome, in all the brick *campaniles*, and more especially in that singular assemblage of ancient fragments and brick-work, supposed to have been the habitation of Nicholas, the son of Crescentius and Theodora. This species of work, alike adopted in Constantinople and in Lombardy, became, in the former, the

embryo and life of singular combinations of facettes and angles, with which the Mahomedans afterwards covered, in their buildings, every capital and cornice, bracket and niche ; and in the latter, the parent of the cord and the cable, the zig-zag, or the chevron, the lozenge, the billet, the nebule, the embattled fret, and all other ornaments having no peculiar meaning, introduced in shafts, capitals, arches, and other members of Lombard buildings, which we have since called Saxon ; which have been introduced so early that we see them in all the miniature paintings of the Syriac M.S. of the Evangelists, in the Medico-Laurentian library at Florence, written A.D. 585 ; and which appear in the edifices of the middle ages in greater numbers, as they are more wanted to supply the deficiency of sculpture and significant ornaments."

Again, "Every part of that extensive plain (of Lombardy) offers edifices in the cinque-cento, as well as in the Lombard and German manner, wholly of brick, and in which that humble material is ennobled by the most exquisite and delicate forms." Some of the best churches and public buildings of our own day are of brick, with stone dressings ; it is only in the private houses of England that we seem to be ashamed of this material.

If the builder cannot afford stone finishings to his brick-house, let him by no means make plaster imitations of them. Every one knows stone from plaster at a glance, and every one knows that stone finishings are only used where larger and more coherent masses of material are required than can be supplied by bricks. Now, to put masses of plaster, which are well known to be infinitely *less* fitted than the bricks themselves are to supply the requisite occasional accessions of strength, is a most disgusting absurdity. Plaster is a very useful material when it does not pretend to be stone ; its use in many Renaissance and Elizabethan decorations in secure positions, as in bas-reliefs upon, or along the walls just beneath ceilings, is, we are disposed to think, legitimate ; but it is utterly to be reprehended in every position of exposure to rough usage.

It should be remembered that forms which are right and expressive in one material, may, and most probably will, be unmeaning, and worse than unmeaning, in another. What conceivable sense is there in *rusticated plaster*, of which London contains thousands of acres ? or in the plaster brackets, held up by, instead of supporting, plaster cornices ? As if architects and builders had, more than other men, a propensity for lying merely for lying's sake ; you will find them even ruining a real material by forcing it, against its nature, to assume the forms of a totally different real material. Thus, London is not wanting in examples of expensively built brick-houses, whose builders disdaining the

timid plaster falsehood, which has some pretence of making itself believed to be the stone it imitates, have absolutely rusticated the bare brick, and constructed mock voussoirs in door and window-heads, each voussoir being constituted of several bricks mortared together in the ordinary way! Sometimes we may see brick voussoirs of this kind alternating, in the same door-head, with mock-stone voussoirs of plaster. There are hundreds of new houses in and about London and our great provincial cities, which are unmitigated architectural nonsense as they stand, but which would be changed at once into intelligible, if not agreeable, objects, by the mere realization of the mock material, as an "invisible picture" comes out when held before the fire. There are *hundreds of miles* of two or three story houses in London with the ground story made to look like a rusticated stone basement. Now, a far more architectural proceeding would have been to have set the one or two fragile upper stories upon six or eight stout broom-sticks. In these small houses, the thinnest brick wall is thicker than is need for the support of the story or two above it; but as a certain thickness is required for other purposes than that of support, and as, therefore, the power of support, and the weight supported, must be out of proportion one to the other, a sensible builder, instead of vastly increasing and emphasizing this disproportion, would conceal the fact of it as far as possible. This may be, and in some few cases has been done, by making the face of the upper stories *project* slightly *beyond*, instead of recede from, the face of the basement story.

Let it be remembered that, so far from its being advisable to make bricks look like stone, we ought rather, in our northern climate, and in a country where the poorest man likes to have a house to himself, to make a boast and display of it: since, among many other reasons, a stone material, unless the apertures are arched, requires narrow fenestration, and always produces a decidedly unarchitectural effect in edifices of inconsiderable size. In Scotland, and the North of England, however, the abundance of stone is a reason which outweighs these disadvantages.

Plate-glass is very injurious to the effect of house architecture, as well on account of the great size of the panes commonly used, as by reason of its being, when well-cleaned, quite invisible. The smaller the panes, the rougher the glass, and the more conspicuous the frames in which it is set, the better for the architectural effect. There are few windows so architectural as the old casements, made of little lozenge-shaped panes set on a net-work of metal bars. The absence of any suggestion of resistance to the vertical and lateral wall-pressure which is always suggested to the mind by square-headed apertures, is very painfully felt when,

as is often the case in modern houses, each window-sash contains but one pane.

Comfort, modesty, and permanence ought to be the leading expressions in every *private* house, however noble its inhabitant. The leading expressions of modern house architecture are discomfort, pride, and impermanence. "Much of the naked and solitary appearance of [modern] houses is owing to the practice of totally concealing, nay, sometimes of burying, all the offices under ground, and that by way of giving consequence to the mansion; but though exceptions may arise from particular situations and circumstances, yet, in general, nothing contributes so much to give both variety and consequence to the principal building, as the accompaniment, and, as it were, the attendance of the inferior parts in their different gradations."—(*Price on the Picturesque*.) So far is the house architect from being in danger of having to sacrifice effect to convenience, that a display of convenience is the most valuable element of effect at his command. The most beautiful examples of British and foreign house architecture—not public or palatial—are those in which all care of even the commonest symmetry and order is cast away, and in which the house seems to grow, as we have said, from its root in the hearth, as wildly as the trees that surround it. There are certain weighty reasons for regularity and uniformity of façade in street architecture; but the Englishman's beloved privilege of doing what he likes with his own, outweighs them all, and it would be incomparably better by a studied and otherwise needless and even inconvenient variety in street architecture, to give him free scope for his "individualities"—than to let him violate, as he will, however you may preach, the prudery of symmetrical "rows," "crescents," "quadrants" and "squares,"—painting his domicile long before, or long after his neighbour has painted his, and so sometimes punishing a pedimental façade as Dante punishes the schismatics in hell, namely, by splitting them in half; erecting unique verandahs before his windows; crowning his chimney-pots with fantastical charms against smoke; graining his door with light maple pattern, because his neighbour's is dark mahogany; and indulging in a hundred other equally unsymmetrical declarations of independence—that number being multiplied by ten when we come to shops, instead of private houses.

In matters of decorations generally, modern architects fall into one or other of the extremes of meretriciousness—mistaken for richness; and poverty—mistaken for simplicity. True simplicity arises from distinctness and well pronounced unity among many details, and not from paucity of ornament. Richness is not only compatible with simplicity; it may greatly increase it.

There is no simplicity like that of the Duchess who wears her coronet as if it were a wreath of May.

Nothing can be more absurd than to juxtapose the conscious dignity of Greek forms, with the inevitably humble associations of trade and business. We do not hold with Mr. Ruskin, that shops and railway stations ought to be wholly devoid of architectural charms. We believe, on the contrary, that Christian architecture, that is, pre-eminently the northern pointed, is as remarkable for its adaptation to all degrees as Christianity itself. Apart from the constructive principles of pointed Gothic there is a power in the mere form of the pointed arch which has never yet been satisfactorily accounted for. A mere suggestion of it is enough to change the whole character of a building, as may be seen in several of the early Renaissance Italian palaces, in which the outer line of the voussoirs of semi-circular door and window-heads constitutes the pointed arch.

If we must copy ancient styles—and there is no help for it so long as we have none of our own—let us copy the best styles, and the best phases of those styles. The modern practice of crowning steeples with what are technically called broach-spires, *i.e.*, spires of which the eaves overhang the wall of the steeple, instead of the subsequently invented spire rising considerably within the wall, and surrounded by a gutter with a parapet and pinnacles, is one of many modern practices which are not more sensible than it would be in the mechanical arts to prefer canal boats to railways. The mistakes which have arisen in architecture during the last five-and-twenty years, merely from want of judgment in choosing the right styles, and the right phases of the right styles, are in number and magnitude something quite appalling to think of. During this period, in London alone, we have raised public buildings, probably more numerous, costly, and magnificent, than any entire nation before us has raised in a century. The Houses of Parliament, the British Museum, Buckingham Palace, the Post-office, the Royal Exchange, the new West-End Club-Houses, and churches innumerable, testify to our unprecedented riches and unprecedented want of consideration. The same money, judiciously expended upon the same and other edifices, in the early “Decorated” for ecclesiastical, and the late “Tudor” for civil purposes, might have transformed London from the least architecturally meritorious of all great cities in Europe, to the most so. It is sad to think, that, as such an opportunity has never before occurred, so probably it will never occur again.

There is a certain artistical anachronism involved in the revival of any ancient style of art. There is also a great source of beauty in an original architecture which cannot be renewed in

the revival of such an art : we mean the delightful sense of life arising from the growth of one phase of the style into another. During the career of an original architecture, every considerable building constitutes an advance upon its predecessors, and its achievement of some unprecedented beauty makes criticism dumb to its defects. So far have the ancient builders been from entertaining the modern craving for a critical completeness, that there is scarcely a finished Greek temple, or a Gothic cathedral in existence. This is a curious fact, and one which we do not remember to have seen noticed ; and it is one which remarkably illustrates the eager life of a new art. How incomparably more attractive are unsuccessful efforts after the highest perfection, than successful attempts at mediocrity ! Architecture, in its best times, has always exhibited what, in speaking of a Christian's life, an old divine calls an "incomplete completeness." We do not say that it would be possible or right for us to try to imitate this quality. We have no vital architecture, and yet we must build. Let us, therefore, thoroughly comprehend and adopt the only style that is fit for us.

A notion has been gaining ground lately that there may be some hope of an *entirely new* architecture arising from the employment of a new material, namely, iron—and it seems to us that there are substantial grounds for this hope. We have said that the principal architectures of the world have been indebted for their fundamental expressions to particular references to the laws of gravitation. Every legitimate kind of reference which is capable of being made in stone or brick appears to have been exhausted ; but iron is capable of affording *two new references* of which stone and brick are incapable, namely, *suspension* and *impension* of weight. These principles have already been frequently and splendidly employed in the mechanical arts, but no distinctly architectural development of them has ever, to our knowledge, been attempted. There are a few minor, but still very important considerations with respect to iron as an architectural material at which it will be well to glance.

The constructive ideas of Gothic and Arabian architectures are such that they can only be fully realized in iron. The fancy is scarcely able to pursue the reality which has become possible for Gothic architecture through the present abundance of iron and glass, and the skill we have attained in working them. A cathedral twice as big as Cologne, with a spire a thousand feet high, would be quite a moderate undertaking compared with the cathedral of Milan, or the Gothic Houses of Parliament. Witness the expense of raising the Great Exhibition !

Iron *requires* painting. Here is a source of decoration which would almost outweigh the impossibility of carving in that mate-

rial. It is capable of being employed with wonderful advantages in conjunction with slate. Iron is susceptible, as Mr. Pickett has shewn in a pamphlet upon the subject, of a very characteristic and beautiful species of decoration, by what that author calls "interstitial form." The advantages of iron and slate for domestic architecture are numerous; one or two only can be mentioned here: hollow walls, filled with sand to prevent the transmission of sound, would retain warmth better than any other mode of construction; they would also offer immense facilities for artificial warming; a house built of iron would always be worth so much per pound when done with; much space would be saved in towns; and the great modern difficulty of covering large spaces architecturally—a difficulty which is generally but vainly supposed to be got rid of by combining the two utterly diverse ideas of *roof* and *ceiling*—would be at once overcome by the properties of the material in question.

In conclusion, let us heartily recommend the "Stones of Venice" to the best attention as well of the general reader as of the architectural student. Though we differ from Mr. Ruskin in several significant points, we are compelled to confess that we have learned far more from his books concerning the very essence and heart of architecture, than we have learned from any other works whatever. No one can be *indifferent* to what he has written upon the subject. Those who do not care for the subject itself, must be delighted and carried along without weariness, by the charms of his way of writing, and will be continually instructed by the wise and witty sayings which are scattered through this and all other of his books; and which are capable of applications as wide as the whole world of art and morals. What Mr. Ruskin says of the conditions of a capacity to enjoy good architecture, is in great measure true of the tone of mind with which one ought to enter upon the perusal of his bold and genial discourses.

"It needs some little care to try experiments on yourself; it needs deliberate question and upright answer. But there is no difficulty to be overcome, no abstruse reasoning to be gone into; only a little watchfulness needed, and thoughtfulness, and so much honesty as will enable you to confess to yourself, and to all men, that you enjoy things, though great authorities say you should not. This looks somewhat like pride; but it is true humility, a trust that you have been so created as to enjoy what is fitting for you, and a willingness to be pleased as it was intended that you should be. It is the child's spirit which we are then most happy when we most recover; only wiser than children in that we are ready to think it subject of thankfulness that we can still be pleased with a fair colour or a dancing light."

- ART. VIII.—1. *Delle Cinque Piaghe della Santa Chiesa: trattato dedicato al Clero Cattolico.* Di ANTONIO ROSMINI. Perugia, 1849.
2. *Discorso Funebre pei Morti di Vienna, recitato il giorno 27 Novembre nella insigne Chiesa di S. Andrea della Valle dal Rmo. P. D. GIOACHIMO VENTURA.* Roma, 1848.
3. *Lettere Storico-Critiche intorno alle Cinque Piaghe della Santa Chiesa del Chiarissimo Sacerdote D. Antonio de Rosmini-Serbati.* Dal P. A. THEINER. (Tradotte in Italiano.) Napoli, 1849.
4. *Legge Siccardi sull' Abolizione del Foro e delle Immunità Ecclesiastiche. Tornate del Parlamento Sub-Alpino.* Vol. unico. Torino, 1850.
5. *L'Italie Rouge, ou Histoire des Révolutions de Rome, Naples, Palerme, Messine, Florence, Parme, Modène, Turin, Milan, Venise; depuis l'avènement du Pape Pie IX., en Juin 1846, jusqu'à sa rentrée dans sa capitale, en Avril 1850.* Par le V^{TE} D'ARLINCOURT. Paris, 1850.
6. *Principi della Scuola Rosminiana: da un Prete Bolognese.* 2 vol. Milano, 1851.
7. *La Civiltà Cattolica.* Vol. i.: Napoli, 1850. Vol. ii.-iv. Roma, 1850-1851.

ROME is *par excellence* the city of ceremonies. Its very religion consists in grand theatrical displays, and its people seem never wearied in "turning out," whether to the blessing of animals on the Festival of St. Anthony, or the *Via Crucis* in the Flavian Amphitheatre—to the buffoonery of the Carnival, or the solemn mysteries of the Sistine Chapel. On the 27th of November 1848, when the assassination of Count Rossi and the flight of the Pope were still the town-talk, "the great attraction" was the Church of St. Andrea della Valle. The magnificent sanctuary of the Theatines was lighted up for a gorgeous ceremony, and solemn mass was said for the repose of the souls of "the brave" who had fallen in the great insurrection of Vienna. It was not a day to be lost in "wondering after" the Four Evangelists of Domenichino, or in gazing up into the painted glories of Lanfranco's cupola—the most beautiful in Rome: politics were in the ascendant, and a spirit-stirring discourse was expected from the most eloquent of Roman orators.

"Consedere duces, vulgique stante corona,
Surgit ad hos clypei dominus septemplicis Ajax."

The Very Reverend Father Gioacchino Ventura, Ex-General

of the Regular Clergy, Counsellor of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, Examiner of the Bishops and of the Roman Clergy, mounted the pulpit, and read his text from the Vulgate : "*Montes Gelboe, nec ros, nec pluvia veniant super vos : quia ibi abjectus est clypeus fortium. . . . Quomodo ceciderunt fortes in praelio !*" 2 Regum i. 21-25.

The preacher began :—" At the sight of the pious ceremony, of the sacred expiatory rite performed here to-day for the souls of the brave fallen in the capital of Austria in combat for liberty, the implacable enemies of all political liberty, the malignant detractors of every popular movement will not fail to say that we wish to-day in Rome to absolve rebellion, to legitimate treason, to sanctify anarchy : and with an air of holy indignation and of saintly sorrow, they will exclaim in more places than one, O diabolical abuse of things sacred ! O profanation ! O scandal ! O sacrilege !" After a few sentences he proceeds to announce his divisions after a somewhat peculiar formula :—" To the confusion of knaves, to the instruction of the simple, to the encouragement of the generous, to the edification of the pious, I undertake to examine to-day the true causes of the great war which has been lately waged at Vienna and elsewhere : *Quomodo ceciderunt fortes in praelio* : to conclude from hence that the proud heights of Absolutism, the scene of the slaughter of the brave, have with justice incurred the anathemas which David pronounced on the mountains of Gilboa, and that the heroes who have fallen there have well merited of religion : *Montes Gelboe, nec ros, nec pluvia veniant super vos, quia ibi abjectus est clypeus fortium.* In two words, 'I shall shew you that the cause of liberty is truly the cause of religion, and therefore that all those who have died fighting for liberty have a right to the suffrage, to the prayers, to the praise of religion. Let us begin."

Here was preaching for the million ! Father Ventura's principle was, that the clergy, instead of confining themselves to the breviary and to their spiritual duties, should frequent the clubs, mingle with the civic guard, and imitate the French clergy, who at once became republican on the 22d of February, and blessed the trees of liberty in the streets of Paris. St. Bernard and St. Thomas, he argued, were ecclesiastics, but did not abstain from politics. The people were marching towards liberty, civil and religious, and if the Church did not march along with them they would march without her—against her. He pleaded for the liberty, fraternity, and equality of the French Republic. "The Christian people should be guided and governed as *persons*, not ruled as *things* : *Principes gentium dominantur eorum, vos autem non sic.* The sovereign is the minister, the servant of his subjects, and command is not a privilege, but a servitude :

qui major est inter vos erit omnium minister. The *Costituente*, he held, would even emancipate the Church, now so thoroughly under the control of the civil power; and the nomination of the bishops and pastors of the Church, so long usurped by the secular governments, would return to the clergy and the people. The Theatine Father then went on to paint in the darkest colours the "Macchiavellian, atrocious, and infernal" policy of Austria, enslaving the Church, and using the clergy only as a black police: corrupting the morals of the people on very purpose that in the voluptuousness of the royal city they might lose all that was noble and daring, and hence dangerous to their despots: encouraging the feuds of rival races, and setting them to fight each other on the old principle of *Divide et impera*: hounding the peasantry, like hungry dogs, on the proprietors, and paying the heads of the latter at ten florins a piece! Such had been the Aulic policy; and the solemn mass said that day in Rome was in suffrage of the souls of the valiant youths who, in heroic attempt to overthrow the infernal system, had fallen in the eight days' insurrection at Vienna. To unite the Church in wedlock with democracy, to restore *that* Pius IX., who had protested against the occupation of Ferrara, from the influence of the retrogrades and *Oscurantisti*, and to lead him back again to that course of reform which he had himself begun, seemed to Padre Ventura the only mode of preserving, in days like the present, the influence of the Church.*

The Theatine Father had risen into high reputation as the most eloquent preacher in Rome: a fitting person to preach a funeral oration on the death of O'Connell, or to sing a hymn of victory over the barricades of Vienna. He had, moreover, like most of his class, a strong inclination to exhibit himself in print in panegyrics, funeral orations, biographies, and homilies; his most celebrated books being "The School of Miracles," a series of homilies preached in the Vatican during the Quaresima of 1843; "The Beauties of Faith," or the felicity of belonging to the true Church; and "The Mother of God, Mother of Men; or, an Exposition of the Mystery of Most Holy Mary at the foot of the Cross," a kind of "Stabat Mater" in prose. During the reforming days of "the simple Pius" he was in high favour with the Pope, and in precisely the reverse with the Cardinals;

* *Discorso Funebre pei Morti di Vienna.* The Discourse was printed "con permesso per la parte religiosa;" and with the extreme of Italian *gentilezza*, the censors sent back the message to the very reverend writer, "*Nella cose del Padre Ventura non si può metter pecco!*" It was, however, in due time put into the Index of Prohibited Books by the Sacred Congregation at Gaeta, and the Theatine Father, smitten by ecclesiastical censure, humbly read his recantation. Alas for the preacher, whose eloquent discourse may have "instructed the simple," but had not, unfortunately, "confounded knaves!"

so much so that his frequent visits to the Quirinal were looked on as a sort of public calamity; and if any one inquired on such occasions, "*Chi ci sta dentro?*" the answer was more energetic than refined, "*Ci sta quel diavolo del Padre Ventura!*" But the Father comforted himself with the knowledge that he possessed the confidence of the Roman populace, who had declared that they would have faith in the Pope as long as they knew that Father Ventura was permitted to mount the stairs of the Monte Cavallo.

We should follow the eloquent Theatine's account of the slavery of the Church under Catholic princes, but he himself refers to a much fuller development of that subject from another quarter,—the "*Cinque Piaghe*" of the Abbate Rosmini. Immeasurably above the orator of St. Andrea della Valle in intellect and learning, Antonio Rosmini-Serbati had acquired a name second to none in the Italian priesthood—as high, if not higher, than that of Gioberti. It is true the Turinese philosopher had come forward prominently on the great and stirring political questions of the day, had become the idol of the populace, and had been *fêted* beyond all precedent, and as yet the charm of his name was unbroken. The "*Primacy*" and "*the Modern Jesuit*" had struck the right cord, and programmes of reform that came thick and fast from Turin had made Gioberti the great ecclesiastical head of the Italian movement when Pius IX. had ceased to be a reformer. Rosmini was simply an ecclesiastic, a modest man of letters, and though his strong sympathy with the Liberal movement was well known, no Italian priest kept his place with more gravity and dignity than he did. We do not mean to refer at length to the fifteen dense octavo volumes by which he had acquired so high a name as a philosopher and a moralist. As to his "*Ideology, or New Essay on the origin of Ideas*," in three elaborate volumes, and his "*Moral Philosophy*," treating of the principles of Moral Science, of Anthropology, and of Conscience, in a form equally elaborate; it may be sufficient to say that Gioberti has published the orthodox number of three octavos with the ominous title, "*Philosophical Errors of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati*," but at present we have no wish to ring the changes on Locke and Reid, on Cousin and Kant. His "*Ascetics*" and "*Ecclesiastical Prose*" were a proper study for the priests: his "*Teodicea*" was too grave a subject for a season of revolution; but some smaller works, dealing with matters that came more directly home "*to men's bosoms and business*," had been printed and reprinted in almost every part of Italy. In the end of August 1848, Rosmini was sent to Rome to negotiate on the part of the Piedmontese Government that Italian League which had been proposed by the Pope. The time

was unpropitious. The Allocution of April—Durando's tricolored crosses—the Armistice of Milan—were fresh in every one's mind, and Rome and Piedmont mutually accused each other of the recent failure in Lombardy. Rosmini was unsuccessful in his negotiations, but personally he was held in high esteem by the Pontiff. A party among the clergy accused him of holding dangerous opinions, especially expressed in his "Cinque Piaghe:" but not only were his opinions at that time not condemned, but he was himself appointed consulter of the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office and of the Index, and even nominated to the high honour of the purple. It was also rumoured that he would soon be appointed Minister of Public Instruction, an office for which he was certainly as well qualified as the old Cardinal Mezzofanti had been, notwithstanding his thirty languages. But Rosmini was not doomed to be a Cardinal. The Fabbri Ministry crumbled as the Mamiani Cabinet had done before it, and the ill-fated Rossi succeeded to all the honour and all the danger of upholding the throne of two hundred and sixty Popes. The "Contemporaneo" launched its thunders, if such they could be called, against the friend of Guizot; the "Epoca" set itself in opposition, and "Don Pirlone," with his caricatures and his buffoonery—for Pasquin had ceased to be exclusively the *Punch* of Rome—was true to the popular party, and ranged himself on the winning side. Rossi's attempted reform of the law, roused against him the whole tribe that depended on a corrupt administration. The riotous proceedings in Tuscany—the descent of Garibaldi into the Papal territories—the preaching of Father Gavazzi, the mob-orator of the republicans—the violent articles of the journals—increased the excitement of the Roman factions against the unfortunate minister, till the dagger of the assassin was held up in triumph on the steps of the Cancellaria, and the dregs of Rome kept holiday for a murder.

We can judge the assassination of Count Rossi in no other way than as one of the darkest crimes that ever stained even the dark annals of Rome. In the dense crowd that thronged the stairs of the Cancellaria, and closed around the victim, there were wretches in military disguise and armed with daggers, who looked on with Satanic triumph while the blood gurgled from the neck of the dying minister. The civic guard and carabinieri raised not an arm—the poltroons of the Council Hall made an ineffectual attempt to read the minutes of the last session, as if nothing serious had happened—without, all was in confusion. On the next day the Quirinal was besieged, and the Pope compelled to treat with Galletti, the popular hero, the amnestied of St. Angelo, for the formation of a new ministry. Galletti, as a matter of course, proposed himself as a fit and proper person for

the Ministry of the Interior ; Mamiani, as Minister of Foreign Affairs ; Sterbini, the ruler of the "Circoli," as Minister of Commerce and Public works ; and, not to speak of others, he named Rosmini as Minister of Public Instruction and President of the Council. It is pleasing to say, that both Rosmini and Count Mamiani refused to accept office in the Cabinet extemporized by Galletti, and conceded by a sovereign who was not in a condition to refuse anything. Seven days after the Pope had reversed his own medal, *Non relinquam vos orphanos.*

We would gladly follow that romantic gentleman, the Viscount d'Arlincourt, in his account of the midnight flight in Bianchone's *voiture*, on through the Pontine Marshes, and onward still till the Neapolitan frontier was crossed, and the disguised Abbé, (for the Viscount ignores the scandal of the Bavarian footman,) now manifest as Pius IX., pressed to his heart the silver box in which his predecessor Braschi had carried with him the consecrated host in his exile, and murmured "tout bas un Te Deum en actions de grâce de sa délivrance." But it is time to return to Rosmini.

The history of Rosmini's treatise on Ecclesiastical Reform is instructive. It was begun in 1832, and completed in the year following. "The times did not then seem propitious" for publishing on such a subject, and like one of the seven sleepers of Ephesus, the forgotten treatise slumbered peacefully for thirteen years, to wake up at the accession of a Pontiff, who seemed destined to introduce "a new era" for the Church and the world. To write at all of such a subject as "the Wounds of the Holy Church," was not to be thought of lightly. Was not this a subject for the Bishops, or for the Sovereign Pontiff, rather than for a simple Abbaté ? Yes, truly ; but the bishops and the Pope are busily occupied, or ought to be so, and have not much leisure for quiet meditation ; and it is a service done to them to bring such a subject before them, or at least, they ought to consider it as such, for, unfortunately, the ontology and the deontology of such questions do not always harmonize at Rome. And then, besides, St. Jerome, St. Bernard, and St. Catherine of Sienna, who were not bishops, both spoke and wrote on the evils and the reform of the Church in their day. As a proof that abuses exist in the Church, and that reform may be proposed without incurring the charge of heresy, Rosmini refers to the celebrated Bologna Commission of 1537, appointed by Paul III., to search out all the abuses of the Church, and to submit them to the Pontiff. At the head of this commission were the cardinals Contarini, Caraffa, Sadolet, and Pole. Now, it may be worth while to pause a moment on the history of that commission, which has been rather unfortunately evoked as a precedent. The prime mover

in the matter was Caraffa, the Theatine cardinal whom Erasmus had praised in such fulsome terms in the dedication of his edition of Jerome in 1516. The commission specified as abuses the sale of benefices, the disposition of them by testament, the union of bishoprics, and the admission of improper persons to the priesthood, and gave some very proper advice on these matters. Five years after the Bologna meeting, Caraffa, the mild reformer of abuses, was heading the crusade against heresy, and plying throughout Italy the infernal enginery of the Spanish Inquisition, which ceased not its deeds of darkness till Rome had gained the mastery over the fallen faith. And when Caraffa himself ascended the papal throne as Paul IV., he put *his own advice* into the Expurgatory Index. He had certainly a precedent in the conduct of his predecessor, Pius II., who strongly censured, when he became a pope, all the liberal opinions which he had expressed when he was simply Æneas Sylvius. "Reject Æneas," he said, "receive Pius. The former name was imposed by my parents—a Gentile name—and in my infancy; the other I assumed as a Christian in my apostolate!" The Bologna council of cardinals and bishops recommended as a necessary reform, the prohibition of the Colloquies of Erasmus as a school-book. Luther wrote over against this part of the advice, "Would God he had been living!" for no one enjoyed more than Luther did the genial humour, and the polished or unpolished ridicule of the *Punch* of the Reformation.

All such damaging stories are, however, "ignored" by all true churchmen. Rosmini's book was printed, reprinted, and applauded; but in due time the Sacred Congregation of Gacta entered it on the Index—and no wonder, for Pius IX. was then repudiating his own reforms as the fruit of "a revolutionary spirit."

We choose this treatise of Rosmini, rather than any other, as the text of our present notice of ecclesiastical affairs in Italy, not only on account of the high name of Rosmini, but also because no Italian ecclesiastic, not even Gioberti, has more directly entered on the great subject of the abuses of the Church. We shall not waste time in observing the priestly character of the "Cinque Piaghe," as exhibited in divisions that to our northern imaginations seem somewhat fantastic; but we have not been taught to kneel to a crucifix of Giotto or Donatello, and the pulpits from which we have been instructed were not sculptured in marble by the Pisani, and hence we may allow the *structure* of the treatise to pass unchallenged.

I. The author speaks first of the Wound of the Left Hand of the Holy Church, which is *the division of the people from the clergy in public worship*. He does not mean by this a separation in

heart and spirit, but the want of actual union, which arises when the people do not understand the prayers and services of the Church. The *mission* of the gospel was to subdue the whole man to the law of God: the means were the preaching of the word, the administration of the sacraments, and prayer. With these simple agencies the sent of Christ were to regenerate the world. "The apostles and their successors, who added to the few sacraments instituted by Christ the ornaments of holy prayers, of ceremonies, of outward signs, and of noble rites, that the public worship of the Redeemer of men might be more serviceable to the honour of the God-man, and to the assembly of those who believed in his word, followed, in doing this, the example given by their divine master, that is, they introduced nothing into the temple devoid of signification," p. 14. These ceremonies or sacramentals added by the Church to that simple form of worship instituted by Christ, have not only, he holds, their proper signification, but also participate in the vivifying power of the sacraments. The conclusion is right though the syllogism is wrong; in this public worship of God, the people are not meant to be mere spectators of a sacred representation, as if present at a show, but should themselves take part in the service with the understanding and the heart. We need not follow the eloquent argument by which Rosmini establishes the great principle, that the prayers which the faithful unite in offering up at the throne of grace should be understood of all. The unity of Christian worshippers is not material but spiritual, a union of understanding and of feeling. But this union has ceased to exist, and a wall of separation arises between the clergy and the people.

The principle enunciated is an extremely simple one, but the reform to which it points would strike at the whole system of Romish worship. The Church, in Roman Catholic Christendom, has adorned herself with the trappings of Pagan superstition; the very temples body forth the symbolism of the east accommodated to a Christian creed, and the heresies of centuries have been wrought into their walls. A Romish church is not a mere building in which worshippers may meet for the service of God, it is an apocalypse of mediæval mysteries. Its walls are sculptured over with angels, and prophets, and apostles, or with symbolical animals, "the mythological menagerie" of the east and west; its niches and cupolas tell over again the lying legends and fabulous histories of the breviary and of the lives of the saints; statues, Pagan or Christian, from Phidias to Canova, and pictures from "St. Luke" to Raphael, form its appropriate decorations. It is vain to treat such things as mere artistic ornaments—they are suited to no creed but one; and the ecclesiological experiment of the English tractarians is a proof that their

influence is not imaginary. In truth, it has been well said, that "the study of ancient church architecture is an admirable preparative for the old faith." But apart from this, the whole service is a mere theatrical display. A profusion of tapers burning before an altar, gorgeous in its decorations, or tricked out in the most tawdry finery—priests in showy vestments mumbling an unintelligible mass—crossings, kneelings, a repeated kissing of the altar—the ringing of bells and the music—the smoke of the incense, and the dipping of the finger in the holy water—make up the whole service. The right word to express it is "mummery," were it not for the melancholy reflection that this empty show is made to pass for the worship of Him who requires worship from his servants "in spirit and in truth."

It is well, in these days of Popish controversy, to be able to cite the testimony of a Romish ecclesiastic on this matter of "mummery." Rosmini gives the two causes of this separation of the laity from the clergy in the public worship of the Church, which he deplures as the first of the Church's wounds. In the first place, the people are not instructed in the Christian faith. They are kept in ignorance, as if ignorance were better for them than knowledge, or as if they were not fit to receive the sublime truths of the Gospel, in direct opposition to the command of him who said, "Go and teach all nations." Something more is necessary than an instruction in catechisms and formulas, repeated without being understood. These symbols of the Church must be expounded at length till they reach the understanding and the heart. A catechism may be committed to memory, and the most exact words of the creed may be repeated in answer to set questions; and yet all this may be a mere exercise of memory, leaving "the instructed" as profoundly ignorant after his instruction as he was before it. And hence, the question is proposed as at least a legitimate one, whether the catechisms of the Church have not done more harm than good? The second reason is an important one. The Latin tongue, which the Roman arms had carried to the ends of the earth, became naturally the common language of the Church in teaching her doctrines and offering her prayers; but the language of the Church has ceased to be a spoken language, and by her absurd persistence in the use of a dead tongue, "he that occupieth the place of the unlearned cannot say, amen," and in the very church of his own city is like a pilgrim in a strange land, where the words that are spoken are to him devoid of all signification. Hence the carelessness of the people for the services of the Church, which are all unintelligible, and in which they could be only materially present, without any spiritual understanding—present as the statues and pillars of the temple." And he adds, "this repugnance to frequent the

Christian churches becomes an unjust reason by which human indiscretion has often drawn to a sense so strange and so far from the truth, that *compelle intrare* of the Redeemer," p. 20.

The Romish system is stereotyped, and it is in short impossible to effect any change without destroying the monuments which infallible builders reared "in perpetuam rei memoriam." And yet within the narrow limits allowed by her unchanging rubric, the Church has made some stray efforts at accommodation. The *Oratoires* and the *Marian congregations* were instituted that the Church might not always speak as a barbarian in the most solemn acts of her worship. In such a country as Protestant England, so deeply infected with the great Lutheran heresy of the right of free inquiry, even cardinals must *preach*; but the religious population of such a state as Naples are content with a hasty mass, that they may hurry off to the more entertaining exhibitions of Policinella. Preaching is not the business of an Italian priest, and we suppose not more than one out of every five hundred that darken the streets of the Italian cities ever ascends a pulpit. The great preaching season is during the forty days of Lent, and a few monks are selected as the preachers of the stated course of forty sermons, and duly inflict their *Quaresimale* on their audience. They are generally deplorably illiterate, but the stock of forty sermons once prepared, the preacher is furnished for a lifetime. In the selection of subjects, with the exception of four discourses, "the world is all before him where to choose," and of late years the pernicious principles of Protestantism and the unmingled evils of Bible Societies have been favourite topics with the shaven orator. But preach what he may, he must wind up with "the four last things," Judgment, Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, and "do" the Divine Comedy into homilies. The pulpit is on the whole a somewhat useless ornament of an Italian church, and in most cases might be removed entirely: the great service is the sacrifice at the altar, and the muttered mass in Latin. The worshippers look on, or kneel, or read such books as "the Garden of the Soul" and "the Way of Paradise." We have been somewhat interested with two little volumes lately published by Rosmini.* The one is a catechism, in which the doctrines of the Church are developed "according to the order of ideas," and with much ability; for however much he may be hampered by a system which he has not light enough to abjure, it is not in Rosmini that one will find the grossness of a Liguori. The other is a collection of prayers and instructions, to enable the wor-

* *Opere Spirituali di A. Rosmini Serbati* 2 vols. Pp. 640.

shipper to accompany intelligently the service of the Mass, and certainly few Italian priests have ever edited such a series of prayers for the use of the unlearned : they are a translation of some of the finest Psalms of David, with a few notes from the Fathers, to give an air of orthodoxy to the volume. Even such an approach to the Bible in the vulgar tongue is suspicious, and some will not willingly sanction more, and for the sake of appearances Rosmini has appended an exposition of the Hymn of the Virgin Mary. Jansenism, or the tendency to Jansenism, is not more highly favoured now by the princes of the Church than it was in the days of the Port-Royal. The priestly caste, with laws and customs, and a language of their own, must be preserved as a separate society.

II. The second great evil, or as Rosmini describes it—the Wound of the Right Hand of the Holy Church—is *the insufficient education of the clergy*. We shall condense the substance of this section of the treatise, preserving the outline and following the train of thought of the learned Abbate. In the first ages of the Church, preaching and the services of public worship were the great schools of the Christian people, in which “by word and sacrament” the great truths of religion were brought home to the hearts of the believing. The first teachers appealed not only to the intellectual, but to the moral man—not only to the head but to the heart : and the priests of the new religion chosen from among the faithful, and raised to the high honour of the Christian ministry, felt all the solemnity of their holy office, when a simple layman, untaught in “the schools of the prophets,” but taught of the Spirit, was called by the voice of the people to the oversight of the flock, and refusing in vain, became a burning and shining light, a St. Ambrose or a St. Martin. As were the people, so were the priests who issued from the people. And now look at the Church in our day : still the rule holds, “like people like priests.” The people now are present at the services and ceremonies of the Church, as spectators at a show ; there is no clear understanding of the duty and the dignity of membership in the body of Christ—no union of mind and heart with the clergy, so that both may prostrate themselves with a common feeling before Him with whom they have to do. The clergy are rather regarded as a peculiar and privileged class, living by the altar—a caste and a sect apart from others, and separated from the great body of the faithful. Hence the affairs of the Church are spoken of as the affairs of the priests : and from a Christian laity so ill-taught and so ignorant of the spiritualities of their religion, issue the priests, bringing with them the meagreness of instruction gained in such a school, and that secular spirit which

still lurks under the black robe—ignorant alike of lay Christianity and of Christian priesthood, and of the bond by which they are united. These narrow-minded priests communicate to others who are to succeed them the slender stream of their instruction, and they again to others, and so the process of deterioration goes on, for “the disciple is not above his master.”

A second reason of this insufficient education is the giving over of the instruction of the clergy to men unfitted for their office. In the earlier days the bishops were the teachers: Athanasius grew up under the shadow of Alexander, a scholar worthy of the master; Irenæus had learned from Polycarp, and Polycarp from John. Brought up at the feet of the Apostles, the Timothies and Tituses were prepared to carry on the work of winning souls to Christ. Thus from one race of pastors to another the truth was handed down, and the bond of union between the members of the Church preserved: *the distinctions of higher and lower clergy were then unknown*; the bishop was himself the teacher. The instruction of the people was rarely committed to other hands, except in cases of extraordinary genius and sanctity in the person chosen to the vicarious duty,—as when Chrysostom was chosen preacher by Flavian of Antioch, or Augustine by Valerius of Carthage; and much less the duty of teaching the teachers.

In the sixth century, the position of the clergy was changed. They were no longer poor and persecuted; they had issued from the catacombs and the arena; they were loaded with secular duties, and involved in secular business, so much that Origen warned the priests against the danger of becoming priests of Pharaoh,—holding lands and occupied in earthly things rather than priests of the Lord; and Gregory the Great complained that under the name of the Episcopate he had returned to the world, and had more secular affairs on hand as a priest than ever he had had as a layman. The clergy mingled more and more in secular affairs throughout the middle ages, and while kings were advancing in devotion to the Church, so that monarchs gained at times the titles of saints, the clergy was becoming more and more a secularized community, living with nobles and as nobles, occupied in politics, economy, and secular administration, and devolving on the inferior clergy the duties of feeding the flock. Parishes were instituted, and in the tenth century and onwards, the houses of the bishops were no longer academies for the training of future pastors, but courtly palaces where license was given to the immoralities of the age. The people forgot that the bishop was a pastor. The inferior clergy were no longer on terms of equality and of brotherly fellowship with the bishop, who became more and more separated from all pastoral duty, till

the day came when the cup was full, and the Protestant kingdoms abolished the office which had become so manifestly useless. Influenced by the example of their superiors, the inferior clergy also became ambitious; the drudgery of their pastoral work was valued only for the income it yielded, or the hopes of advancement it held out; the word of God and the sacraments became a spiritual merchandise; and each Judas in the priesthood sold his Lord. Such pastors neglected all teaching, save what referred to benedictions or indulgences, or whatever might increase the revenue of those who lived by the altar; and so degraded did the clergy become, that restrictive laws and legal means were employed to check the evil—means which could only prevent its growth for a time, but could never reach its root. The day came at last when the Church was punished for her sin: kingdoms and nations abandoned the Church which had before abandoned them to the leading of blind guides, and the lands and endowments which the clergy had sought as their chief good, were in one moment taken from them. The Church, spoiled of her ill-gotten wealth, roused herself to some effort to regain her position; but the bishops of that day, instead of returning to the good customs of the early Church in training the clergy, through whom they were to retain or regain their hold on the nations, still kept aloof from their proper work, and contented themselves with a wholly inadequate reform. In fine, seminaries were chosen as the means of providing for the education of the clergy. The teachers of the seminaries were generally inferior men, and besides, were soon removed to some poor benefice; and others, all inexperienced, put in their stead. Such are the teachers of the Church now, and the scanty education of the seminary becomes a mere exercise of memory. Well may Rosmini add, How unlike the description which Clement of Alexandria gives of his master—"a bee that sucked the flowers of prophetic and apostolic meadows, that he might form in the souls of those who heard him the honey of a sincere and uncorrupted knowledge!" And to this poor task of teaching the rising generation of the teachers of the Church, is attached an income so scanty, that a promotion to some poor benefice causes the happy professor to leap for joy!

Another cause of this insufficient education is the use of mere elementary books. The books of elaborate learning, full of doctrine and of wisdom, are compressed into miserable compendiums. "In the early ages of the Church, the Sacred Scriptures were the only text of popular and ecclesiastical instruction—the Scriptures, which are truly *the book* of the human race—the *Bible*—the *Scripture* by Autonomasia. Such a code paints humanity from its beginning to its end;"—and so on, for space

does not permit us to quote at length Rosmini's eloquent eulogium of the Book of God, pp. 38, 39. The imprisoned Bibles of Italy in the present day suggest a sad comment on the words of the earnest writer :—"This great book, in the hands of great men who expounded it, was the nutriment of other great men." Hence the pastors of the Church were also the great writers of antiquity, except in rare cases where genius opened to a Tertullian or an Origen the way to the chair of Christian instruction. These books of the early fathers served in their turn for the education of the clergy, and most of all in leading them to the one Book in which every question is solved that regards man's salvation. Ages of feebleness followed, when the ecclesiastical writers, chiefly shut up in monasteries, spent their days over the pages of the Fathers, copying, copying perpetually, an Augustine or a Jerome, compiling, abbreviating, condensing, and compressing into miserable sentences the wisdom of the princes of the Church. This system had its advantages : it preserved the writings of the Church by those endless copies of the monks ; but it was also accompanied with great evils. The minds of men were chained down to what others had said, and such studies had more to do with the intellect and memory than with the heart and conscience. These were the scholastic ages, the ages of compendiums and summaries, when Peter Lombard compiled his "Sentences," and Thomas Aquinas wrote his "Summa." The wisdom of the Fathers was epitomized, and the living pages of the early writers were abbreviated into hard, dry, and lifeless formulas. It was in keeping with the spirit of such an age, that, in philosophy, Plato, the favourite of the ancients, was abandoned for the more sapless Aristotle. This scholasticism reached its climax in Thomas Aquinas, and then other centuries of mediocrity followed, when the schoolmen who had abbreviated the Fathers were themselves abbreviated. Such has been the progress of deterioration : the Fathers succeeded to the Scriptures, the schoolmen condensed and epitomized the Fathers, and, lastly, the theologians came with their miserable compendiums and selections—books made out of books—"books without spirit, without principle, without eloquence, without method"—books that can awaken no sentiment, kindle no genius, excite no fancy, and that need in their teachers and scholars nothing more than eyes and ears.

We have thought it right to present in outline the thoroughly Jansenist principles of this section of Rosmini's work. But the position of the Jansenists, half-way between Rome and the Reformation, must ever be a false one. Theories that would divest the Pope of his assumed infallibility and lordship over his brethren, and of the substantial advantages of his temporal

power, can scarcely consist with adherence to a Church which stipulates these points as articles of faith. The learning of Arnauud and the wit of Pascal, joined with that purity of morals which formed such a contrast to the maxims and the practice of a dissolute age, were not able to save the Port-Royal. All the enlightened men of Italy hold principles akin to those of Rosmini, though few have so well expressed them; but they are not prepared to break with the historic church. They do not hold the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff, however cautious they may be in assailing a hallowed superstition; the temporal power of the Popes is no part of their creed, however they may differ in their ideas of the propriety of retaining for St. Peter's see, or appropriating to secular purposes, the accumulated "donations" of twelve centuries. The privileged tribunals and right of asylum belong to things abolished. They do not believe that the existence of the Church depends on holding lands in mortmain; they admit abuses, and deplore them: but the great principle of the Reformation has not prevailed to shake their historic attachment to the system of religion which has its home in Italy, and its seat on the seven hills. There are exceptions, as we know, but we speak of the general feeling of the more educated classes. They would reform the Church, but this is precisely the one thing that they cannot accomplish; and the tenacity with which the authorities of the Church hold fast their abuses has done more, and is doing more, than any other agency to alienate men from a system which knows no change, and admits of no reformation. The great historic demonstration of five years has wrought a wondrous revolution of sentiment, and to satisfy the present requirements of a people so far enlightened, some change is needed. Uncomplying and obstinate, the Church is gathering herself up for desperate resistance, and for a determined effort to prevail by force. She has leagued herself with the old despotisms of Europe, and made the police the right arm of her strength; she has plied her Index and her Inquisition, and closed her gates against the merchandise of truth; she has recalled the Jesuits to Rome, as her firmest friends and ablest defenders, and laid under ban the very men whose more liberal views had conciliated her more wavering adherents or commanded the respect of her enemies. "The day will declare" the end and issue of this "strong delusion."

The work of her clergy is not that of enlightening the mind, and of convincing the heart by great Bible principles. The education of the priests is such as Rosmini has described it, and much worse than he has described it; but we are content at present to abide by his account, which cannot be suspected of

exaggeration. They are not preachers, for their work is to go through a formal service in a language unintelligible to the people; schooled in their sapless books, and living apart from the earnest practical work of a gospel ministry, they are not labourers for Christ like the early teachers; they are mere intellectual machines, or machines *not* intellectual. But if the clergy were to be brought back to the primitive standard, "in this way there would be few priests. Well, even so. Pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest that he may send forth reapers into his harvest."

It is needless to say that we are not discussing the great question of Romanism and the Reformation, but simply sketching some of the evils of the Romish Church as one of her own adherents has presented them. Hence we must not be held as "homologating" the opinions of Rosmini as to the kind or measure of reform that is needed. We hold rather the impossibility of reforming the Romish system; for its lofty assumption of infallibility precludes all change, and the great Protestant principle gaining fast on the Church from without is destructive to the elements of strength and weakness by which her creed has been supported. According to the defenders of the Church, the great vitiating principle of modern society is Protestantism. The revolt of Luther, founded on the emancipation of reason and conscience, opened a new era in the history of the world. The Council of Trent, the last of the councils, closed the history of the middle ages, and with defined dogmas the old Church that had once been all-powerful stood henceforth on the defensive. The Protestant principle, in one form or another, has been since leavening society, and, both in religion and politics, the Church is striving hard against its influence. The right or the responsibility of private judgment on the one hand, with freedom of conscience, the right of worship, the liberty of the press, and constitutional government embodying the principle of representation—such are the great ideas of the one party; antiquity in philosophy, authority in the Church, and absolutism in government, are the leading principles of the other. The Papacy, holding both spiritual and temporal power, embodies all these elements, and to *modernize* it is impossible. It must stand or fall with its canon law and the decrees of its mediæval councils. The freedom of the press—the unrestrained circulation of the Bible—an enlightened education, and representative government,—the Church knows well would be fatal to her influence in Italy; and hundreds of the Italian priests are no way in advance of that Dominican father who enlightened his Florentine audience more than two centuries ago, in the Church of Santa Maria Novella, on the astronomical heresy of Galileo,

drawing both his text and his condemnation from those words of the Vulgate, "*Viri Galilæi, quid statis aspicientes in cælum?*"

III. But it is time to pass on to the third evil, or as Rosmini calls it—the Wound of the Side of the Holy Church, viz., *the disunion of the bishops*. Now, the Romish Church plumes herself on her unity, on her having and holding one Lord, one faith, one baptism. In the earlier ages of the Church, Rosmini's *Saturnia regna*, bishop visited bishop, or corresponded by letter: in provincial councils presbyters consulted together, and, besides, the pastors consulted with the congregations of the people. According to Rosmini's statement, and he cites his favourite authority Fleury in proof, for six centuries after the Christian era, if a pastor was refused by a congregation, no effort was made to force his services on the people; and he cites a higher authority than Fleury for consulting the members of the Church, even the example of the apostles in the election of deacons. But we need not speak of the "rings of gold" that bound together the earlier Episcopate. The time came when the clergy, involved in secular business, precisely reversed the rule of the apostles, who would not leave the duties of prayer and the ministry of the word to serve tables. Temporal honours became the sources of discord and division. The rich see of Constantinople; the new Rome on the Bosphorus, rivalled both in its secular and ecclesiastical relations the old Rome on the Tiber, and the increasing temporal influence of the Byzantine rival ended in the Greek schism by which the east was lost to the Church. The Archbishops in the Exarchate of Ravenna disobeyed the Popes: Anti-popes arose, and again there was the schism of the west. The councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basle—the defection of the north in the sixteenth century—the Gallican Liberties—the Aulic influences to which the Church was subjected, and the control assumed by emperors and grand-dukes—all belong to times when the Church had "benefices" to contend for, and when it could no longer be said that "he who desired the office of a bishop, desired a good work."

Now, supposing the Romish Church to be *the* Church, a really devoted Romanist, if he follows out his principles logically, must approve of much that the mere eclectic adherent of Rome may plume himself on rejecting. Gioberti, while propounding his great theory of the regeneration of Italy by a reforming Vatican, wrote five volumes against the Society of Jesus, the ablest company that ever the Church sent forth for her defence. This may look like liberality, and Gioberti's fame rests on his magnificent absurdity: but the propounder of two such theories as are embodied respectively in the "Primato" and the "Gesuita Mo-

dermo," can have no higher praise than that which attaches to the *splendide mendax*; choosing between the school of Gioberti and the school of Rosmini, we prefer the latter, for however erroneous the application of its principles may be, the principles themselves are not the fine fictions of philosophic dreamers. Rosmini contrasts the secularized bishops with "those apostolic men who, with Loyola at their head, founded a company of indefatigable workmen in the vineyard of the Lord," binding themselves even with vows to avoid the burden of secularities. The institution of Mendicant Friars in the thirteenth century, and of the Regular Clergy in the sixteenth, manifestly aimed at supplying what had been left undone by the clergy which was too truly distinguished as "secular." Whatever in practice they may have been, if Rome be the depository of the truth, the *principle* of the Society of Jesus cannot consistently be assailed by an adherent of the Church which they have so powerfully upheld.

The Episcopal Sees, according to Rosmini's faithful picture, were reserved for the flatterers or the servants of the princes, or as livings for younger or illegitimate sons. In the Venetian Republic the younger sons of the patrician houses were the bishops, having been devoted to the Episcopate before they were born; and such being the mode of appointment, they were charitably released from sacred duties, and allowed to lead what life they pleased. Rosmini paints in the darkest colours the infamy of the secularized bishops, and exclaims, "God knoweth, I recite not mere possibilities! Of all that I have written, the horrible examples are in history. They are written there in characters so indelible, that all the bitter tears of the Church, and all the rubbing and polishing of ages, shall never be able to efface them."

The Episcopacy is no longer a distinct and sacred power between the princes and the people: it is absorbed in the temporal power which thus presents two faces to the people, one military, and the other sacerdotal: it has become but a part of the civil magistracy, its interests being national, not Catholic. The Church, whatever its alliance may be, is not a creation of the State, and must preserve its own independence. . . . All Italy—all Europe—has rung with the scandal of Franzoni and the Servite fathers of San Carlo at Turin. The warfare waged so relentlessly at the deathbed of Santa Rosa has kindled, and justly kindled, the indignation of the civilized world, and priestcraft has certainly not gained in that battle. All Piedmont rung to the cry of outraged humanity, and yet, judging both parties by the principles which they hold in common, we suspect the priests had the right side of the question, if we can speak of

a right side in a case where we hold both to have been in the wrong. Granted that the Pontiff is not only a temporal prince, but also head of the Church, whether by Divine right or by the consent of Catholic Christendom, it is a grave question for a Roman Catholic kingdom—whether a concordat, such as that solemnly entered into in 1841, between Charles Albert and Gregory XVI., can be set aside by one of the contracting parties, without the consent of the other? And how can any Roman Catholic, admitting the pretensions of the priesthood, question the principle affirmed by the Pope in the Allocution of November 1850, that the administration of the sacraments belongs not to the civil but to the ecclesiastical power? The Servite fathers were bound to obey their archbishop, and Franzoni had sworn obedience to St. Peter's Chair. Judged on Romish principles, both the prisoner of the Fenestrolle and his rival for the honours of martyrdom, the worthy Marongiu Nurra, Archbishop of Cagliari—*par nobile fratrum*—may have been perfectly right, and as long as nations will judge by Romish principles, such cases are likely to recur. The fault lies in the system, and it is needless to cry out against such displays of Romish tyranny, or whatever else it may be called, while the system itself is acknowledged as existing by "right divine." As long as kingdoms give themselves up bound hand and foot by their concordats into the power of the Court of Rome, and persist in acknowledging the Roman Pontiff as their spiritual head, they must abide the consequences. The only effectual remedy implies the laying of the axe to the root of the tree: and such cases as those of Turin and Cagliari are doing much to open the eyes of the people, however slow the governments may be to learn, or act according to their knowledge.

But the Pope has not a Franzoni in every capital, and the Catholic princes have managed, in general, to keep their bishops in better order. They have gained the battle of investitures, and in the main have perfected the system of clerical subjection. The resistance of the Catholic kingdoms to the Bull *In Coena Domini* is an old story now. In that great Papal manifesto, the universal monarch extended his divine right over kings and governments, and anathematized all who opposed his authority. The princes incurred anathemas by the dozen, and the Venetian Republic ran up her score to thirty-six. And now the Catholic sovereigns submit the decisions of their spiritual head to lay tribunals, without whose sanction Bulls and Letters Apostolic cannot be published in their dominions. In truth, by the confession of Romanists themselves, their Church has far greater liberty in countries that are not Catholic, than in the kingdoms that profess subjection to the Pope. We need not say how com-

pletely the Church was subjected to the civil power in Austria since the time of the Emperor Joseph, till the new laws of the 18th and 23d April 1850,* issued by the present Emperor, abolishing the royal *Placet*, and the restrictions of 1781. In Tuscany the Leopoldine Laws have remained in force till the present year, when the "piety," or the weakness, of the Grand Duke has favoured the restless efforts of the Court of Rome to regain as far as may be its old supremacy. Even Naples came in for its full share of periodic denunciation at Rome on account of grievous "aggression" on the rights of the Pope, till Pius IX., after the hospitalities of Gaeta and Portici, felt that he could not with ordinary decency keep up the farce of protesting against his most dutiful and most Christian son, the *Re Bombardatore*. England and America have been held up as examples to the Catholic kingdoms: though it must be acknowledged that the uproar which we have raised against "Papal Aggression" has somewhat damaged our claims to the gratitude of the Holy Father. Still it is to be expected that our Cardinal-Archbishop and his suffragans will walk in the footsteps of "our glorious St. Thomas," and some way or other make it evident that they are no longer in the lamentable position of bishops *in partibus*.

The secular wealth of the clergy has also been a fruitful source of schism. The sequestrating of ecclesiastical property the Church has always held to be sacrilege, and has, as usual, defended herself by excommunications. Rosmini puts the case: Might not the timely giving up of all temporal possessions and honours in the days of Gustavus Vasa, of Frederick I., and of Henry VIII., have saved the authority of the Church in Sweden, in Denmark, and England? The Church aimed at keeping all, and lost her very position—both her possessions and her power sunk together. Such cases are likely to occur again, and the safer course which he indicates is to cast overboard the cargo to save the sinking vessel. The Church is a spiritual society, and must maintain her independence of secular communities in the exercise of her spiritual duties. The principle is right, and would be appropriate if Rome were the true Church of Christ.

IV. The fourth of the evils which Rosmini deplotes—or, as he calls it, the "Wound of the Right Foot"—is *lay patronage*, or the abandonment of the nomination of bishops to the lay power. He first establishes the right of the Church to elect her own office-bearers—a right given her, or rather a duty laid upon her, by the great Head of the Church—a right exercised by the Apostles, (Acts xiv. 22,) and by those whom they ordained, (Titus i. 3)—a right which the Church cannot barter nor alienate without yielding that liberty which belongs to those whom the Lord

hath made free. But this right of election belongs not merely to those who have been set in authority, for he states next the great principle of the early Church—the *people were the counselor and the clergy the judge*. He cites St. Leo and a host of fathers and bishops, to shew that the election of bishops, according to the Canons of the Church, belonged to the clergy and the people, and that no pastor was intruded on an unwilling flock. In the Roman Pontifical the ceremony in which the bishop asks of the ordained if they enjoy a good testimony among the faithful still remains, but it remains only as a ceremony. The right of government, of election of office-bearers, of holding councils, and of giving forth decisions in matters of doctrine and discipline according to God's Word, existed unquestionably among the early followers of the Lord: their Master's kingdom was not of this world, and "the Church of the Catacombs" took not her laws from Cæsar. After the conversion of Constantine, when the clergy began to abound in wealth, it became the interest of the emperors to subject them to their power, and hence in Antioch and Constantinople lay patronage was introduced into the Church. First the consent of the lay power was required to every ordination—and this consent grew into the right to nominate—and right to nominate became power to sell the benefices. He traces the long history of the struggle of the Church by her canons and councils against growing Byzantinism, and the gradual subjection of the Church to the secular power. He gives at length the case of the nomination of Odoacre to the Church of Beauvais by Louis III.—his rejection by the Council of Fismes held in 881, under the presidency of Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims—the intrusion of Odoacre, and his deposition by the Church; and this is but one example of the manner in which, during the struggle of centuries, the Church maintained her rights.

But in the Church herself there was a decline from the early rule of canonical election. The people were gradually excluded; then part of the clergy, till at last the Fourth Council of Lateran restricted the election of bishops to the canons of the cathedral. Then came the captivity at Avignon; the age of pontifical reserves; of pragmatic sanctions; and of concordats—by which the Church made terms for her authority over her own subjects. In fine, the elections were taken from the clergy and the people—taken out of the hands of the canons of the cathedrals—taken from under the control of the pontifical reserves; the long established rights of the Church were abolished, and the elections in all Catholic nations were abandoned to the lay power, reserving to the Pope the empty rite of confirmation.

The history of the Middle Ages is full of the struggles of the

Popes against lay investiture, and nominally for the right of canonical election; but they are no longer the struggles of the early Fathers for the purity of the Church of Christ. The leader in the war was Hildebrand, and his mantle seemed to have fallen on the Popes who succeeded him. Rome won the battle, and history has recorded *how*; but the authority which she had acquired by the terror of her interdicts languished into pontifical reserves, was counteracted by pragmatic sanctions, and at length compromised by concordats, till at last, in the sixteenth century, the cause gained by Hildebrand and his successors was again lost by the Church. The three great parties in the war against the Popes were Henry VIII. of England, Francis I., and Charles V.; in England Rome lost all, and happily for the cause of truth; in France and the Empire the nomination to benefices was ceded to the sovereign, the Pope reserving a mere subordinate authority in the right of confirmation. Such have been the rule and practice since; the bishop owes his ring and staff to the prince rather than to the Pontiff.

That the right of election belongs to the clergy and to the Christian people, Rosmini lays down as the scriptural rule, and as the law of the primitive Church. The civil power can require no more of the pastor than that he should be a good subject, obedient in all that relates to the laws of the State, but has no right to require that a pastor of the Church of Christ should be "*un misero impiegato di polizia*." But the fidelity of the pastor to the prince does not consist in flattery of his sovereign, or the sale of his own conscience, but in holding up to all the truth of the gospel, and the law of God's word. The appointment of the bishops now are political appointments, regulated by political interests, and dependent on the character and sentiments of a cabinet or a court; and, in such a case, where is the Church's liberty, or that right of counsel and election which was awarded to the faithful by the disciples of the Lord?

Nations are jealous of an *imperium in imperio*; and certainly the Church of Rome does not afford a very favourable arena on which to fight the battle of spiritual independence. In England we are not a little proud of our old statutes of mortmain, provisors, and *præmunire*; and, whatever may be said for the Lanfrancs and Anselms, St. Thomas à Becket is not exactly a saint according to the Protestant calendar. The Synod of Thurles has not quite convinced our Legislature of the great spiritual advantages to be derived from synodical action; and we have not yet been able to appreciate the wisdom and the tender concern of Mother Church for the educational and intellectual advancement of her children, by enrolling on her excellent Index the Greek Lexicon of Scapula and Whately's Logic.

We have made no little stir against the "government" of a cardinal, though taking title from that sacred spot in "Rome the Holy" where "St. Peter is groundedly believed to have enjoyed the hospitality of the noble and partly British family of the Senator Pudens." We judge the Church of Rome as a great ecclesiastical despotism, grasping at civil supremacy; and the history of that Church, from the time of the Seventh Gregory down to the "Letters Apostolic" of Pius IX., reconstituting the Romish hierarchy, with sounding titles, in the "very flourishing realm of England," verify the judgment. But Rosmini's plea on behalf of his Church, for liberty of action, must be judged of, not separately, but along with the other principles which he has laid down. His Church would not mumble a Latin mass; would not withhold the Book of books; would not separate the people in understanding and in heart from those who are set over them in holy things; and would have no division of the clergy into high and low, lords and subjects. His Church would not grasp at *benefices*, for the very name he abhors, as the memorial of liberty bartered by the Church for wealth; her rule, her interests, her work, belong not to an earthly kingdom.

Rosmini's ideal is the early Church, unsold to any earthly power, but usurping no temporal dominion. With all the zeal of a Guelph he contends for the Church's independence, and stands forth as the apologist alike of Hildebrand and Loyola. But the Church of Rome never has answered his ideal, and were that Church reformed even according to the principles sketched in his Essay, imperfect as that programme of reform may be, she would no longer make merchandise of souls, nor sit as a queen on the seven hills. Let the Roman bishop resign his triple crown, and return to the simple condition of the pastors of the flock before Constantine had bestowed the "fatal gift" on the "first rich father"—let the distinction between higher and inferior clergy be annulled—let the Book of books circulate freely, and the word be preached, so that every man may "hear in his own tongue the wondrous works of God"—and let the people have that voice and vote in the election of their pastors which the apostles and the early Church recognised; and when this reform has been effected, we shall not have much difficulty in coming to an agreement on the subject of synodical action. We do not need at this time of day to discuss over again for the ten-thousandth time the question of lay patronage in a Church that claims no authority over the things that are Cæsar's: but it is curious to mark how parties the most opposite in their tendencies meet at one narrow point on this subject of spiritual independence, only to diverge from it again. Rosmini has made

as near an approach to true principles on this question as any Romanist can make, but in doing so he has levelled the whole constitution of his Church, and fallen under the heavy censure of its authorities. The marvel is that one who has discovered such grievous declensions in the course of ages from the truths taught, and the principles carried out into practice by the apostles of the Lord, should continue to acknowledge the Church of Rome as the Church of Christ. The high-priests of the Italian Republic caught up the principle of the independence of the Church, not so much in concern for the authority of the Pope, as in zeal for the liberties of the people; the Venturas maintained it in eloquent declamations before the *élite* of democracy, and the Gavazzis rung it into the ears of the groundlings. The Pontiff and his Jesuit allies, abhorring in their heart of hearts all liberty of conscience among the people, sung *Te Deum* when the *Placet* was abolished in Austria, as the young Emperor had thus made the first step towards the giving over his dominions to a great spiritual despotism, the tried and trusty friend of unmitigated absolutism in the State. The Guelph in these days joins hands with the Ghibelline, as the new enemy that has arisen is an enemy to both. The Pope and his council plead for the independence of the Church that they may bring the bishops more thoroughly into subjection, and through the bishops enslave the people. Mazzini demands a council that he may crush the Pope. The new hierarchy in England makes an appeal in favour of synodical action; and the old hierarchy which feels itself assailed pleads for the revival of the Convocation, that it may not only assert its own authority in doctrine, but settle the weighty matters of candles and surplices. The pretensions of the Church of Rome grasping at her old supremacy over the bodies and the souls of men, and the pretensions of a Romanizing clergy assuming in a Protestant land all the airs of a priesthood, make us thankful at the moment for even such a weapon as the royal supremacy, to repel the aggression from without and from within. But the only antagonist that shall in the end prevail against error is the truth; and whether for meeting the assailants of our faith, or for the preserving of the doctrine and discipline of the Church, we should trust more to those really scriptural principles to which Rosmini has made so near an approach, than to the control of a parliament over benefices and bishops. Let the English Convocation be revived, and it is not too much to say that evangelical truth might run some risk at present; but let in at the same time the element of the popular voice in the election of pastors, and the sound Protestantism of the English people would make short work of "mummeries." And when Pius IX. claims unlimited authority

as successor of St. Peter, let him be required to answer whether he "enjoys a good reputation among the faithful," in his own See of Rome, and his guard of Gallic bayonets would make an affirmative answer no little awkward. Above all, let the Canons of the early Church as to the election of pastors be carried out in Tuscany, and we suspect the result would be such as Rosmini has not dreamed of. Tuscany, notwithstanding the walls of defence raised by the wisdom of Peter Leopold, has had her "Papal Aggression." The Church has formed an alliance with despotism, and continental liberalism under whatever form must wage warfare against both. Rosmini sees no hope for the Church save in revolution—not that he can sanction rebellion, or preach it as part of his creed, but that Providence may use the arm of the rebel to punish unjust usurpation, and to vindicate the liberties of the Church. Whatever the right and wrong of the question may be, the fact is evident, that in Roman Catholic Europe the elements of revolution are ready to break out again, and the time cannot be far distant when the continental kingdoms shall once more heave to the earthquake.

V. The last of the evils which Rosmini deplores—or, as he terms it, the "Wound of the Left Foot"—is *the servitude of ecclesiastical property*.

The system of the Church at present is an organized feudalism—a system of lordship and of vassalage. The clergy are divided from the people as an ecclesiastical caste; the clergy themselves are divided into lords and subjects; the higher clergy, or bishops, are divided from each other by vassalage to their respective princes; the Church in each kingdom is subject to the civil government in the election of its pastors; and, finally, the administration and use of ecclesiastical property are subject to the control of the secular power. The feudal spirit still regulates the relations of the Church.

The first rule of donations to the Church is, that they should be freely, spontaneously given. The Levitical law of tithes was not continued under the New Testament, that the measure of giving might be regulated, not by positive law, but by the consciences of the faithful. But when the Church degenerated, the free offerings of temporal things by the members of the Church to those who ministered unto them spiritual things, were merged and lost in the relation of debtor and creditor; and the donations of the faithful were absorbed in feudal property. Hence the laws of mortmain, regulating the property held by the Church in "dead hands," and hence the frequent examples of sequestrating all ecclesiastical goods for the uses of the State. The Church waged war with canons, Pontifical bulls, and excommu-

nications, to defend her secular wealth, but in a spirit unworthy of her character and her calling. In the early ages of Christianity, the words "secular clergy" had not been invented as a term descriptive of the pastors of the flock. Rosmini lays down rules for the regulation of ecclesiastical property, and deplors the scandal and the evil which arise from the prevalent idea that the Church has her hands always open to receive, but never open to give, and that all that enters her ark goes no more out. This unseemly grasping at this world's goods, excites the governments to interfere in sequestrating ecclesiastical property, and stirs up the people to break open the locked doors of the sanctuary. The Church, he says, should make public all her accounts, and publish an annual balance-sheet of all her income and expenditure; and if disputes arise between the ecclesiastical order and the secular power, the Church should rather abandon all her temporal wealth than run the risk of losing her hold on the hearts and consciences of the people.

It is difficult to persuade the Romish clergy that it is for their good that they should be unburthened of their temporal wealth; and in Italy, especially, it has passed into a proverb, *Wo be to the man who has money-dealings with a priest!* And the clutching ecclesiastics soften their avarice into a virtue, for they say the property is not theirs, but belongs to the Church, and they must defend the goods of the Church from the comfortable patrimony of St. Peter downward to the smallest benefice. The bishops, in addition to the somewhat notorious "*pro posse persequar*," swear to defend against all deadly the *regalia sancti Petri*. That they should exemplify Rosmini's virtue of willingly giving up their worldly goods for the peace of the Church and the good of souls is out of the question, and it is not a little difficult for Roman Catholic countries to apply the overgrown wealth of the clergy to the purposes of the State. When France laid her hands on ecclesiastical property in 1789, she was not particularly anxious about her reputation for Catholicity, and the reforms of the first Leopold in Tuscany were not certainly endorsed by the Pope. Even liberal and constitutional Sardinia, after such a bold measure as the passing of the Siccardi laws, is not prepared to go the length of sequestrating the property of the Church and pensioning the clergy. It is an interference with the canon law, and the Church will not suffer the *concordia discordantium canonum* of Gratian to be disturbed. It is an interference with the will and intention of testators, who have bequeathed their property to the clergy that masses may be said for the repose of their souls; it is a violation of solemn concordats with the court of Rome, and sacrilege in the eyes of the Church. When a nation abjures the doctrines of Romanism the case is clear; the

faith of posterity cannot be held in mortmain, and that which has been wrested by fraud and deception, and applied to idolatrous or superstitious purposes, may be restored again to legitimate uses. But the case of Sardinia shews how hard it is for a liberalized kingdom to act out its liberalism and yet retain its Popery. Rome never willingly yields one inch of ground that she has gained in the long struggle of thirteen centuries, and if kingdoms wait for the consent of Rome to their plans of reform, all progress is impossible. The brilliant aberrations of 1847 did not continue long to astound the world, and Popery has sobered into itself again. Such tricks may not be played again in St. Peter's Chair.

We have thus sketched the programme of reform proposed by an Italian priest, attached to his order, and willing to maintain all its influence; but it must be evident that reformation, even up to the point proposed, would destroy the characteristic features of modern Popery. Under Gregory XVI. the Cinque Piaghe lay unpublished in the author's desk—under Pius IX. the treatise has been put in the Index, and the writer exposed to the continual attacks of the priesthood. The Romish system requires something more than even Rosmini has proposed, and reformation originating in the Church itself may at once be given up as hopeless. The sober philosopher has managed to maintain his place, but his followers have been scattered or silenced. Father Ventura has read his recantation, and sunk into obscurity; and Father Gavazzi, if we may name him in such company, has been "starring it" in London, where his weekly orations have been "done" for the English press by an abler hand than his. Gioberti, too, has run his course, and retired into that privacy which, for his own credit, he should have never quitted. The vision of a reforming Vatican has been dissipated—Italy lies prostrate as before—and the dreaded company of Loyola have climbed again into the high places of the Eternal City. It will no longer do to assail abuses and bow to the holder of St. Peter's keys. The Neo-Catholic spirit is all but extinct in Italy: its noblest impersonations were Manzoni and Silvio Pellico; but the beautiful creations of the novelist are a libel on living capuchins and living cardinals, and the prisoner of Spielberg has outlived his reputation. Where, then, are we to look for the hope of reformation? Shall we find it in Mazzini and his republic?

If nothing more were sought than an overturn of the *statu quo*, we might answer, Yes; and certainly it would be difficult to reduce Italy to a worse condition than her present; yet we have not much confidence in Mazzini's substitute for the Papacy and the princes. Still it is evident that, without an utter over-

turn of the present system, there is no hope for the Peninsula. In the last revolution the democratic party was in the minority. Till the Allocution of April, Italy had not lost faith in the Pope, and the first campaign closed before she had lost faith in the princes. Novara dispelled all her dreams of independence, and the reaction quenched every hope of reform. Sardinia alone rose above the waters. The prisons of the two Sicilies are gorged with victims beyond number; in Rome the flag of the keys and mitre is guarded by the bayonets of France; and the same Pontiff who signed the amnesty of 1846 holds twelve thousand prisoners immured for political offences. The Romans "bide their time;" for one day in Paris may change all the relations of fickle France. In the gentle Tuscany, a miserable Government is fast undoing all that her legislators and reformers had done to raise her above the level of Italian states, and edicts worthy of the darkest days of barbarism have been placarded on the walls of Florence. Lombardy and Venice are still in the iron grasp of Austria, and Parma and Modena retain their little despots by favour of their Imperial "Protector." "The war of kings" ended at Novara, and Mazzini has since risen into a veritable power in Italy. When another revolution breaks out—and break out it must ere long, for all the elements are working beneath the surface with tenfold greater power than before—there will be fewer questions about kings and constitutions; and the wretched Governments of the Peninsula have forfeited all claim to liberal sympathy for the "weird" they have to "dree." But it is chiefly with the possible ecclesiastical changes we have to do, should the Mazzinian policy prevail in Italy.

And, *first*, after the decree of the *Senatus Populusque Romanus* on the 9th of February 1849, it is needless to say in what way the Republican party would deal with the temporal power of the Pope. At that time, when it was declared by the representatives of the Roman people that the Pope had fallen from his temporal power *de facto et de jure*, it was also decreed that the Roman Pontiff should have all necessary securities for his independence in the exercise of his spiritual power. We are not sure that the "Roman Pontiff" would escape so easily again. The defenders of the Papacy have been labouring hard of late to prove that the liberty of the Church requires that the Head of the Church should be independent—that this independence implies and requires a temporal dominion—and that such temporal dominion must be free from the control of a representative constitution, which, in fact, does not suit a Pope. The clique of old ladies that edit the *Civiltà Cattolica*—by far the ablest organ of the Papacy in Italy—have not yet convinced the world

that Rome enjoys more real liberty than any state in Europe, and that even the Model Republic is not so happy nor so free. Whatever the influence of the Pope may be in other quarters, his own subjects are strangely insensible to their blessings, and have listened to the voice of the demagogues. Democracy has been gaining power in the Peninsula since the first organization of the Neapolitan Carbonari. Father Curci, indeed, traces the origin of the system higher. It began with Lucifer; it whispered in Eden, "Ye shall be as gods;" it possessed itself of the heart of Cain, and began its earthly course in fratricide; it rose up again in Nimrod, and made him "a hunter of men;" and it inspired the builders of Babel to resist nature and her God. In the time of the Messiah it called itself Judas, and Caiaphas, and Pilate; centuries afterwards it was Mohammed; and when nearly another millennium had elapsed, it was Luther. Now it is Ronge in Germany—Proudhon in France—Mazzini in Italy. Here, then, is the *catena patrum* in favour of democracy. Whether the Papacy is yet to be swept away by the tide of infidel democracy remains to be seen; but certain it is that the revolutionary flood is flowing fast towards the "seat of the beast." Italy has not yet sunk to the level of France, has not yet become infidel; but the Papacy, unable to uphold its superstitions, and yet determined to shut out the truth, is fast obliterating every sentiment even of a false religion, and preparing the weapons for her own destruction. The republican faith in the future is in the constituent and the council—the "mission" of the Pope ended in 1848.

The democratic party would introduce a sweeping reform into the whole Church Establishment, which even Sardinia has not yet dared to attempt. Italy is literally eaten up by her army of ecclesiastics. In Sardinia, with a population of less than 4,500,000, there are 4 archbishops, 26 bishops, 52 vicars, 1484 canons and chaplains, 3854 parish priests, 7300 regulars of both sexes, and 3000 ecclesiastics, secular or regular. In the island of Sardinia, with a population of about half a million, there are about 3000 ecclesiastics, secular or regular: the convents throughout the kingdom amount to 428. In the Grand-Duchy of Tuscany, with a population of 1,500,000, (excluding Lucca,) there are 8757 secular clergy, 2540 regular, and 3900 nuns: the convents are 210. The number of convents before the time of the Leopoldine reforms was 300, and their patrimony, according to Count Serristori, (*Statistica dell' Italia: Firenze, 1842*,) "was represented by a capital of 98,000,000 of Tuscan livres. In the kingdom of Naples, with a population of 6,000,000, there are 26,304 priests or secular clergy, 11,394 regular clergy or friars, and 9512 nuns. In Sicily there are about 1316 con-

vents with a population of 15,182 monks or nuns, and this is an island numbering but 2,000,000 of inhabitants! In the city of Rome, with a population of about 150,000, there are nearly 2000 secular clergy, with about 4000 monks and nuns—in all 6000, or one to every twenty-five of the population. We could willingly enlarge on this subject, but these few facts may suffice to give an idea of the priestly element of Italian society. To account for the excessive numbers of the clergy, we must bring the doctrine of purgatory into the question. A priest can celebrate but one mass each day; and all the clergy in Italy are scarcely sufficient to say all the masses that must be said for the souls of the dead, and for the ordinary services of the Romish Church. The purgatorial domain is fruitful beyond all others in the production of priests, or of income for priests. The convents, again, are nurseries of idleness or vice; the lands of the wealthier orders lie uncultivated, while the monks fatten into a living scandal on the poverty of their profession. But the palmy days of Italian monachism are past, and of late the higher orders of monks have draughted but few novices into their convents. It would be exceedingly interesting to examine the condition of the monasteries throughout Italy, and to judge how far the spirit of the age has penetrated into the cloister. We believe that, among higher religious orders, the statistics of the convents would lead to the conclusion that monkery is dying for want of monks. The whole establishment of Vallombrosa, with a refectory fitted for 200 brothers, has been reduced to about four-and-twenty, including priests, lay brothers, and novices. Among the “Dons” of the magnificent Camaldoli, there are so few novices that the most beautiful of the sanctuaries of the Apennines may soon be empty of the followers of St. Romuald. We could point to one of the finest of the Olivetan convents where there is not a single novice, and where six recluses are wearing out their days in the all but deserted cloisters. To the sickly admirer of mediæval devotion, Italy seems a body from which the soul is departing. *Proh pudor!* the French are in Rome! In central and northern Italy the convents have been turned into barracks, or divided between monks and Croats. In the fair Florence the cloisters of St. Mark echo to the tramp of the soldiers of Austria: they have locked Savonarola’s cell, and boarded up the frescoes of Fra Angelico. The Dominicans, or, as mediæval legends loved to call them, the *Domini canes*, the dogs of the Lord, have somewhat overdone the thing, in establishing a reputation for the eager hunting out of heretics; and as the inquisition and the censorship do not happen to be popular just now, it is time that they should set their house in order. During the last revolution

the Jesuits were chased from every kingdom of Italy when the popular voice prevailed, and that formidable order must stand or fall with absolutism. While the Romish Church is decaying, and becoming gradually more feeble in the other orders, all her vital energies have been concentrated in the Society of Jesus. They have taken the traditionary place of St. Francis and St. Dominic, and uphold the falling Church of St. John Lateran. Rome is mustering her hosts for her last effort to regain her lordship over the bodies and the souls of men, and the Jesuits are the men whom she has chosen to order the battle. In the bosom of Catholicity itself, a spirit of resistance has been roused; and the Church, true to her principle, has leagued her priesthood with despotism, and blessed the princes in breaking the oaths by which they bound themselves to bestow a measure of freedom which proved dangerous to sacerdotal pretensions. The democracy of Gioberti, and the popular election of Rosmini, whatever their effect might be in the extremities, would make wild work for the Church in the central seat of Romanism. The "mission" of the Jesuits has not yet been accomplished. There are other orders that keep their place and flourish by the sheer force of ignorance. The corded Franciscan and bearded Capuchin are men of the people, and their convents are still abundantly crowded with the spiritual progeny of the beggar of Assisi. The vocation of the ecclesiastical gaberlunzie might harmonize even with the Mazzinian motto of—"God and the people."

The wanderings of twenty years, the war of the *Costituente*, and the brief term of the dictatorship at Rome—no longer Rome of the Popes, but Rome of the people—have thrown the charms of romance around the exiled Genoese; and the present condition of Italy, trodden down by the iron heel of both secular and ecclesiastical despotism, makes one almost long for the return of Mazzini. His principles imply at least liberty of thought and of action; and a free Gospel might work a wondrous change in a land that has not yet cast off all sense of responsibility to God. But all the iniquities of Rome may not tempt us into even a momentary approval of theories that differ *toto cælo* from the "Evangel" of Christ. The "Paroles d'un Croyant" of the Abbé Lamennais are but a poor travestie of the faith, and we must class Mazzini with such "believers." We might refer to the volumes published many years ago in exile, to the selections printed in Florence in 1848, and to the little pamphlets which still issue from secret presses, and make their way to thousands of eager readers throughout the length and breadth of the Peninsula. Some of these have been presented in English garb to British readers, so that we need not spend time in expounding

his theories. The Gospel he receives as a code of liberty, fraternity, equality, in the political and democratic sense of the words; and, instead of the falling or fallen Papacy, the people are to him the expounders of the will of God—his millennium is democracy. We listen not to one word of his maligners—his personal integrity has been proof against slander; and it can be no pleasure to dwell on writings so beautiful in language and rich in poetic sentiment, and expressing at times such lofty thoughts on the destiny of man, and yet to find nothing but poetic paganism breathed into the outward forms of Christianity. Even the downfall of the Pope, and the overthrow of his hierarchy might leave all untouched “the soul-destroying heresies,” as our forefathers called them, that have wrought themselves into the very sentiment and common thought of Italy. The creed of Rome has been infused into her architecture, her sculpture, her painting, her poetry, her romance, and what unsparing iconoclasm shall break all her idols? The one remedy that would heal “the wounds” of a corrupted “Church” may not be applied; for both the Church and the States which she inspires have combined utterly to reject it, and a constitution so diseased is beyond the power of the *vis medicatrix*. It is impossible to reform and be infallible, and in the vista that is opening we do not hope to discern the Vatican of Gioberti. The heavens are ominous enough of change, and the bright day will doubtless come at last; but, like the cloud blackening over Vesuvius, there are symptoms of impending woes when the contending elements shall break out, and the great city shall be divided, and the cities of the nations shall fall, and great Babylon shall come in remembrance before God.

ART. IX.—*The Exposition of 1851 ; or, Views of the Industry, the Science, and the Government of England.* By CHARLES BABBAGE, Esq., Corresponding Member of the Academy of Moral Sciences of the Institute of France. London, 1851. Second Edition.

THE Exposition of 1851—the great experiment of modern times, at first an idea, at last a reality—now stands before us, gigantic and sublime, commanding the admiration, and challenging the criticism of the civilized world. Commingling its crystal canopy with the azure vault which surrounds it, and stretching its magic corridors beyond our visual range, we are at once startled by its colossal magnitude, and enchanted with its fairy trellis work. In its moral and political, more than in its physical aspect, it is instinct with deep instruction, and pregnant with matchless results. Within the precincts of the lofty bazaar are displayed the productions of a planet—its diamonds and its gems ; its gold and its metals ; its coal and its minerals ; the ancient and the recent productions of its soil ; and the rich spoils of its animal and vegetable life ;—the elementary materials, in short, of the terrestrial freehold which the Great Benefactor has made over to man. Around them stand in proud array the noblest efforts of human genius ; the lifeless portraiture of forms divine ; the brilliant fabrics ; and the wondrous mechanisms which science and art have combined their powers to create. The sage and the artist of every clime, of every colour, and of every faith, are here enabled to study the productions of each other's country, to ponder over each other's labours, to share each other's wisdom, and to learn those lessons of love and charity, which a community of race, of interest, and of destiny, cannot fail to teach. Thus has the Palace of the Arts become a cosmopolitan gymnasium for the instruction of the world, and a temple of concord, in which a thousand hearts may beat as one, and a thousand anthems issue from every tongue. Nor will this knowledge be fruitless, and this community of feeling cease, when the Palace itself has been dissolved, and its riches scattered, and its occupants dispersed. If in the material world the most repulsive elements may be permanently compressed within their sphere of mutual attraction ;—if in the world of instinct natures the most ferocious may be softened, and even tamed, when driven into a common retreat by their deadliest foe,—may we not expect, in the world of reason and of faith, that men, severed by national and personal enmities, who have been

toiling under the same impulse, and acting for the same end, who are standing in the porch of the same hall of judgment, and panting for the same eternal home—may we not expect that such men, thus temporarily united in heart and in purpose, will never again consent to brandish the deadly cutlass, or throw the hostile spear? With such feelings, we doubt not, has the Exhibition of the Industry of all Nations been viewed by every party who has visited it; by the sanguine, who never doubted of its success; by the more cautious, who feared it might be impracticable; and, we hope, also even by its enemies, who not only anticipated, but desired its failure.

The history of so remarkable an event as the “Exposition of 1851,” in its origin, its objects, and its probable consequences, cannot fail to be a subject of the deepest interest, not only to those who have been its most frequent visitors, but to those who have never seen its exterior, or entered its walls. We shall endeavour, as briefly as we can, and yet as fully as our limits will permit us, to gratify the wishes of these two classes of our readers.

As early as the year 1845, after his Royal Highness Prince Albert became President of the Society for the Encouragement of Arts and Manufactures, he suggested the formation of a great periodical exhibition of the produce of British industry, in arts, manufactures, and commerce. A committee of the Society was appointed, on the 16th June 1845, to carry this suggestion into effect, and considerable sums were liberally subscribed to defray the necessary expenses; but the indifference of the public, the lukewarmness of manufacturers, and the hostility of some of the most eminent of their number, induced the committee to abandon the attempt.

There are some men, however, whom Providence occasionally summons to its aid, as the pioneers and the promoters of great undertakings—men of moral courage, whom no self-interest seduces, and no failure daunts, and no opposition subdues—who, looking beyond the influences of the passing hour, and viewing measures in the maturity of their results, determine at once to realize them. The Committee of the Society of Arts contained men of this high organization. Mr. Scott Russell, in December 1845, placed £50 at the disposal of the council of the Society of Arts, to be offered in “prizes for a series of models and designs of useful objects, calculated to improve general taste;” and it was further proposed, “that they should collect and exhibit models of the most exquisite works in art, for the improvement of the taste of workers and manufacturers in metals.” To this sum Mr. F. Cooke added £50, and the Society of Arts the same sum. A competition for these prizes

took place in May 1846; but few competitors appeared, and the judges had some difficulty in finding subjects deserving of reward.

The first exhibition of select specimens of British manufacture took place in March 1847, but it would have been a complete failure, had not two individuals, by personal exertion, obtained from a few great manufacturers a sufficient number of articles for show. The exhibition, however, was successful. Twenty thousand persons visited it, and the manufacturers, who had hitherto stood aloof, were now convinced that the articles had been favourably seen and rightly appreciated. In 1848, the exhibitors came forward unsolicited, and the Exhibition was witnessed by upwards of seventy thousand visitors. The third exhibition, in March 1849, was still more successful. Prince Albert offered a prize for the encouragement of colonial manufactures, and another for the improvement of an important art. Her Majesty, and several of the nobility and gentry, contributed objects of art to the exhibition, and a larger number than usual of medals and prizes was conferred by the Prince on the more eminent manufacturers. The success of these preliminary arrangements encouraged the Prince and his coadjutors to advance with a still bolder step. The Board of Trade had agreed to co-operate in the scheme of a great triennial exhibition, and the First Commissioner of Woods and Forests had consented to give a site for a suitable building. It was accordingly announced to the public in March 1849, that a series of periodical exhibitions of British industry, and an appropriate building, would be immediately commenced. •

The great idea of Prince Albert, of an Exhibition of the Industry of all Nations, was now about to be realized. The ignorance and apathy of manufacturers, the indifference of the public, and the lukewarm acquiescence of Government, had given way before the zeal and energy of its promoters. In June 1849, Mr. Scott Russell first ventured to submit to the Prince his opinion, and afterwards to state publicly at the annual distribution of prizes, that the time seemed to have arrived for carrying out the original suggestion of His Royal Highness. Mr. Russell had an audience of Prince Albert, and a small committee, consisting of himself, Mr. Cole, Mr. Fuller, and Mr. Cubitt, assembled at Buckingham Palace on the 30th June 1849, when the Prince communicated his views regarding the promotion of a great collection of works of industry and art in London in 1851, for the purposes of exhibition and competition; and it was on this occasion that His Royal Highness mentioned the four great divisions of *Raw Material, Machinery and Mechanical Inventions, Manufactures, Sculpture and Plastic Art*, of which the Exhibition should

consist. It was at this meeting, also, that the great feature of universality was given to the Exhibition by Prince Albert, and that it was agreed that it should comprehend the *Industry of all Nations*. Thus involving questions of international relations and colonial interests, and requiring the use of royal property for a site, it became necessary that the affairs of the Exhibition should be conducted under a Royal Commission. Six months elapsed before the Government came to a decision on the subject. In the meantime, the Committee and the Society of Arts continued actively to complete their arrangements; and when the Ministry saw the firmness and resolution with which the Prince and his friends prosecuted their enterprise, they issued their Royal Commission on the 3d January 1850. After naming the Commissioners, the Executive Committee, and their Secretaries, the execution of the plan was entrusted to any three or more of the Commissioners.*

Such was the sanction tardily given by the Government to this great undertaking. It involved them in no responsibility, bound them to no outlay of public money, and did not even imply the granting of a site on the property of the Crown. This ungenerous concurrence, however, did not daunt the ardour of the Prince and the Commissioners. They proceeded with great zeal to collect the necessary funds, and complete the necessary arrangements. Travelling Commissioners had been dispatched to the provinces to organize local committees, and Mr. Scott Russell had visited Prussia, and secured the co-operation of the authorities at Berlin, and of the States of the Zollverein in promoting the objects of the Exposition.

A site in Hyde Park having been fixed upon by the Commissioners, and granted by the Government, they advertised for a temporary and fire-proof building, which could be quickly erected, and still more quickly removed. No fewer than 245 designs† were speedily prepared, and exhibited by the Society of Arts; but though a few of these were selected as deserving of praise, yet the greater number were found to be of no value, from their inconsistency with the conditions laid down by the Commission. Beautiful and ingenious as some of the selected plans were, they were nevertheless all rejected as unfit for the purpose to which they were to be applied.

* The only important fact stated in the Commission, is that £20,000 was invested in the names of certain Commissioners, to be awarded in prizes and medals to the exhibitors of the most meritorious works.

† Of these plans, 38 were by foreigners; France sending 27, and other European states 11. Residents in London sent 128; residents in provincial towns in England and Scotland sent 60; and 7 were anonymous.

In this dilemma an event occurred so remarkable in itself and so singular in its results as to deserve being remembered. Mr. Paxton, who had superintended the construction of the Duke of Devonshire's hothouses, &c., at Chatsworth, was presiding at a Committee of the Midland Railway, assembled at Derby, to inquire into the conduct of a pointsman who had committed a railway offence: There lay before him a clean sheet of blotting-paper, upon which he was observed to be writing while the trial of the pointsman was going on: he was then asked to give his opinion on the case, as he had been paying particular attention to it. Having been previously acquainted with the particulars of the case, he had employed his time in making a sketch of the Crystal Palace, which, in the course of ten days, was expanded into regular plans, sections, and elevations of this remarkable design. The original sketch, thus so singularly executed, is displayed in the Exhibition, and is universally regarded as a document of peculiar interest. It represented a building consisting chiefly of glass and iron; and having been adopted by the Royal Commission, Messrs. Fox, Henderson, and Co., gave in a tender to construct it for £79,800. The Crystal Palace consists of a transept and a nave. The transept is 408 feet long from south to north: it is surmounted by a semi-cylindrical vault, 72 feet in diameter, springing from the vertical pillars at a height of 68 feet from the ground. The nave, including the width of the transept, is 1848 feet, the total length of the building. It is 64 feet high and 72 wide, and on each side of it extend aisles 24 feet in width, and above them at a height of 24 feet from the ground are carried galleries, which surround the whole of the nave and the transept. Beyond these first aisles, and parallel with them, at the distance of 48 feet, there are other aisles of the same width similarly covered with galleries of the same height as those over the first aisles. Bridges at frequent intervals span the 48 feet avenues, and divide them into courts. The 48 feet avenues, and the second aisles, are roofed over at the height of 44 feet from the ground. The rest of the building consists of one story 24 feet high without galleries. Access is given to the galleries by ten double staircases 8 feet wide. The total area of the ground floor is 772,784 square feet; and that of the galleries, which extend nearly a mile in length, 217,100 square feet. The cubic content of the whole building is 33,000,000 feet. There are 896,000 superficial feet of glass, weighing 400 tons,—2300 cast-iron girders,—358 wrought-iron trusses for supporting the galleries and roof,—30 miles of gutters for carrying water into the columns, and 200 miles of sash bars. Of wrought-iron, 550 tons have been used, and of cast-iron 3500 tons. The quantity of wood, including the flooring, is about 600,000 cubic feet.

The breadth of the nave is nearly double that of St. Paul's, and its length more than four times as great.

Such is a general description of the Crystal Palace, in so far as words and numbers can describe its form and dimensions; but no language, even with the aid of the most correct drawings, can convey a just idea either of its exterior magnificence or of its internal splendour. We may indeed delineate in imagination its lofty transept raising its glassy roof to the skies, and its lengthened nave vanishing from the eye in its distant and misty perspective:—We may gaze along its endless avenues, and rest our wearied eye-ball among its numerous aisles, but we strive in vain to create the gigantic portrait of the whole, or to construct mentally its gossamer of iron, or summon before us the innumerable and ever changing pictures which from above and from below meet the eye while we wander in astonishment through its crystal labyrinths.

Still more difficult is it to form even an approximate idea of the number, variety, and magnitude of its contents,—of the splendour of its furniture, or the richness of its decorations. On the external outline of its walls, and from its iron balconies within, wave the banners of nations—those bloody symbols of war under which our ancestors, and even our friends, have fought and bled. They are now the symbols of peace. Woven and reared by the hands of industry, they hang in unruffled unity—untorn by violence, and unstained with blood—the emblems indeed of strife, but of that noble strife in which nations shall contend for victory in the fields of science, in the schemes of philanthropy, and in the arts of life. The trophies of such conquests, the triumphs of such arts, are displayed within. Who can describe them without “thoughts that breathe and words that burn?” *Here* are the materials gathered from the surface, or torn from the bowels of our planet, the products of primæval creation or of annual growth, the direct gift of God to man—the elements of civilisation, from which his genius is to elaborate those combinations of science and of art which administer to the comforts of life and the grandeur of nations. *There* are the instruments to grasp with the eye the infinite and the infinitesimal, to measure space and time, to charm, to cure, and to kill. *There* are the mechanisms which have made man a tyrant over matter, cutting and twisting, and tearing and moulding its most adamant as well as its tenderest elements—which break and pulverize the crust of the earth—which lift up its heaviest and most solid strata—which span its rivers and its valleys—which transport the riches of our commerce across the deep, and which hurry us on wings of iron, beating the eagle in its flight, and mimicking the lightning in its speed. Yonder are

the fabrics which clothe the peasant and the prince, which deck the cottage and glitter in the palace—the cup which the husbandman dips into the crystal well, and the goblet of gold and of silver from which the more favoured of our race quaff the nectar of the gods—the jewels which hang on the neck of beauty, or which play a part in the pomp of kings. And, finally, as if to chide the vanity of the riches that perish, and chasten the extravagance that lives but for the present, we see commingled with the baubles of wealth and luxury, with what the moth and the rust corrupt, those divine models which record in marble or in bronze, the deeds of heroism that time has spared—the glorious names which the past has preserved for the future—the forms divine of the sage who enlightened, the warrior who defended, and the patriot who saved his country.

From the things thus seen and appreciated, we would desire to describe the circumstances under which we have seen them, the numbers, the appearance, the character, and the conduct of those who have flocked to the Palace of Industry. The inauguration of the Exhibition on the 1st of May, when it was first opened to the holders of season tickets, was a scene of national interest which can never be forgotten by those who had the good fortune to witness it. In this imposing ceremonial the Queen and Prince Albert were to perform the principal part. The Prince, at the head of the Royal Commissioners, was to read a short report on the proceedings of the Commission, and the Queen was to return an answer. Under ordinary circumstances such a ceremonial would have been one of those brilliant shows in which a sovereign in all the pomp of state exhibits herself to her subjects, but on this occasion it had a very different character. The Prince had proposed the Exhibition which was about to be opened;—the Queen had patronized it;—the public had viewed the scheme with an unfavourable eye;—the great and the wealthy took alarm, and became its enemies;—the ignorant hesitated,—the timid quailed: Philosophers threw their science at the airy fabric, while the engineer directed against it the bolts of his practical wisdom. Even the manufacturer and the artist, whose interests it was especially calculated to promote, viewed it with suspicion; and the Government itself, which, like other European Governments, ought long ere this to have established such an Exhibition for England, regarded it with coldness and indifference, and would have opposed it with all their influence had it been proposed by any other person than a Prince. In the face of all this opposition, the Prince proceeded with firmness and caution. He was sustained by the greatness of the object, and the grandeur of its results; and by that union of sagacity and moral courage which never fails to achieve what it contemplates, he had

succeeded in rearing a Temple of Industry, and filling it with the rarest productions of the earth, and the richest creations of science and the arts.

The day of trial at length arrived. A jury of twenty-five thousand intelligent spectators occupied the interior, and traversed the corridors of the gigantic bazaar. They stood aghast before the splendour of its furniture, the brilliancy of its decorations, and the massive grandeur of its mechanism. They trod in safety its iron carpentry. The hurricane and the hailstorm spent their violence upon its glassy roof, and the Palace of the Arts took its place, in the vocabulary even of its enemies, as one of the world's wonders. But who can describe the moral triumphs of the inauguration day? A Queen holding her court in the midst of twenty-five thousand of her subjects, and listening to a Report by her husband connected with the arts and sciences of her kingdom, was a sight never before witnessed in England; and we shall never forget the moment when fifty thousand eyes were fixed upon their Queen when she rose to reply to the Report of the Prince. After traversing at the head of her court and the ambassadors of foreign nations, the nave and the transept of the Crystal Palace, her Majesty truly said, that that day had been the happiest in her life. Happy, too, we would add, is the country with a Sovereign that derives her happiness from the patronage of science and the arts; happier still would that country be were it governed by men who shared in the feelings of their Queen, and possessed the knowledge of the Prince.

Three months have now elapsed since the Palace of Industry was opened to the public. Upwards of 74,000 persons have visited it in one day: The poorest labourer and the humblest artisan have been among the visitors, and yet no vulgar word has been heard, and no vulgar deed perpetrated within its crystal walls. Lectures have been established for the instruction of those who desire to be acquainted with the different objects in the Exhibition. Intelligent guides have been provided to point out and explain to strangers the different objects in which they take the deepest interest, and in this great national gymnasium the most regular attendants, the most ardent students, and, we venture to say, the best scholars, are the Queen and Prince Albert. The young Princes, accompanied by their tutor, attend the same school; and while the restless tide of life is flowing in gentle murmurs over this truly Pacific Ocean, the Royal Barge may be seen riding undisturbed, while its princely occupants are surveying their intellectual domain, and anticipating in its auroral beams the sunrise of British science. We have ourselves visited the Exhibition almost hourly ever since it was opened, and in every hour we have seen new wonders, and imbibed fresh know-

ledge, and returned again to be taught and to be humbled. "It is," as we have elsewhere had occasion to say, "among the productions of minds, at once inventive and profound, that we discover the limits and recognise the littleness of our own."

Such is a brief notice of the Exhibition of the Industry of all Nations. We have conveyed no idea of it to our readers, because it baffles all description, and transcends even the power of imagination. The eye alone can grasp the marvellous phases of an edifice which presents from every part of its floor and its galleries new ranges of perspective, new groups of aisles, and new combinations of objects; and that mind alone which throws upon the productions around the glances of its reason can form a right judgment of the extent and grandeur of the scene. It is scarcely, therefore, a matter of wonder that men of ordinary capacity, and even men of a high reach of mind, should have failed in realizing to themselves the nature and consequences of such an exposition; and we are for this reason the more surprised that some individuals who had no share in its organization, and no personal interest in its success, should have hailed this great undertaking from its commencement, and given their best energies to secure its success. Mr. Babbage, the author of the work which we are about to analyze, was one of the first to perceive and to acknowledge the advantages of the Exposition,—to appreciate the value of Prince Albert's labours, and, though not one of the Royal Commissioners—a position to which the author of "*The Economy of Manufactures*," and the inventor of the Calculating Engine, was pre-eminently entitled—to exert himself both by his conversation and his writings, to promote the objects of so great an undertaking.

In treating of the Exposition of 1851, he treats also of the Industry, the Science, and the Government of England,—subjects which have now acquired the deepest interest from the hold which the two first have taken of the public mind, and the recognition which has been made of their value in the highest quarters. Without its science the industry of England could never flourish, and without the stimulus and patronage of an intelligent Government, the sciences and the arts, the very food of our industry, would sink into insignificance.

The influence of the Exposition of 1851 on the cause of domestic and foreign civilisation, and the peculiar difficulties which Prince Albert must have encountered in organizing it, are thus beautifully described in Mr. Babbage's Preface:—

"The merit of the original conception of the present Exposition is insignificant in comparison with that of the efforts by which it was carried out, and with the importance of its practical results.

"To have seen from afar its effects on the improvement, the wealth,

and the happiness of the people—to have seized the fit moment, when, by the right use of the influence of an exalted station, it was *possible* to overcome the deeply-rooted prejudices of the upper classes—to remove the still more formidable, because latent, impediments of party—generously to have undertaken great responsibility, and with indefatigable labour to have endeavoured to make the best out of the only materials at hand,—these are endowments of no ordinary kind.

“To move in any rank of society an exception to its general rules is a very difficult, and, if accompanied by the consciousness of the situation, a very painful position to a reflecting mind.

“Whatever may be the cause, whether exalted rank, unbounded wealth, surpassing beauty, or unrivalled wit,—the renown of daring deeds, the magic of a world-wide fame; to all within those narrow limits the dangers and the penalties are great. Each exists an isolated spirit; each unconsciously imprisoned within its crystal globe, perceives the colours of all external objects modified by those tints imparted to them by its own surrounding sphere.

“No change of view can teach it to rectify this partial judgment; throughout its earthward course the same undying rainbow attends to the last its parent drop.

“Rarely indeed can some deep-searching mind, after long comparison, perceive the real colours of those translucent shells which encompass kindred spirits; and thus at length enable him to achromatize the medium which surrounds his own. To one who has thus rectified the ‘colour-blindness’ of his intellectual vision, how deep the sympathy he feels for those still involved in that hopeless obscurity from which he has himself escaped. None can so justly appreciate that sense of loneliness, that solitude of mind, which surrounds unquestioned eminence on its lofty throne;—none, therefore, can make so large an allowance for its errors;—none so skilfully assist in guiding its hazardous career.

“The triumph of the industrial arts will advance the cause of civilisation more rapidly than its warmest advocates could have hoped, and contribute to the permanent prosperity and strength of the country far more than the most splendid victories of successful war. The influences thus engendered, the arts thus developed, will long continue to shed their beneficent effects over countries more extensive than those which the sceptre of England rules.”—*Preface*, pp. viii-xi.

No higher compliment can be paid to the exalted individual so delicately referred to in the preceding paragraphs, and no higher appreciation made of the results of his arduous and successful labours. If in the future part of his work Mr. Babbage criticises the proceedings of the Royal Commissioners, and suggests steps which they have not taken, they will doubtless ascribe his observations and his suggestions to that anxiety for the success of the *Exposition* which he so strongly feels.

Mr. Babbage's work, which has already reached a second

edition, consists of seventeen chapters, in which, after some introductory observations on universal and general principles, he treats of the errors respecting the interchange of commodities—of societies and associations for advancing science—of the origin of the Exposition of 1851—of the object and use of the Exposition—of the limits to the size of the building, and the number and kind of its objects—of the site and construction of the building—of the prices of the articles exhibited—of prizes—of juries, and of the ulterior objects of the Exhibition. In discussing the topics referred to in these *twelve* chapters, Mr. Babbage is led into others not strictly belonging to the subject of the “Exposition of 1851,” but so closely connected with it that he would have done injustice to himself, and to the great cause of which he has been so long the eloquent pleader, if he had not done what no other person but himself was able to do—to expose without any false delicacy the intrigues of science,—to speak of the Calculating Engine, and the strange history of its fate,—to make foreigners, as well as his own countrymen, acquainted with the present position of science in England,—to speak of the influences of the press and of party on the advancement of knowledge, and to convey to readers of all classes what they know very little about, some correct information respecting the nature and number of the rewards which intellectual merit receives in the richest country in the world.

As the greater part of Mr. Babbage's work was in type before the opening of the Exhibition, but, from causes which he does not explain, not published till the building was erected, and the general arrangements of the Exhibition fixed, the Royal Commission was not able as a body to derive from his published remarks and suggestions all the benefit which they were so well calculated to yield; though we have reason to believe that he had communicated his views to individual Commissioners with whom he was personally acquainted. Regarding the plan of the Exhibition as “unrivalled for the advancement of the arts of peace, and calculated not only to benefit our own country, but to contribute to the civilisation of the world,” Mr. Babbage has commented with some severity on the conduct of the Ministry, and of the inhabitants of Belgrave Square and its neighbourhood, for the opposition which they made to it; and it was no doubt from the hostility which both these parties exhibited that all the fears and predictions of failure which so long and so deeply affected the public mind took their rise. Government had hitherto left all our institutions for the advancement of literature and science to be supported by voluntary associations, and it is more than probable that if the Exposition of 1851 had been suggested or patronized by any other person than the Prince,

they would neither have granted the site for the building, nor permitted a Royal Commission to be issued. Their scientific advisers, for it would seem that some persons assume such a title, had no doubt warned them that the patronage of such an institution would expose them to fresh demands from science and the arts, and gradually introduce that system of national organization which they had so zealously striven to oppose.

After treating of the origin of the Exposition, and making many important suggestions respecting the collection of subscriptions, the price of admission, and a variety of other topics, which, "even though unavailing for the present, may promote the interests of some future Exposition," our author enters upon the more interesting topic of the object and use of the Exposition:—

"The approaching Exhibition is considered by many as a great and splendid show, calculated to give pleasure and excitement to hundreds of thousands of persons. Even in this sense it would be beneficial, for it is always important that the pleasures of the people should be productive of some advance in their tastes and information. But its great and paramount value depends on other causes. Its object may be most concisely expressed by stating that—

"The Exposition is calculated to promote and increase the free interchange of raw materials and manufactured commodities between all the nations of the earth.

"Its object is not the exclusive benefit of England; and if any such mistaken view is still entertained, it may without hesitation be stated that it would be impossible by any mode of management to accomplish so selfish an object.

"The interest of every people is, that all other nations should advance in knowledge, in industrial skill, in taste, and in science. The advances made in the two latter subjects acquire *permanent* existence only through the *publicity* given to their enunciation and discussion. Refining and elevating all by whom they are received, new principles in taste or in science, as soon as they are accepted as truths, become the universal property of mankind.

"But although the Exposition itself could not and ought not to have been attempted for the sole benefit of this country, it is almost certain that England will reap the greatest share of its advantages. This will arise from the more extended system of her commerce, and from the habits of her people. The profits of the merchant, other circumstances being equal, depend upon the amount of his capital. Similarly, the knowledge brought back by the traveller in foreign countries, or derived from his observation in his own, will mainly depend on the stock of information he carried with him to give in exchange.

"To arrive at those principles by which the Exposition ought to

be regulated, it becomes necessary to examine the nature and extent of the interests involved.

"In all interchanges there are three distinct parties concerned—

The Consumer,
The Middle-man,
The Producer.

"Consumers, including every human being, have a strong interest in the freest competition as producing the lowest price.

"Producers have an interest in selling their produce in the dearest market, and therefore claim free competition. But they have no advantage in selling it at the highest price: because a high price limits the extent of the sale. Their object is that the profit on each article, multiplied by the number sold, shall be the greatest possible.

"Middle-men, although usually averse to competition, have yet a direct interest in the amount sold."—Pp. 41-43.

One of the first problems which the Commissioners had to solve, was to determine the nature of the articles which should have a place in the Exhibition. A certain limitation, however general it might be, was absolutely necessary before the size and character of the building could be fixed. The Committee do not seem to have imposed any limits upon those who might exhibit the productions of the soil, or of the interior of the earth. The space granted to nations as well as to individuals, was in this a sufficient bar against the accumulation of such articles. But in exhibiting specimens of the industry of the world, the Commissioners found it advisable to make a distinction between the *fine* and the *industrial* arts, which, though they at some points come into close approximation, are yet separated by a line sufficiently distinct.

"The fine arts and the industrial arts," says Mr. Babbage, "although of the highest importance each to the other, are separated by a sufficiently definite line of demarcation, even at the points at which they most nearly approach. The characteristic of the fine arts is, that each example is an individual—the production of individual taste, executed by individual hands; the produce of the fine arts is therefore necessarily costly. The characteristic of the industrial arts is, that each example is but one of a multitude, generated according to the same law, by tools or machines, (in the largest sense of those terms,) moved with unerring precision by the application of physical force. Their produce is consequently cheap.

"The fine arts idealize nature by generalizing from its individual objects: the industrial arts realize identity by the unbounded use of the principle of copying.

"The union of the two, enlarging vastly the utility of both, enables art to be appreciated and genius to be admired by millions whom its single productions would never reach; whilst the spectator in return, elevated by the continual presence of the multiplied repro-

duction of the highest beauty, acquires a new source of pleasure, and feels his own mechanical arts raised in his estimation by such an alliance."—Pp. 47, 48.

According to this definition, as Mr. Babbage himself remarks, lace not produced by machinery would take its place among the fine arts, while statues made by machinery would be ranked among the industrial arts, the one being made by the united labour of individuals, and the other capable of being multiplied to any extent. In like manner, the beautiful oil prints of Mr. Baxter, and the chromographs, as they are called in the Catalogues of the articles exhibited by the Imperial Austrian Printing Establishment, belong to the industrial, while the originals from which they are copied belong to the fine arts.

The nature of the articles exhibited depends as much upon the character of the building which is to receive them, as it does upon their own individual character. In a building which admits the whole light of the sky, except where it is eclipsed by the beams of its carpentry, it would be impossible to make a favourable exhibition of pictures, while statues could be advantageously displayed. When an oil painting is illuminated from numerous points, or by broad beams of light, the varnished surface thus rendered visible destroys the finest touches of the artist, and removes the illusion which he had produced. In like manner, gems, such as the diamond, which derive their principal beauty from the prismatic spectra which they produce, lose all their charm when exhibited in a palace of crystal, while gems and precious stones, which derive all their beauty from their colour, are displayed to great advantage. The great Koh-i-noor or Mountain of Light, the Durra-i-noor or the Sea of Light, and the fine blue diamond of Mr. Hope, have less effect, as now exhibited by daylight, than a piece of glass of the same size and tint would have, if exhibited in a private room with two or three windows. In the spectra produced by broad luminous spaces, all the colours are recombined into white light, and hence the disappointment which every person has experienced at the first sight of these singular gems. Were the same gems to be worn by a lady in a drawing-room, with numerous bright lights, their effect would astonish the company.* The fine coloured refractions of the diamond disappear also under other circumstances. When the diamonds are very small, and set closely together, the numerous prismatic spectra which they produce are mingled, and produce white light on the retina of the

*Many intelligent persons mistook the hollow foil of its case for the great diamond itself.

eye, and this diminution of colour increases with the number of lights. When small diamonds, however, are at a sufficient distance from each other, they are seen to the greatest advantage when the lights are sharp and numerous.

As the sight of rare precious stones must always be exceedingly interesting, because they are never seen in collections of minerals, and when in the possession of individuals can only be seen by their private friends, it would have been desirable to place all the diamonds (as the Koh-i-noor is on Fridays and Saturdays) in a dark apartment illuminated by numerous small and brilliant lights. Till this was done with the Koh-i-noor, nobody had any idea of its purity and beauty, and indeed nobody till then could say that it was not a piece of glass.*

The existence of an exhibition in the National Gallery, both of painting and sculpture, was very naturally urged as a reason why neither paintings nor statues should be admitted into the Exhibition. The Commissioners, however, decided in favour of sculpture, and, as Mr. Babbage has stated, "the beautiful effect produced by the sculpture in the Crystal Palace has fully justified the decision." Under such circumstances we cannot see any reason for the rejection of pictures. There is at this moment ample room for a very large collection in the remote part of the foreign galleries, and it would have been easy to have obtained a beautiful illumination of them from the glass roof. A collection of the pictures of the best foreign living artists, selected by the Commissioners of their respective countries, would have been an object of great interest to all classes; and if such a collection had been made, the works of our own living artists would doubtless have found a place. The contemporaneous existence of two exhibitions of pictures would not have been attended with greater difficulties than the contemporaneous exhibition of two galleries of statues.†

Our author's chapter on the site and construction of the building contains many valuable suggestions. He proposed to place

* The introduction of ground glass globes into our apartments, however beautiful they may be as objects seen by the eye, destroy the beauty of all other objects. Silver and gold plate, and all other objects that derive their beauty from reflected light, lose their polish, and have actually the same appearance as if their surface was ground. The coloured spectra, too, produced by the diamond and other precious stones, are all *dimmed* as if they were seen through ground glass.

† Since this was written we have seen the admirable pamphlet of Mr. Spiridione Gambardella, entitled, "*What shall we do with the Glass Palace?*" in which he proposes "that the Crystal Palace shall remain in its present site, to be used (among other things) as a temple of art, one year for painters and one for sculptors," and that all the painters in the world shall be invited to compete within its walls in the summers of 1853-54. The author proposes that twelve prizes, at least, and of large amount, shall be adjudged by a jury of twenty-five qualified persons;

it on the eastern side of Hyde Park, on the open ground adjacent to "a narrow stripe near Park Lane, occupied by plantations, the circular reservoir, and garden;" and he shews by an accurate calculation, that upon the supposition that there will be *four millions* of visitors, five millions of miles will be uselessly traversed by placing it where it is, and a pecuniary loss incurred of £35,833. With regard to the building itself, Mr. Babbage highly approves of Mr. Paxton's design. "Amongst all the curious and singular products," he says, "which the taste, the skill, the industry of the world have confided to the judgment of England, there will be found within the crystal envelope few whose manufacture can claim a higher share of our admiration than that Palace itself, which shelters these splendid results of advanced civilisation. The building itself was regularly manufactured. Simple in its construction, and requiring the multiplied repetition of a few parts, its fabrication was contrived with consummate skill. The internal economy with which its parts were made and put together on the spot, was itself a most instructive study."

One of the most singular facts in the history of the Exposition of 1851, was the absolute prohibition by the Commissioners, that no exhibitor should affix a price to the articles which he exhibited. Mr. Babbage has treated this interesting question at great length, and has pointed out, with his usual talent, the absurdity and the injurious consequences of such a prohibition. So early as the 28th February 1850, Colonel Reid had recommended that "prices should be attached to the objects exhibited;" but in place of adopting this excellent recommendation, the Commissioners came to the decision, "that the prices are not to be fixed to the articles exhibited." The Chevalier Bunsen, in the name of the Prussian Government, the Leeds Committee, and the Hamburg and Danish Commissioners, all remonstrated against that decision, and declared that the statement of price was essential to the utility of the Exhibition. The Commissioners were thus induced to modify their decision so far as to permit the exhibitor to give their prices to the Commissioners or to the jurors, and to make cheapness of articles an element in the adjudication of prizes; but they sub-

and that the jury shall publish a general report, containing the names of the jurors who voted for each prize picture, and the reason for their votes. The "leading features of this plan are,—

" 1. The free competition of artists.

" 2. The selection of unimpeachable judges.

" 3. The instruction of the people, and the cultivation of their taste."

We would recommend this remarkable pamphlet to the careful perusal of our readers. It is written by a distinguished artist, who unites the noble quality of high moral courage with the best qualities of a rich and cultivated intellect.

stantially adhered to their first decision, by declaring that prices must not be affixed to any article exhibited, even though there should be no other reason for exhibiting it than its price. The reason which the Commissioners themselves state for this regulation is, that if "they allowed the fixing the actual price to the articles themselves, they should be making themselves responsible for the accuracy of those prices in all instances;" but however much they were influenced by the weight of this responsibility, there is reason to believe that it was the powerful influence of the retailing shopkeeper and the middle-men that overcame the better judgment of the Commissioners. These men saw that their customers would stand aghast at the magnitude of their profits, but they might have trusted to the influence of reason and truth, which would have enlightened the public mind, and proved that their apparently large profits were necessary to meet the expense and the commercial risks of the retail trade.* The following observations of Mr. Babbage deserve to be studied by both parties.

"If every article had its price affixed, many relations would strike the eye of an experienced observer which might lead him to further inquiries, and probably to the most interesting results. But it is quite impossible for him to write to any considerable portion of 15,000 expositors for their list of prices, or even to go round and ask for it in the building itself.†

"Price in many cases offers at once a verification of the truth of other statements. Thus, to a person conversant with the subjects—

"The low price of an article might prove that it had been manufactured in some mode entirely different from that usually practised. This would lead to an examination of it, in order to discover the improved process.

* Mr. Babbage has given the following list of expenses to which the retail trader is subject:—

- "1. Commission to broker or other middle-man.
- "2. Cost of carriage from manufactory to shop.
- "3. Rent of shop itself, and perhaps, also, of a warehouse.
- "4. Insurance of stock against fire.
- "5. Attendants to sell in shop.
- "6. Sending goods home to purchasers.
- "7. Expense of paper, string, &c., for packing goods delivered.
- "8. Loss by plunder of servants.
- "9. Expense of taking stock to diminish this loss.
- "10. Goods soiled or injured by exposing to sale.
- "11. Goods going out of fashion, cheapened by improved manufacture, or superseded by new inventions.
- "12. Giving long credit.
- "13. Bad debts.
- "14. Payment for his own personal services, as retail trader.
- "15. Interest on capital employed."

† Since Mr. Babbage's work was published, several detailed catalogues, with the prices of the articles, have been printed by the Commissaries of foreign countries.

"The *price* of an article compared with its weight might prove that the metal of which it is made *could not* be genuine.

"The *price* of a woven fabric, added to a knowledge of its breadth and substance, even without its weight, might in many cases effectually disprove the statement of its being entirely made of wool, or hair, or flax, or silk, as the case might be.

"The exchange of commodities between those to whom such exchanges may be desirable, being the great and ultimate object of the Exposition, every circumstance that can give publicity to the things exhibited, should be most carefully attended to. The price in money is the *most important element* in every bargain; to omit it is not less absurd than to represent a tragedy without its hero, or to paint a portrait without a nose.

"It commits a double error: for it withholds the only test by which the comparative value of things can be known, and it puts aside the greatest of all interests, that of the consumer, in order to favour a small and particular class—the middle-men."—Pp. 79, 80.

In his *ninth* chapter, Mr. Babbage discusses the important subject of prizes. In the general plan settled at Osborne on the 14th July 1849, "it was proposed that the first prize should be £5000, and that one, at least of £1000, should be given in each of the *five* sections." This proposal was, we think, wisely abandoned, and the amount to be given in prizes was fixed at £20,000, the sum subsequently named in the Royal Commission as the least that was to be expended on prizes and medals. The announcement on the Continent of this system of prizes excited universal astonishment, and many individuals made great personal sacrifices in the hope of carrying off one of these high rewards. Mr. Babbage is of opinion that "the effect of such rewards would be to increase very much the number of minds engaged in making inventions," the inventor "being generally the least rewarded," while "the capitalist, or the manufacturer of articles," can almost always make his own way to wealth. Among the subjects which Mr. Babbage mentions as "fit subjects for prizes," he enumerates "a small motive power ranging from the force of half a man to that of two horses, which might commence and cease its action at a moment's notice, require no expense of time for its management, and be of a moderate price, both in original cost and in daily expense." Such a power, he conceives, would be invaluable for the "men just rising from the class of journeymen to that of master," and also "to small masters in many trades," or "it might be applied to small planing and drilling machines, to lathes, to grindstones, grinding mills, mangling, and a great variety of other purposes." To this Mr. Babbage adds an improvement on the lathe, by which it could be made to cut screws, plane small pieces of metal, and cut the

teeth of wheels. Mr. Babbage mentions other two desiderata, namely, the use of voltaic batteries as sources of light, and their application to the darkening and restoring of light by breaking and renewing the galvanic circuit. "Ready means," he adds, "might then be supplied of clearly distinguishing one lighthouse from another; and for this purpose, it would be necessary to denote the lighthouses on any coast by different numbers."*

It was at first the intention of the Royal Commissioners that several of the rewards should be money prizes, but it has been subsequently decided that the greater part of the £20,000 prize fund—at least £15,000—shall be given in medals, and that these medals shall be wholly of bronze. The great medal, which is to be given very sparingly, and for a very high degree of merit, is to have the value of about £2, 5s.; and the second medal, which is to be given very liberally, is to have the value of about £1, 10s. The number of great medals will probably not exceed 700, and the number of the other medals 4000 at the very utmost, which would correspond only to the sum of £6450—a very small portion of the Prize Fund. If we add to this a sum of £2000 for the silver medal, which it is proposed to give to each of about 310 persons, there will thus be left a large unappropriated portion of the fund devoted for prizes.

It has always been our opinion, and, we believe, to a considerable extent the opinion of the public, that the prizes should have been medals of gold or silver;—articles of real value, which the poor prizeholder could make available in his hour of necessity, or which the rich man could display with more satisfaction than he can do a large disc of bronze, however beautiful be its design and its execution.

In his *tenth* chapter, our author passes to the subject of the Juries by whom the prizes are to be awarded, and the principles and rules by which they should be guided in adjudging them. Since the publication of Mr. Babbage's work, the Royal Commissioners have arranged everything connected with the adjudication of the prizes with great sagacity. They have established thirty classes, containing about 312 jurors, one-half of which are British subjects, and the other half foreigners—some of these classes having one or more sub-juries. These

* Mr. Babbage states also that Sir David Brewster had proposed a plan for distinguishing lighthouses from one another numerically. When the light transmitted through a thin transparent film is analyzed by a prism, it appears either single, or divided into two, three, four, or more parts, according to its thickness. Mr. Babbage's contrivance, which we have seen in action, consists in eclipsing the light a certain number of times by the agency of a clock, and is applicable to signals, or to convey telegraphic messages either to vessels in distress, or for other purposes.

thirty classes are arranged into *six* groups;* and as a court of appeal there is a third body called the Council of Chairmen, composed of the chairmen of the thirty juries and sub-juries. The adjudication of the second medal is entrusted to each jury, subject to the approval of the group to which that jury belongs. The different classes name the individuals for the great medal; but its final adjudication, after being approved of by the group, is left to the Council of Chairmen. In this way, there is every reason to believe that the prizes will be awarded according to the merit of the articles exhibited. In order to avoid as far as possible the idea of individual or national competition, the juries have distinct instructions from the Council of Chairmen "that medals are to be awarded for articles possessing decided superiority, of whatever nature that superiority might be, and not with reference to a merely individual competition;" and that "the two classes of medals are intended to distinguish the respective characters of subjects, and not as first and second in degree of the same class of subjects."

The Medal Committee, consisting of Mr. Gladstone, Lord Lyttleton, Mr. Macaulay, and the Rev. H. G. Liddel, have recommended for the inscription on the *first* medal the following line, very slightly altered from Manilius :†

"Est etiam in magno quædam respublica mundo."

For the *second* medal the following line from Ovid :‡

"Dissociata locis concordî pace ligavit."

For the *third* medal, which has now been abandoned, the following line from Claudian :§

"Artificis tacitæ quod meruere manus."||

And for the *Jurors' silver* medal :

"Pulcher et ille labor Palma decorare laborem."

The selection of jurors for each foreign country was left to that country, and the number of jurors allowed to each foreign country was, upon the suggestion of the Foreign Commissioners, as follows :—

* 1. The Group of Raw Materials ; 2. The Group of Machinery, including Philosophical Instruments ; 3. The Group of Textile Fabrics ; 4. The Group of Metallic, Vitreous, and Ceramic Manufactures ; 5. The Group of Miscellaneous Manufactures ; and, 6. The Group of Fine Arts.

† *Astronomicon*, v. 737.

‡ *Metamorph.* v. 25.

§ *Eidyll*, vii. 20.

|| We cannot approve of any of these inscriptions. With regard to the first, the Americans *will* say, and the French *might* say, "This is our Republic." The second inscription would appropriately encircle the head of Prince Albert on the medal, but records *only one*, and that only a probable result of the Exposition. The third is quite inapplicable, as that medal was intended for exhibitors only.

France,	32	Turkey,	3
United States,	21	Spain,	3
Zollverein,*	19	Egypt,	2
Austria,	15	Holland,	2
Belgium,	11	Portugal,	2
Italy,†	6	Denmark,	1
Russia,	6	Sweden and Norway,	1
Switzerland,	4	Greece,	1
North Germany,‡	7		

In the very laborious and difficult task confided to the juries, they have been aided in the general transaction of their business by a person named by the Royal Commissioners for the purpose of explaining the rules of the Commission. The person thus named by the Commissioners was Dr. LYON PLAYFAIR, of whose talents, sagacity, and habits of business it is impossible to speak in terms of too high praise; and without undervaluing the great services of our English friends, we may be excused if, in a Scottish Review, we signalize the services of our countrymen, Colonel Reid, the Chairman of the Executive Committee, Mr. Scott Russell, one of the two secretaries to the Royal Commissioners, and Dr. Lyon Playfair, as having greatly contributed to the success of the Exposition of 1851.

The views which Mr. Babbage has given in his *eleventh* chapter, "on the ulterior objects" of the Exposition, have a peculiar value, and we have no doubt that the Royal Commission will gladly avail themselves of many of his suggestions. Mr. Babbage suggests that extensive collections should be made of examples of the industrial products in the Exhibition, and it appears that the French Chamber has already devoted 50,000 francs for the purchase of specimens. He proposes that specimens of all woven products should be arranged in books;—that coloured woven goods might be similarly arranged in regard to colour;—and that enamel colours on porcelain from different manufactories should be obtained from the manufacturer in small squares.

Among the higher advantages of the Exposition, Mr. Babbage justly ranks its influence over the mind, the taste, and the judgment of its visitors; and, while we call the attention of our readers to the following eloquent expression of his views, we would ask the young statesman, who has not yet imbibed the prejudices and displayed the ignorance of his teachers, to consider what will be the judgment of posterity upon the successive Governments of England, who have neglected, and systematically excluded

* Including Bavaria, Prussia, Saxony, Wurtemberg, &c.

† Comprehending Sardinia and Tuscany.

‡ Comprehending Bremen, Hamburg, and Hanover.

from office and from honours the class of men to which this extract refers :—

“Shew to the student,” says Mr. Babbage, “some mechanism effecting results apparently beyond the reach of the art, and he becomes impressed with the immense distance between his own intelligence and that which contrived it. Explain to him the simple means and the beautiful combinations by which it is effected, you then raise him in his own estimation, and the studious disciple thus instructed, will ultimately arrive at the conclusion that the only distance which is really *immense*, is that existing between the perfection of the highest work of human skill and the simplest of the productions of nature.

“In questions relating to taste the subject-matter is so idealized that the enthusiastic and the timid equally dread its contact with the more sober powers of reasoning, lest the process of analysis should disenchant its visionary scenes, and dissolve the unreal basis of their delight. Taste the most perfect, without a knowledge of the principles on which it rests, resembles the barren instinct of animals; like them, it gathers but little improvement from experience, and like them it perishes with the extinction of the individual life; its labours leave no inheritance to its race.

“Taste united with an intimate knowledge of its principles, and still more if conjoined with the power of eliminating from the fleeting relations amongst the objects of its attention, those resemblances which, when sufficiently multiplied and defined, lead up to the discovery of higher generalizations, confers upon its enviable possessor a double source of happiness; it adds the delight of an intellectual triumph to those romantic feelings which are excited by the beautiful, the lovely, or the sublime in Nature, or which are suggested by the most perfect representations of art.

“The comprehension of the cause of our pleasure renders us more acute to perceive those elements which conduce to its existence, to trace their connexion, to estimate their amount, to mould and to call up for the happiness of others and of ourselves their endless combinations.

“There is, however, for that rare union of judgment, imagination, and taste, which we call genius, when each exists in due proportion and in rich abundance, a yet higher object, a still nobler ambition. To have given to mankind those models, which, after twenty centuries, still rivet their attention, commanding unbounded admiration and defying rivalry, is indeed a splendid achievement, justly repaid by the undying fame which accompanies the names of those benefactors to mankind.

“But great as undoubtedly our gratitude ought to be for such gifts, it is trifling compared with that which civilized society would owe to him, who should instruct us in the *principles* that guided the intellect, as well as the hands of those by whom such immortal works were executed.

“In the fine arts, and in the arts of industry, as well as in the pursuits of science, the highest department of each is that of the dis-

covery of principles, and the invention of methods. To investigate the laws by which human intellect picks with caution its uncertain track through those obscure and outlying regions of our knowledge which separate the known and the certain from the unknown; to teach us how to cast as it were an intellectual and temporary connecting line across that chasm, by which a new truth is separated from the old—confident that when arrested by that isolated truth it will have fixed itself upon one solid point, amidst a floating chaos of error,—confident also that, when once the fixity of that single point has been assured, it is always *possible*, however formidable the task, to link it by innumerable ties to established knowledge, and thus to fill up the intervening space even to the very boundary of its enlarged domain:—to achieve such a conquest in any science surpasses all other discoveries, for it supplies tools for the use of intellect, and enlarges the limits and the powers of human reason.”—Pp. 123-126.

In contemplating the Exposition of 1851 in its results, we trust that Prince Albert may truly say in the terms of the inscription which we have mentioned:—

“*Dissociata locis concordi pace ligavi.*”*

It will indeed be one of the noblest results of this great reunion, should it effect among nations what it has already produced among individuals, the removal of jealousies that are temporary, and the establishment of friendships that are enduring. The annual meetings of the scientific men of all nations have already taught us that personal communication, and the interchange of social kindness, revive our better feelings, and soften the asperities of rival and conflicting interests. May they not even teach us that “lowliness of mind” under which “each may esteem others better than themselves?” Nations are composed of individuals; and that kindness and humility which adorn the single heart, cannot be real if it disappears in the united sentiment of nations. “It is not easy to believe,” as we have elsewhere had occasion to state, “that nations which have embraced each other in friendly intercourse, in the interchange of social kindness and professional knowledge, will ever recognise any other object of rivalry and ambition than a superiority in the arts of peace. It is not likely that men who have admired each other’s genius, and borrowed each other’s lights, and given just judgment on rival inventions, will ever again concur in referring questions of national right and national honour to the sanguinary arbitrament of war. Among the thousand instruments which hang beneath every banner that waves in the Crystal Palace, there is one which, though but spiritually discerned, escapes no eye and excites no envy: it is the calumet of peace—the little emblem

* What space separates the Exhibition unites.

of that universal brotherhood which we trust is about to dawn upon distracted and divided nations."

Among the other ulterior objects of the Exposition to which Mr. Babbage refers, we may mention as subjects of interesting discussion with our foreign visitors—the state of the Patent laws in every part of the world—the state of the English law of partnership, which presents great obstacles to the progress of the mechanical arts—and the universal language of mechanical notation,* "which will be, when generally employed, capable of being read by every people, just as the Arabic numerals are at present." These important topics, as he suggests, might be discussed by the Society of Civil Engineers, and at the Statistical Society; but we fear that the distracting occupations in the Crystal Palace, and in the society of the metropolis, are not very favourable to discussions of such overwhelming interest.

The eleven chapters of Mr. Babbage's volume which we have endeavoured briefly to analyze, relate strictly to the Exposition of 1851. The other six have a different character. They expose the intrigues of science, the dishonesty of party, and the selfishness, the ignorance, and the injustice of English Governments. If we look to the Exposition of 1851 as the world looks to it, as the beginning of a new era in which the arts of peace are to hold their due place in the national esteem, we cannot but consider these chapters as well calculated to promote so desirable a change. It is from the conduct of Government to individuals that we can alone infer the principles which guide them; and it is when these individuals have associated their name with great discoveries in science which the world has recognised, or with great inventions in the arts by which the world is to be benefited, that the cry of their grievances is likely to reach the royal ear, and to vibrate through the public heart. It is under such circumstances when the perpetration of injustice by men in power startles the judgment, and rouses the passions, that a ministry might be dismissed, and a ministry installed, when the one has persecuted genius by the intrigues, and the other is disposed to foster it by the love of science. The man, therefore, who throws himself into the breach, and compromises his tranquillity, and even his good name, by a personal appearance in his own cause, deserves that twofold gratitude which we so cheerfully extend to the warrior in command, who defends himself that he may defend his country.

Mr. Babbage himself tells us in special reference to these chapters, that several friends whose esteem he prizes, have urged him to avoid everything personal, and some even to suppress

* See Mr. Babbage's paper on this subject in the *Phil. Trans.*, 1826. v. 250.

his volume. While he values their friendship, he rejects their counsel. If such was the opinion of our author's friends, what must be the opinion of his enemies and the men whose principles he has censured, and whose intrigues he has exposed? The impartial critic and the disinterested reader will probably form an opinion differing from both. In questions of high import, the best friends are often the worst advisers. Overlooking the temperament and the social position of him whose ardour they seek to restrain, they balance the temporary interest and the transitory feeling of the individual against the lofty claims of truth and of knowledge; and without moral courage themselves, they would reduce a great mind to the level of their own pusillanimity. Actuated only by the feeling of the day, they forget the triumphs of the morrow. Inhaling the breath of living applause, and listening but to the rumour that flutters and dies, they are insensible to the voice of fame, and hear not from afar those deathless notes which announce the apotheosis of the martyred sage.

We wish it were in our power to give our readers such an account of the life and labours of Mr. Babbage as would enable them to form an accurate judgment respecting the circumstances under which he felt himself called upon to speak freely of his own Calculating Engine,—of the dishonesty of party,—of the intrigues of which he believes he has been the victim,—of the humiliating position of scientific men in England,—and of the honours and rewards which the British Government grudgingly give, when they do give them, and cheerfully withhold from the cultivators of science. The time has scarcely arrived when such an exposure can be advantageously made, but Mr. Babbage has done it with a sparing hand; and it is not from the fear of man, or the dread of official power, that we follow his example and repress our indignation.

When Mr. Babbage left Cambridge, the seat of his education, he resolved to devote his life to the pursuit of science. After travelling from time to time on the Continent, studying man as well as nature, he settled in the metropolis, enjoying the gay and the intellectual society which it affords, and himself the centre of a large and brilliant circle that stately assembled in his house. He had long revolved in his mind the idea of a Calculating Machine, very different in its construction, and more extensive in its powers than the arithmetical machine of Pascal and of Leibnitz, and so early as 1822 he had constructed a small model of his Difference Engine. On the 8d of July in the same year, he sent Sir Humphry Davy a description of this model, which produced 44 figures in a minute, and performed with rapidity and precision all the calculations for which it was designed. On the 21st of May 1822, a committee of the more dis-

tinguished members of the Royal Society reported to the Lords of the Treasury that Mr. Babbage "was highly deserving of public encouragement in the prosecution of his undertaking;" and on the 23d of the same month, Mr. Babbage had an interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in consequence of which £1500 was granted "to enable him to bring his invention to perfection." Under these circumstances he took measures for the construction of "the present Difference Engine," which were continued for four years. In this laborious undertaking, in which the most delicate drawings had to be made, and new tools formed, and workmen educated, Mr. Babbage was encouraged by the adjudication to himself of the first gold medal given by the Astronomical Society.

A large sum of the public money having been expended on the Engine, and the attention of the public directed to the fact, the Government consulted the Royal Society, who, on reporting favourably of the invention, "expressed their trust that while Mr. Babbage's mind was intently occupied on an undertaking likely to do so much honour to his country, he might be relieved as much as possible from all other sources of anxiety."* Upon this report the Government advanced more money, and the machine was declared national property. At this time some external influence seems to have affected the Lords of the Treasury, whose "official payments failed to meet the heavy and increasing expenses incurred by Mr. Babbage."† Under these circumstances it was represented to the Duke of Wellington by an influential committee of Mr. Babbage's friends,‡ dated May 12th, 1829, that he had expended £7000, while the Government had advanced only £3000. The result of this application was the further advance of £3000; and after other negotiations between the Treasury and the Royal Society, it was resolved that the workshops for the machine should be removed to Mr. Babbage's residence, and that Government should "*defray the further expense necessary for its completion.*" After the requisite buildings had been erected and £17,000 expended, new difficulties arose. Mr. Clement, the superintendent of the works, "withdrew from the undertaking, and carried off with him all the valuable tools that had been used in the work."§ From this and from other causes, the works were suspended, and what none of the parties could have anticipated, an event occurred which finally led to the abandonment of the Difference Engine. In 1834 the idea of executing analytical operations by

* Weld's *History of the Royal Society*, chap. xi.

† *Id. Id.*

‡ Including the Duke of Somerset, Lord Ashley, Mr. Herschel, &c.

§ Weld's *History of the Royal Society*, chap. xi.

an Analytical Engine occurred to Mr. Babbage, and in May 1835 he announced, through M. Quetelet, to the Academy of Science at Brussels, that he had "for six months been engaged in making the drawings of a new Calculating Engine, of *far greater power than the first*. Subsequently to the date of this letter, Mr. Babbage went to Turin, and explained to M. Menabrea and others the principles of his Analytical Engine. M. Menabrea sent an account of it to the *Bibliothèque Universelle*, and the same article, translated by Lady Lovelace, with copious original notes, was afterwards published in Taylor's Scientific Memoirs. The fact of Mr. Babbage having invented the Analytical Engine was communicated to the Government; but from various causes, with which we are unacquainted, their intentions could not be ascertained. In October 1838, Mr. Babbage applied in vain to Mr. Goulburn, to learn if it was the desire of Government that he should superintend the completion of the Difference Engine which had been suspended for five years. No answer having been made to this new application, Mr. Babbage, both by himself and through his friends, applied to Sir Robert Peel, who announced to him through Mr. Goulburn the resolution of Government to abandon the completion of the machine.

In parting with Mr. Babbage, Sir Robert Peel seemed disposed to do him a favour. He proposed to withdraw all claim on the part of the Government to the machine as at present constructed, and by placing it at his entire disposal "to assist in some degree his future exertions in the cause of science." Mr. Babbage declined to accept of the offer thus made, and the Difference Engine, as it then stood, was placed in the Museum of King's College, London.

Thus terminated Mr. Babbage's connexion with the Government in reference to the Difference Engine, which, on the ground of "*the expense*," they refused to complete, and to the Analytical Engine, which they did not offer to construct. No mark of kindness, and no expression of thanks for years of incessant and unpaid labour, accompanied an event which will long be deplored in the annals of science. It was assumed by the Government that Mr. Babbage would continue "his exertions in the cause of science," and to assist him in his exertions he was offered the fragment of the machine, which the same Government were bound in honour to have completed. It will not be readily believed, even by the most credulous, that a man like Sir Robert Peel could have thus acted if left to the native impulses of his own generous nature. It will scarcely be doubted, even by the most sceptical, that the Government acted under the advice of some jealous rival or some concealed enemy; and that they

renounced the services of Mr. Babbage, because they were assured that these services would be of no advantage to the country. Had financial adversity, or the dread of parliamentary opposition, prevented the Minister from granting a few thousand pounds for the completion of a great and a useful invention, there were many ways in which the justice and the liberality of the State might have been dispensed. Mr. Babbage's own views of the matter will be seen in the following extract :—

“After eight years of repeated applications, and of the most harassing delay, at the end of 1842 the Government arrived at the resolution of giving up the completion of the Difference Engine, on the alleged ground of its expense.

“In the meantime, new views had opened out to me the prospect of performing purely algebraic operations by means of mechanism. To arrive at so entirely unexpected a result I deemed worthy of any sacrifice, and accordingly spared no expense in procuring every subsidiary assistance which could enable me to attain it. Each successive difficulty was met by new contrivances, and at last I found that I had surmounted all the great difficulties of the question, and had made drawings of each distinct department of the Analytical Engine.

“Having expended upwards of £20,000 on the experiments and inquiries which had led me to these results, it would not have been prudent to attempt the construction of such an engine. I thought, however, that there were several offices in the appointment of Government for which I was qualified, and to which, under the circumstances, I had some claim. I hoped if I had obtained one of these, by fulfilling its laborious duties for a few years, and by allowing the whole salary to accumulate, that I might then have been able to retire ; and adding the money thus earned to my own private resources, that I might yet have enough of life and energy left to execute the Analytical Engine, and thus complete one of the great objects of my ambition.

“Having neither asked nor been offered any acknowledgment for all the sacrifices I had made, I felt that I had some just claims to one of these appointments.”—Pp. 152, 153.

For such appointments, however, every application, as Mr. Babbage informs us, was unsuccessful. A Government which knows so well how to reward its political friends, would have found no difficulty, if they wished it, in effectually “assisting Mr. Babbage's future exertions in the career of science.” Offices for which he was well qualified, and which he would have filled to the benefit of his country, were given to others who had never served it ; and those rewards and honours which were freely lavished on others, were systematically withheld from him. Two vacancies occurred in the Register-Generalship of Births, &c., an office for which Mr. Babbage was especially qualified. Other

two arose in the Commissionerships of the Railway Board,* and another in the Mastership of the Mint; but though Mr. Babbage and his friends made application for the two last of these offices, the applications were either unnoticed or refused.

Even the Royal Society, who had so many honorary rewards in their power, and who had repeatedly urged the Government to complete the Difference Engine, seems to have been struck by the same malign influence; and the British Association, in which Mr. Babbage held the office of auditor, and to which he made the valuable addition of a statistical section, was induced to treat him with disrespect, and occasion his resignation.

Mr. Weld, from whose interesting chapter on the Calculating Machine we have derived much of our information respecting the history of the Difference Engine, considers it due to Mr. Babbage to state, "that he refused more than one highly desirable and profitable situation, in order that he might give his whole time and thoughts to the fulfilment of the contract which he considered himself as having entered into with Government." His early friends who had started with him in the race of life, had risen to high situations in the Church, in the Universities, or at the Bar, while he who preferred the humbler though nobler career of philosophy,—who sacrificed wealth to fame, and who in that sacrifice honoured and served his country,—stands alone without promotion or reward,—a beacon to remind statesmen of their ingratitude,—and to warn genius of its fate.

With these facts in view, our readers will readily understand why Mr. Babbage has written the closing chapters of his work on the intrigues and position of science—on the influence of the press and of party—and on the rewards which England grants to her intellectual servants; and they will understand also why these chapters have found a suitable place in an account of the Exposition of 1851.

In the details of a controversy, which had the unusual character of being at once legal and scientific, Mr. Babbage found what he regarded as proofs, that certain parties who had the confidence of Government, had advised them to discontinue the Calculating Engine, and had by false representations of his character interfered with his future advancement. The charges thus made by our author in his chapter on the Intrigues of Science, remain at this moment uncontradicted; but in a matter so deeply affecting individual and even national character, we must withhold our opinion till both parties are fairly in

* Mr. Babbage had, at great expense, and even at the risk of his life, made a series of valuable experiments on the Great Western Railway, on the subject of the broad gauge.

the field. There are facts, indeed, within our own knowledge, and which will doubtless appear in the future biography of individuals, which place it beyond a doubt that there is an influential party in England who, themselves in office, or in affluence, have no feeling for their humbler rivals, and who not only oppose every public measure which might elevate the condition of unbefriended genius, but who directly interfere with its professional advancement. If such a party have any influence over the Government, it is time that the Government should know it; and if that influence is injurious to the nation, as every secret and irresponsible influence must be, it is time that the Legislature should put it down, and it is more than time that they should organize some responsible institution to superintend the science of the country.

In his *fourteenth* chapter, on the Position of Science, Mr. Babbage thus describes "the present situation of men of science in England :"—

"The estimate which is formed of the social position of any class of society, depends mainly upon the answer to these two questions :—

"What are the salaries of the highest offices to which the most successful may aspire ?

"What are the honorary distinctions to which the most eminent can attain ?

"Offices of a strictly scientific nature are few, and their salaries are generally of small amount; amongst these there are—

"A few of the professorships at our Universities.

"The Astronomer-Royal.

"The Astronomers of some of our Colonial Observatories.

"The Master of Mechanics to the Queen.

"The Conductor of the Nautical Almanac.

"The Director of the Museum of Economical Geology and of the Geological Survey.

"Various officers of the same institution.

"Some of the officers in the Natural History department of the British Museum.

"The most valuable of these, that of Astronomer-Royal, receives about £1300 a-year, including a pension of £300.

"Thus there is amongst this class one solitary prize of, at the utmost, £1300 a-year, and that is confined to one department of science.

"Offices for which men of science are at least as fit as any other class, are numerous, though they are very rarely attained by those who pursue it.

"It may, perhaps, have been expected that the recent appointment of Sir John Herschel to the Mastership of the Mint, should have been noticed in the previous list. But until the motives which dictated it are known, I have no observation to make, except that it is gratifying to me to find that the great principle of the 'claims of science,' for which I have all my life been contending, has been thus, as it were

unconsciously, admitted by the Minister ; and had the accident of birth placed me in his position, the appointment would have been the same, although the motives for it might have been different.

"Let us now turn to the *honorary distinctions* which await science. During the eleven years of the present reign, one solitary instance is to be found of a baronetcy given for science, and that too occurred only at a festival (the coronation) at which baronetages and peerages were showered upon those whose sole claim was founded on the mere support of party.

"During the same interval, about half-a-dozen of those who cultivate science have been knighted.

"It appears then that the highest position a man of science can attain, and that but very rarely, is a baronetcy ; that the highest salary is about £1000 a-year. When this is compared with the most successful prizes in the army, the navy, the church, or the bar, it shows at once the inferior position occupied by science."—Pp. 173-175. *

But though there are few institutions in England open to men of science, there are many of a secondary and temporary kind, in which a knowledge of various branches of science is useful, if not absolutely necessary. To these situations "officers of engineers, of artillery, and of other corps of the army and the navy have been appointed, to the exclusion of scientific men ; and those very individuals who, from the nature of their profession, may rise to high and well-paid offices, and receive the high honours which custom permits them to receive, thus usurp the position of that very class from whom office and honour are equally withheld." "Thus," says Mr. Babbage, "those whose service is already paid for by the country, are excused from doing their ordinary duty, and are paid again for doing another, and perhaps a more agreeable duty. Under the delusive plea that *military* and *civil* engineering are the same science, military engineers have been placed in situations for which they were unfit, and civil engineers have been excluded, to the injury of that profession, and to the much greater damage of the country."

In treating the question how equally great discoveries should be rewarded when the discoverers occupy different ranks in society, Mr. Babbage makes an interesting allusion to the noble services which the Earl of Rosse has rendered to science.

"Those who maintain that science is its own reward, cannot have remarked the vicious circle in their reasoning. The delight derived from discovery is indeed a high intellectual reward, but the force of this maxim is only known practically to those who have already advanced in the career of discovery : it can, therefore, never direct the course into that line. All men are subject to the same feelings and passions. It is certainly true that men of wealth and rank will be

happier if they cultivate their faculties, and add to the amount of human knowledge; but they cannot know this truth until they have already advanced, consequently it cannot have induced them to commence this cultivation.

"But it is the interest of those who are the consumers of knowledge, that all other minds should be induced to advance it; therefore it is our interest to place, even before the highest classes, motives for its pursuit at the commencement of their career. Having raised such expectations, justice compels us to fulfil them; nor can we regret that the advantages derived from the course into which we have invited them should have proved beneficial to them beyond even the limits of our*prediction.

"It is of the very nature of knowledge that the recondite and apparently useless acquisition of to-day, becomes part of the popular food of a succeeding generation. Thus, the nobleman who spends his wealth in constructing unrivalled instruments, and his nights in scrutinizing with them the remotest boundaries of space into which human vision has yet penetrated, is preparing a source of pleasure and happiness for the descendants of those very peasants whom his practical skill in engineering has raised, by his own instructions, above the ranks in which he originally found them.*

"Another question has been raised, but not yet answered, respecting those pensions which have been awarded for scientific discoveries. A certain definite limit has been fixed by practice, which has never yet been exceeded when assigned to science. The sum of three hundred a-year, the maximum of reward to science, is almost the minimum of reward for other qualifications.

"The most important question is, Whether these pensions are given as the reward of scientific services rendered to the country, or as charity to enlightened and studious persons who are poor? In the one case, they are an honour which a philosopher may be proud of receiving from his country; in the other, they are no more than a higher order of pauper relief, which an independent gentleman can scarcely condescend to accept. . . .

"For the honour and the advancement of science, it is necessary that these questions should be distinctly answered. It is to be hoped that some independent member of parliament will at last press them in a manner which no ministerial shuffling can evade."—Pp. 180-183.

Mr. Babbage's last chapter, on the Honours and Rewards of Merit, will, we trust, be read with peculiar interest at a time when the Great Exhibition has displayed to men of all ranks and views the fruits of British science and the products of British industry. Nowhere will the statesman see with a clearer eye the intimate connexion between the deepest science and the homeliest as well as the highest industry. Researches in chemistry the most profound form the basis of the most useful arts; and the micrometer,

* We have no doubt that Lord Roese is here alluded to.

which the astronomer long regarded as his own peculiar instrument, now stands in the workshop—the auxiliary of the mechanical engineer. If the arts of England are the source of her greatness, where can that greatness be so well displayed as in that chamber of mechanism where we see every machine between that which pierces the eye of the needle and that which cuts and perforates the most solid iron? And if the products of that machinery constitute the wealth of England, where can we count its millions more certainly than in the corridors hung with its gorgeous fabrics, and in the crystal halls which shine with its precious metals? And if that greatness is to be maintained, and that wealth increased, the statesman must be taught what he is so unwilling to learn—to foster the genius from which they spring, and give its possessor his true place among the other servants of the State. How and when that lesson is to be taught are problems that remain to be solved, and the art of solving them will, we trust, be acquired by the millions who visit the Crystal Palace:—And what that position is to which the intellectual patriot has yet to rise, may be gathered from the powerful argument of Mr. Babbage, and the eloquent appeal which he has made to the noblest sympathies of his countrymen.

“The personal distinctions in the gift of the Government of this country consist of the following five orders of knighthood:—

NAME.	NO. OF MEMBERS.		
	Grand Cross.	Knight Com.	Comp.
The Garter,*	25		
The Thistle,	16		
St. Patrick,	16		
The Bath { Military, . .	50	102	525
{ Civil, . .	25	50	200
St. George and St. Michael,†	15	20	25
	147	172	750

“Of these the first three are restricted, with few and rare exceptions, to persons of a certain rank—including earls, and those above them. . . .

“Thus England has, practically, only one order of merit; and singularly enough, with the exception of a few civil crosses of the first class, almost invariably given for diplomatic service, until lately that order was accessible to any other than military merit.

* “An amusing and characteristic anecdote respecting one of these Orders, the Garter, is related of a late Premier. At a time when several of these ‘baubles’ had fallen vacant, and been judiciously given away by the discreet minister, a friend asked him, why he had not retained a Garter for himself † to which he wittily replied, ‘Why, the fact is, I don’t see the use of a man’s bribing himself.’”
—P. 203.

† Instituted for the Ionian Islands.

“In countries, however, which we fondly flattered ourselves were less advanced in civilisation than our own, the vulgar notion of paying homage to brute force has long been superseded by a more just appreciation of the elements of military glory. Nations even the most ambitious of this species of renown, have admitted that physical prowess, that recklessness of personal danger, form but the smallest amongst those qualities which contribute to military success.”

After a beautiful compliment to the Duke of Wellington, whose military genius is justly regarded as intellectual, and such as would have distinguished him in many different careers, our author thus proceeds :—

“It is not uninteresting to observe in society the opinions of its different classes respecting honours conferred on science. Military and naval men, especially the most eminent, feel that genius is limited by no profession, and themselves sympathizing with it, would gladly hail as brothers in the same distinction the philosopher and the poet. With lawyers the case is reversed ; genius dwells not in their courts : industry and acuteness, monopolized by one absorbing professional subject, exclude larger views ; and ribbons not being amongst the honoraria of their own profession, they reprobate their application to science. To this there are, however, some noble exceptions. Men of larger experience and of views more extended than their profession usually produces, and who are themselves qualified to have become discoverers and reformers in other sciences, are yet among the brightest ornaments of their own. It is much to be regretted when such powers are applied to the mere administration, instead of to the reformation, of the laws of their country.

“It is difficult to pronounce, on the opinion of the ministers of our Church as a body ; one portion of them, by far the least informed, protests against anything which can advance the honour and the interests of science, because, in their limited and mistaken view, science is adverse to religion. This is not the place to argue that great question. It is sufficient to remark, that the best informed and most enlightened men of all creeds and pursuits, agree that truth can never damage truth, and that every truth is allied indissolubly by chains more or less circuitous with all other truths ; whilst error, at every step we make in its diffusion, becomes not only wider apart and more discordant from all truths, but also has the additional chance of destruction from all rival errors.”—Pp. 204-207.

Our waning limits will not permit us to follow Mr. Babbage through the rest of his chapter. He places before us the undeniable facts that it is not the people of England, but the occupants of place, and the chiefs of party, and the members of a hard-hearted and well-paid clique of scientific men, who oppose the organization of science, and the elevation of its cultivators. He warns the men who “refuse to science the means of acquiring competence, exclude it from personal honours, and refuse

it hereditary rank, because it has not devoted itself to the acquisition of wealth," that they will thus give rise to grave questions which it would be wise to avoid. In reply to the puerile assertion that the dignity of science is incompatible with wealth, and that decorations and titles are unworthy of its legitimate ambition, he justly asserts "that all pursuits which are deemed of a higher order, are still more absolutely excluded from such vanities; and that the members of a Christian Church, its bishops and deacons, should neither be loaded with wealth nor decked with ribbons." * With equal truth he might have added that the intellectual general who never drew his sword, and the profound judge who never sought for wealth,—the patriot statesman whose mind perished for his country, and the philanthropic nobleman who has intellectually created around him a moral and a contented population, should each, in virtue of their high intelligence, disregard the emoluments and the honours of the State. The proposition which we thus assail, when reduced to its simplest form, is, that wealth and honours to men of talent and genius are unenviable and worthless possessions. We admit the Utopian truth; and were any attempt made to give it an impartial application, the honours and the rewards of the State would be no longer withheld from science.

Mr. Babbage has justly said that the views which we have been opposing are those of "the shallow and the thoughtless," and that though the "pursuits of mind may modify, they can never obliterate the instincts, the feelings, or the passions of man." There may, indeed, be some rare instances in which a philosopher "may have personally little ambition to attain the honours which the rest of the world covet; but he may be bound by other ties which link him inseparably to the present."

"He may look," as Mr. Babbage in the conclusion of his volume touchingly observes, "with fond and affectionate gratitude on her whose maternal care watched over the dangers of his childhood; who trained his infant mind, and with her own mild power, checking the rash vigour of his youthful days, remained ever the faithful and respected counsellor of his riper age. To gladden the declining years of her who, with more than prophetic inspiration, foresaw as woman only can, the distant fame of her beloved offspring, he may well be forgiven the desire for some outward mark of his country's approbation.

"If such a relative were wanting, there might yet survive another parent whose less enthusiastic temperament had ever repressed those fond anticipations of maternal affection, but who now in the ripeness of his honoured age,* might be compelled, with faltering accents, to

* Two archbishops, one bishop, and two deans, wear decorations of orders of knighthood.

admit that the voice of the country confirmed the predictions of the mother.

"Perhaps another and yet dearer friend might exist; the partner of his daily cares, the witness of his unceasing toil; whose youthful mind, cultivated by his skill, rewards with enduring affection those efforts which called into existence her own latent and unsuspected powers. When driven by exhausted means and injured health almost to despair of the achievement of his life's great object—when the brain itself reels beneath the weight its own ambition had imposed, and the world's neglect aggravates the throbbings of an over-tasked frame, an angel spirit sits beside his couch ministering with gentlest skill to every wish, watching with anxious thought till renovated nature shall admit of bolder counsels, then points the way to hope, herself the guardian of his deathless fame.

"The fool may sneer, the worldly-wise may smile, the heartless laugh,—the saint may moralize, the bigot preach: there dwells not within the deep recesses of the human heart one sentiment more powerful, more exalted, or more pure than these.

"That man is not a statesman who is unaware of the strength of these powerful excitements to human action. Cold and incapable of such sentiments himself,—no grasp of intellect enables him to infer their existence, and to supply the deficiencies of his own, by an insight into the hearts of others.

"That man is a fool, not a statesman, who, knowing their strength, hesitates to avail himself of it, for the benefit of his country and of mankind.

"But if there should arise a man conscious of their power, who yet should dare to use it for the purposes of party, that man will combine in his character the not incongruous mixture of statesman and of knave. A statesman he may be if he can penetrate into the character of men, and can divine the action of human motives upon the masses, as well as on the individuals of his race. With such knowledge, and with the talent that its possession implies, he cannot be a fool; except, indeed, in so far as he is entitled to credit for that limited amount of folly which is inseparably attached to him in his other character of knave. It is *possible* that he may be successful in his day; it is *certain* that he will ultimately be found out and disgraced in the eyes of posterity. His name may remain a beacon for a time, until some greater or more recent knave supersedes his example, and thus consigns him to oblivion.

"It is not, then, the gaudy ribbon, the brilliant star, the titled name, that have intrinsic charms for him who dedicates his genius to the search for truth. How large a portion of his real greatness, even of his most splendid discoveries, would he not willingly sacrifice to confer on those he loves that exquisite happiness, which arises only when hidden but long-cherished convictions, entertained diffidently from the consciousness of partial affection, receive at length their final confirmation by that decision which national acknowledgment can alone command!"—Pp. 228-231.

Such is a brief analysis of Mr. Babbage's volume on the Exposition of 1851,—itself one of the first and best results of that great Panorama of the World's Industry. The most ardent admirers of the Exhibition, and even those who were the most deeply interested in its success, could not have pronounced upon it a higher eulogy than that which breathes through every page of his work. Warm with feeling, and adorned with eloquence, the sentiments which this volume contains will influence the future more than the present, and when the controversies of the hour have ceased, and its interests have expired, posterity will pronounce a righteous judgment upon the truths which it speaks, and the cause which it pleads.

Nor is it without its moral, that while a distinguished philosopher has been advocating against the Government of the day the claims of science, a distinguished artist* should have been pleading the cause of art against the same men,—its hollow and its shallow patrons. Martyrs at the same stake, Art and Science have risen in allied resistance to their common foe, and marching as they do under the Royal banner of the Exposition, they will not lay down their arms till they have achieved a joint and a glorious triumph.

We have already alluded to the advantages which men of science and their institutions, and through them the nation and the world, will derive from the great and successful experiment of the Exhibition. The Ministers of England, who have hitherto been the advisers of the Crown, however great have been their talents in debate, and their sagacity in administration, have been pre-eminently ignorant of science and the arts. Even now they are only beginning to recognise (and act feebly on the recognition) the influence of education and of knowledge in the peace and happiness and prosperity of nations. Science they have ever viewed, as they still do, through the mist of official prejudice, and the cloud of personal ignorance; and though they have thrown some crumbs from the Treasury table,—perchance to gain a little credit with the public,—perchance to calm the indignation of a political adherent, they have nevertheless refused, though urged by the two greatest scientific institutions of the country, to grant a small sum out of their financial surplus to promote one of the most interesting objects of astronomical research.†

* M. Gambardella, in the pamphlet already referred to in note, p. 543.

† "In consequence of the discovery of new planets, and new satellites, and new forms of nebulae, by the united exertions of astronomers, the British Association, at two of its meetings, resolved to apply to Government for the means of constructing a large reflecting telescope, to be employed in a southern climate for the

However discouraging to the friends of science, this very refusal may prove the ground of its future triumphs. Contemporaneous with the Exposition, this apathy of the Minister stands in painful contrast with the conduct of his Royal Mistress. A sovereign studying the sciences and the arts in the same school with the humblest of her subjects—a school, too, founded by her Royal Consort, is a sight new in the annals of England. The lofty genius of which she has seen the development, and the matchless skill of which she has admired the results, cannot be to her an object of indifference, or even of temporary gratification. Herself honoured by her country's genius, she cannot but feel for it a reciprocal regard. Herself the fountain of honour, she cannot but dispense a portion of its fulness to enlarge the springs by which it is fed. Round a throne thus enlightened, and thus liberal to the highest efforts of the mind, there will necessarily be found enlightened counsellors and sagacious guardians. Round the altar which that throne defends, there will stand an enlightened priesthood, acknowledging science as its handmaid—accepting her truths as auxiliary to its own—tolerant as knowledge is ever tolerant, and regarding the education and instruction of their flocks as the best passport to that land of rest which is reserved for the wise and the good. The scientific institutions of England will then take their place beside the institutions of other lands,—her philosophers will appear, like theirs, in the positions which they merit, and with the decorations they have achieved,—a contented population will surround an enlightened throne, and glory in an enlightened sovereign, and thus perpetuate institutions which the ignorance of the people alone can assail, and the ignorance of a Government alone can overturn.

advancement of astronomy. In making this application, our late distinguished President, Dr. Robinson, informed Lord John Russell that an assembly of 1500 persons, among whom were found almost every British name of scientific renown, had received this proposal with enthusiastic approbation. Dr. Robinson assured his Lordship that such a grant was demanded by public feeling, and that it belonged to the rulers of the freest and most enlightened nation in the world to give that encouragement to physical science which the spirit of the age had obtained from the most despotic sovereigns of Europe. The Earl of Rosse, and the Royal Society, seconded this application; and as no preceding Government had refused any of the requests of the British Association, we looked forward with confidence to the realization of a scheme which would have added to the conquests of science, and thrown a fresh lustre over the British name. I regret, however, to say, that in a year of great financial prosperity, this application has been refused, and as it is not possible in matters of science that any secret or sinister influence could affect the judgment of a statesman, we must suppose that Lord John Russell has some better object in view to advance the interests of science, and promote the intellectual glory of the nation.”—*Sir David Brewster's Address at Ipswich.*

APPENDIX.

We are enabled, through the kindness of the Secretary to the Royal Commissioners, to present our readers with the following interesting RETURN OF RECEIPTS at the Crystal Palace. The Number of Persons who have visited the Exhibition may readily be calculated from the data in the Table.

DATE. 1851.	Number of Season Tickets sold.			Amount.	Receipts at the Doorn.	
	Gentlemen.	Ladies.	Total.		Rate.	Amount.
Previous to						
May 1	10,892	8,615	19,507	£52,401 6 0		
" 2	249	283	532	1,378 13 0	£1	£560 0 0
" 3	166	253	419	1,054 4 0	£1	482 0 0
" 5	144	138	282	743 8 0	5s.	1,362 19 0
" 6	137	214	351	880 19 0	5s.	1,458 10 0
" 7	143	229	372	931 7 0	5s.	1,790 15 0
" 8	157	198	355	910 7 0	5s.	2,018 0 0
" 9	141	208	349	880 19 0	5s.	1,824 10 0
" 10	146	190	336	858 18 0	5s.	1,843 15 0
" 12	128	165	293	749 14 0	5s.	1,597 10 0
" 13	135	224	359	895 13 0	5s.	2,229 10 0
" 14	103	127	230	591 3 0	5s.	2,064 15 0
" 15	104	169	273	682 10 0	5s.	2,426 0 0
" 16	104	166	270	676 4 0	5s.	2,556 10 0
" 17	83	141	224	557 11 0	5s.	2,472 5 0
" 19	71	126	197	488 5 0	5s.	2,345 0 0
" 20	52	89	141	350 14 0	5s.	3,360 15 0
" 21	44	67	111	279 6 0	5s.	3,512 5 0
" 22	31	37	68	175 7 0	5s.	3,797 11 0
" 23	18	37	55	134 8 0	5s.	4,095 10 0
" 24	22	41	63	155 8 0	5s.	5,078 0 0
" 26	8	7	15	39 18 0	1s.	920 2 0
" 27	3	5	8	19 19 0	1s.	1,347 17 0
" 28	3	2	5	13 13 0	1s.	1,869 4 0
" 29	5	3	8	22 1 0	1s.	2,375 18 0
" 30	11	13	24	61 19 0	2s. 6d.	2,839 9 0
" 31	12	28	40	96 12 0	5s.	1,770 15 0
June 2	3	2	5	13 13 0	1s.	2,129 1 0
" 3	2	2	4	10 10 0	1s.	2,415 2 0
" 4	...	9	9	18 18 0	1s.	2,500 16 0
" 5	4	3	7	18 18 0	1s.	2,566 17 0
" 6	5	8	13	32 11 0	2s. 6d.	2,558 11 0
" 7	3	13	16	86 15 0	5s.	1,523 15 0
" 9	...	1	1	2 2 0	1s.	2,436 4 0
" 10	1	3	4	9 9 0	1s.	2,272 2 0
" 11	...	2	2	4 4 0	1s.	2,160 19 0
" 12	3	3	6	15 15 0	1s.	2,233 7 0
" 13	6	10	16	39 18 0	2s. 6d.	2,206 5 0
" 14	6	8	14	35 14 0	5s.	1,634 17 0
" 16	3	1	4	11 11 0	1s.	2,854 9 0
" 17	3	1	4	11 11 0	1s.	3,191 2 0
Carry over	13,151	11,841	24,992	£66,290 15 0		£90,692 12 0

DATE. 1851.	Number of Season Tickets sold.			Amount.	Receipts at the Doors.	
	Gentlemen.	Ladies.	Total.		Rate.	Amount.
Brought over,	13,151	11,841	24,992	£66,290 15 0		£90,692 12 0
June 18	8	5	8	19 19 0	1s.	2,897 7 0
" 19	1	4	5	11 11 0	1s.	2,984 12 0
" 20	1	16	17	36 15 0	2s. 6d.	2,819 4 6
" 21	4	10	14	33 12 0	5s.	1,674 10 0
" 23	...	1	1	2 2 0	1s.	3,016 11 6
" 24	1	6	7	15 15 0	1s.	3,186 12 0
" 25	...	2	2	4 4 0	1s.	2,691 14 0
" 26	1	1	2	5 5 0	1s.	2,722 10 0
" 27	...	2	2	4 4 0	2s. 6d.	2,969 6 0
" 28	2	5	7	16 16 0	5s.	1,590 16 0
" 30	1s.	2,469 16 6
July 1	1	1	2	5 5 0	1s.	2,429 10 0
" 2	3	1	4	11 11 0	1s.	2,863 18 0
" 3	2	2	4	10 10 0	1s.	2,651 19 0
" 4	3	6	9	22 1 0	2s. 6d.	2,592 2 6
" 5	2	5	7	16 16 0	5s.	1,565 15 0
" 7	1s.	2,852 2 0
" 8	...	1	1	2 2 0	1s.	8,169 5 0
" 9	2	1	3	8 8 0	1s.	2,710 6 0
" 10	2	...	2	6 6 0	1s.	2,958 0 0
" 11	1	7	8	17 17 0	2s. 6d.	3,145 17 6
" 12	2	1	3	8 8 0	5s.	1,589 15 0
" 14	1	...	1	3 3 0	1s.	2,957 8 0
" 15	1	2	3	7 7 0	1s.	3,502 1 0
" 16	1	...	1	3 3 0	1s.	2,910 4 0
" 17	1	2	3	7 7 0	1s.	8,023 5 0
" 18	3	4	7	17 17 0	2s. 6d.	3,762 7 6
" 19	2	6	8	18 18 0	5s.	1,360 15 0
" 21	2	...	2	6 6 0	1s.	3,338 7 0
" 22	...	5	5	10 10 0	1s.	3,286 2 0
Total,	13,198	11,937	25,130	£66,625 13 0		£171,824 11 0

The following TABLE shews the Total Number of Persons who have visited the Exhibition daily, including Staff, Attendants, &c.

May 1,	25,000	May 22,	31,893	June 12,	48,318	July 3,	55,638
" 2,	15,560	" 23,	32,357	" 13,	24,520	" 4,	26,000
" 3,	15,482	" 24,	44,512	" 14,	14,102	" 5,	11,747
" 5,	17,756	" 26,	25,402	" 16,	63,769	" 7,	61,670
" 6,	18,156	" 27,	30,000	" 17,	68,154	" 8,	65,962
" 7,	19,479	" 28,	40,605	" 18,	62,663	" 9,	58,055
" 8,	21,072	" 29,	51,888	" 19,	63,863	" 10,	61,420
" 9,	19,614	" 30,	45,689	" 20,	81,834	" 11,	30,067
" 10,	22,176	" 31,	28,550	" 21,	12,732	" 12,	11,181
" 12,	21,322	June 2,	46,290	" 23,	6,755	" 14,	62,694
" 13,	23,945	" 3,	50,629	" 24,	68,394	" 15,	74,122
" 14,	23,890	" 4,	54,635	" 25,	58,545	" 16,	60,626
" 15,	25,281	" 5,	55,254	" 26,	57,781	" 17,	63,746
" 16,	26,030	" 6,	26,134	" 27,	29,033	" 18,	35,838
" 17,	25,589	" 7,	12,986	" 28,	11,501	" 19,	9,326
" 19,	25,120	" 9,	54,194	" 30,	52,879	" 21,	70,640
" 20,	29,248	" 10,	49,697	July 1,	51,069	" 22,	68,161
" 21,	30,249	" 11,	47,756	" 2,	49,399		

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